

REPRESENTING CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and
Nation Branding in Sweden and Mexico



BY CÉSAR VILLANUEVA RIVAS
VÄXJÖ UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007

ISBN: 978-91-7636-560-1

Contact: cesar.villanueva@vxu.se or cesar.villanueva@uia.mx

“The progress of Diplomatic Theory has been from the narrow conception of exclusive tribal rights to the wider conception of inclusive common interests”
Sir Harold Nicolson

Abstract

Villanueva, César (2007) *Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Nation Branding in Mexico and Sweden*. Acta Wexionensia No. ????. ISSN: 1404-4307, ISBN: 978-91-7636-560-1. Written in English.

This study aims at understanding how representational theories can substantiate the field of Cultural Diplomacy by looking at three models: Cosmopolitan Constructivism, Nation Branding and Soft Power. The task is to provide a theoretical backbone to understand, reformulate and also develop the field of Cultural Diplomacy by analyzing and comparing the three main representational models altogether. Using Hanna F. Pitkin's discussion on political representation as a background, the author analyses the pertinence of these ideas in the form of contemporary discourses of Cultural Diplomacy. The main issues these representational models address have to do with how culture is represented abroad by diplomacies in terms of contents and discursivity, paying particular attention to the identity-alterity relations between the cultural-real and the represented-referent. The main theoretical original contribution of the book lies in setting up an agenda for analyzing Cosmopolitan Constructivism and its sources: multilateral diplomacy, cosmopolitan theory and constructivist politics.

In order to anchor these debates in specific realities, the author studies concrete aspects of Mexican and Swedish Cultural Diplomacies during the nineties and early millennium, using them as expository cases that illustrate the theoretical apparatus. Two specific cases are chosen to illustrate the political templates underlying concepts of representation: the idea of Soft-Power in Mexico through the 1990-1992 international exhibition "Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries" and the idea of "Nation-Branding" as set up by the Swedish Cultural Diplomatic apparatus to respond to global pressures in the early millennium. In the expository cases, the book shows that Mexico and Sweden have oscillating values between a form of Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Soft Power, with an emerging Nation Branding presence in their cultural diplomacies.

The conclusion of this study shows that Cultural Diplomacy is a field that, in spite of its relative impact inside the foreign ministries, can help understand the processes of constructing a cultural-national identity abroad in relation to the puzzling representations of alterities in a global world. In sum, this thesis shows the symbolic potential of nations, in Cultural Diplomacy terms, to tell their own stories to the world and, concurrently, pay attention to what others have to express about themselves.

Key words: Representational Theory, Cultural Diplomacy, Cosmopolitan Constructivism, Soft Power, Nation Branding, Mexican identity, Swedish identity.

Acknowledgments

This work is indebted to a number of people, organizations and institutions. My first thanks go to professors Tom Bryder and Stanley Katz. They have been inspirational forces in my work, giving me support and advice in such a novel topic. They have been my main supervisors in this thesis and also excellent advisors throughout my career as a doctoral student. Tom and Stanley encouraged me to join international conferences, present and discuss papers in seminars, and opened opportunities for me to spend valuable time in their own institutions, in Copenhagen and Princeton. They not only believed in my work and made intelligent comments on my text, but also took the time to speak to me in a more informal way, caring about my daily whereabouts as an international student, opening a space for empathy and understanding, in spite of their own busy professional and personal agendas. At times we had wonderful visits to art museums, where we strolled, pondered and discussed aesthetics and artistic trends, enjoying a common passion that complemented our discussions in politics, history and diplomacy. For their intellectual and personal inspiration to me, this book is dedicated to them.

Many of my colleagues at the School of Social Sciences have made this work possible. Betty Rodhin, Fredrik Bynander and Krister Håkansson were pivotal in my decision to come to Sweden to study political science, by giving me all details necessary to understand the academic system, but more importantly, the cultural milieu. They paid several visits to Mexico City, teaching, researching and on vacation, allowing me to enjoy time with them every time. They really ensured that I had a good start in Växjö, opening the doors of their homes to me and sharing with me their own contacts and introducing me to the people I needed to know in order to survive at the beginning of my studies. Along with these friends, I had the good fortune to hold a teaching position at Universidad Iberoamericana where Ambassadors Agustín Gutiérrez Canet and Martha Barcenás Coqui also held senior positions in the Department of International Affairs. They gave me all support and advice necessary to continue with my cultural interests in IR and later, kindly invited me to join successive summer courses in Sweden as a teacher. In this, many of my Swedish and Mexican friends taught an unforgettable inter-institutional course named “International Relations and Culture” from where many of the ideas for this book were first sketched. In a happy turn of fate, Martha Barcenás Coqui and Agustín Gutiérrez Canet were later posted in Finland and Denmark where they enjoy their lives in the diplomatic service, and have me as to visit from time to time.

Växjö University has been a place where friendships have flourished. I feel gratitude to my first professors at the department of Political Science, Lennart Berg-

felt, Lena Ageval and Stefan Höjelid, who made me part of the group from the start and listened attentively to my suggestions, making sure I was included in their plans. Professor Lennart Lundquist from Lund University was also alert and interested in my progress and read the thesis prospectus and some papers I presented in our political science seminar. In a cold winter of 2003, when I had just joined the program, the “PhD student gang” gave me a welcome gathering at the famous local Växjö Bishop Arms and I still remember their presence very dearly from that day: Anne Haglund, Fredrik Bynander, Torgny Klasson, Daniel and Charlotte Silander, Rebecka Ulfgard, Martin Nilsson, Karl Loxbo, Ulf Petäjä, Alexander Rodhin and Björn Idlinge. All of them have integrated me in their own ways through the years, not only making me feel at home but also putting searching questions about my research. They all made a lucid bright pack of good critics who listened to me and showed empathy in good and bad times. All my gratitude to them.

Later on, new faces joined the department, people with whom I have shared academic concerns and spent some time. They, for the most part have either wondered what my research was all about, or why my Swedish language skills were so bad: Magnus Hagevi, Karin Olsson, Tobias Bromander, Johanna Jormfeldt, Otto Petterson, Erik Wångmar, Elin Hellquist, Marcus Ohlström, Stefan Lindkvist and Staffan Andersson. A big fraternal thanks to all of them.

Another exciting circle of friends in other departments from whom I also learnt a lot was that made up by Catarina Gaunitz, Elisabet Wartoft, Cecilia Brandel, Hans Andrén, Christer Persson, Glenn Sjöstrand, Anna and Stefan Lund, Hans and Marcela Lundberg, Kristina Möller, Manuela Aguilar, Sara and Marie Denward, Jaime Campos, Osvaldo Salas, Dante Alarcón, Sandra Carranza, Lotta Skoglund, and Ingela Åberg. With all of them, I shared a continuous dialogue and spent some so much needed leisure time, dining out, travelling to places, chatting, drinking or dancing some salsa tones. A warm collective thanks to all of them.

Other good colleagues and teachers showed interest and shared comments with me on the corridors or over a cup of coffee. I truly appreciated their efforts to connect with me at some level: Lars Zanderin, Svante Lundberg, Ola Agevall, Hans Lindberg, Dennis Frank, Linnea Sandstedt, Anna Maria Sandstrand, Malin Hjorth, Eva Lundberg, Joacim Martinsson, Mats Trondman, Dino Viscovi, Anders Nilsson, Håkan Sandström, Marcus Janesson, Abdul Mohamed, Andrejs Ozolins, Bengt-Åke Gustafsson, Peter Hultgren, Cecilia Jonsson, Joacim Larsson, Dan Maspers and Dan Sturesson.

Special mention goes to professors Gunnar Olofsson, Mats Sjölin, Emil Udhammar, the dean Thorbjörn Nilsson and vice-deans Björn Idlinge and Martin Nilsson (in their administrative roles) who in one way or another, showed interest in my academic and professional needs, and supported me from their institutional roles to expand my academic perspectives. For example, Martin gave me support to teach the international course “Perspectives of Globalization” and “Arts and Democracy” over a period of three years, for which I gained not only teaching experience, but also a few extra coins to make ends meet given my

rather limited stipend from Mexico as an international student. At the end of my stay, Mats and Emil made valuable suggestions helping to improve the final manuscript of my thesis. Stefan Höjelid has been my Swedish “Virgil” in my trip through Hell and Purgatory in the last bureaucratic stages of the thesis. My recognition also goes to Catarina Gaunitz who has made the last administrative paper work for me before the defence of the thesis. I also want to mention some wonderful people working in the administration of the institution who made my days in Växjö much easier and brighter: Solvay Hedberg, Margareta Wikström, Pär-Arne Rosén, Johanna Sturesson, Charlotte Wikell Sjöberg, Margareta Arvidsson, Cecilia Brandel, Birgitta Smith. They were frequently present in my duties, either helping me with booking rooms, preparing budgets or administering the final grades to my students. From the University coffee shop, Johanna Andersson, Mia Sturesson and Anna Tuneskog-Olsberg got the some of the best coffees in town, always with a proverbial smile.

Many people in Stockholm and Uppsala have been critical in getting information to me so that I could have the necessary references for my topic. Fredrik Wetterqvist is not only a top class Swedish diplomat, but also a wonderful person. He gave me a number of interviews, pointed me towards the right people for contacts, opened the doors of his house to me, and invited me for lunch (not a minor thing these days). His wife Åsa is a wonderful singer at the famous Uppsala Allmänna Sången choir that I have been listening during the last two years with admiration. At the Foreign Ministry, Anette Jakobsson, Patrik Svensson, Maja Bentzer were interested in my project and gave me part of their time to gain knowledge of their activities. From the Swedish Institute, Hans Lepp gave me good suggestions to carry on my work, especially in the Swedish part. Åsa Lundmark was direct, clear and generous. Per Svensson and Gudrun Vahlquist from the Council of Culture gave me thoughts to advance my Swedish materials in a richer perspective.

In Mexico City, my colleagues from the National University of Mexico (UNAM) always showed their appreciation to me by keeping a distance course over the years under my responsibility, and making sure I was never totally gone: Lilia Jimenez, Carlos Uscanga, César Delgado and Consuelo Dávila, Irene and Norberto Nava, and the lovely secretary Juanita. At Universidad Iberoamericana (UIA), I always got support from Agustín Gutiérrez Canet, Alejandro Anaya, Cristina Barrón and the brilliant secretaries Amalia and Lourdes. From the National Institute of Fine Arts (INBA), my thanks go to Alejandro Vega, Jesús Miránda, Roberto Gómez Soto Othón Téllez, Jesús Taylor, María Luisa Frutos and Gonzálo Rodríguez who have supported me over the years. Double thanks to Roberto for accepting the task of designing the jacket for this book.

My many thanks go to Ernesto Sosa from the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations, who gave a couple of rather explicit interviews on the subject of cultural diplomacy, to later extend an invitation for me to teach at the Matías Romero School of Diplomacy, which also led to the writing of a couple of chapters for Mexican books. Porfirio Thierry Muñoz Ledo and Jessica Cascante gave me some hints on how to approach the Mexican case. Silvia Molina opened the do-

ors of her house to me for a wonderful long conversation on the subject. Martha Bárcenas and Agustín Gutierrez-Canet were also very professional presenting their ideas on diplomacy and culture to me in a rather pragmatic way, and they are actually some of the most enthusiastic diplomats genuinely interested in representing Mexican culture abroad that I know of. Daniel Leyva from the National Institute of Fine Arts and Jaime Nualart from the National Council of Culture and Arts were enthusiastic and kind to me as a PhD student. Jorge Alberto Lozoya and Gerardo Estrada are not only exceptionally experienced cultural diplomats, but also top intellectuals who gave me a generous amount of time in their agendas for several interviews and phone exchanges. Thanks also go to Leticia Luna and Irma Sánchez from the “Genaro Estrada” historic and diplomatic archives, from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Mexico.

Many institutions cooperated to make this last transition possible. I got a student scholarship from the Mexican National Science and Technology Foundation (CONACYT) to carry on my doctoral studies in Sweden. The School of Social Science at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) paid for a one-way air ticket for me to come to Sweden at the beginning of my studies. The School of Social Sciences at Växjö University supported me offering me an office to work, a stipend for books and travels and all the academic support necessary to finish my work. The Research Committee of the School of Social Sciences allocated funds throughout my stay so that I could participate in conferences, do some archive and interview research, and visit some institutions to gain first hand knowledge of the things I write about in this book. The research Committee made it also possible to have Stanley Katz visiting the university and participating as an opponent in my last seminar, during the fall 2006. The department of Political Science at Växjö University also helped me out to get some assistance in translating official documents from Swedish into English, and Stefan Lindquist made a great difference. They also provided me with the funds to get the professional English proofreading of the book for which I also thank David Ratford for his superb job. And last, but not least, this book is produced under the financial support of Växjö University Press having the determined and kind editorial support of Kerstin Brodén. During my last year, when my Mexican funds dried up, the Dean Thorbjörn Nilsson offered me a contract to help me finish my studies, in combination with a grant we had just been given from the Swedish Science Foundation (*Vetenskaprådet*), via an invitation from Marie Denward from the Interactive Institute, which also gave me the opportunity to do advanced research in the field of contemporary arts in both Mexico and Sweden.

I warmly thank people who took the time to read my draft and gave me concrete comments, either on the whole or on parts of it. Norbert Götz was an early supporter after reading a paper I wrote for a Maastricht conference in 2004. Manuela Aguilar was good in asking for more clarity and simplification. Christer Persson pointed at the necessity to reach a “final reasoning stage” as a PhD thesis in my work. Anna Lund made me reflect on the “cultural part” of my work more carefully. Glenn Sjöstrand supported me in my reading of the identity and Swedish sections with rich comments. Hans Lundberg made encouraging remarks and posed questions in the “discourse” part. Karl Loxbo was an excellent intellectual

sparring-partner who made me feel the thesis could actually fly. Fredrik Bynander gave a generous IR “critical look” at my thesis, posing a few interrogations along the way. Karina Olivares is one of the most passionate discussants on the topic and gave me constructive comments. Rebecka Ulfsgard read the manuscript in detail giving me some “elemental lessons” on how to conclude a doctoral thesis in political science in Sweden. A disclosure to all of them and my advisors: as in all cases, responsibility for the book belongs entirely to me.

Last but not least, my mother Ofelia and my brother Daniel deserve all my gratitude for being so patient with me throughout the years. My nephew Carlitos is my pride. Lucía gave me the confidence to take on this journey and was a supporting partner through these years. My apologies to some of the close relatives who have noticed my “absence” from the family circles in recent years, specially my aunties Lucila, Martha V., Eda, Genoveva (an the extended Moncada family), my uncles Enrique, Flavio and Rafael. My second family in Tacoma Washington, Helen and Stanley are always remembered with joy and thankfulness. Rebecka is a ray of light, and has given me the strength and solace in this last stage of the thesis. My father passed away a few years ago, but my gratitude to him always remains intact.

In retrospect, it was a brave decision to come from Mexico to study a doctoral program in Sweden. Everyday life was a challenge: climate (yes, it is cold up here!), food, friends, distances and trying to make sense of the Scandinavian temperament. In spite of my relative knowledge about the Swedish graduate educational system at the time, my decision was also naïf. There are very few intellectual connections between the two countries and their political science traditions differ enormously. It was a difficult task to make sense of the many different aspects of Swedish academia: language, references, theoretical styles, methods, teaching and criticism. Yet, no matter how complicated, this was the best decision I ever made. Swedish research in the field is quite international and visible, with top of the line professors, great infrastructure and publications flourishing. Sweden’s political science tradition has a well deserved reputation. On the other hand, it is a difficult space to penetrate as an outsider. There is not enough international diversity inside the departments, and in my experience there was much “blind” self-confidence and self-reassurance. The Anglo-Saxon tradition is the main navigational compass, for good or ill. In sum, the differences between my Mexican references and the Swedish ones were greater than what I expected. To my surprise, I soon realized that this book makes me the first Mexican PhD in Political Science ever to graduate from a Swedish (and probably a Scandinavian) university. I am not sure that there are any other foreign international students, especially from outside Europe, writing PhD theses in Political Science in Sweden. But I doubt it. At the same time, I do not know of any Swede taking or having taken a full PhD in our discipline outside the “comfort zone.” This might be a symptom of domestic isolation or simply unidirectional internationalization. Since this thesis is about mutual understanding and cosmopolitan values, this personal concern is justified. International cooperation and exchange in graduate education and research is needed, in my opinion, if Swedish Political Science is to move beyond itself in the years to come.

Acknowledgments

Contents

Figures

Illustrations and Pictures

Abbreviations

INTRODUCTION	17
Cultural Diplomacy and Holbein’s <i>The Ambassadors</i>	17
The Main Research Riddle(s)	20
What is the Fuss over Cultural Diplomacy?	20
Cultural Diplomacy Representations: SP-CC-NB	22
Method: On the Construction of Representation	23
Swedish and Mexican Cultural Diplomacies	25
Aim, Delimitations and Disposition	27
Organization of the Thesis	28
Final Note: How to Relate to this Study	30
CHAPTER ONE: Representing Cultural Diplomacy	31
Introduction	31
1.1. Addressing “Cultural Diplomacy” Representations	32
1.1.1. The Restrictive “E-P-A” Triad	32
1.1.2. The Cultural <i>Attaché</i>	34
1.1.3. Constructing Cultural Diplomacy in Discourse	36
a) Instrumentality	37
b) Securitization	39
c) Spatiality	40
d) The Directionality	42
e) The Private/Public divide	43
1.2. Diplomacy: The Public and Representations	45
1.2.1 Public Diplomacy in Discourse	46
1.2.2. Difference between Public and Cultural Diplomacy	47
1.2.3. Public Diplomacy in Sweden and Mexico	49
1.3. Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism in Discourse	50
1.3.1 Soft-Power	51
1.3.2. Nation-Branding	53
1.3.3. Cosmopolitan Constructivism	55
1.4. Conclusion	60

CHAPTER TWO: Representing Culture	61
2.1. On Representation and Cultural Diplomacy	61
2.2. Political Representations	63
2.3. Cultural Representations	68
2.4. Three Cultural Representations	73
2.4.1. Reflective Representations	74
2.4.2. Symbolic Representations	77
2.4.3. Postmodern Representations	81
2.5. Conclusion	86
CHAPTER THREE: Representing Identities/Alterities	87
3.1. Identity inside Cultural Diplomacy Representations	87
3.2. Endo-Representations: Four Forms of Identity	93
3.2.1. Psychological Identity	94
3.2.2. Corporeal Identity	95
3.2.3. National Identity	96
3.2.4. Cultural Identity	99
3.3. Alter-Representations: The Process of Alterity Formation	102
3.3.1. Representations of Rival/Enemy	106
3.3.2. Representations of Ally/Friend	108
3.3.3. Exotic as Other: The <i>Orientalist</i> Effect	110
3.3.4. Representing the Barbarian-Other	111
3.4. Conclusions	114
CHAPTER FOUR: Representing Mexico Abroad: Tradition and Modernity at Crossroads	116
Introduction	117
4.1. Mexican Cultural Diplomacy Representations in Discourse	118
4.1.1. Three Illustrations from Mexican Cultural <i>Attachés</i>	120
4.2. Political Representations in Mexican Cultural Diplomacy	124
4.3. Cultural Diplomacy and the Representation of Identity: The Case of “Mexico, Splendors of Thirty Centuries”	131
4.3.1. Mexican Cultural Diplomacy at Work	132
4.3.2. Identity/Alterity Discussion	136
4.4. Conclusion	142

CHAPTER 5: Representing Swedish Culture: Sources of Sweden’s Diplomatic Success Abroad	142
Introduction	142
5.1. Cultural Diplomacy Representation <i>à la Suède</i> and the Cosmopolitan Constructivist Discourse	143
5.1.1. Swedish Cultural and Public Diplomacy	144
5.1.2. Instrumentality and Cultural Diplomacy Representations	147
5.1.3. Differences in the Cosmopolitan Constructivist Discourse	148
5.2. Organizational Structure and the Cosmopolitan Constructivist Layout	150
5.2.1. From Symbolic to Postmodern Representations of Sweden	156
5.3. Swedish Cultural Diplomacy <i>à la</i> Nation-Branding	158
5.3.1. Sweden as a Nation-Brand	163
5.3.1.1. Discussion	166
5.4. Conclusion	168
CHAPTER SIX: Concluding Notes	170
6.1. The Overall Question	170
6.2. Interrelated and Subsidiary Questions	171
6.3. The Mexican and Swedish Expository Cases	173
6.4. Cultural Diplomacy Lessons	176
6.5. Further Research: Parallel Theoretical Arguments	178
REFERENCES	183
Books, Journal Articles and Occasional Papers	183
Swedish Sources, Reports and Materials	198
Mexican Sources, Reports and Materials	200
Interviews	201
Mexican Diplomatic Dossiers	201

Tables and Figures

Table 1.1. Representations of Cultural Diplomacy as Discourses

Figure 1.1. Comparing Cultural and Public Diplomacies

Table 2.1. CD representations and Pitkin's political descriptive view

Table 2.2. Comparative Representations of Cultural Diplomacy via Culture

Table 2.3. Cultural Representations and Standing For and Acting For

Figure 3.1. Identity influencing Representations and CD

Table 3.1. Identifications of Cultural Diplomacy Representations

Table 3.2. Endo-Representations: Analytical Distinctions

Table 3.3. Alter-Representations: Analytical Distinctions

Table 4.1. Representations of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy in SP and CC

Table 4.2. Agents of Mexican CD: Official and Unofficial

Table 4.3. Mexican Cultural Diplomacy Representations and Culture

Table 4.4. CD Representations for Mexico (based on Pitkin's view)

Table 5.1. Representations of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy

Figure 6.1. Figure 6.1. Cultural/Public Diplomacy and Cultural Relations

Illustrations

Illustration I: Holbein, Hans, “The Ambassadors” 1533 Oil on oak, 207 x 209.5 cm. National Gallery, London. ‘Photo © The National Gallery, London’. With the authorization of The National Gallery, London. The use of the image on the book dust jacket and the electronic PDF version is also authorized.

Illustration II: Velázquez de Silva, Diego “Las Meninas o la Familia de Felipe IV /The Maids of Honor or the Family of Philip IV” 1657. Oil on canvas, 10.5 x 9.1. With the authorization of Museo del Prado, Madrid.

Illustration III: Picasso, Pablo “Las Meninas (after Velazquez)” 1957, Oil on canvas 194 x 260 cm., Museum Picasso, Barcelona. With the authorization of BUSS Sweden.

Illustration IV: Gironella, Alberto “Gran Obrador” (1964), collage, oil on canvas, assemblage, carved-wood. With the authorization of Emiliano Gironella, owner of Alberto Gironella’s reproduction rights, México.

Illustration V: Frida Kahlo, “Self-portrait as a Tehuana” 1943 oil on canvas, Mexico. With the authorization of “La Colección de Arte Mexicano Moderno y Contemporáneo de Jacques y Natasha Gelman, Cortesía de la Fundación Vergel, Muros, Costco y Comercial Mexicana” and INBA, México.

Illustration VI: Fragment of “Mexico A work of Art” campaign in San Antonio, Texas 1991. A partial segment of the photo taken from Goldman, Shiffra “3,000 of Mexican Art” in *Art Journal*, vol. 51., No. 2, Art and Ecology, (Summer 1992), p. 91.

Illustration VII: FrontPage publication, Sweden & Swedes, 2003. Swedish Institute catalogue. With authorization of the Swedish Institute.

Illustration VIII: Interior page of Sweden & Swedes (society), Swedish Institute catalogue 2003. With authorization of the Swedish Institute.

Copyrighted material may not be reproduced by any means without the further express permission of the copyright holders noted above.

List of Abbreviations

THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

AF	Acting For
CC	Cosmopolitan Constructivism
CD	Cultural Diplomacy
CP	Cultural Policy
NB	Nation Branding
PD	Public Diplomacy
PMR	Postmodern Representation
RR	Reflective Representation
SF	Standing For
SP	Soft Power
SR	Symbolic Representation

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

EU	European Union
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	UN Organization for Education, Science and Culture

MEXICAN INSTITUTIONS

CONACULTA	National Council of Culture and Arts
DAC	Direction of Cultural Affairs (from SRE)
FONCA	National Foundation for Culture and Arts
IMEXCI	Mexican Institute for International Cooperation
INAH	National Institute of Anthropology and History
INBA	National Institute of Fine Arts
MS30C	Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries
SEM	Mexican Foreign Service (Career Diplomats)
SEP	Secretary of Public Education
SRE or SFA	<i>Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores.</i> Secretary of Foreign Affairs

SWEDISH INSTITUTIONS

NF	Swedish Nobel Foundation
NSU	Council for Promotion of Sweden Abroad
PIK	Press, Information and Communication Department
SI	Swedish Institute
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRC	Swedish Royal Court
UD or SMFA	<i>Utrikesdepartementet</i> or Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Illustration 1. Holbein, Hans, "The Ambassadors" 1533 Oil on oak 207 x 209.5 cm. National Gallery, London. 'Photo © The National Gallery, London'.

INTRODUCTION

Cultural Diplomacy and Holbein's *The Ambassadors*

It was a cold day in February 1533 when French ambassador Jean de Dinteville arrived in England on his second diplomatic mission. His instructions from the King of France, Francis I, were both to reassure King Henry VIII of England of friendship and support and also to assess the domestic political situation. This diplomatic assignment was of critical importance for France at the time, since rumors were spreading that Henry VIII wanted to divorce his Spanish wife, Catherine of Aragon, to marry the Englishwoman Anne Boleyn, a move that posed potential conflicts with the Vatican, Spain, England and the growing support for the protestant movement. Events developed very quickly: at the beginning of 1533, Henry VIII had secretly married Boleyn who was already pregnant. In May, his marriage to Catherine was annulled and his new marriage declared valid by the Archbishop of Canterbury. This meant a break with Rome. Georges de Selve, Bishop of Lavaur, also acted on several occasions as ambassador to the Roman Emperor, the Venetian Republic and the Holy See. He went to England during the spring 1533 to pay a visit to his friend and fellow-countryman, Jean de Dinteville, and to find out more details about the King's irregular religious situation (North 2002: 37). That visit to London in 1533 is commemorated in Hans Holbein the Younger's painting *The Ambassadors*, and it is the pretext I use to introduce my research work on representations and cultural diplomacy.

The painting shows a full-length portrait of the two French ambassadors standing side by side within a well-decorated courtroom full of symbolic objects proper to the diplomatic discourse of the time. To the left stands de Dinteville, flamboyantly dressed, in pink and a black satin gown mixed with velvet and fur (North 2002: 41). To the right stands de Selve in more modest clothing – a long brown robe, indicative of his clerical position. We know the ages of the two ambassadors because “The embossed decoration of Dinteville's dagger tells us that he is in his twenty-ninth year, while an inscription on the book on which de Selve rests his arm reveals he is in his twenty-fifth year” (Foister 1998: 11). De Dinteville wears a sword while de Selve holds his black gloves: black dye was not only expensive, but also conveyed the personal qualities of intellectual introspection. They lean on a cabinet displaying objects related to the heavens (upper shelf), and others indicating their material interests (lower shelf), which is a compendium of culture of the age. Above, there is a heavenly globe while below there is another, this time of the earth, showing the little town of Polisy, where stood de Dinteville's *château* (North 2002: 154). Various scientific instruments

show the date when the gathering took place (11 April at 10.30) and the artist's signature tells us the year (1533). The navigational instruments (a polyhedral sundial, a magnetic compass, a shepherd's dial, a torquetum and a hymn book¹) on the top shelf are matched on the bottom one by the earthly and artistic objects (the arithmetic book for merchants, the set square, the case of flutes and the lute, with its broken string: a symbol of fragility, according to North, 2002: 159). It is clear that the display of objects has always been a means to convey wealth and power, and this painting is no exception. More interesting though, these objects also represent a cultural order: "it has been argued that the ambassadors themselves represent the skills of the *Trivium*: grammar, rhetoric and dialectic" (Foster 1998: 33) while I claim the *Quadrivium* is also appropriate for diplomats: geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music (North 2002: 71-72). In any case, the cultural order Holbein represents is constitutive of the power relations of diplomacy (Constantinou, 1996 ch. 1 and Der Derian 1992, intro.).

The world of diplomacy at the beginning of the 16th century can also be portrayed as a struggle between two political ideals, the humanism of Erasmus and his pleas for peaceful coexistence and moral stands, and that of Machiavelli's *The Prince*, where ambition, cynicism and deception are characteristics of success. Holbein's splendid artistic representation can be seen as a reminder of these philosophical questions: Are diplomats agents of deception and intrigue or can they have moral stature? Is diplomacy doomed to become a field of treachery or can it be a discipline for mutual understanding and trust?

This book is conscious of these questions, arguing from the particular corner of cultural diplomacy. *Soft Power* is the strategy used in today's world to show an image of superiority and higher value from the side of a country, to other nations. The goal is to conquer the "hearts and minds" of other foreign peoples in order to make them well disposed in cultural terms, favouring the power positions of the dominant nation in international relations. *Nation Branding* is another current strategy that nations use as cultural diplomacy templates to fabricate a sense of commercial value over other countries, thus developing a symbolic hierarchy that transforms national culture in an international commodity for exchange. Finally, *Cosmopolitan Constructivism* is a mix of multilateral and identity diplomacy where the point is for a nation to represent a coherent view of its culture and elaborate a genuine understanding of other nations in order to construct a peaceful international society. Stretching an interpretation of *The Ambassadors* under these cultural diplomacy representations, it is possible to argue that the power-oriented and Machiavellian side of the discipline can be seen in the materiality of the symbols depicted: luxurious robes, magnificent atmospheres, conquering territories and triumphant young bodily dispositions.

Soft Power (SP) and Nation Branding (NB) would be the equivalent of the power image depicted in the painting by Holbein where the nations select and show their best achievements to inspire awe in foreign observers. Cosmopolitan Con-

¹ Martin Luther's hymn, *Come Holy Ghost our souls inspire*, possibly "a plea to German Reformers" from a moderate religious de Selve, cf. Foister 1998: 40.

structivism (CC) would bring a self-reflexive sense for cultural diplomacy, where Erasmus' own preoccupations with humanity and peace would be accurately represented and symbolized by the distorted skull shown across the mosaic floor and the crucifix on the upper left corner. Why are they there? This is a matter of popular and scholarly speculation. The skull can only be perceived in its "true form" from a standpoint at the edges of the panel, and its significance can be associated with the inevitable fate that confronts humans (North 2002: 166-167). The counter to the symbol of the skull is the crucifix, meaning resurrection, a promise of eternal life and peace.

In Cosmopolitan Constructivist terms, cultural diplomacy ideals would appear in the painting as an indication of the identities and alterities of nations, where science, arts and humanism permeate the discourses nations present about themselves abroad. *The Ambassadors* can also be understood as a moral concern about the international relations of Europe. As Foister, Roy and Wyld suggest:

The whole painting then may be read as a meditation on Dintevilles's melancholy and misery, and on de Selve's despair at the condition of Europe. Standing on a floor which may allude to the cosmos, and placed between objects including astronomical instruments, perhaps arranged to stimulate heaven and earth, and which certainly allude to a world of chaos, both men think of the brevity of life and their end, but also of the hope of the life to come (Foister et. al. 1998: 57).

At all events, this painting allows me to have a opening discussion of the world of the arts, representations and diplomacy. In this thesis *The Ambassadors* is a representation of cultural diplomacy and the *attachés*, i.e. the actors who appear as acting diplomats representing a sovereign, a country, their customs, personal objects and beloved cultures. This is also an appropriate index of the political world structured in symbols, context, language and cultures, as it will be read in this work. And last, but not least, this painting is also an accurate example of the "constructedness" of representations in social and political life that in conventions pass as natural and normal. The fact that Holbein dared to place a distorted skull in the center evokes the artificiality of our arrangements and the bias in our interpretation of reality, in almost every field of knowledge. In sum, the painting does not deny the materiality of the world, because the world of the diplomats is depicted in detail with its rich and exuberant qualities, as the artist² masterfully shows in his work. But the painting shows the "other world," the one shaped by symbols, values and ideas that cannot be depicted, grasped or frozen, but only suggested. This book is, in many ways, a debate between these two positions that I have used as a pretext to re-think the field of diplomacy and culture in an epoch where these questions seem more relevant than ever before.

² E.H. Gombrich says of Holbein's art that: "There is nothing dramatic in these portraits of Holbein, nothing to catch the eye, but the longer we look at them the more they seem to reveal of the sitter's mind and personality. We do not doubt for a moment that they are in fact faithful records of what Holbein saw, drawn without fear or favor. The way in which Holbein has placed the figure in the picture shows the sure touch of the master. Nothing seems left to chance; the whole composition is so perfectly balanced that it may easily seem 'obvious' to us" 1987: 117).

The Main Research Riddle(s)

The main general research question guiding this thesis is rather simple and reveals a theoretical ambition: How can representational theories construct an understanding of cultural diplomacy in the late 20th century and early millennium? In order to address this broad question, I suggest the following three interrelated and subsidiary issues that organize the ideational spine of the thesis based on representational theory

- “how” is cultural diplomacy understood and constructed in three models of representation: Soft Power (SP), Nation Branding (NB) and Cosmopolitan Constructivism (CC);
- “what” is the significance of cultural representations (Reflective, Symbolic and Post-modern) for contemporary cultural diplomacies;
- “how” can identities/alterities be constructed to inform the overarching Cultural Diplomacy (CD) representations (SP, NB and CC).

These three “sub-questions” respond to guiding theories that would have very little substance if left in their “ivory tower,” and failed to be related to specific realities. For this reason, I subject the theories to questioning on the basis of empirical illustrations and expository cases, specifically exemplified by looking at aspects of the contemporary cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden.

What is the Fuss over Cultural Diplomacy?

All form of diplomacy share the common roots of the profession: representation of the national interests abroad, collection of knowledge and advice, negotiation skills, developing social networks, influencing outcomes and managing the consular activities. What is the fuss over cultural diplomacy? Put simply, Cultural Diplomacy (CD) is about representing national cultures abroad.³ It is about constructing the diplomatic tools to develop long-lasting relations with other nations in terms understanding each other in friendly and cosmopolitan terms. True, its relevance is rather limited compared to other forms of diplomacy, especially economic or political. As I substantiate in chapter one, my investigations show very little specificity on how to approach Cultural Diplomacy beyond the traditional practice. Theories about how to proceed on this are underdeveloped, practice-driven and subordinated to general diplomacy, International Relations and cultural policy approaches (Aguilar 1996, Arendt 2005, Astié-Burgos 2003, Bélanger 1999, Finn 2003, Katzenstein 2002, Lee and Sharp 2005, Wise 2003). In a macro view of politics or diplomacy, Cultural Diplomacy can be dispensed with in most studies, since only marginal interest has been accorded to the field. However, something peculiar occurred in the late 20th century and early millennium: countries began to pay much closer attention to it. Suddenly, cultural is-

³ I use “Cultural Diplomacy” or CD to refer to the field from a theoretical perspective. On the other hand, I use lowercase “cultural diplomacy” or “cultural diplomacies” to refer to the diplomatic practice or empirical traditions carried out by foreign ministries. The same goes with other concepts such as Public Diplomacy and the frequent references to Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism.

sues quickly became national security concerns for many governments and their diplomacies. This feeling is confirmed, for example, by Helena K. Finn when saying that

Early in the Cold War, American efforts at cultural diplomacy were funded by the CIA as well as the State Department's Division of Cultural Relations. Although CIA sponsorship would be inappropriate and counterproductive today that history is a useful reminder of how seriously Washington once took the promotion of mutual understanding through cultural exchange. Policy makers understood the link between engagements with foreign audiences and victory over ideological enemies and considered cultural diplomacy vital to US national security (2003: 15).

In effect, the report "Eroding Respect for America Seen as Major Problem" from the Pew Research Center says that most Americans are aware of the loss of international respect for the United States, particularly in the context of Iraq and the Middle East. The poll suggests that two-thirds of Americans say the US is "less respected" by other countries than in the past. The study points out that a great proportion of Americans (two to one) "feel this loss of respect is viewed as a major –not minor– problem for the US" (2004: 1). Adding to this anxiety over cultural diplomacy in the US, Globe Scan and Pipa (think tank) reported in 2004 that "In 20 of 23 Countries Polled Citizens Want Europe to Be More Influential Than US," expressing its findings in the following way:

A public opinion poll across 23 countries finds that in 20, a majority (17) or a plurality (3) of citizens think it would be mainly positive for Europe to become more influential than the US in world affairs. Currently, Europe is seen as having a mainly positive influence in the world in 22 countries. Among specific major countries, the one most widely viewed as having a positive influence is France — viewed positively in 20 countries. The countries most widely viewed as having a negative influence are the US (viewed negatively in 15 countries) and Russia (14 countries) (2004: 1).

While these are problems related more to the Public Diplomacy proper, in this thesis I contend that Cultural Diplomacy has become a more relevant diplomatic field in a world defined by symbols, culture and images. In some ways, it may be argued that Cultural Diplomacy is making a modest contribution in redefining the priorities in foreign ministries when it comes to cultural issues abroad. Traditional approaches defined Cultural Diplomacy as mainly *the promotion abroad of a state's cultural achievements*, its science, technology as well as the arts, humanities, social sciences and national languages (Berridge and James 2003: 62). A more elaborated view says that "Cultural Diplomacy means the deliberate projection of a nation's culture and values, as an undisputed dimension of their foreign affairs" (Arendt 2005: 553). These approaches fulfilled the basic purposes of exchange, promotion, and advertisement of national culture abroad for most foreign ministries (thus called the EPA triad in this work). With few exceptions, traditional Cultural Diplomacy's mission was mainly subordinated to other diplomatic goals inside the ministries. Martha Barcenás, a Mexican diplomat, insists that the problem of cultural diplomacy is to go beyond the simplified masks of national identities into authentic reciprocity and cooperation in culture (interview 18). This study moves into an exploration of a self-reflective position in cultural diplomacy, using representations as the main organizing concept where culture and identity come very strong into the fore.

Taking these considerations into account, I claim that the natural mission of Cultural Diplomacy is the plural representation of cultural identities abroad, for the purposes of making it possible for people to understand their common needs and reconcile their differences. Overall, this study aims to understand these cultural processes, and their political relevance in diplomatic settings. In particular, this thesis examines the political relevance of cultural representations, their possible transformations into cultural diplomatic discourses, and gives examples of some practical implications for the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden as separate cases.

All things considered, this investigation aims to provide a theoretical backbone for the understanding, reformulation and also development of the field of Cultural Diplomacy. In this, I investigate cultural studies and political science to learn which models of cultural and political representation are relevant to understanding how policies are constructed and practices constituted in Cultural Diplomacy.

Cultural Diplomacy Representations: SP-CC-NB

The main representations of Cultural Diplomacy are threefold: Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. First, as it has been widely expressed, “Soft-Power” (SP), a term coined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr., is briefly summarized as a country’s cultural and ideological attraction where the ability to get desired outcomes through appeal instead of force, defines the success. Soft Power works by persuading other nations that they should follow a preferred path, or by getting these nations to agree to certain norms and institutions. It is clear that Soft Power depends largely on persuasion and good management of information (Nye 1999: 27). In other words, Soft Power is the use of images, symbols and simulation to convince nations and people of some policy objective that serves a country’s own strategy.

Secondly, Nation Branding (NB) has become more important for cultural diplomacy in the last few years for its emphasis on making sharp symbolic national distinction via stereotyping, image making and the inclusion of private firms as cultural actors. Nation Branding is indeed a rather simple and easily achieved representation that aims to characterize and profile nations according to a set of variables that produce a market value in the form of a brand.

Thirdly, the representational model called Cosmopolitan Constructivism (CC) assimilates multilateral diplomacy, cooperation and identity politics into the field of Cultural Diplomacy. Cosmopolitan Constructivism’s main claims rely on the significance of constructivist theory of international relations elevated to a rather cosmopolitan framework, from where culture is a mechanism for common understanding and peace.

Using Hanna Pitkin’s discussion on political representation as a background (1967), I accommodate these political ideas in the form of contemporary discourses to distinguish three political representations in the field of cultural diplomacy: Soft Power (Nye 2004), Nation Branding (Anholt 2004) and what I

term Cosmopolitan Constructivism (Wendt 1999). The first two representations will be called “Rational-instrumental” for their use of national culture to advance the “national interest” and/or “private-firm interests” and the second is termed “Reflexive” for it sees the expression of the national culture “as an end in itself,” and also as a way to convey understanding of a nation’s own identity in relation to other national cultural alterities (Neumann 1999).

Method: On the Construction of Representation

This thesis is argued, methodologically speaking, mainly from representational theories, by which I mean an analytical division between material reality and the world of ideas and symbols. Thus, the main methodological contribution in this work rests on its capacity to connect the field of Cultural Diplomacy with that of representational theory. Secondly, this thesis also stresses the *constructedness* of knowledge, the paths to articulate concepts, organize identities and describe relations. In this methodological sense, representation analysis is a relevant hermeneutic-constitutive device since it explores the relationships we construct between “the material and ideational worlds” in order to constitute meaning. Therefore, these theories can quite well “analyze the properties, rules, and modes of functioning of systems of representation, with a view to uncovering their assumptions, describing their origins, and above all, unmasking the processed whereby those origins are concealed...” (Prendergast 2000: 9). In other words, representational theories can be seen as a constitutive matrix of thought to track the ways we make sense of the world –in a self-reflective mode.

There are two approaches to representations in this work, the structural-analytical view represented by Hanna F. Pitkin (1967) and the post-structural and cultural view represented by Stuart Hall (1997) and Richard Harvey Brown (1995). For the most part, I take Pitkin’s views as the main method, since she presents a well articulated political discussion with a concrete technique. As a complement to, and a necessary upgrading of, Pitkin’s views, Brown and Hall’s critique presents arguments that I found necessary to deal with, in theoretical and methodological terms.

In any case, Hanna Pitkin’s reflexions on representations function as the main referent for argumentation in this thesis. She takes representations as a political concept that creates an obligation between a representative and a constituency, and focuses her efforts in defining that obligation. Put differently, her representation creates a political obligation between the representing and the subject being represented. This makes a case for a method that she explores in detail in three takes, what she calls the *formalistic* view, the *standing for others* and the third and last view, *acting for others*.

The formalistic view explores the ideas of *authorization* and *accountability* the former being about sources to perform on behalf of others and the latter about bonds or responsibilities assumed as a result of the representation. This method is useful in order to question the assumptions made in political organizations (such as cultural diplomacy) as to where the sources to represent lie and give au-

thorization to perform on their behalf, and secondly, in order to make explicit how the representation is accountable (or not) to a constituency.

Also, Pitkin's view of representation as *standing for others* presupposes two distinctions, *descriptive* and *symbolic*. The former aims to respond to the question of truth, in the sense of determining the criteria to constitute an accurate mimetic representation. In the case of Holbein's *The Ambassadors*, for example, "*mimesis* came to function as an artistic tool to make art look like reality. An understanding of this shift is facilitated when the meaning of the term is interpreted as 'depiction'" (Gombrich 2000: 81). In diplomacy, Jönsson and Hall remind us that the medieval idea of representation "as one-for-one correspondence was readily accepted [...] and] 'the medieval ambassador represented his sovereign in the sense that he was him, or embodied him (literally in some readings) when he presented himself at court'" (2005: 113). In the later distinction, Pitkin embarks on a definition of the symbolic world behind representations. For this, she suggests an *ad-hoc* relation where a symbol decouples the mimetic necessity of depiction. In discussion of this very issue, Edward Said makes a similar point when saying that

we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is *eo ipso* implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the 'truth,' which is itself a representation. What this must lead us to methodologically is to view representations [...] as inhabiting a common field of play defined for them, not by some inherent common subject matter alone, but by some common history, tradition, universe of discourse (Said 1995: 272).

Pitkin's third take, *acting for others*, simply defines the act of *representing*. As the title of this book suggests, the act of representing is a central concern for my investigations. The title of this thesis, *Representing Culture Abroad*, is not a trivial choice. It comes after reading the dissertation Hanna Fenichel Pitkin devotes to the specific concept "on representing" in chapter six of her book. In effect, most of her readers concede that one of the most original ideas she elucidates in the book is the concept of Representing as "Acting For" (Eulau and Karps 1978, Fain 1980, and Young 2000). Prior to her publication, representation was a concept that had its center of gravity in the idea of "substitution," "authorization," "accountability" or simply, "standing for." The concentration on the act of representing was more or less ignored. Pitkin says in relation to this that "What neither of these activities can give us, however, is representation as an acting for others, an activity in behalf of, in the interest of, as the agent of, someone else" (1967: 113). She refers to the act of representing as an agent or actor that represents what s/he looks after, concerned with the interests of his/her respective group's interests. And Pitkin insists: "Here, again, the substance of representing is activity. This is what a Political scientist means when he says that the test of representation is not whether the leader is elected, but how well he acts to further the objectives of those he represents" (1967: 116). In other words, "representing culture abroad" means a concentration on how nations perform the act of representing their own selves abroad, acting to advance the interests of those belonging to the national culture of the country.

All in all, it is important to mention that the only adjustment to Pitkin's theory I make in chapter two is on reconstructing the possibilities she offers, calling them

“cultural representations,” using Stuart Hall’s views, becoming three distinct ones: reflective, symbolic and postmodern. To illustrate these debates in this thesis, I take the liberty of adopting a rather heterodox method in the discipline of political science, making use of three famous paintings to discuss theoretical issues related to representations. Drawing on the famous discussion of Velázquez’ *Las Meninas* by Michel Foucault, I re-state the arguments and illustrate them further by showing two variants of the same painting, one made by the Spanish artist Pablo Picasso in 1957, called *Las Meninas After Velázquez*, and the second in 1964 by the Mexican-Spanish artist Alberto Gironella, called *El Gran Obrador*. I use these paintings as empirical materials to debate the multiple layers of representational theory via a hermeneutic-aesthetics. The use of paintings as sources illustrations does not contradict my method. In fact, Pitkin herself accords a special place to the role of artistic representations and especially to the role of the artistic activity, as an act of representing (e.g. 1967: 68-71, 81-91 and 93-97). Also, two of the most influential authors in the field of diplomacy, Costas Constantinou (1996) and James Der Derian (1992) make frequent use of visual material in the form of photographs, video or paintings as support for their methods, illustrations of applicability or even as philosophical pretexts to argue and make specific intellectual elaborations. This is why I also take the liberty of conducting such debates when appropriate, especially at the moment of discussing the theoretical foundations of representations.

Let us not forget that for this method, in its ontology, the material world is concrete and has its structural consequences. However, what matters is to observe the symbolic discursive practices through which representations, language and meanings perform (Hall 1997: 15-35). In sum, the strength of representations can be found in making explicit the limitations of the sources and the accountability of the act, the formalistic view of standing for and the more dynamic *acting for*, which wraps up the whole method. It is also important to mention that in this thesis I use discourse analysis in a deemphasized manner, especially for making sense of cultural representations in diplomacy and the production of meaning via language (cfr. Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). Its more methodologically oriented application is analytical and comes in chapter one, when I discuss the concept of Cultural Diplomacy. The “instrumentality” of the discourse, as explained in chapter one, is more in line with some versions of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2003 and Chilton 2004) but I am afraid I do not take it all the way down, since I give more attention to the representational models. In chapters four and five I try a more “critical version” of it with the expository cases when discussing the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden.

Swedish and Mexican Cultural Diplomacies

Sweden and Mexico are two salient and relevant cases that help me illustrate cultural diplomacy in empirical terms. Both pose a challenge as regards their similarities and differences. They are peripheral nations when it comes to a supra-regional analysis (EU-North America) but are leading nations at an infra-regional level (Scandinavia-Latin-America). The two countries have cultural diplomacies

which have been pursued steadily for at least thirty years, but they are rather different in nature. Even though this is not a comparative study, the two cases are appropriate from an international relations approach since the two countries devote much attention to the issue of culture in their foreign policies. They have established specific institutional bodies to implement cultural diplomacy (Swedish Institute/Mexican Institute) and the 1990s were exemplar in the sense that their decision-making procedures struggled to reshape themselves in the realm of globalization. The construction of a suitable representation of their cultural identity abroad was a great challenge in this period since both countries joined regional organizations, NAFTA and EU. I claim that the construction of a fair representation abroad passes through the “acting and standing for” questions in the form of cultural diversity, class, migration, indigenous groups and democracy. Sweden and Mexico both have distinct international identities and are conscious about it. Finally, the two nations actually represent their cultures abroad in the overarching models explained here (SP, NB and CC) and hence are good examples to match theories requiring empirical evidence in the form of expository cases. The sources of my investigation are based in lengthy interviews with experienced diplomats in cultural affairs, historic archives, dossiers, official documents, popular culture pamphlets and reports.

As the reader will realize, this is first and foremost a theoretical thesis. Nevertheless, given the suggestions made by my colleagues and supervisors, I decided to embark on an empirical study of cultural diplomacy presenting two cases as illustrations of the theoretical possibilities explored in the first three chapters, and I chose the two countries Mexico and Sweden, which make chapters four and five. My cases are constitutive of theory in reference to Harry Eckstein’s “soft line” theory, “as any mental construct that orders phenomena or inquiry into them” (1975: 86-87). They also refer to the idea of expository cases as elaborated by Tom Bryder (1998), where the empirical examples are not approached in positivist terms mainly by illustrations for the plausibility of the conceptual elaborations (1998: Introduction). In this thesis, Mexico and Sweden are relevant cases as regards the manner in which both countries develop their cultural diplomacies, using the different expository cases

In sum, elaborating mainly on constructivist theories, this thesis argues in favour of a cosmopolitan cultural diplomacy that takes into consideration the identities and alterities of nations. The expository examples of Mexico and Sweden allow me to explore the discourses contained in their political representations in cultural diplomacies (especially through a study of *Swedish Nation Branding and Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries*), their Cultural Diplomatic apparatuses⁴, their goals, the institutional actors, and how they make sense of their cultural national identity. I report in my theories. The period of study is roughly the 1990s,

⁴ When analyzing the “Cultural Diplomatic apparatuses,” as I called them in obvious reference to Louis Althusser and his “Ideological State Apparatuses” (1987), I had in mind his work in relation of ideology, state and society, which gave a very provocative Marxist reading of the state structure. However, I did not develop Althusser’s ideas here, except for the fact that I try to understand a diplomatic structure and “its ideology” (discourse) in a representational form.

but in both countries I also explore materials from the late 1980s and the first years of the new millennium.

Aim, Delimitations and Disposition

My aim in this book is to understand the relevance of the theory of cultural representation for the very specific field of cultural diplomacy, having two nations' diplomacies as illustrations: Sweden and Mexico during the 1990s. In this, I engage in an exploration of cultural representations as discursive systems that can possibly construct identities and alterities. To be sure, cultural representations are elaborated and discussed as systems of discursive identities (having in mind states and their diplomacies), which in turn may be capable of describing systems of significance, with possible applications in the field of diplomacy and culture. Thus, the main theoretical assumptions come from the field of diplomacy/IR (contemporary diplomacy approach & IR third debate), representations (structuralism vs. post-structuralism), and identity/alterity (constructivism and postmodernity), which in fact constitute the plan of the first three chapters.

This thesis does not operate under the assumptions made in the more consolidated models of scientific inquiry. I do not have hypotheses to test, variables to measure, causality to prove, correlations to show or truths to be scrutinized. I am rather reluctant to make strong scientific claims in the more traditional and established forms. My work is an investigation of how some socio-political concepts organize the understanding of what we consider to be reality. I do not intend to prove what is out there in the "real world," even when my focus for a referential analysis is many times "out there." The empirical examples are therefore not there to supply "proof" but to illustrate how the theories can be understood in practical cases.

It has been more useful for me to be curious about "the tools" we as researchers use to make sense of the world, which in my investigations happened to be of a representational nature. I claim that in discourse we represent the world that is possible, given the cultural and political arrangements. Representation is an in-between biased concept that helps us construct real worlds: the surroundings, the identities and the alterities. Therefore, identity/alterity functions as the referent for the representations, and discourse is the "carrier" that shapes them. Yes, I do have organizing concepts, namely representations, culture, diplomacy, discourse and identity. And I have relations to establish: constitutive and complementary. I do have evidence in the form of texts, images and interviews, and I look for their disposition in terms of verisimilitude, as aspects of discourse that "seem to be true" (cf. Constantinou, 1996: Preamble). However, they are approached in a hermeneutic tone where the judgment of the researcher is a pre-requisite to produce understanding of what is going on "out there" in diplomacy and culture. As Steve Smith suggests

But the social world is not like that [*objectified reality*]. Our perceptions of it literally construct that social world. They need not be in the slightest bit compatible with one another, and they do not necessarily admit to reconciliation. We see different mobiles, different realities, not simply the same reality from different perspectives. So the social world is not like the mobile, it is not something that we

observe, it is something we inhabit, and we can never stand in relationship to it as neutral observer, however much we might like to pretend that we can. To repeat, *there is no view from nowhere, and our views of it are not simply contextual, but instead are that social world.* (Smith 2004: 513, my italics).

I subscribe to these views but mine is not a radical stand against the more consolidated views in the social sciences or political inquiry. Not only do I agree with the constructivist camp, but also my topic requires the use of those ontologies and epistemologies. In this thesis, for instance, I am not concerned with treating culture as a variable causing effects. As I make it clear throughout this work, causality is not the point here. I am carefully looking into the “meaning and significance equation” through the constitution of the material world and the universe of ideas in representations via discourses. Alexander Wendt says that “Constitutive claims concerns how social kinds are put together rather than the relation between independent and dependent variables [...]. Ideas or social structures have constitutive effects when they create phenomena –properties, powers, dispositions, meanings, etc. – that are conceptually or logically dependent on those ideas or structures, that exist only in ‘virtue’ of them” (1999: 88). In this sense, I use these methods not to prove causality or make correlations, but actually I frequently engage in analyzing relations that constitute meaning and significance. At the end of the day, I fully agree with James Der Derian when he says that these problems “respond better to *interpretation* than *verification*” because the diplomatic practices traditionally emphasize discursive strategies, images, symbols and grand narratives which imply a broad understanding of cultural concerns (1992: introduction).

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter one opens the discussion about cultural diplomacy by establishing a theoretical framework which serves the purpose of a guide to the rest of this study. The task is to identify the discursive logic of Cultural Diplomacy and its constitutive meanings via representations, appealing to the three models that run throughout the thesis, mainly constructed during the 1990s: Nation Branding, Soft Power and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. The chapter also pays attention to the analytical distinctions between public and cultural diplomacy, and the performative role of the cultural *attaché*. Furthermore, it specifically looks into the ways discourses of Cultural Diplomacy are organized around five concepts: instrumentality, security, spatiality, directionality, and the public/private divide. Finally, the chapter already makes use of some basic illustrations of cultural diplomacy developed in Mexico and Sweden during the 1990s, serving as a baseline for the more empirically oriented chapters four and five.

Chapter is an effort to dig into the complexities of representation and cultural diplomacy, paying particular attention to the two most common conjectures of the former term: a) making something/someone present again, and b) designating a substitute that stands for or acts on behalf of. In order to do this, I make extensive use of Hanna F. Pitkin’s theories of representation addressing three specific issues: the relation between political representations and the conceptualization of the classic *authorization/accountability* problem; the definition of culture in rela-

tion to the cultural diplomacy representations, and a synthesized program for cultural representations in three types of cultural representations: Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern. In the discussion of cultural representations I present an artistic analysis of a trilogy of paintings, all based on *Las Meninas* by Diego Velázquez, that illustrate the formal and the substantial debates.

Chapter three concludes the theoretical discussion by eliciting connections to the political aspects of constructing identities and equally important, alterities. More precisely, I argue that cultural representation in diplomacy is best understood as a political strategy to symbolize and construct national identities/alterities abroad through a process of representations. The identity and alterity divide is seen in complementary terms and only derivative of Endo-representations (ER) and Alter-representations (AR). This chapter allows me to construct the analytical distinctions for identifications in the form of psychological, corporeal, national and the cultural proper. The previous discussion leads me to characterize four forms of alterity in the form of rival/enemy, ally/friend, exotic and barbarian. These distinctions, however theoretical, find their empirical applications in the ways I analyse Soft Power (SP), Nation Branding (NB) and Cosmopolitan Constructivist (CC) as representational models.

Chapter four is an empirical illustration of the cultural diplomacy of Mexico, taking certain aspects that help make sense of theory, from the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium. I begin by describing the understanding of the field drawing on the discourses of some cultural *attachés*. I then describe the cultural diplomatic apparatus in the context of cultural policy to suggest that there are official actors but that the relevant case is to be made on the non-official cultural diplomatic movers, namely the president of Mexico and the intellectual world seeking international symbolic recognition. Finally I make a brief visit to the colossal exhibition, “Mexico Splendors of 30 centuries from 1990-1992” as a clear example of Soft Power in cultural diplomacy. In sum, I conclude that Mexico has been caught up in a Cultural Diplomacy discourse in between “modernity” and “tradition” that fails in articulating a coherent perspective in tone with its position in contemporary cultural world affairs.

Just like the previous one, chapter five addresses the cultural diplomacy of Sweden on empirical-expository terms. Sweden has been discussing cultural diplomacy seriously since the 1990s and has provided a series of definitions and plans for how to do this in practice inside the government. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA) consolidated an area for cultural issues inside its structure where policies are defined for the embassies and cultural *attachés*. I describe these organizing units and their merits, taking into consideration the official and non-official cultural diplomacy actors. Finally, I make a brief visit to the salient strategy “Public Diplomacy and Nation-Branding,” as a clear example of how some policies are being implemented for Swedish cultural diplomacy under global costumes. My visit to the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy model is for the most part positive, especially when Cosmopolitan Constructivism drives the diplomatic actions. At the same time, I am sceptical in my assessment of the recent take that builds on Nation Branding.

Final Note: How to Relate to this Study

This work must be read as an effort to go beyond the more established traditional political science that dominates the field, by embracing constructivist theory and its emphasis on representations and to a lesser extent discourse. The thesis draws on representational and cultural approaches that become discursive practices about cultural diplomacy in the cases of Mexico and Sweden.

It is my conviction that many of the contemporary political issues can only be understood in terms of cultural constructions. I am aware of the scepticism and hostility that this kind of method and approach may provoke among the more established and stable traditions in political science. I know that some of the emerging methodologies and approaches constantly raise eyebrows when brought into the academic political field. It is not my intention to pick a quarrel with the established tradition I respect; quite the contrary, my work here is an invitation to my colleagues to incorporate the cultural *constructedness*, the discourse practices and contingencies of meaning in representational strategies in the political world these days.

The political research you are about to read is interdisciplinary, and has as its main study-object the concept of representations, using as the main theoretical basis social constructivism under a thin discourse analysis approach. The topic that informs the way in which representations take shape in foreign policy is cultural diplomacy, and the empirical cases on which I base myself are Sweden and Mexico during the 1990s. Fair? *A rose is a rose is a rose* (Stein *dixit*). At the end, I may not lead all my readers to accept my precepts and approaches, but if at least I contribute to the plurality of theoretical options in the field of political science, my grain of sand in the discipline was worth the time and effort invested in a doctoral thesis.

Representing Cultural Diplomacy

My end goal in this chapter is to establish a theoretical basis for an understanding of the relevance of Cultural Diplomacy and its internal discursive logic from a State perspective. The main research question is to understand how Cultural Diplomacy constitutes its representation by looking at three contemporary discourses: Nation Branding (NB), Soft Power (SP) and Cosmopolitan Constructivism (CC). Since Cultural Diplomacy (CD) owes much to Public Diplomacy (PD), I study their similarities and differences claiming that however related to each other, there are distinctions to be made: the former associated to identity/alterity, and the latter to communications and information to foreign publics. I begin the chapter by studying how the term “Cultural Diplomacy” was constructed in discursive terms to limit its own scope to the triadic idea of “Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement,” as the ruling representation. While presenting the contemporary concerns in the current state of Cultural Diplomacy, I also develop five structural discursive components, namely Instrumentality, Security, Spatiality, Directionality, and the Public/private divide. These enable me to discern the ways in which discourses are organized in a specific diplomatic logic to become representations of Cultural Diplomacy proper. Finally, within these dense theoretical discussions, I have incorporated some illustrations from the expository cases, namely Mexico and Sweden, as an introduction to ideas I develop further in chapters four and five.

Introduction

“How can countries gain the affection and esteem of other nations?” asks Edward T. Hall in the introduction to his famous book *The Silent Language* (1959: ix). “Though the United States has spent billions of dollars on foreign aid programs, it has captured neither the affection nor esteem of the rest of the world,” asserts Hall, adding that “It is not my thesis that Americans should be universally loved. But I take no consolation in the remark of a government official who stated that ‘we don’t have to be liked just so long as we are respected’. In most countries we are neither liked nor respected” concludes Hall after a careful evaluation of the perceptions and miscommunications between American officials and foreign diplomats at the end of the 1950s. The context was not an easy one: the Cold War, the Korean War, and leadership within the Western world. However E.T. Hall the diplomatic anthropologist has a point: Countries care about their images abroad, the way foreigners perceive their culture, their policies and their intentions. Foreign officials invest efforts and resources in trying to leave a mark for their countries in a congested world of information and paradoxically, rampant simplifications. The simple lesson found by most countries is that the ways in which their stories and appearances are constructed abroad count. But

more importantly, as I argue below, the way countries internalize their values of tolerance, friendship and respect for each other, will ultimately determine how others look upon them. Foreign ministries all over the planet have sooner or later come to realize this: cultural diplomacy matters.

1.1. Addressing “Cultural Diplomacy” Representations

In strict anthropological terms, all diplomacy is cultural. Every nation has its own culture(s) and when diplomats travel abroad, they have nothing but a series of cultural encounters. Thus, in principle, all diplomacy could be studied in cultural terms from the very beginning. In practice, however, the objectives of diplomacy are not necessarily “cultural” in an anthropological sense of the world. Diplomacy can be related to economic, political, military or public issues, depending on how each nation sees itself and its ambitions in other regions, and the international milieu. Consequently, *cultural diplomacy* (cd in lowercase) in practice is when a nation decides to embark on a cultural exchange with other nations, bringing education, arts and society to the forum. This decision presents problems of political nature that require further theorization in order to take the cultural argument further. Questions such as how to make culture construct diplomacy, what traditions actually inform the field, what cultural objectives are necessary and issues related to representations and discourse, etc. This is when research in *Cultural Diplomacy* (CD upper-case) enters the picture.

1.1.1. The Restrictive “Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement” Triad

It is fair to mention that research in the field of Cultural Diplomacy is embryonic and, to a great extent, subordinated to “public diplomacy” or dependent upon the role of *The Diplomacy* proper. Often, diplomatic apparatuses recognize the importance of cultural diplomacy in practice by appointing *attachés* in embassies, but for the most part fail to theorize the specific role of the activity. The professionals who have investigated this area are mostly cultural diplomats in the field (see for example Arndt 2005, Astié-Burgos 2003, Bélanger 1999, Finn 2003, or Wise 2003). Their writing on the topic is greatly influenced by their professional practice and it is mostly descriptive. A good proportion of what goes on in shaping Cultural Diplomacy in discourse is documented in diplomatic dossiers or internal reports inside the foreign ministries (much of which is unexplored). But very little work has been done to understand more precisely the implications of such discourses and the possibilities of common criteria to interpret and systematize what passes as Cultural Diplomacy.⁵ Therefore, it is difficult to find a uni-

⁵ See for example the debates taking place recently. Sablosky says that “It is not only the United States that is re-examining its cultural diplomacy at century’s end. Other countries are assessing the impact that the end of the cold war and the information revolution have had on the conduct of their cultural relations. Nations’ responses vary, as they are conditioned by traditional attitudes about culture and the government’s role in the arts and education, by expectations about the role cultural diplomacy can or should play in foreign relations, and by the priority attached to cultural diplomacy in making budget allocations” (1999: 3). More recently, Jan Melissen edited a book where ques-

fied field where debates take place on a systematic basis, and where academic gatherings and publications are promoted.⁶ More importantly, when cultural diplomacy has attracted greater interest and funding in the past few years, the underlying reasons are only too apparent, giving rise to much suspicion since the clear association goes hand in hand with propagandistic or commercial efforts, leaving aside the question of the cultural proper (Lee and Sharp 2005, Wise 2003).

In spite of the above-mentioned limitations and lack of systematic attention, Cultural Diplomacy is a current constructed concept with specific meanings. For example, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines it as “the furthering of international relations by cultural exchange [and] the act of publicizing and exhibiting examples of one’s national culture abroad” (*OED* 2004). This is not new. The use of these meanings was already common in the inter-war period in Europe (mainly in a nationalist and propagandistic fashion); however, the actual currency of the word became more evident only in the early 1980s. Berridge and James’ *Dictionary of Diplomacy* adds a discursive layer of meaning: “Cultural diplomacy is *the promotion abroad of a state’s cultural achievements*, in the case of France and Britain, among others, notably their languages [...] Defined broadly to include the *advertisement of achievements in science and technology as well as in the arts, humanities and social sciences*” (2003: 62, my italics).

tions related to diplomacy, Soft Power and culture were addressed from many different angles having in mind a European concern (2006). During 2002-2003 the “Arts and Minds Seminar” and the subsequent “Arts & Minds: A Conference on Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions” (April 14-15, 2003) at Columbia University, put a spotlight on cultural diplomacy’s history, viability and prospects. The event, sponsored by the National Arts Journalism Program, Arts International and the Center for Arts and Culture, brought together prominent US and foreign diplomats, social scientist, artists, arts administrators and media experts. However the event was limited in scope, since most panels and discussions mainly explored the role of the US image abroad. In a similar drive, Richard Arndt’ book (2005) explores the American Cultural Diplomacy in the 20th Century, and in a recent European response, Alexander Stephan (ed.) investigates what he terms “the Americanization of Europe” through culture and diplomacy in the post-war (2006). Finally, just as I close this chapter, Bound, Briggs *et.al.* (2007) published a text where they explore cultural diplomacy in theory and practice. See next footnote for the specific debates in Mexico and Sweden.

⁶ Exceptions to this are the UNESCO efforts for a *Dialogue Among Civilizations* (<http://www.unesco.org/dialogue2001/>), the *Center for Arts and Cultural Policy* at Princeton University N.J. (<http://www.princeton.edu/~artspol/>) the *Center for Arts and Culture* in the US (www.culturalpolicy.org), the *Institute for Cultural Diplomacy* in Berlin and NYC (<http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/>) and efforts such as *The White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy* held in Washington D.C. in 2000 (<http://www.state.gov/t/whconf/index.html>) and the *Hearts & Minds Seminar Series: Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions*, presented in the US coordinated by Michael Z. Wise. In Sweden, the Swedish Foreign Ministry (SMFA) and the Swedish Institute (SI) have been promoting discussions on the issue during the last five years. As a concrete action, the government appointed a *Committee of Inquiry on International Cultural Activities* in 2002 which produced the famous report SOU 2003: 121 which was the foundation for the official policy document known as *Regeringens Skrivelse* 2005/06: 188, in 2005. SMFA and SI also hosted the conference “Sweden in the World: Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding and the Image of Sweden” (*Sverige i Världen: Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding och Sverigebild*) in Stockholm in June 2005. In Mexico the discussion on the topic has also been active. The “Matias Romero School of Diplomacy” from the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations (SFR) held several conferences addressing “the cultural factor in diplomacy” during the late 1990’s. By the early millennium, the curricula for the new diplomats at the school had incorporated a couple of subjects targeted at cultural affairs. In fact, I was in charge of the seminar of Cultural Relations and Diplomacy at the school of diplomacy, from where the idea of this book emerged in the first place. In there, Ernesto Sosa, career diplomat and former director of diplomatic training at the Matias Romero School, coordinated some books, publications and interviews that are mentioned throughout the book.

Let us take a moment to understand what the OED suggests. The first connotation provided by the OED for cultural diplomacy has to do with the action of “furthering international relations by cultural exchange.” As is obvious, the semantics of the expression makes culture a subsidiary tool for the main international goal of “furthering international relations.” In this case, culture and, more specifically, “cultural exchange” is an instrumental mechanism for the main objective of principle: peaceful relations among nations. This is not strange, particularly in the post-war mindset of nations. UNESCO’s spirit and main goals are precisely the quest for peace and understanding (Villanueva, 2005). In practice, governments actually engage in cultural exchange as one strategy for the establishment of cultural diplomacy, considering, at least discursively, “the betterment of international understanding.” This is only one part of the story.

The second connotation of cultural diplomacy by the OED (but also in Berridge & James) is referred to as the “act of publicizing and exhibiting examples of one’s national culture abroad.” Publicizing and exhibition are quite peculiar words: they both refer to the action of making public something (in our case a national culture) but also of advertising, displaying or making something visible for the public. If cultural diplomacy has to do with making one’s culture public for external consumption, then it follows that this could also be framed as the setting up of a series of national representations abroad. These are the seeds of my own representational investigations and the connections to my theoretical ambitions in chapter two.

1.1.2. The Cultural *Attaché*

What about the agency of cultural diplomacy? The OED’s reference to the role of the cultural *attaché* is clear but limiting: “an embassy official whose function is to promote cultural relations between his country and the country in which he is staying” (OED 2004). And Moreno Pino argues that the cultural *attaché* is the person responsible for making the academics and the educational sector in the target country aware of his nation’s culture, making sure his own national culture is disseminated through conferences and museum exhibitions (1996: 166). Another aspect of these same definitions of the cultural diplomat comes from A.T.J. Lennon (2003), Helena K. Finn (2003) and Joseph Nye’s (2004) ideas, where the cultural diplomat is an agent of persuasion, soft-power, terrorism prevention (security issues) and/or simply an image maker, an ideology story-teller (democracy and market promoter), or worse, a propagandist. This has been made clear when discourses expressed that “Politics in an Information age ‘may ultimately be about whose story wins’ [...]. Governments compete with each other and with their organizations to enhance their own credibility and weaken that of their opponents” (Nye, 2004: 106).

This depiction of the diplomats as “agents, who have been entrusted with certain tasks from their principals (rulers, governments)” in the form of principal-agent (P-A) has its adherents and capacity to explain political behaviours but, as Jönsson and Hall make explicit in their study, this approach needs to be further clari-

fied (2005: 99 & 108-113), especially, I argue, in the field of culture. The risk otherwise, is to end up in the same old wine of Realism, re-bottled in the new container labelled cultural diplomacy. See, for example, the definitive description of both theory and practice by Helena F. Finn's article in the Nov-Dic 2003 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. She refers to Cultural Diplomacy as the "battle for hearts and minds" in the ongoing "war against Terror."⁷ She calls for a combination of "hard" diplomacy complemented by "soft" diplomacy via cultural exchange and a persistent effort to promote and inculcate American values and pro-American attitudes abroad (*sic*). To challenge this Again, there is more to this story, particularly how contemporary diplomatic theory has approached culture and its own cultural agency (see for example Constantinou 2004, Der Derian 1992, Riordan 2002 & Sharp 2001, 2005). Consider Richard T. Arndt discussion on the work of the diplomats on the field. He says that

Cultural Diplomats first of all are practicing diplomats who deal with a sector of society uniquely theirs, the domain of intellect; they must therefore juggle the values of both worlds. Any diplomat represents his or her country, advises the ambassador, builds networks with foreign notables, negotiates agreements, and administers staff. Cultural diplomats do the same, but with the special sector of the political culture, the host's country educational system, its intellectuals, and its artists (2005: xix)

The specific functions and the status of the *attaché* is also a matter of context. In countries like Mexico, the designation of cultural *attachés* is a national event and follows a long tradition of selecting people with intellectual and artistic credentials, without paying attention to their diplomatic training (interview 13). In Sweden, the selection of *attachés* is mostly an *ad hoc* process, where bodies such as the Swedish Institute and the Ministry of Education have a major voice in the appointment of the *cultural attachés* (interview 6). At all events, in this investigation I contend that Cultural Diplomacy deals with cultural representations, and I want to suggest that the *attaché* is the "official agent," an appointed diplomat from the foreign ministry, responsible for the construction of identity and discourse of a nation's culture abroad. It is clear, as Arndt suggests that an *attaché* is in practice a cultural affairs officer (CAO) with a specific diplomatic ranking: commissaries, counsellors or ministers. Their practical job responsibilities are related to studying the foreign nations to understand their cultures and establishing the necessary networks with society and their intellectual elites, facilitating mutual interaction (2005: Afterword). The more complex discussion of the cultural diplomat's activities (developing an understanding of cosmopolitan identities/alterities) unfolds in the coming chapters. However, for the moment it is also clear that there are other "unofficial agents" acting on behalf of national culture, and also constructing representations of nations abroad, in one way or another. Take the example of companies, artists, sportsmen or women or towns. They are

⁷ The idea of "winning the hearts and minds of people" come in many articles and books that discuss Cultural Diplomacy. As far as I could trace this idea, the main proponent of such strategy was Charles Douglas Jackson who in 1953 was appointed as Special Assistant to US president Dwight D. Eisenhower. As Prevost mentions it, "Jackson's view of psychological warfare was to fight for the minds and souls of the enemy, thus potentially avoiding military combat and destruction" (1998, 12). Other sources confirm that it is the beginning of the Cold War when the idea is shaped in political and military circles of the US (Cfr. Arendt 2005, Lennon 2003 and Stephan ed. 2006).

here considered as actors in the field of cultural relations (and not as diplomats). I come back to this topic in the next chapter.

This initial exploration of the basic definitions can lead to a conclusion: in a restrictive sense, cultural diplomacy accounts only for exchanges, promotion and advertisement of national achievements through the traditional channels of diplomacy. Again, in this limiting sense cultural diplomats are treated as national promoters, propaganda agents and cultural traders. Conceptually, this is a jump backwards to the “*missi* regime” in the Middle Ages. My claim is that research in the field of Cultural Diplomacy needs to go beyond the limiting “conceptual triad” exchange-promotion-advertisement (EPA) of cultural diplomacy (in lower-case). There is a need for a much richer academic understanding of the field and its wider possibilities. Thus, I argue in this thesis that diplomatic theory needs to make use of representational theories, International Relations debates, and cultural studies for a re-conceptualization of the field.

1.1.3. Constructing Cultural Diplomacy in Discourse

In my investigations into the *state-of-the-art* of cultural diplomacy during the 1990s I realized that a peculiarity of this field is that it is seen as a “minor diplomatic task,” a peripheral decorative activity whose relevance pales, compared with, for example, summit diplomacy or economic diplomacy (interviews 2 and 12). Part of the problem is one of practice, *i.e.* how cultural diplomacy has been conducted (*e.g.* the EPA triad) but the more substantial issue, I argue, is epistemic in nature, *i.e.* it is a matter of conceptualization. Every definition of cultural diplomacy *represents* not only the values, actions and objectives but also the limits of a practice. These *representations* can be analyzed in the form of discourses, as will be discussed later on.⁸ I have determined that Cultural Diplomacy is concerned with at least five issues that can be addressed in discursive terms. These are to be seen as key features of its internal discursive logic: Instrumentality, Security, Spatiality, Directionality, and the Public/private divide. I have discerned these five ways of constructing the field, drawing on the latest research on Cultural Diplomacy, which provided me with a relevant analytical perspective. The aim of these discourses (which I take as social constructions) is to understand the key features that may take us beyond the conceptual triad presented earlier. Yet, in the thesis I pay special attention to the role of “instrumentality” since I consider this is the “main discourse” defining how cultural diplomacy is constructed as a practice in foreign ministries.

⁸ For now let’s assume discourse in terms of what I call “the latter Norman Fairclough,” meaning his writings on the issue in the late nineties and early millennium, particularly articulated in his 2003 book. In this venue, “the term discourse (...) signals the particular view of language (...)—as an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements” such as practices, disciplines, instrumentality, etc., inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. In this work, I am rather concerned in the availability and disposition of particular discourses for *representing* specific cultural interests in diplomacy. However, I do not follow a rigorous technique as it would have been the case if my main method was the Discourse Analysis. This is a thesis that looks into representations.

a) Instrumentality

In this, I approach Cultural Diplomacy by thinking of it as “an instrument” of something, (be this politics, economics or culture) embedded in the diplomacy principles generally established by the foreign ministry and the Cultural Policy of the nation. This notion of instrumentality is pivotal to my argument since I can realize how Cultural Diplomacy discourse constructs itself in formal ways (via interests, goals, purposes, etc.) or in an abstract form (via ideals, values, principles, etc.), having in mind a contextual approach. I suggest that Cultural Diplomacy as an abstract structure of norms and concepts (and not as a constitutive set of socially embedded practices) is ultimately an instrument that reinterprets and often simply reflects the aims of the diplomatic apparatus.⁹ This vision of instrumentality has importance for the relationship between action and representation considered in the expository cases in chapters four (Mexico, mainly power) and five (Sweden, mainly culture).

There are two views on this discourse of instrumentality. The first departs from instrumentality as modern thought, according to Michel Foucault, meaning that we now see objects in a logical space under the necessity of a “rational force” (power-knowledge) that in return constitute the subject in a historical context (see 1980: 103). In other words, the process of objectifying reality has an instrumental intersection with the production of truth and the process of subjectification in the context of the institutional modernity. In this, “cultural diplomacy knowledge” is formed across multiple discourses organized by institutional diplomatic regimes of truth. These “truths” play a role in how cultural diplomats define their identities and subjectivities in relation to the instruments (both conceptual and material) they have been provided with (Wendt, 1999:164).

The second view is closer to Horkheimer and Adorno’s ideas (1998 [1954]) on the nature of the “Project of Enlightenment,” where science is represented as a project to dominate and control nature. The argument is that the scientific-modern gaze reduces nature to an object, and thereby turns the subject into an object as well. The result is a technocratic consciousness or “instrumentalized rationality” in which the core of domination is both contained and concealed. Positive science goes about its business of problem solving, discovery and testing, suggesting that the instruments of science (including technology) have no need for examining their ends or goals. In my discussion, this means that diplomacy would generally be content with the adequacy of procedures, etiquette and protocols, for purposes more or less taken for granted. This maybe so in the past. It is possible to argue that generally speaking, diplomacy has failed in efforts to make explicit their discourse of the ends and disposition of instruments. Instead, questions of substance are reduced to technical questions of communications and negotiation. Normative questions or interrogations about societal goals are reduced in diplomatic discussions to technical issues: problems that can only be solved according to the allegedly objective standards of diplomatic rationality. Put sim-

⁹ It is important to be careful and not jump to a fast conclusion assuming that Cultural Diplomacy is powerless from the start. Rather the contrary, instrumentality is a way to discuss the epistemology of the concept.

ply, Instrumentality is seen as a way to reach from A to B, without questioning the traditional diplomatic reasoning, thus losing reflectivity: in Cultural Diplomatic terms, culture alienates a goal different from itself.

This leads me to a fundamental conclusion: in the case of Cultural Diplomacy there are three main instrumental “rational forces” that in the past two decades have determined the articulation of discourse: marketing rationale (*Nation-branding*), power politics (*Soft-power*) and culture (*Cosmopolitan Constructivism*). The first and the second alienate cultural diplomacy, making it serve objectives different from itself. The third, related to culture in the form of identity and alterity, is the natural field of Cultural Diplomacy that opens the possibilities of advancing an extended research agenda. Let us take a look at how this instrumentality works in research discourses.

Cultural Diplomacy was Manuela Aguilar’s research plan for the book (1996) in which she defines it as the “way a government *portrays its country to another country’s people* in order to help *achieve certain foreign policy goals*” (Aguilar, 1996: 8). The key questions in relation to what we explained earlier are the emphasis on portrayal (as a form of promotion or image), the audience (the peoples of foreign countries) and the undisclosed foreign policy goals. To put it in a nutshell, Cultural Diplomacy is the instrument of undisclosed State foreign policy goals whose objective is to influence and persuade publics in other nations (*soft-power*). This is nothing new. Discourses in the field have commonly emphasized this perspective, even in the most recent publications, *e.g.* Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones remark that “Cultural Diplomacy, which is about the quest for the tourist dollar as well as the battle for the hearts and minds, is a competitive marketplace” (2007: 18.19). A second point Aguilar makes is that both information activities and educational and cultural activities are in fact Cultural Diplomacy since they both “transmit aspects of the culture of a people to foreign audiences; they are also consciously employed to serve the same underlying goal: *the advancement of national policy interests* through the portrayal of the various aspects of a country’s culture” (1996: 12, *my italics*). As is obvious, this rationale contains very strong views of power-politics, where cultural diplomacy is objectified serving the needs of the national-interest (whatever that may be) and the hegemony of the State over that of societies (both national and foreign). In this, the instruments of Cultural Diplomacy construct subjectivity under the national-interest logic as a form of “regime of truth,” seen as forms of exercising power through knowledge (Rabinow 1991: 51-75).

In sum, the instrumentality of discourse is the key aspect –in understanding the way cultural diplomacy is constituted. Instrumentality in discourse constructs the subject via regimes of truth and technical authority. In my study of different discourses, the end-goals of Cultural Diplomacy are seldom clarified and there is very little room for reflexivity in the field. Manuela Aguilar’s research is a good illustration of these points. She constructs the field in terms of “portrayal,” assuming that the end-goal for the diplomats is to influence other societies abroad in order to achieve (undisclosed) foreign policy goals. However, she leaves room for a society-society communication and exchange which she terms “cultural re-

lations,” as a way to escape the constraints of cultural diplomacy (as exchange-promotion-advertisement).¹⁰

b) Securitization

Security theory is one of the strongest research areas of International Relations (IR).¹¹ Diplomacy has also been concerned with securitization, particularly during the 19th and 20th centuries, where views on the role of the national interest, sovereignty and the balance of power are in the forefront of the discussions.¹² Security, in the late 20th century and the new millennium, follows an agenda based on the social, environmental and human dimensions of security. The question is, what needs to be securitized in “cultural diplomatic” terms anyways? The answer is twofold: national culture and cultural presence abroad.¹³

A study on Cultural Diplomacy which is relevant to an understanding of the need for diplomatic discourses to secure national cultures is that carried out by Louis Bélanger (1999). The first problem he addresses is in the changing nature of Cultural Diplomacy. He argues that “until recently, cultural diplomacy essentially involved strengthening a country’s cultural influence by funding artist’s tours and or by promoting the study of the country’s language and culture in universities abroad” (1999: 677). However,

The situation is quite different today. The international cultural agenda is now structured more by the challenges faced by each culture in the age of globalization, as cultural products are increasingly swept into the transnational communication and economic flows. To be culturally powerful-or even culturally significant-in today’s world, a country must exercise control over these flows, which are increasing in tandem with the development of new information and communication technologies (NICT’s) and trade liberalization (1999: 677-688).

His view is that there is an inevitable path towards a liberal globalization that makes cultural diplomacy an instrument to assist nations in managing the structural changes taking place. In fact, the idea that Cultural Diplomacy is a reflection of foreign policy, (the expression of a national interest profoundly rooted in some cultural denominator) is *passé*. He goes on to suggest that the actual relation between Cultural Diplomacy and foreign policy is changing because of a context of growing “cultural insecurity,” meaning that migration flows, concealed foreign cultural influence, or religious differences pose “threats both real and perceived, not to state sovereignty but to the identity of societies –that is, the sense of belonging or the mode of subjectivization of a society.” Therefore, the concept known, in the terminology of the Copenhagen School, as “social security,” is necessary to justify the role of Cultural Diplomacy these days.

However, in recent years Foreign Ministries are more inclined to make culture an instrument of economics and polity, and when they change their approaches to culture, it is usually to assimilate it with civic principles and values, as expressed

¹⁰ E.g. Arndt (2005), Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones (2007) and Wise (2003).

¹¹ e.g. see Buzan and Wæver eds. 2003, Campbell, D. 1998, Katzenstein ed. 1996, and Keohane and Nye 1998.

¹² e.g. Der Derian 1992, particularly his “genealogy of security” and Costas 2004, particularly his “Poetics of Security.”

¹³ Cf. Michael C. Williams’ most recent book *Culture and Security* (2007).

in the case of Canada during the 1990s (1999: 695). Summarizing, in Bélanger's view Cultural Diplomacy in the 1990s emerges as a relevant institution with the capacity to influence foreign policy (and not only the other way around), particularly for its role in the promotion of domestic culture abroad but also in its protection (security discourse) against any external "corrupting influence," particularly having the context of a liberal globalization. He suggests that attention should be paid to the pressures exerted by globalization in the foreign policies. It should also be understood that these pressures will come not only from States but also from actors or groups acting in self-interest, thus potentially eroding aspects of social/human security of the nation, beyond the core understanding of national interests.¹⁴ Cultural Diplomacy is then constructed as a safeguard and a watchdog for national culture (as actors of cultural relations).

In sum, a securitization discourse in Cultural Diplomacy means protecting the national culture from external influences (propaganda, migration or/and commercial overflow) and also finds it necessary to organize a foreign policy programme to develop national culture into other nations, emphasizing for example language, traditions and local views of society. For this discourse to work, diplomacies must operate in strict nationalist terms, having an essentialist view of their own cultural and national identities. This is a form of "cultural sovereignty" as an institution that provides the state with exclusive political and cultural authority in their territorial spaces, basic in the construction of state identity (cf. Katzenstein, Wendt and Jepperson 1996). As it may be obvious for the reader, liberal globalization makes this discourse to seem anachronistic (but not irrelevant) with the current trends in world societies, particularly in the post-industrial nations and the regional integration of the new millennium.

c) Spatiality

Cultural diplomatic discourses also pay attention to how spatiality is constructed, both in terms of the national territory and borders, but also in "foreign" terms. This is so because the field has natural "external" implications, *e.g.* regional, international or global. One of the missions of Cultural Diplomacy is to represent culture abroad; the question is "how far" does "abroad" extend here? By default, most cultural diplomacies in the 20th century conceptualize themselves as belonging to the international space. However, more and more, ideas in regional and global spatiality make cultural diplomacies reconsider their scope. These conceptualizations are not only necessary for theoretical reasons, but they also represent power and influence. Peter J. Katzenstein's observations on the field (2002), explore the definitions established by the German and Japanese cultural diplomacies as a way to illustrate the differences between globalization, regionalization and internationalization theories. He begins by saying that "States typically regard themselves as the privileged carrier of national culture" (2002: 2) and "In their cultural diplomacies all states reflect, as in security, the logic of an international, not global, world. They regard it as their special prerogative *to rep-*

¹⁴ A similar discussion on rationality of actors and the setting up of preferences where Culture, Welfare and Defense are discussed as political options, can be found in Lewin 1988.

resent the cultural achievements of the political community in their international society of states” (2002: 10, my italics). In particular, Katzenstein argues that there are two faces of Japanese cultural diplomacy, as having both “inwards and outwards” approaches (2002: 19) to spatiality. The former acts to create the necessary infrastructure/base to attract other people to Japan, while the latter is the projection of Japanese culture abroad.

Yet another spatial angle explored by Katzenstein is the role of markets and cultural industries in the construction of a national-cultural representation abroad. The analytical categories used here are the “potential market dynamics” and the “regional/international/global spread” of cultures abroad, in association with, or in isolation from, State intervention. The first category explores the cultural potential of nations to attract the attention of other nations (the “inwards” face), followed by the expansion capabilities, all from a private-firm mentality (“outwards” face). In this case, the study of cultural industries as agents of cultural relations acting, unofficially, on behalf of nations, gets to the point: their mission becomes the commodification of culture and profit becomes the yardstick of success (Miller and Yúdice, 2002: 72-106). If a national-cultural product is dynamic, then it has the potential to go abroad and a cultural firm may make use of the market opportunity. The depth of the product’s dynamic will ensure that the cultural commodity will “spread” to a region, or else use an international frame or a fluid global market circuit (second category).¹⁵ If the product is not dynamic, then perhaps it is the role of the State alone to carry on the weight of the cultural exports. An example Katzenstein presents summarizes the Japanese approach as follows:

Since the early 1970’s, Japan’s contemporary cultural diplomacy has changed greatly. While Japanese nationalist sentiments remain strong and exist today in clearly recognizable form, national closure to cultural influences from abroad is no longer public policy and neither is national propaganda. For Japan as for most other industrial states the export and import of cultural values and practices occurs in a world in which national cultures are integral parts of transnational cultural networks. [...] The dynamic spread of Japan’s mass culture industries outside of Japan is reinforcing this important shift. Despite its inaccessible language, a combination of exceptional artistic creativity and corporate savvy have made [...] ‘the cuteness of capital and the commodification of intimacy’ the hallmarks of Japan’s cool cultural power (2002: 51).

The relevance of these discussions will appear over and over in the thesis, particularly in the opposition of Cultural Diplomacy and industries (see *infra*), their own logics/interests and capacity to reach out, as well as their representational formulations. It is important to mention that little research has actually been done in this regard and this is a difficult but necessary question for cultural diplomacies everywhere. When it comes to the three main discourses of Cultural Diplomacy studied in this thesis, the economic one, presented as Nation Branding has a closer relevance to this debate. However, the way it has been set up by leading experts adds more doubts than certainties (see *infra*).

¹⁵ A compelling example of this is the “Harry Potter effect” which has made some bright scholars write a book on the issue of popular culture and international relations, having the impact of the book in world cultures as the focus of analysis, see Neuman and Nexon 2006.

Summarizing, for the moment it is important to stress the suggestion Katzenstein brings to the debate that cultural diplomacies operate mainly in a regional area with an international logic, while the cultural industries function in regional areas mainly, with a global expansive predisposition.

d) The Directionality

Most definitions of Cultural Diplomacy address the issue of directionality in the sense of signaling at what level they expect “cultural exchange” to take place. The official definition of Cultural Diplomacy presented by Milton C. Cummings in his research study on US cultural diplomacy is a good starting point for a further analysis of the idea of “cultural exchange”: “The concept of ‘cultural diplomacy,’ refers to the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture *among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding*” (2003: 1, my italics). The discursive logic of the definition (exchange of “culture” in order to foster mutual understanding among nations and their peoples) is what matters here. This logic uses culture in a perspective where mutuality is at the core of this approach.

The problem of representing the nation abroad opens up for a discussion on what is to be represented (a major question for chapter two). According to Katzenstein (2002), when the nation decides to represent its own identity abroad only (unidirectional representation, say through language and arts exports), the logic of the diplomacy is in an apparent conflict with Western values of democracy and human rights (*e.g.* neo-colonialism and imperial cultural impulses). Germany is used as an example for overcoming this dilemma using a different representational strategy: Ralf Dahrendorf called for

a ‘shift of emphasis from a foreign policy of state to a foreign policy of societies’. If the options were once thought to be either ‘self-representation’ or ‘dialogue’, since the 1970s ‘dialogue as self-representation’ has increasingly come to be taken for granted [...thus] The institutionalization of the dialogue model of cultural diplomacy, however, was the result of practical work in the field which gradually shaped the views of politicians and informed the articulation of policy principles” (quoted in Katzenstein 2002: 28).

This “dialogue model” is best exemplified by the direction and representation of the policy as presented above, where dialogue means a form of bi-retro or multi-directionality, while propaganda means uni-directionality. The directionality of the Cultural Diplomacy is easy to establish when looking at the disposition of the discourse. Naima Prevost, for example mentions that the cultural diplomacy of the US is embedded in private initiative, and not only in government involvement, and that is why money for such activities comes from funds such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Their missions, during the Cold War, were “sponsoring exchanges of professors, students, and publications, stimulating translations and the book trade, and encouraging the teaching of English. Much of the activity was aimed at Latin America with the idea of *spreading knowledge about us* as a neighbor, thus fostering friendly relations” (1998: 18). As is obvious, this is mostly a unidirectional approach with some bidirectional ambitions, but the ultimate goal is to “spread knowledge about us.” While the idea of exchanges exists, it was subordinated to the fear of communism gaining

influence in the area, thus the need to show the superiority of American capitalism, their way of life and their language.

The perspective of Cultural Diplomacy in the metaphor of one-way or two-way avenues is relevant in principle. In this instance then, one-way refers to the unilateral projection of a nation or cultural identities abroad while two-way implies reciprocity (you present something here, I present something in return over there). Mutuality requires what I term here “retrodirectional” action, meaning the reflection of policy efforts in a retro-reflective way.¹⁶ A “retroreflective cultural diplomacy” here means a policy constructed in common by two nations in order to achieve mutual understanding (we present something together here and/or over there). Finally, A multidirectional cultural action aims at plurality, meaning a multilateral diplomatic approach to culture, as many efforts inside UNESCO attest (we all do something together to the benefit of all). The only objection here is that while keeping an international framework where nations are the main agents of the exchange, societies become only repositories or containers of the cultural actions. The debate on public diplomacy will shed light on this.

In sum, in order to make these concepts useful for my expository cases later on, I would like to suggest four divisions, thus clarifying the direction and representation of the cultural diplomacy: one-way (unidirectional), two-way (bi-directional), mutuality (retro-directional) and plurality (multi-directional).

e) The Private/Public Divide

Another topic relevant for this study is Katzenstein’s (2002) concept of “private” cultural diplomacy, in which he analyzes the Japanese way of financing cultural activities abroad through corporations, philanthropic groups and foundations. This is a peculiar approach since in traditional terms cultural diplomacy is viewed mainly as a public affair. Diplomacies operate with public financial support and in principle it seems strange to talk about private cultural diplomacy. However, Katzenstein’s observation points to the fact that the forms of appropriating culture by various diplomatic apparatuses differs dramatically from country to country. The question arising here is whether culture is constructed as an active or passive catalyst for the cultural representation abroad (2002: 23). When passive, (such as the Japanese case) culture becomes secondary, non-nationalistic and anti-propagandistic, *i.e.* very little state intervention and more private support comes into the picture, as has been the case of the US for many years. When active, culture becomes a prime focus of attention for the state and its foreign policy, and both national and cultural identities are given salience, triggering a

¹⁶ In his recent discussion on “New Diplomacy” Shaun Riordan reminds us that “The postmodern world will live with continued forms of asymmetric resistance of various kinds [... and] similarly, values, and in particular civil society cannot be imposed together with their Western cultural contexts. Success will lie in promoting a genuine and open debate about core values and their realization. The image of the postmodern world as a whole, and its individual countries and communities, is essential to the project” (2003: 131-132). Similarly, Strobe Talbot argues in his essay “Globalization and Diplomacy” that in the case of the American government, there is no other alternative but to work “Multi-Multilaterally” (2004: 370-371).

state intervention impulse, such has been the case of Britain or France in the past.¹⁷

At the same time, when culture is active in diplomacy, there is a struggle to reconcile the popular and the modern *avant-garde* identities in discourse, a struggle that may also aim to represent other nationalities, issues (development, feminism, peace) and cultures inside diplomacy, using it as a place for diversity and contestation (cosmopolitanism).¹⁸ For example, Germany, according to Katzenstein used culture as an active tool after 1952 when the German “Foreign Ministry established a division of cultural affairs and made culture, besides economics and politics, the ‘third pillar’ of Germany’s foreign policy intended to improve the international climate by fostering cooperation and exchange (Brandt 1967)” (2002: 26).

As is obvious here, the debate on how to approach cultural diplomacy, from a pure public or private perspective is no longer valid. Most countries now look for sources to finance their cultural diplomacies beyond state funds, and this makes foreign ministries find ways to cooperate with firms and foundations.¹⁹ Undoubtedly, this trend shapes the way Cultural Diplomacy is now perceived: more as an object of consumption in a market mentality, rather than a legitimate state preoccupation with how its national culture and identity is constructed and penetrates international society. In this, both Soft-power and Nation-Branding pose a real challenge to assumptions made by Cosmopolitan Constructivism, as we will see in the expository cases.²⁰

In conclusion, the definition of Cultural Diplomacy needs to be re-addressed posing new legitimate research questions. As this survey of four scholarly discussions makes clear, Cultural Diplomacy gives me the possibility to address the internal discursive logic of five issues: Instrumentality (power, marketing or culture), Security (external cultural threat and cultural national projection), Spatiality (regional, international, global) Directionality (unidirectional, bi-directional, retro-directional, and multi-directional), and the Public/private divide (cultural diplomacy, foundations and industries). These features are embedded in the ways Cultural Diplomacy is represented in Soft Power (SP), Nation Branding (NB) or Cosmopolitan Constructivism (CC), as is obvious in table 1.1.

¹⁷ Eytan Gliboa argues that “media, and global television in particular, have become a central source of information in world affairs” directly affecting diplomacy and the way it is carried out (2004). Similarly Christer Jönsson suggests that television age has modified the way diplomacy operates by producing a new way of “signaling” that challenges traditional practices (2004). These two aspects are part of a trend where culture is produced mostly by private firms, and appropriated by society and contemporary diplomacies later on. Diplomatic apparatuses lack the “economic muscle” to compete with the great media empires of today’s world.

¹⁸ In my interview with Ernesto Sosa (June 2003), he expressed his view that “the world of culture is difficult to discern for the diplomatic apparatuses. It is too mobile and flexible to grasp and discipline, thus the options usually tend to be the more established, elite culture choices.”

¹⁹ E.g. Michael Wise 2003, specially the part defined as “The Cultural Diplomacy of Other Nations.”

²⁰ Richard Arndt shares pessimism on this, especially after seeing how some of the best US efforts in the field were eroded in what he terms “Two decades of Decline” from the Reagan Administration to Bush II, when the perception of the country in foreign eyes sank throughout the world, especially after the Iraqi conflict (2006, chapter 24).

Table 1.1: Representations of Cultural Diplomacy as Discourses

Discursive issues	Soft Power	Nation Branding	Cosmopolitan Constructivism
<i>Instrumentality</i>	Power	Marketing	Culture
<i>Security</i>	Protection-Promotion	Promotion	Exchange
<i>Spatiality</i>	International	Global	International/Global
<i>Directionality</i>	One-way	One-way/two way	Mutual-plurality
<i>Public/private</i>	Mainly public	Mainly private	Mainly public

In the expository cases (chapters four and five) I use these concepts to explain how Sweden and Mexico construct their cultural diplomacies, paying particular attention to cultural diplomacy and discursive practices. I also want to stress the fact that this debate goes beyond the exchange-promotion-advertisement triad that traditionally defines the field in rather restrictive terms.

1.2. Diplomacy: The Public and Representations

Until recently, diplomacy was an aristocratic, highly hierarchical non-conventional political practice which had the mission of negotiating the interests of a nation abroad –and particularly the prevention of unexpected war. While the structure of contemporary diplomacy challenges this basic perception, there is no doubt that this activity is still rooted in its traditional European *top-down* inception (Mowat 1982 [1929]). The public enters “diplomacy” at a later stage, as we explain below.

Traditional diplomatic theory, from its Italian formal inception in the fifteenth century, stresses the importance of the modern nation-states as the key actors in the international structure, which is a legacy we still endure and debate. The main themes for traditional diplomacy are the conformation of the states, their mutual recognition, and the means to maintain order and survive in an uncertain international system (*e.g.* Jönsson and Langhorne 2004, vol. II). To that extent, diplomacy was founded under the primary assumption of statecraft and interstate relations, where “there was no superior jurisdiction to the state; international law existed only insofar as it permitted the minimal rules of coexistence between states; and war was permitted to resolve disputes between states” (Riordan, 2003: 11). This is one of the reasons why we frequently find that definitions of diplomacy follow such a line of thought. Take Elmer Plischke’s frequently used definition of diplomacy as the “political process by which political entities, generally states, conduct official relations with one another within the international environment” (1979: 33). Another classic, Sir Ernest Satow proposed that “Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states” (Satow 1979 [1934]: p.1). In this thesis, I lump these definitions under the state-centric representation of diplomacy. But this is just one side of the coin. The other is affirmatively, society, represented by public diplomacy.

1.2.1 Public Diplomacy in Discourse

Harold Nicholson claims that diplomatic modernity arrives when a) there is a shift from secret to open diplomacy; b) public opinion has something to say about the foreign affairs; and c) communications become widely used (1988 [1939]: 36-39). Whether or not this is modernity, the point is that the public enters the diplomatic radar and has the possibility to express its views and actually influence outcomes on issues that were considered forbidden for the majority. Diplomacy in the 20th century finally pays attention to the public, media, discourses, and NGOs as powerful emerging international actors with their own demands. Dag Hammarskjöld explains the spirit of the times very eloquently by saying that “no diplomat is likely to meet the demands of *public opinion* on him as a representative in international policy unless he understands this opinion and unless he respects it deeply enough to give it leadership when he feels that *the opinion truly represents the deeper and finally decisive aspirations in the minds and hearts of the people*” (Hammarskjöld 1979: 86, my italics). The discursive finesse used by this high-profile Swedish diplomat in getting a grasp of “people’s true aspirations” is especially relevant if we compare it with the more ordinary definitions. Take Christopher Ross’ definition of Public Diplomacy, for example:

It is not traditional diplomacy, which consists essentially of the interactions that take place between governments. The practitioners of traditional diplomacy engage the representative of foreign governments in order to *advance the national interest articulated in their own government’s strategic goals in international affairs*. Public diplomacy, by contrast, engages carefully *targeted sectors of foreign publics in order to develop support for those same strategic goals* (2003: 251-252, my italics).


These two illustrations show clear divisions on how Public Diplomacy can be approached, defined and practised, given academic and political traditions.²¹ Let us describe two approaches, Top-Down and Bottom-Up, where the diplomatic agency is in charge of making the representation on behalf of the constituency-patron. Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic discursive treatment of the concept is more of a Bottom-up approach, following a democratic idealist tradition in the context of the 1970s-80s. Ross’ view is more pragmatic and instrumental, following a Top-down approach in line with power politics as described above. However, the point to clarify here seems to be that under the discursive sphere of public diplomacy the diplomat (agency) becomes a representative of people’s interests and aspirations (constituents), in contrast with the traditional discourse of elite diplomacy (acting patrons) who ultimately define the “national interest” and make the diplomatic corps follow in step. In chapter two, I come back to this discussion re-casting the debate under the umbrella of representational theories and the problems of *standing for* and *acting on behalf of*.

²¹ Mark Leonard cautions that “The term ‘public diplomacy’ is often euphemism for propaganda. But the proliferation of information in open societies (and increasingly in closed ones as well) makes it more difficult for governments to control information” (2004: 229). Thus, this division of bottom-up and top-down is just schematic and must be confronted against current practices that evaporate these distinctions. Remember that Aguilar defined Cultural Diplomacy in very similar terms earlier.

1.2.2. Difference between Public and Cultural Diplomacy

It is time now to distinguish between Cultural Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy. I claim that while they connect in their primary interest in addressing societies abroad, Cultural Diplomacy is more concerned, in a long-term perspective, with how people's identities are constructed and represented in discursive terms, while Public Diplomacy is more oriented in the short-term problem of representation at the level of communication and image-making of society (see figure 1.1).²² It is obvious that the idea of Public Diplomacy clearly incorporates a cultural dimension, and *vice versa*. Public Diplomacy can be said to be representative of forces such as the media, newspapers, academia, unions and the some extent, the layperson who, by virtue of accessing information may influence diplomatic decisions abroad. In most of my interviews, the diplomats in the field could see differences between the two camps, but failed in clearly point down the sharp dissimilarities. The easy solution is to uncritically subsume Cultural Diplomacy under Public Diplomacy. I claim this is noticeably a mistake, since they require different competences, fulfil different objectives and have different time frames. Ideally, they should be seen as two separate fields operating in mutual constitutive relations. In fact, the advantages of looking at them in this manner are greater, as I show in figure 1.1. In there, I suggest that Cultural Diplomacy is responsible for the artistic, cultural and scientific fields, preparing educational exchanges and developing an official discourses about the national and cultural identities of the country. On the other hand, Public diplomacy would operate as an information agency where official communications, the public relations and the image of the country abroad can be assessed and also disseminated (even as a propaganda or commercial). They both operate under the diplomacy proper, and connect in their interests to reach out foreign societies in other nations.

Figure 1.1. Comparing Cultural and Public Diplomacies



²² The tendency in many ministries, however, is to see cultural diplomacy as a subsidiary field of public diplomacy. Margaret J. Wyszomirski says that "Generally speaking, the two major components of public diplomacy are: information policy and cultural/educational programs. Cultural and educational diplomacy emphasizes exchanges of persons and ideas that directly involve a relatively small number of people and is concerned with promoting long-term mutual understanding between peoples" (2003: 1).

The distinction between the two diplomatic fields has not been properly addressed in literature and only a few authors have commented on it. Richard T. Arndt defends the uniqueness of Cultural Diplomacy arguing that (at least in the US) “Today the cultural dimension of diplomacy has been slashed, its independence compromised, its values blurred, its human resources driven away, its budgets strangled, and its honest servants befuddled by misguided reorganizations and meretricious rhetoric” (2005: xxi). During the Arts and Minds seminar carried out in 2003, in the Panel of experts “Cultural Diplomacy of other Nations,” Andy Macay, Director of the British Council US said that in his view

public diplomacy is about [...] government messages. Government wants to get out something about a country, [...] so you have public diplomacy messages, and if you want to get them across better, you switch up the volume more, you increase the frequency, or you produce a new leaflet. Along side that there is cultural diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy, for me, is much more [...] about [...] the creation of long-term relations that will endure. They will endure because there is a mutual understanding that results from those relationships (2003: 37).

In most of my interviews, experts in the field declared their views that during conflict, the government is more prone to use public diplomacy as a defensive-offensive political tactic, recurring to propaganda and stereotyping if necessary (e.g. Melissen, 2005: 16-21). On the other hand, in peace and democracy most governments engage in a form of cultural diplomacy, or as some also referred to “foreign cultural policy.”²³ In addition, Manuela Aguilar makes a necessary distinction that stresses a division between the interests of the State and those of society, accepting that in power-politics they are not necessarily the same. Aguilar makes it clear that Cultural Diplomacy is not a task for government-to-government interaction, but rather government-to-foreign peoples communication, thus sharing this concern with that of Public Diplomacy. She clearly makes a separate distinction with “cultural relations” which are international activities carried out by individuals, organizations, firms and/NGO’s in order to develop a cultural exchange on the basis of their own interests, and not necessarily follows the political goals of the official Public Diplomacy for producing “a positive image and to increase the prestige of their country among the foreign target audience” (1996: 9). This is a way out from the rationality of the modern discourse, a door to liberate culture and society from the alienating instrumentality of power-politics in the more traditional form of Public Diplomacy. Let us not forget, however, that the core of cultural and public diplomacies is the societies they try to reach out abroad. This is a work of representation in the sense that the diplomacies represent their own societies and at the same time they represent not only foreign diplomats but in this case foreign societies. Paul Sharp adds to this that “Once diplomacy is seen again in terms of representation rather than as an instrument of more substantive foreign policies, then it becomes possible to see

²³ Not all critics agree with these distinctions. Take the case of Mark Leonard who advocates the idea that “Public Diplomacy should be about building relationships, starting from understanding other countries needs, cultures, and peoples and then looking for areas to make common cause” (2004: 230, vol. III). Similarly, the classic definition presented by Hans Tuch says that Public Diplomacy is “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies”. Quoted in Melissen 2005: 12-13.

how it expresses a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years” (1999: 43). In sum, this thesis assumes both a differentiation but also a continuous feed back between cultural and public diplomacies. At the same time, distinctions are important since this work mainly devotes its attention to Cultural Diplomacy and to a much lesser extent to Public Diplomacy.

1.2.3. Public Diplomacy in Sweden and Mexico

In practice, however, there some caveats in this discourse. For example, Sweden, as one of my expository examples in the thesis, defines public diplomacy these days as a country’s communication with the general public in other countries with the purpose of creating understanding for its own nation’s way of thinking, ideals, institutions and culture as well as its national goals and current politics. Public diplomacy is primarily used to understand, inform, affect and build relations abroad in order to realize real political, cultural and economical goals. In a time of increased democracy and mass communication, a country’s ability to reach political goals, promote trade, attract investments and visitors and take part in the exchange of talent and creativity is to a large extent dependent on how the country is perceived abroad (*Regeringens skrivelse* 2005/06: 188). The foundation of Swedish public diplomacy is communication with the general public abroad to gain common understanding, and then reach political, cultural and economic goals. This approach is discursively rather current. It takes into consideration the instrumentality at three levels (economic, political and cultural), there is room for all kinds of directionalities, and it opens the doors to public and private participation. It is not very clear how its “spatiality” is accounted for, but there is a reference to an “international dimension” at the beginning (the reference to boundaries of a country) and to globalization at the end (the reference to increased democracy and mass communications). At the same time, the lack of specificity makes this discourse accommodate a number of views, which do not necessarily address the more restricted question as to who must be represented.

In recent years, Mexico has defined its public diplomacy under the concept of cooperation and development. The idea of public diplomacy is not well defined as such in the Mexican diplomatic discourse but it is suggested in different forms. For Example, Jorge Alberto Lozoya writes that “Today, non-traditional actors and transnational units – private and public agents, among which you find corporations, banks, foundations, and NGOs – are salient and constitutive agents of international activity. They tend to occupy the spaces of action left aside by the states, and their preoccupations contribute to reinterpret the world issues and disseminate their relevance in the global agenda” (1999: 25). And after acknowledging that these “new actors” have nurtured the discussion related to the preservation of the environment, the human rights agenda, free market and democracy promotion and fight against international illegal crime, he comes to recognize that cooperation is the buzzword for Mexican diplomacy concerning these issues. He substantiates the definition by arguing that

international cooperation has an increasing importance as a catalyst for development and support for economic and commercial transactions. It is a primordial link to have access to technical and scientific knowledge, stimulate the intercultural dialogue and to promote a better inter-institutional knowledge, but also among social organizations and individuals with a compromise with social change (1999: 16).

Put simply, the foundations of Mexican public diplomacy are to be seen through the mechanisms of international cooperation where diplomacy proper continues to be the representative link of societies' best interest, and thus reach technoscientific, cultural-educational and economic/development goals. This is a rather conventional view of public diplomacy and it is anchored in debates taking place in multilateral diplomacy, particularly in line with 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), particularly Article 3, which shows the five functions of modern-contemporary diplomacy.²⁴

In diplomacy, the goal of cooperation and presenting one's culture beyond simplistic stereotypes comes up repeatedly. Paolo Riani, director of the Italian Cultural Institute, is intent on "presenting an image of the country that is not just Mafia, not just fashion." Flavio Perri, the Brazilian consul general, wants "to show we are more than Carnival" (Wise 2002). Joseph Nye reminds us that "Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values." (Nye 2004: 7). This is one of the theoretical justifications for the Mexican diplomacy to engage in a cultural diplomacy closer to the Soft Power idea, as I will show in detail in chapter four.

1.3. Representing Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism in Discourse

I now come back to E.T. Hall's question at the beginning of the chapter where he confronts us with one basic foreign policy problem: *how can countries gain the affection and esteem of other nations?* The short answer is to be found in the powers of persuasion and public diplomacy. The more complex one has to do with finding the proper Cultural Diplomacy to construct common understanding. Then, the simple solution is to improve the persuasive channels of bilateral and multilateral communications, refine the tools for the conquest of the "hearts and minds" of the peoples abroad and make respect and admiration a goal in itself in foreign policy (cf. Lennon, 2003 and Nye 2004). This requires a great deal of

²⁴ Article 3

1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist, inter alia, in:

- (a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State;
- (b) Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
- (c) Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
- (d) Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State;
- (e) Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.

2. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as preventing the performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission.

rhetoric, brainwashing and propaganda. It is expensive and has short-term effects. The complex solution is to engage in a programme for reciprocal cultural understanding, where countries have the opportunities to gain knowledge of each other through their own societies and thus improve their own direct communication mechanisms. This is a hard learning process with no guarantee of success in any direction. But it is also a more substantial and realistic process to make everyone aware of their own commonalities and differences. The long term effects, says theory, should be more effective and meaningful for all (Hall, S. 2002: 61: 85). The worst scenario may end up at a “cultural deadlock” where values and identities find no common grounds to interact and influence each other in a productive way. In the following, I suggest three discourses that are constitutive of Cultural Diplomacy: Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. In this, I assume the discourses themselves are not Cultural Diplomacy. The representation of Cultural Diplomacy is dependent on how they are appropriated in practice by the ministries and their diplomatic apparatuses.

1.3.1 Soft-Power

Joseph Nye Jr. first developed the Soft Power (SP) concept in his book *Bound to Lead* (1990) that questioned the then-prevalent view that America was in decline. His point was that the US was the strongest nation on earth in military and economic terms. And he went on to suggest that also the values and ideals that gave substance to the “hard stuff,” meaning that liberty, democracy and culture the American way were also factors to take into account. These are all sources of Soft Power. Ever since, the concept has been used as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Soft power rises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and policies” (2004: x). He suggested that this power could be cultivated through relations with allies, economic assistance, and cultural exchanges. His rationale insisted that this would result in a more favourable public opinion and credibility abroad, making it easier for the US specifically to carry on business as usual.

He returned to this theme again in 2001 with the publication of *The Paradox of American Power*, a book that sees the need for US to lead the emerging global system, for if the strongest state does not lead, the prospects for instability increase for all. One of his strongest points is that “power is becoming less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible” (2001: 188), thus recognizing that the old Realist equation needs to be reformulated. For Nye US leadership should show the way to other nations towards an interdependent world community founded on free trade, in which nation-states increasingly share power with multinational firms, nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors. And this is the paradox he elaborates: interdependence and global diffusion of power makes military force increasingly irrelevant and renders traditional calculations of power rather meaningless.

His last contribution to the debate was the book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004). Here, Nye develops further his idea that the nature and sources of power in world politics are changing and that power has become

less tangible and more diffuse. Thus, in postindustrial nations, traditional material power (economic & military) is becoming less important as a means to the realization of international favourable results (in a more utilitarian way). Power is increasingly exercised through persuasive means—that is, though influence rather than threat and coercion. This “soft” approach consists in the ability of a state to set a political agenda so as to influence the “preferences and interests” of other states in ways consistent with its own. Soft Power assets include: culture, lifestyle, technology, norms and values as means to influence the public, organizations and institutions.

In this perspective, foreign policy is in principle a concern of government in that cultural diplomacy assists in the achievement of the “national interest” of the State. The most “rational means” should be regarded as a form of Soft Power to retain control and superiority over other nations through symbols and rituals (Richelieu [see letters & memoirs in Bonney 1988], Lennon 2003, Nye 1990, 2004). In traditional IR theory, this would bring us closer to the Realists and a cut of the Liberal-Utilitarian perception of world affairs, in any of its main variations (Aron R. 1996, Bull H. 1995, Morgenthau H. 1993, Krasner 1985, and Waltz K. 1979, etc.). Cultural Diplomacy becomes an instrument to stimulate power through the influence of culture, understood as a set of superior values and norms that both have structural effects over weaker traditions, and thus attract other nations closer to a countries’ point of view by winning the battle for their “hearts and minds.” In this sense, the representation of Soft Power as suggested by Joseph Nye Jr. is

a country's cultural and ideological appeal. It is the ability to get desired outcomes through attraction instead of force. It works by convincing others that they should follow you or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce behavior you want. Soft power depends largely on the persuasiveness of information. If a country can make its position attractive in the eyes of others and strengthen international institutions that encourage others to define their interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many traditional economic or military resources. In today's global information age, soft power is becoming increasingly important (Nye 1999: 27).

In other words, Soft Power is the use of images, symbols and simulation to convince nations and people of some policy objective that serves a country's interest.

It is time now to deliver some sound critical arguments. Let me expose three concrete intellectual positions: Nye's ideas of Soft Power suggest egotistical rational states reluctant to cooperate and otherwise in a happy isolation.²⁵ This representation also suggests a mono-polar world where the US enjoys the promi-

²⁵ In the famous “stag and the hare” parable presented by Kenneth Waltz (1959), five individuals agree to cooperate in order to trap a stag. However, selfishness beats cooperation when one of the hunters catches a rabbit and satisfies his own hunger without sharing any further efforts or part of the prey with the rest. This is the underlying assumption behind anarchy and selfishness. However, in a response to this, J. R. Ruggie says in the introduction to his book, *Constructing the World Polity*, that “the five individuals just happened upon another; they did not seem to belong to any organized social collectivity or have any ongoing social relations with each other or anyone else. They only have a rudimentary ability to speak And they knew that they would go their separate ways again—where to?— once the project of trapping the stag was accomplished or not as it turned out). This seems to me, was an unduly and unnecessarily undersocialized view of the world” (1998: 2).

ment position of being the only world super power on earth, making it possible for its leaders to get away with their say on the premises of its material superiority (see 2004: chapter 2). In representational terms, “the world out there” (including other Western nations) becomes an alien. Nye’s position gives nations around the globe the clear alterity signal (as discussed in chapter three). Second, his alterity is not only instrumental, but also alienating. It makes nations instruments for the consolidation of American power, but also alienates the world into a discursive symbolic control where cooperation or not is punishable on its own (a dichotomy of the world in good and bad nations). Finally, the use of culture as persuasion brings the bad propaganda strategy back in, assuming that nations and societies are innocent and malleable masses to be manipulated and conquered. It assumes they are uncritically disposed to mimic American interests elsewhere; or else, they are deviant and grotesque entities incapable of belonging to the “West.” The great problem with this approach, and other similar ones, is that nations are disciplined and subjugated in their own identities, making a stronger case for conflict and domination. Said’s critique of Orientalism in chapter three is well suited to understand in full the implications of this approach for the identities of cultures and nations.

1.3.2. Nation-Branding

Nation Branding (NB) is the latest approach to diplomacy adopted in recent years. Put in a nutshell, it means the discursive commodification of a nation-state through marketing and image strategies in order to affect in positive terms the perception of foreign publics. It is in line with trends in liberal globalization, where economics and marketing set the agenda of nations and societies. It is easy to be misled into thinking that this is just an “economist view of diplomacy,” and not a political one. In fact, it is more of a marketing take on diplomacy with a hard-line political view, which to some extent can accommodate for aspects of both cultural and public diplomacy, with Nation Branding holding the steering wheel throughout. In the words of Wally Olins, “the truth of the matter is that nations have always to create and modulate their reputations in order to create domestic loyalties and coherence and promote their own power and influence in neighboring countries,” and then to accept that “There is in reality nothing new about national branding, except the word ‘brand’ and the techniques that are now used, which derive from mainstream marketing and brand techniques” (2005: 170).

Simon Anholt, an expert on this field, also explains that “Today, we live in a world which globalisation has turned into a single marketplace”; adding that “every country (and every city and region too) must compete with every other place for its share of the world’s consumers, tourists, investors, and for the attention and respect of the international media, of other governments, and the people of other countries. It is also a world in which international public opinion matters as never before. Countries, cities and regions are brands because people perceive them as brands.” (Anholt, 2006: 1).

Olins explains that “There are three areas in which nations are in direct and overt competition with each other. In each of these are winners and losers, and each nation consists, to a considerable extent for its success on the clarity, emphasis and enthusiasm with which it projects its nation brand. The three areas are: brand export; foreign direct investment; and tourism” (2005: 172). However, the agenda seems to be bigger than that, when looking at other people writing along these lines. Take for example Jack Yan’s article where he suggests that foreign policy, human rights, United Nations and the so much needed “harmony” in the international community can be improved by means of using Nation Branding (2002). Anholt epitomizes the approach when suggesting that “Nation branding is a new paradigm for statecraft in the modern age, and one of the most powerful tools for competitive advantage” (2006). These ideas, good though they may look on the surface, would raise eyebrows in most academic circles since there is very little consistency in their argumentation, not to mention the lack of a solid methodological grounds in the familiar social sciences (and not marketing).

John O’Shaughnessy and Nicholas Jackson O’Shaughnessy have taken the time to discuss the idea of “treating the nation as a brand” (2000) and have reached the conclusion that this is possible by using the concept of “reputational capital” as the cornerstone of Nation Branding. The authors argue “That the nation’s image is a factor in buying decisions has long been accepted. For example, the nineteenth-century historian Ernest Williams (1896) argued that the ‘Made in Germany’ label was a marketing advantage” (2000: 56). They then assume that the international reputation of a nation, seen as the beliefs other nations (and their societies) hold about them, is what gives nations a certain symbolic standing. They go on to say that “The nation cannot be simplistically viewed as a brand writ large. This leads us to argue that in thinking about any nation, buyers will (1) hold some position along a continuum from like to dislike, and (2) buyers, in respect to buying a specific product, will have some sense of that nation’s reputational capital for producing whatever they seek from such a product. Reputational capital is embodied in propositions (beliefs) rather than pure imagery” (2000: 59). The brothers O’Shaughnessy suggest “The concept of reputational capital is more tied to propositional representations (beliefs) than imagery representations and connects to [...] claims about the home base being crucial to the firm’s competitiveness abroad” (2000: 59). In any case, they conclude that images are also important ingredients of Nation Branding, arguing that the strategy must be that if a whole nation can be treated as a brand, the image should follow course. Otherwise, “if we accept that the nation as a brand will have a fragmented image, this means selecting the attractive fragments in the nation’s image that will resonate with the target audience” (2000: 60). This allows for a fragmentation of identities, discourses, cultures and nations, depending on the market demands.

In his brief assessment of the field of Nation Branding in relation to Public Diplomacy, Jan Melissen says that “the practice of branding a nation involves a much greater and coordinated effort than public diplomacy. For one, public diplomacy is initiated by practitioners, whereas branding is about the mobilization of all nation’s forces that can contribute to the promotion of its image abroad”

(2005: 19). He says that both Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding are “sisters under the skin” since they both are intended for public audiences abroad, and try to improve the standing, image or brand of the nation. However, he poses two main differences: first, levels of ambition, Nation Branding is holistic and Public Diplomacy is modest and concrete; and second, the use of language and methods. Melissens says that “The language of Nation-branders resembles the ‘can-do’ approach from the practice of marketing and the clarity of strategic vision from the corporate world. It is hard to deny that the language of branding is ‘cool’ and promising, and branding has particularly attracted countries with a weak international image or a reputation that leaves much to be desired” (2005: 20).

Addressing the field of Nation Branding in traditional political science terms is a challenge since the onto-epistemological points of departure are remarkably different.²⁶ The language, the objects of analysis, the method, and the theoretical ambitions put this field at a disadvantage when trying to initiate a fresh discussion in the sphere of diplomacy and politics. However, despite the apparent incommensurability, there are in fact three possibilities to make some connections. First, research in the field of Nation Branding needs to be able to understand diplomatic and political science theory, a field where they intend to make a contribution. Secondly, Nation Branding needs to refine and improve its own research. Much of what is published in Nation Branding fails to meet the standards of analytical discussion and/or scientific quality in relation to more consolidated fields in the social sciences. And third, social sciences (and in particular political science) need to allow room for new challenging methodologies and theories to enter the discussions, where for example, debates on constructivism, postmodernism or poststructuralism are still seen as distant unrelated approaches.

1.3.3. Cosmopolitan Constructivism

Drawing on constructivist theories of IR and postmodern diplomacy, I dare to suggest a third discourse that I term Cosmopolitan Constructivism (Constantinou, 1997 and 2002, Der Derian 1987 and 1992, Onuf E. 1989, Campbell D. 1998, Hopf 2002, Mitchell J.M. 1986, Pérez de Cuellar 1997, Ruggie 1998, Walker R.J.B. 1984 and 1990, Wendt 1992 and 1999). The discursive assumption is simple: the community of states matters and governments collaborate in the inter-subjective construction of their identities (intercultural dialogue) via cultural diplomacy. This idea aims to construct durable friendly relations among states by addressing their societies in the construction of cosmopolitan cultural attitudes. This discourse celebrates “cultural difference,” cultural exchange, civil societies’ meetings and encounters in order to foster common understanding in difference. Cultural Diplomacy can also be seen as a societal cosmopolitan political arrangement conducive to the construction of a plurality of cultural representations of the identities/alterities abroad via the diplomatic institutions.

²⁶ Some articles and books that show some of these epistemologies in the area of NB are e.g. Schutte, T. F. 1969, Holt, D. 2004, Keillor, B.D. and Hult G.T.M. 1999.

Cosmopolitanism is traditionally associated with a straightforward idea: the willingness to be part of a society of nations and participate in its welfare, on material, institutional or moral grounds.²⁷ This simple account is not self-evident in the nation's own identities. Take for example *Isolationism*, where nations struggle for self-sufficiency, non-dependence and have difficulty in cooperating with and developing an understanding of others. The same goes for *Exceptionalism*, where some nations accept to be part of the rest of the international community, but on the premise that they are in some respects exceptionally suited in relation to the rest. Cosmopolitanism, in a broad general sense, is a holistic approach to international society where the premise is to live and let live, understand and be understood, to show respect and enjoy respect in return (*cfr.* Derrida 2001). Not all debates in this area are linear. For very good reasons, political and religious boundaries are being challenged, identifications with given cultures or nationalities are no longer taken for granted, NGOs, markets and entrepreneurs are stretching the envelope further, and non-communitarianism, post-identity politics and multi-citizenships are reshaping the way people think of cosmopolitanism (see, Beck 2002, Giddens 1999, Hall, S. 2002, and Held 2002).

To avoid any misunderstandings, I still operate on the basis of IR and diplomacy theory considerations, thus assuming the Nation-State to be the basic unit of analysis, and the diplomats to be the agents carrying out the specific practice, following the *top-down* approach referred to earlier.²⁸ Three components of cosmopolitanism in this work are multilateralism, pluralism and reflexivity. There is nothing fashionable or new in these ideas. Multilateralism in cultural diplomatic terms can be located as a discourse coming from –among other institutions– UNESCO and some other academic affiliates, stressing a common mechanism of cooperation in the field of culture and international relations. Some buzzwords associated with it are the notions of “intercultural dialogue” and “cultural pluralism,” which in many ways spill over into the constructivist camp. These are beneficial efforts on the part of the international organizations aiming at realizing the UN main mission of peace, development and democracy for all and at the same time building bridges of understanding between cultures, religions and ethnicities.

Javier Pérez de Cuellar (former UN Secretary General) is one of the main supporters of multilateral efforts in the field of culture. His world report from 1997 stresses the importance of material development for societies but also the cultural alternatives to reach a satisfying, comprehensive and inclusive quality of life. The book promotes a less confrontational view of global cultural encounters, and triggered an imaginative exploration of the possibilities of cooperation and cultural understanding among societies, based on the principles of respect, diversity and multiculturalism. However, the resources channelled into these efforts in

²⁷ Cosmopolitan theory from Emmanuel Kant, Hegel & Marx or George Simmel in the 19th century to David Held, Ulrich Beck or David Harvey in the 20th century is fundamentally concerned with an engagement with the international community.

²⁸ I am considering classic texts in this, such as Satow (1979), Nicholson (1988) and Morgenthau (1993), but also the challenges to this views in for example James A. (2004), Sharp (1999, 2001 and 2002) and Constantinou (1996, 2004 and 2006).

practice make them pale when in comparison with the attention, energy and interests devoted to discourses such as “The Clash of Civilizations” or “Jihad vs. McWorld” which claim not dialogue but confrontation (see Huntington 1996 and Barber 1996). Some exceptions apart, in this thesis I do not pay much attention to this specific discourse and only make a brief comment in the conclusions of the thesis.

In constructivist terms, I primarily emphasise the work of Alexander Wendt, whose book *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) is pivotal in my understanding of the “constructivist turn” in the field. Wendt has expressed severe criticism of traditional IR approaches that fail to see the importance of identity in the field. He says that “A rationalist neglect of identity seems equally misplaced. To have an identity is simply to have a certain idea about who one is in a given situation, and as such, the concept of identity fits squarely into the belief side of the desire plus belief equation. These beliefs in turn help constitute interests” (1999: 170). Wendt also sees identity as part of cultural phenomena, or collective group beliefs where ideas are shared and “communally sustained,” thus becoming inherently a public phenomenon (1999: 164). In cosmopolitanism, I refer to Wendt’s elaboration of the “Kantian Culture” in the ways countries perceive of others in the intersubjective construction of friendship as an internalized discursive process. These internalization processes in states, he argues, are coercion, self-interest and legitimacy, and this will define the possibilities of acquiring respect and friendship among other nations.²⁹ Thus, I mainly shape this discourse along the constructivist line in terms of Alexander Wendt’s theories (1992 & 1999), because it allows me to explore some radical theoretical postmodern territories and yet to be practical in my research when analyzing my country expository cases for cultural diplomacy. Chapter three advances this issue further, especially considering other IR theories that also add explanatory power to Cosmopolitan Constructivist ideas. I come back to this in chapter three.³⁰

Finally, I want to make a brief connection of Cosmopolitan Constructivist with the diplomatic theories developed by Paul Sharp in relation to representations and identity. He begins by clearly stating, “Diplomacy is a discrete human practice constituted by the explicit construction, representation, negotiation, and manipulation of necessarily ambiguous identities. As such, it provides powerful metaphors not only for understanding what the professional diplomats do, but also for understanding international relations in general” (1999:33). His main claim is that at the center of diplomacy, there is room to see diplomacy not only as a “business as usual” type of activity, but the practices of diplomacy represent something else, a sort of metaphor that tells us more about the relations among

²⁹ I will argue in chapter three and my expository cases that coercion is best understood in Soft Power terms, self-interest in Nation Branding terms and legitimacy under the discourse of Cosmopolitan Constructivism.

³⁰ Other discourses may also be appropriate. For example I dare to suggest that a CC is also influenced by a sort of Neo-Idealism (Walker, 1993 & Kegley 1993 & 1999), Institutionalism (Keohane 1984, 1988 & 1989 & Krasner 1982 & 1985) and Cooperation (Axelrod 1984 & 1992, Fearon 1998). All of these proposals require careful consideration, further exploration and evaluation. In this thesis I only argue in line with constructivist and cosmopolitan theories, setting up an argument that is in tune with diplomatic theories.

nations (a clear reference to Constantinou, 1997). His claim is that the identities of nations are actually shaped by the dynamics of diplomacy, and that this is one of the strengths of the discipline, which allows it to claim its independence of the IR/IS or Foreign Policy studies. In particular, Sharp advances his claim in a debate between the more traditional diplomatic studies that see the field as transcendent and essentializing versus those who see it as a playground for the analysis of oppression and control. Sharp says that researchers such as James Der Derian and Costas Constantinou hit the nail on the head

because they draw our attention away from positivist interpretations of diplomacy that focus on how the substantive interests, ends, and means of actors whose identities are treated as unproblematic are set, and then increasingly struggle to find a place for diplomacy in that process. Instead, Der Derian and others direct our attention to how much of diplomacy is about representation, the production and reproduction of identities, and the context in which they conduct their relations. [...] By diplomacy, the actors and their relations are constituted (1999: 50).

Sharp constructs a research agenda for investigations of representation and diplomacy. His first point is that diplomacy should be seen as independent of the modern state system, because in this way it is unnecessary to restrict our analysis in determining who is and who is not a diplomatic player: "Once diplomacy is seen again in terms of representation rather than as an instrument of more substantive foreign policies, then it becomes possible to see how it expresses a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years" (1999: 51).

The second representational problem Sharp underlines is that of political representation proper: "As the preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states (1961), people have lived in nations 'from ancient times'. International relations are expressed as now having evolved to the point where states are authentic expressions of popular sovereignty and nations are authentic expressions of popular cultural identity" (1999: 51). This question is at the crux of my investigations, and I give a positive but relative answer in the following chapters: it is possible for states to represent the cultural identities of their societies abroad via diplomacy, but this is always a temporary contingent arrangement that needs to be re-enacted over and over again, following a democratic plurality (constructivism/postmodernism) and not "the national interest" (SP).

A third problem posed by Sharp is what I call "return-ticket diplomacy": "Diplomats not only seek to represent their states to the world, but also seek to represent that world back to their respective states, with the objective of keeping the whole ensemble together" (1999: 53). This idea, obvious though it may seem, is at the heart of diplomacy and calls for an examination of the inculcation of political and political values diplomats may hold. In other words, it is a self-reflexive question. Diplomats have a mission to report the other nations' views, interests and cultures, an assignment laden with much responsibility. The representation of the "other" back to their countries is a diplomatic representational problem that keeps international relations in motion: "these situations may be examined as instances in which diplomats are engaged in the construction, maintenance, and representation of different identities to one another" (1999: 54). As we will see in chapter two, representations of foreign identities are also expres-

sions of the condition of domestic national identities. The production of images, stereotypes and simplifications may have negative consequences in international affairs as the two great wars of the 20th century can attest (*cf.* Neumann 1999).

However basic, these three representations capture and show analytical differences that explain political positions which in turn translate into in practical diplomacies. As I also explain in chapters four and five, Mexico and Sweden showed similar swinging patterns of preference when approaching the three models during the 1990s and in the new millennium, emphasizing the two “rational-instrumental” approaches, *i.e.* Soft Power (Mexico) and Nation Branding (Sweden) without disengaging themselves from the also called “reflexive” approach, *i.e.* Cosmopolitan Constructivism. The core difference is that in spite of the fact that at the beginning of the 1990s there was a conservative government under Carl Bildt, Swedish discourses still departed from mainly a social democratic platform and had open debates about cultural policy and the role of their institutions abroad. In the case of Mexico, there was a more pragmatic governmental platform that accommodated the values of cultural realism very well, particularly in the Salinas government. The Zedillo government developed a shift towards cooperation and cultural institutionalism, as we will see in the following chapter. Two examples: in the early 1990s Mexico engaged in a series of “mega-exhibitions” abroad showing their great archeological findings, their arts and history, to construct a cultural representation that introduced the country as a reliable long-standing civilization (and, therefore, a reliable business partner), having in mind the expansion of commerce via NAFTA. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the former President of the country, explains it this way “At the same time we tried to strengthen Mexico’s image abroad by using the extraordinary exhibition set up at the Metropolitan Museum in NY, «México: Splendor of Thirty Centuries»” (2000:431). On the other hand, during the early 1990s a representational trend emerged in Sweden when the liberal government tried to build an image of hyper-modernity and financial liberalization (leaving aside associations with the welfare state) that quickly emerged as a ruling representation in the latter part of the decade. At the same time, the Cosmopolitan Constructivism approach was evident when Sweden was the host and organizer for the *UNESCO’s World Conference on Cultural Policies for Development* in Stockholm “The Power of Culture” (March/April 1998), where Perez de Cuéllar’s report was discussed, along with European Commission’s *In From The Margins*. The conference became a marker in current debates. For example, the definition of culture as “the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group.... not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs,” which is a comprehensive view, nowadays informs many of the official documents (and diplomacies) of many countries, including Sweden and Mexico.

1.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I set out the theoretical basis for my understanding of the discursive-representational implications of cultural diplomacy from a State-IR perspective. Three contemporary discourses were addressed: Nation Branding or the marketing discourse to promote nations' symbolic comparative advantages (*i.e.* marketing of nations); Soft Power or discursive strategy to persuade other nations of a cultural superiority and dominance (*i.e.* supremacy over other nations); and Cosmopolitan Constructivism, or a discursive plan to represent cultural/national identity abroad for legitimate friendly reasons (*i.e.* respect for other nations). In this thesis, the former two are also called “rational-instrumental” approaches or representations and the latter is also referred to as “reflexive.”

This chapter explained what is one of my contributions in the book, the role of public diplomacy in relation to cultural diplomacy, showing that in spite of their similarities, there are distinctions to be made: a study of cultural-national identity/alterity is at the core of the situation (specially under a CC point of departure). I also showed that definitions of Cultural Diplomacy usually address five structural components: Instrumentality, Security, Spatiality, Directionality, and the Public/private divide. These helped me *introduce up-to-date* research in the field in order to understand the specific representational-discursive logic.

In sum, after analyzing the different possibilities for a contemporary cultural diplomacy, I came to the conclusion that the traditional triad exchange-promotion-advertisement discourse (in reference to cultural diplomacy “in lowercase”) should be substituted for Cosmopolitan Constructivism in the best scenario. I suggest that Soft Power and Nation Branding are limiting discursive schemes that have a short-term life and produce short-term results in diplomacy. Cosmopolitan Constructivism has the advantage of bringing cultural issues in the form of cultural and national identity as a part of a cosmopolitan environment where nations coexist and cooperate. The constructivist camp poses a challenge to the SP and NB positions of diplomacy since the latter concentrate much more on the material forces of power and the marketing side of a nation transformed into a commodity. Cosmopolitan Constructivism in contrast, has a preoccupation with ontologies of knowledge, culture as such, discursive practices, identities-alterities, etc. (many of these will be addressed in chapter three). At the same time, the specific function that interests me is related to representation and culture but I address this issue in the next chapter.

Representing Culture

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the concept of representation and its relevance for cultural diplomacy, departing from Hanna F. Pitkin's theories on the subject matter. The main problem is to relate the notions of culture and representation conceptually together, so that working definitions of Political and Cultural Representation can shed light on Cultural Diplomacy (CD). In this, the intention of the chapter is to address three specific issues which are contributions in the debates: *the first* is in relation to political representations and the conceptualization Hanna Pitkin presents, particularly in relation to the *authorization/accountability* problem and the *standing for* (SF) and *acting on behalf of* (AF); *secondly*, the chapter defines culture in relation to the cultural diplomacy representations, Soft Power (SP), Cosmopolitan Constructivism (CC) and Nation Branding (NB); *thirdly*, the chapter shows a synthesized program for cultural representations to answer questions of form and substance (or resemblance and interests) in three cultural representations: Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern. In the discussion of cultural representations I include an artistic analysis of three paintings that illustrate the formal and the substantial debates. In reflective representations, reality is reflected "as a mirror" in the representation, allowing very little room for subjective interpretations; in symbolic representations the symbol both stands as a substitute for the absent referent, and acts as a signifying concept to give meaning to reality; finally in postmodern representations the divisions between reality and representation blur and the concentration is on the identity and interest of the diplomatic actions.

2.1. On Representation and Cultural Diplomacy

Representational theory, according to Raymond Williams, traditionally assumes there are two basic meanings behind representation (in the English recorded language) that go back to the XVI century.³¹ The first one is related to the idea of "making present again," in a physical, mental, visual or fictional way (as in a theatre play). The second one is related to the idea of "standing for" or "acting on behalf of." The former comes from the Latin root *representare* as an expression

³¹ The historical layers associated with representation, in Williams' study, compress the debate of the term in its main connotations. One could easily get the impression that there is not much to say beyond the English tradition. The Spanish tradition borrows the concept Representation from Latin origin and transforms it into *Representación* with the same basic connotations explained earlier. The Swedish language draws the word *Representation* from the same linguistic source, *i.e.* in short, "representation" in English inevitably suggests reference to an original – in much the same way as does "copy," "replica," and "reproduction."

of renewed presence, to bring to presence again, or to make reappearance, either in a real sense (spatial-temporal) or figuratively, by mean of simulacrum, via an illusion. The latter connotation implies substitution, having a representative standing for something else (people, sovereignty, a town), or more interestingly, someone authorized to act for others (Williams 1983: 266-267). The first connotation is more “formal” in the sense that it shows the requisites for making things/people reappear in a literal or figurative way; and the second is “substantial,” in the sense that it makes us symbolize the relation of something that is “not present” but anyhow represents and/or can potentially act on behalf of others. In this thesis, these concepts are scrutinized under “political lenses” using the work of Hanna F. Pitkin (1967) and the “cultural turn” in Richard Harvey Brown (1995) and Stuart Hall (1997). The idea is to use these notions to understand their relevance for cultural diplomacy in recent years.

As one can deduce from the previous paragraph, representations imply a constructed division of material reality and the world of ideas³² (Putnam, H. 1998: ch. 2). Its strength rests on its analytical capacity to stress the *constructedness* of the thing, *i.e.* that the world in itself (as a phenomenon) is not fully and directly appropriated, but mediated and partially restricted by our senses, and the high-level cognitive interpretations we make of it (Van Oort 2003). In this, representation is a hermeneutic-constitutive concept. To be sure, representational theory explores the relationships we make between “the material and ideational worlds” in order to constitute meaning and significance (Searle 1995). Therefore, representational theories can quite well “analyze the properties, rules, and modes of functioning of systems of representation, with a view to uncover their assumptions, describing their origins, and above all, unmasking the processes whereby those origins are concealed...” (Prendergast, 2000:9). In this research, representational theory must be seen as an interpretative-constitutive device composed of discourses that make it possible to understand the politics of cultural diplomacy both conceptually and in practice. In other words, representations are both political concepts that make it possible to distinguish the public interest of showing a national cultural reality for foreign audiences abroad (conceptually), and also containers of a diplomatic discursive world that sets in motion the constitution of a fair cultural reality for foreign nations (as practice).

As suggested in chapter one, cultural diplomacy is an activity where a public office inside the diplomatic apparatus (traditionally the Foreign Ministry) has been given the official task of representing the cultural-nation abroad. In other words,

³² The philosophical grounds of this approach go back to classical Greek philosophy, particularly in the debates of Plato and Aristotle regarding knowledge and the relationship between the subject and objects. Plato’s cave condition is crucial to an understanding of the division between matter and the world of ideas. Plato privileges the latter realm as being the true one, since ideas have an existence that transcends this world. According to Plato, general ideas correspond to things such as essences or forms that are supposed to exist independently of us. In his “idealistic cognitivism,” the human spirit is capable of deducing the essence of the things-in-themselves directly. The debate between Plato and Aristotle is also a precursor of a political agenda: it is over the expelling of the poets from the Republic, which, according to Plato, had its justification in the artists being imitators of reality and therefore, untruthful, since they depicted (represented) things they did not know about. Aristotle’s response is that even such “mimetic reproductions” had a pedagogic utility, to say the least, and therefore were sources of knowledge.

an agency is granted the responsibility of making a representational use of the cultural goods in the name of the nation and its people to other nations and their peoples. The representational part is necessary since it is impossible for all people in one nation to carry on this international task, and because it is impossible to take the “whole national culture” abroad. Thus, representations are required. As explained in the previous chapter, conceptions of cultural diplomacy vary from the more traditional Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad to the representations disguised as Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. One first task is to present a concrete argumentation on why the category “representation” is useful to discuss cultural diplomacy. The guiding argument of this chapter can be followed by reading my answers to the crux question posed by Pitkin³³, but adapted to the idea of representation of culture: *How is national culture made present abroad by its diplomacy?*

It is fair to say that representations themselves are theoretically useful as skeletons to organize thought. In different fields, a number of representations are called for: scientific, social, economic, etc. In this chapter I only introduce two strict distinctions, the Political Representations, constituted in the different strands of Cultural Diplomacy (NB, SP, CC), and Cultural Representations constituted in the Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern variants. For Political Representations, I mainly explore the work of Hanna F. Pitkin; and for Cultural Representations, I base my analysis on Stuart Hall’s and Harvey Brown’s perspectives.

2.2. Political Representations

To be politically significant, let us begin by arguing that the concept representation is essentially a “modern construct.”³⁴ Its more relevant uses appear precisely with the rise of what we call “the modern mentality” in most of the Western world, *i.e.* the predominance of capitalism, scientific/artistic discoveries and democratic institutions. In effect, the use of the word representation moves forward from the late Middle Ages into the Renaissance, when the concept captured its substantial meaning. Raymond Williams traces back the idea of representation as early as 1380 (in the sense of symbolize or “stand for”), but stresses the tone in the making of the main European institutions (especially the State) in the early XVII century when “standing for others” became a currency meaning especially in politics (Williams 1988 [1976]). It is not by chance that representation comes along with modern institutions such as the banks, the emergence of the nation-state, and the early democratic tradition in Europe. The simple reason, as Hanna Pitkin argues in her work (1967), is that the concept representation imposes an

³³ Pitkin posed the following question in the introduction to her book (1967): *how is the absent referent (object, process or people) made present?*

³⁴ Hanna F. Pitkin says that “The concept of representation, particularly of *human beings representing other human beings*, is essentially a modern one” (my italics 1967: 2). Suzanne Langer in her philosophical analysis of symbolism says the same, and it all seems to go back to the works of Ernst Cassirer (1987 [1944]).

obligation between a representative and a constituency that needs some explanation. In other words, representation creates an obligation, a bond between two sides in politics: the representing and the subject being represented. Before modernity, these bonds went unnoticed because a divine ulterior authority acted through the “selected ones,” through unquestioned tradition. Representation from a political perspective frames a modern debate where questions must be answered in a rational order, considering two earthly interdependent sides.

According to Pitkin, the *formalistic* view of representation has to do with *authorization* and *accountability*, which calls for an explanation of the ways the representative acquires the rights to make decisions, and the responsibilities assumed (sources) on behalf of a constituency. Second, in Pitkin’s view, representation as *standing for others* and assumes two possibilities, *descriptive* and *symbolic* (1967: intro.). Third, Pitkin also embarks on the task of explaining representations as *acting for others*, or more to the point the very act of *representing*. In these views, the focus is more normative, looking at how the representation is actually bound together, either in the form of correspondence and resemblance (descriptive), or in abstract *ad-hoc* terms (symbolic). In this chapter, I take Pitkin’s *formalistic* views as the guiding concepts to enter the political representations, and I elaborate on the second and third views of *standing for others*, and *representing*. The only adjustment to Pitkin’s theory I make in this chapter is on reconstructing the possibilities she offers, calling them “cultural representations,” using Stuart Hall’s views, becoming three distinct ones: reflective, symbolic and postmodern (see next section in this chapter). This is one of the original contributions of this research into the field of Cultural Diplomacy.

In Pitkin’s line of reasoning, representations themselves are political all the way down, *i.e.* representing is in itself a political action. For example, in her study of Thomas Hobbes, she agrees with him on the statement that “every government is a representative government in that it represents its subjects” (1967: 4), and that “The *Leviathan* attempts to explain and justify political obligation, and to do so in so firm and unequivocal manner, as to leave no possibility of anarchy, rebellion, revolt, or civil war” (1967: 29). In this sense, Pitkin argues that “Hobbes uses not only the device of the social contract but also (as is less frequently recognized) his concept of representation. Men create a commonwealth by contracting each other with every other, to authorize one among them to represent them all” (1967: 29). In this sense, representation is read politically not only because the representative’s obligation is to represent the subjects and cannot be dealt away with, but also, “representation implies standards for, or limits on, the conduct of the representative” which ultimately “implies that the man is to represent his subjects, not merely do whatever he pleases” (1967: 33).

Following Pitkin’s argumentation, I suggest that the cultural diplomatic representations (SP, NB and CC) be scrutinized under the political representations model, in the descriptive form only (see table 2.1). In any case, I suggest three issues to address Cultural Diplomacy representations based on the political questions posed by Pitkin’s work:

1. who has the authority to make decisions on behalf of others;
2. what are the sources of this authority to represent;
3. and how is the representative accountable for the actions performed in the name of the constituents.

Table 2.1. CD representations and Pitkin’s political descriptive view

	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Sources</i>	<i>Accountability Strategies</i>
SP	Political & diplomatic elites. Public diplomacy.	National interest (politics)	Quantity & impact of national cultural events abroad & nation’s image perception abroad.
NB	Private interest groups & public/commercial diplomacy.	Market forces (Marketing)	Nation’s image perception abroad. Promotion of tourism, national firms & products abroad.
CC	Civil society & public/cultural diplomacy.	Identity/alterity (Culture)	Cultural & educational exchange. Cultural representation’s contents & discourse abroad. Cooperation, peace & development with other nations.

The way I understand Pitkin’s work in relation to my investigation on Cultural Diplomacy, suggests that “authorization theory” and “accountability” can apply to the representations I am constructing through my work, namely Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. In her work, she says that authorization theorists believe that a representative is someone who has been authorized to act on behalf of others. In the case of my study, three concepts conform the authority for each Cultural Diplomacy representation (see chart 2.1): political and diplomatic elites along with the area of public diplomacy, private interests groups and public and/or commercial diplomacy, and the civil society along with the cultural and public diplomats operating in a democracy.

Using Soft Power as a straw man, I bring a few examples to substantiate some claims. For instance, Joseph Nye argues that during the Cold War “The Soviet Union also spent billions on an active public diplomacy program that included promoting its high culture, broadening, disseminating disinformation about the West, and sponsoring antinuclear protests, peace movements, and youth organizations” (2004: 73). These programs were given to the Secretary of State (or in other cases the foreign ministries), which then became accountable on how the money was spent and the programs ran. In this classic representation, it is the diplomatic elites who make the main decisions based on their “power rationale and experience”. Later on, in the expository chapters when I study Sweden and Mexico, the use of a top-down hierarchy command to execute cultural diplomacy under the Soft Power regime is more obvious in the case of Mexico, where in some instances, the president of the country functioned as the main catalyst, along with the diplomatic elites, in the promotion of Mexico abroad.

As for sources of representation, using the first case again, Joseph Nye argues that “soft power depends in part on how we frame our own objectives. Policies based on broadly inclusive and far-sighted definitions of the national interest are

easier to make attractive to others than policies that take a narrow and myopic perspective” (2004: 60-61). His statement shows that the way a policy is framed (or “represented”) necessarily passes through the national interest, either in a broad or narrow sense, as the authorization agency. But culture also has a role, however minimized in principle. Nye comments that “The soft power of a country rests on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (2004: 11). It is clear that culture is instrumentally used by Soft Power (see previous chapter); the political values enter the picture in this view, especially when national interests are represented; and the acknowledgment that foreign policy plays a role as a source of authority for legitimization purposes, reinforces the constitutive importance of diplomats and politicians.

Finally, the accountability of the representational outcomes, seen by Pitkin as “someone who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does” (1967: 55), is interpreted slightly differently in this work. This is a matter of emphasis. In my analysis I concentrate on “strategies to become accountable” and less on “who is accountable for.” The obvious reason is that the actors holding authority (the *attachés*), are accountable themselves for the results of the cultural diplomacies implemented. More interestingly is to understand what the strategies *to become accountable* are in the broader scope. Put differently, I try to understand *how the cultural diplomacy offices* legitimize their actions so that they become accountable for the constituency. Accordingly, I suggest viewing the problem of accountability directly inside the three concepts for the Cultural Diplomacy representations: for Soft Power the quantity and impact of national cultural events abroad is equally important as the nation’s image perception abroad.³⁵ For Nation Branding, the international standing of the nation’s image abroad is just as relevant as actions to promote tourism, private companies and products made under the national flavor.³⁶ Finally, Cosmopolitan Constructivism is accountable through programs that emphasize mutual understanding and exchange between civil societies, such as cultural and educational exchange. Also, the cultural representational contents and discourse of the nation abroad are subject to democratic discussion and debate. Finally, a model of Cosmopolitan Constructivism is when the plans also emphasize cooperation in order to achieve peace and development with other nations, both in material terms and in values and ideas. As will be obvious in one of the expository chapters, Sweden has developed a rather refined model of cooperation and development through the

³⁵ In my analysis of the diplomatic dossiers in Mexico and also some official documents describe the actions of the diplomats in quantitative terms as “cultural actions” abroad. *E.g.* the report Instituto Mexicano de Cooperación Internacional (2000) *Glosa del Informe final*. Documento Interno.

³⁶ For instance, the New York Times published an article making reference to this trend in contemporary culture called “Sweeten the Image, Hold the Bling-Bling” where author Lola Ogunnaike argues that today’s trend is to make a brand out of every identity that can actually sell anything, and she presents Rap culture and its “bad image” as an example. Erik Parker, music editor of Vibe magazine argues that today’s rappers such as Puff Dady, Eminem or Jay-Z are the “brand managers now, and they have to think about how their actions are affecting their brand” (Ogunnaike, 2004). In a rather similar take, Nation Branders rally for nations to consider how they can affect their image-brand abroad. See for instance Simon Anholt 2006, Anholt-GMI 2006 and SI 2005.

Swedish International Development Agency SIDA, which has coated Swedish cultural diplomacy with an unchallenged international respect (see chapter five).

I now want to suggest that the political ideas developed by Pitkin in relation to the concept of representation as *standing for* and *acting for* need to be reconsidered. For Pitkin, representation as *standing for* (what she lumps as descriptive representation), involves that “a person or thing stands for others, ‘by being sufficiently like them’” by indexing, mirroring or substituting, for the formal-salient characteristics of their constituencies (1967: 80). This is a “static” and literal understanding of representation that promises a “perfect accuracy of correspondence [*that*] is impossible.” She mentions that *standing for* is passive and static, in “The sense in which a picture or a map represents [which] is not primarily and activity” (1967: 80, 87). In my research, I take this idea all along the three different Cultural Representations: Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern. I assume that *standing for* can take a naturalist form but also a symbolic or a rather abstract image that simply replaces cultural phenomena. Consider the following examples: “Sweden is a nation of blonde-blue eyed people” (reflective), “The Mayans describe an indigenous Mexico still alive” (symbolic) and “Swedes’ soul is both composed of strong individualist feelings along communitarian attitudes” (postmodern). In sum, Representation as *standing for* is used in the thesis to express two things: the organizational chart of decision making inside the cultural diplomatic apparatus in Mexico and Sweden; and in the formal status of a nation in the fixed discourses organized by the ministry. These concepts are illustrated in chapters four and five where I discuss the cultural representations of Mexico and Sweden. A brief reflexive conclusion is also presented in chapter six.

Pitkin’s view of representation as *acting for* is more complex (and is treated in her book as part of the symbolic representation). Its main feature is that representation must be conceived as an activity, as an action or behavior on the part of the representative agent. She says, to clearly define spheres of meaning, that “We are now interested in the nature of the activity itself; what goes on during representing, the substance or content of acting for others, as distinct from its external and formal trappings” (1967: 114). *Acting for* or *representing* “seems to consist in promoting the interest of the represented, in a context where the latter is conceived as capable of action and judgement, but in such a way that he does not object what is done in his name.” In other words, “*What* the representative does must be in his principal interests, but *the way* he does it must be responsive to the principal’s wishes” (1967: 155, italics in text). In the world of Cultural Diplomacy, the crux of the argument is to explain *what* it is that the *acting for* implies for the *attaché* or the cultural office. Pitkin argues that the *acting for* of representations in politics, in (representative governments) has to do with how to ensure a twofold correspondence between the “public interest” (welfare or the good of the whole) and the acts of representatives on the one hand, and the opinions of citizens on the other. This requires disentangling the “selfish wishes of parts of the nation” from the “the good of the whole” (1967: 170-171). Pitkin elaborates on Edmund Burke’s views of representation, understood as the representation of interests operating in “an objective, impersonal, unattached reality” (1967: 168). In this sense, the value of “representing culture” lays in disclosing the interests of

the parts to show what the public interest is when it comes to displaying the nation's culture abroad. Now, in my reading of Pitkin's work and in translation for what is needed in this research, *acting for* can be reflective ("a diplomat speaks his native tongue"), symbolic ("a Mexican diplomat takes the Aztecs to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in NY") or Post-modern (a Swedish cultural *attaché* promotes Volvo cars abroad as a Swedish cultural phenomenon). To accommodate my needs in the field of Cultural Diplomacy, I take the liberty of reinterpreting Pitkin's views on these two issues re-dressing them and confronting them with what I call Cultural Representations in three possibilities: reflective, symbolic and postmodern. But let us explore Cultural Representations first.

2.3. Cultural Representations

Put very simply, Cultural Representation is any attempt made to depict the reality of cultural life. There are many examples: a journalist describing a traditional festivity, an art critic analyzing a youth art show, a diplomat introducing a film festival on his nation in a city abroad, etc. It is clear that we can go on showing examples of Cultural Representations, since the concept can be quite wide. Combining "culture" and "representation" is a well-established conceptual challenge (cf. Chaney 1994: 25-36 and 65-75, Featherstone 1995: ch. 2, and Prendergast 2000). To take this matter further, let us continue with the basic assumption made by Hanna Pitkin earlier on representations.

I intend to use Pitkin's *standing for* and *acting for* models in relation to three possibilities: reflective, symbolic and postmodern (Pitkin only considers the "descriptive" and "symbolic"). Then, these last three possibilities are subsumed as Cultural Representations (see table 2.2). In my study of the concept, I came to the conclusion that Stuart Hall makes an advanced contribution to the concept in several articles, and particularly in the 1997 edition of his book *Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (see also H. Brown 1993). First, according to S. Hall, Cultural Representations create or constitute meaning and do not merely obtain meaning in virtue of their correspondence with reality. Second, what we take to be culture is an intersubjective function of the representations (produced by ourselves and others), and is further dependent on the hegemonic context in which these representations are interpreted. Third, Cultural Representations are discursive devices to convey identity in a social context (Hall S. 1996 & 1997).

In other words, Cultural Representations are seen here as the construction of identities by means of discourse, where "representing subjects" intersubjectively complete the "representational actions/standings" of the cultural space-context. The new challenge of adding the "constructing of identities" into the package of representations is well taken in a cultural context, which is always politicised (this idea is extensively developed in the next chapter). Now, that identities can only be appropriated in discourse is nothing new for the representational theory we have set up so far. While intersubjective refers to the interactions among representational subjects in society (cf. Denzin 1989), or properties or characteristics regarding the shaping of meaning (cf. Van Dijk 1997), the construction of

identities is also political, since it requires authorization and accountability as regards what can be chosen as a discourse of identity for all members. This when social constructivism enter the picture. Having this as a backdrop and in connection with IR, Maja Zehfuss says that Alexander “Wendt argues that the way international politics is conducted is made, not given, because identities and interests are constructed and supported by intersubjective practice. The approach revolves around identity, which is construed as more basic than interests. Notions of self and the environment shape interactions and are shaped by interactions. Thereby social reality is created” (2002: 12).

The question remains: what is the relevance of Cultural Representations for contemporary diplomacies? As mentioned in chapter one, diplomacies have, as one of their basic missions, “the promotion abroad of a state’s cultural achievements, [including] advertisement of achievements in science and technology as well as in the arts, humanities and social sciences” (Berridge 2003: 62). If this is true for the Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad discussed earlier, it is also relevant when analyzing how cultural diplomacy makes use of the category “culture” to fulfil their mission (via SP, NB or CC). Take for example the US government during the Cold War which under a promotion-advertisement approach “flooded much of the world with American orchestras, dance troupes, arts exhibits and jazz performances. An intensive operation to covertly support still more cultural and intellectual activity abroad [...] backed by the Central Intelligence Agency (Wise: 2003: 3). Let us begin by briefly presenting how the word culture became a modern construct in a summarized genealogy made by Raymond Williams and then explain how Cultural Diplomacy representations understand culture to constitute themselves in discourse.

In a similar direction as representation, the dawn of the word culture announces the rise of the early modern mentality in the 15th century, especially in its dual original meaning, from the cultivation of the soil to the cultivation of faith (worship).³⁷ Its Latin stem *colere* already had a variety of meanings: inhabit, cultivate, protect, honor and worship. Williams (1983) explains that some of these meanings eventually separated, ending up in other words such as “inhabit” transforming into *colonus*, Latin *colony*, “honor with worship” led to the Latin verb to *cult* (1483 CAXTON *Gold. Leg.* 81/1 “Whan they departe fro the culture and honour of theyr god” sic *OED* 2004). However, the oldest record of the Latin *cultura* was in the sense of an “action or practice of cultivating the soil; tillage, husbandry” (i.e. circa 1420 *Pallad. on Husb.* I. 21 “In places there thou wilt have the culture” sic *OED* 2004) which is the same association we find in the old French word *couture*, leading to *culture*.

Needless to say, culture has many distinct meanings and there are dozens of definitions. I do not take as a conceptual problem to address the different definitions of culture here, but I do intend to understand how culture signifies some-

³⁷ This can be seen as a shift from the material overtone of the word (the act of tilling the soil) to the symbolic (the cultivation of the spirit). The more evident linguistic shift, though, is when the symbolic connotations concentrate more in culture as civilization in the XIX century, but this is to be explained later on. See *OED* 2004.

thing in the three representations of Cultural Diplomacy introduced earlier. Table 2.3. shows a comparison between three definitions of culture and how they are appropriated by the cultural diplomacies. These concepts were taken from the sources that inform the theories I am working with.

Table 2.2. Comparative Representations of Cultural Diplomacy via Culture

	Definition	Appropriation
SP	“Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, with appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment” (Nye, 2004:11)	“The soft power of a country rests on three resources: Its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004: 11)
NB	“Whether we like it or not, commercial brands are increasingly performing the role of transmitting national culture: they have become one of the primary vectors of national image, and are more and more often the means by which people form their views about national identity” (ANBI, 1996: 2. Special Report on Denmark’s Image)	In NB the aim is to create a clear, simple, differentiating idea built around emotional qualities which can be symbolised both verbally and visually and understood by diverse audiences in a variety of situations. To work effectively, nation branding must embrace political, cultural, business and sport activities. At the simplest, it is a synonym of product country image (Fan, 2005: 6-7).
CC	“Culture is more than a summation of the shared ideas that individuals have in their heads, but a “communally sustained” and thus inherently public phenomenon” (Wendt, 1999: 164). “Culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO 2002 Declaration on Cultural Diversity)	“Cultural Cosmopolitanism should be understood as the capacity to mediate between national cultures, communities of fate and alternative styles of life. It encompasses the possibility of dialogue with the traditions and discourses of others with the aim of expanding the horizons of one’s own framework of meaning and prejudice. Political agents who can ‘reason from the points of view of others’ are better equipped to resolve the challenging transboundary issues that create overlapping communities of fate” (Held, 2002: 58-59).

In the case of Soft Power, Nye’s definition of culture gets closer to the classic Matthew Arnold for whom culture meant “the pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world” (1971: 6). True, Arnold defended liberal education and the flourishing of arts, but “he does envisage culture instrumentally, as a ‘practical benefit... a great help to our present difficulties’. Culture counters social ‘anarchy’ not only by mitigating the modern tendency to break down the traditional ways of life, but also by correcting the shortcoming of the three classes: The Barbarians (aristocracy), the Philistines (the middle class) and the Populace (the working class)” (Miller & Yúdice 2002: 9). Arnold’s view of culture appeals to such characteristics as “beauty,” “intelligence,” and “perfec-

tion” and assumes that these values exist in the abstract and are the same for all human societies. The consequence of these definitions is that they create a divide between high and popular culture on moral grounds, where societies are also assumed to follow the same progressive pattern of cultural development.

The Nation Branding definition of culture can be accommodated as part of the marketing approach to corporate culture and identity. It hinges closer to views held in sociology by Scott Lash and John Urry (1994), who claim that culture in post-Fordist societies tends to produce immaterial services and goods, thus pointing to a whole restructuring of the economies in terms of cultural industries. Culture is more a product of individual choices in a market of commodities, where advertisement, corporations and image empires define in perception, reality (Nixon, 2003: 17-36). At the end of the day, the use of culture in Nation Branding as an instrument for national identity and commercial promotion accounts for less than this as Ying Fan suggests: “This form of nation branding has the clear purpose of using the nation’s image to promote sales and exports. The second form of nation branding is in fact place branding –to promote the country (or maybe a city in the country) as a destination for tourism” (2005: 7). This is a symptomatic way of using culture as a substitute for commercial and propagandistic purposes in forms where, as Stuart Hall argues “Culture can become everything. You can manipulate the symbols without altering the realities” (1997: 24). In this, the marketing of a nations equals *representing culture abroad*.

Finally, the Cosmopolitan Constructivist concept of culture draws from the classic anthropological definition by Edward Tylor (1976 [1871]) who claimed that “Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (1976: 1). It also draws from the views of the so called “constructed culture” advanced by the anthropologist Franz Boas who argues that it is culture that makes us as we are, not biology. That is, we are made into what we are when growing up in a given cultural scenario; we are not naturally born as such. Race, sex and age are cultural constructions, not immutable natural conditions (Kuper, 2001: 32). In any case, these views (including UNESCO’s own) account for what I call a “holistic approach” where all things man-made are “cultural” in principle. Another feature of the cosmopolitan view lies in its respect for cultural identities and alterities via understanding³⁸, and the proposed reconciliation of the international with the local. As I mentioned elsewhere, “It proposes that measures should be taken to preserve and promote cultural activities from the full array of traditions present in any community, not from just one of those traditions if one is to survive in a multicultural world” (Villanueva 1997: 29)³⁹. Criticism of this view is that culture becomes “too broad” of a concept and lacks specificity and, therefore, that it is difficult to devise diplomacy programs in a

³⁸ The way I use “understanding” in this work refers to the debate summarized by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith under a hermeneutic (and not positivistic) framework. In this, “to understand is to reproduce the order in the mind of the actors” (1990:87). For more, see Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. 4.

³⁹ Diana Crane *et. al.* has an excellent up-to-date debate on the issue of globalization and the local in relation to culture. She elaborates four models to deepen the understanding of cultural globalization and the consequences for the local (2002: ch.1).

traditional sense. Also, the cosmopolitan views tend to be a long-term process with long-term investment that every nation accepts in discursive terms, but is reluctant to engage in fully.

In her study of Cultural Diplomacy, Manuela Aguilar (1996) pays particular attention to how the understanding of the idea of “culture” shapes cultural diplomacy discourse in a particular way (for example, the German division between culture and civilization). In other words, she assumes that the government’s understanding of the concept of “culture” informs what that government’s “cultural diplomacy” can be in the interaction with other governments and their publics. This aspect is not part of her coined definition, but certainly stresses the importance of a cultural “regime of truth,” as explained in the previous chapter. As an illustration on how Sweden and Mexico have developed a view of “culture” in their historical traditions, it makes sense to pay a short trip to their own genealogies of the word. In Swedish and Spanish, the words *Kultur* and *cultura* are subsidiaries of the above-mentioned traditions of meaning via German (*Kultur*) and French (*Culture*) at unidentified times between the 17th and 19th centuries. This apparently non-important issue has its relevance when discussing how intellectual traditions are invented (Hobsbawm *dixit*) around the debates of culture, as we can see in the Baroque imperial period in Spain (Singüenza y Góngora, Zorrilla and Cervantes, and Velázquez himself) and the later successive Romantic traditions in England (Wordsworth, Shelley, Coleridge and later Arnold and Eliot) in France (Voltaire, Rousseau and D’Lambert, Diderot and later figures such as Tocqueville and J.L. David) or in Germany (Goethe, Schiller, Humbold and Herder). In Mexico and Sweden, the foundations of the cultural institutions come from the 18th century, but the real debate on culture did not take place until late 19th and early 20th centuries. In México this intellectual class was formed especially around the *Científicos* and *El Ateneo de la Juventud* circles between 1890-1915. In Sweden it was the influence of people like August Strindberg and Selma Lagerlöf, who managed to bring the attention of foreign audiences to new challenging cultural and artistic problems, without ignoring the relevance of the more popular *folkparken* and *folket hus* tradition around 1910 (Englund and Janzon, 1997). As Kuper sharply argues “Even when they are expressed in new codes, discourses on culture are not invented casually: they refer to particular intellectual traditions which have persisted over generations, expanding from Europe throughout the world, imposing conceptions of human nature and history, as well as provoking a series of relevant debates” (2001: 28). I return to this topic in the last chapters when I discuss the cultural diplomacies of the two countries in more detail.

In sum, Cultural Representations are to be taken in this thesis as the construction of identities and alterities for nations via discourses that convey significance, in relation to a fully cultural context. The discussion of Cultural Representations in Pitkin’s *standing for* model (descriptive and symbolic) requires a re-visit and actualization. The addition I suggested here incorporates references to identity, intersubjective interaction and discourse. In any case, the concept of culture is also discussed, shortly on its genealogical roots and in more detail as part of the representations of Cultural Diplomacy. Soft Power and Nation Branding have a

more instrumentalist use of culture, but their assumptions may create more problems than solutions in the practice of cultural diplomacy. Cosmopolitan Constructivism has a more comprehensive view of culture, based on an anthropological and multilateral tradition of diplomacy, but its results can only be judged from a long-term perspective. The next section continues with a discussion on how three types of cultural representations (Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern) address the issue of *standing for* and *acting on behalf* someone else.

2.4. Three Cultural Representations: Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern

After a review of the main academic sources on the problem of representation associated with culture, I came to the conclusion that the best way to present the discussion of representational systems would be from a three-level perspective: Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern (Evans and Boswell 1999; Chaney 1994, Hall S. 1993 & 1997; Harvey Brown 1995; Prendergast 2000; Said 1978 and 2003, and Williams 1983). These distinctions take into account the way the representational referent appears in the representations as *standing for* or *acting on behalf of*. Every cultural representation has a tag that is mainly based on Stuart Hall's discussion (1997)⁴⁰. The relevance of these representations is that they show the correspondence between representative and constituency in an abstract form, using the formula standing for and acting on behalf of. I will now explain the characteristics and functions of Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern representations using as illustrative devices three paintings: Diego Velázquez "Las Meninas" (RR), Pablo Picasso "Las Meninas After Velázquez" (SR) and Gironella "El Gran Obrador" (PMR).⁴¹

2.4.1. Reflective Representations

Stuart Hall says that in the reflective approach, "meaning is thought to lie in the object, person idea or event in the real world, and language functions as a mirror, to reflect the true meaning as it already exists in the world" (1997: 24). This resembles the way indexical systems of representation work. In short, this is the all-familiar distinction of representation as making something/someone present,

⁴⁰ With the only distinction that I use the term postmodern and not constructionist as he does in his study (1997: 25-26).

⁴¹ I found so much needed inspiration in Hanna F. Pitkin's own work (1967) where she spends time discussing all sorts of artistic representations but do not necessarily integrate her conclusions in her rich political views. Also, H. Redner's book (1992) claims that there is ground to make an integrated theory of representation assuming human beings are *homo repraesentans* i.e. the key human quality lies in its ability to produce symbols and create meaning. I also felt encouraged to write this part by reading the well-known discussion brought by Michelle Foucault in his book from 1970, *The Motifs and the Things*, where chapter two is an intellectually challenging discussion on this same picture, *Las Meninas* by Velázquez. Finally, Steve Smith gave me the last "theoretical push" into deciding to include the three paintings of *Las Meninas*, the original one by Velázquez, a variation by Pablo Picasso and one last variation by Alberto Gironella. Smith's admiration for *Las Meninas* also inspired him write a theoretical discussion in one of his latest articles in the field of IR where he finds possibilities for fruitful speculation on epistemic and ontological grounds for social sciences, when taking the picture in question as a starting ground (see Smith 2004).

as a “reflexive index” of the presence. The concept of “index” should be read in this context in a *quasi-semiotic* form⁴², as the annunciation of the presence *in communicational terms only*, as an utterance, without the search for specific meaning beyond the mimetic description of material reality as it appears to be (Deacon 1997: 330-31, Maturana 1970 and Van Oort 2003: 241).

Reflective mimesis has at least two possibilities, “realist impression” and “realist mirror.” The former goes in line with what Emil Durkheim calls “momentary impressions” which are characteristic of the perceptual experience but which “could not serve as the basis of these stable and permanent systems of ideas and practices” constitutive of higher level knowledge (1965 [1915]: 103). In the visual arts, some theorists call this a “retinal” approach, in reference to the “first impression” that comes to the eye through the retina, without this index being processed yet into the more complex brain analysis (Pinker 1997 and Kosslyn 1994). The latter intends to represent reality full of details, but passive and “objective,” as if reflected onto the mirror’s smooth surface. Its “truth” relies on its capacity to depict reality in a literal or factual way, which in a second round could pass an empirical test of reliability. This view gives the materiality of the world an ontological priority over representation, but the epistemology is assumed to contain a contiguous relation in the form of a mirror-like resemblance. Much of the natural sciences and positivism in the social sciences operate under similar assumptions. Let us illustrate this discussion with the famous painting “*Las Meninas*,” taking only the “reflective” layer of meaning.

In *Las Meninas* Spanish painter Diego Velázquez depicts a genre scene of Spanish court life in the 18th century⁴³. The *infanta* Margarita Teresa (the five-year-old daughter of King Philip of Spain) stands in the center flanked by her “*meninas*,” María Agustina Sarmiento (to her right) and Isabel de Velasco (to her left). Two court dwarfs, Maribárbola and Nicolasito Pertusato (who is taunting the dog) have a presence to the left of the princess, and behind them, Marcela de Ulloa, a Lady in Waiting, and a male *Guarda Damas*, both members of the court. The Queen’s chamberlain José Nieto stands beyond the door’s frame, in the doorway out, stepping up the stairs at the back of the picture. The mirror on the rear wall reflects the image of King Philip IV and Queen Mariana of Spain.⁴⁴ Velázquez himself is also shown, standing in front of the large canvas ready to paint. The setting of the painting is the artist’s own atelier, which also serves as a gallery, and there must be a wall mirror that reflects the whole scene just behind the Royal couple. On the large walls we can recognize reproductions of famous paintings (mainly Rubens), and the ceiling is described as a long darkish pictorial

⁴² This means I do not intend to take the semiotic theory to its full consequences but mainly sketch features of it that provide analytic distinctions for understanding representations. The obvious associations of this model come from the work of Charles Peirce (1958), specifically his “Theory of Signs” based on a Semiotic System, who in contrast with Ferdinand de Saussure (1993 [1815]), puts more emphasis in the relation to the sign with an extra-linguistic object.

⁴³ Stuart Hall mentions that the original name was “The Empress with her Ladies and Dwarf” but also cautions that the name given by the Spanish Crown inventory of 1666 was officially “A Portrait of the *Infanta* of Spain with her Ladies in Waiting and Servants, by the Court Painter and Palace Chamberlain Diego Velázquez” (1977: 57).

⁴⁴ This description for identification’s aims is based on Antonio Palomino’s first official description of the painting in 1724 (see Stratton-Prouitt, S. 2003).

(almost abstract) area with two decorative bases for chandeliers. Last, but not least important are the long and vertical reverse side of the canvas, and a royal (sleeping) dog, both in the foreground compositional strategy of the painting.



Illustration II: Velázquez, Diego “Las Meninas”
1656-1657. Oil on canvas. Museo del Prado.

Mimesis as a reflection of reality: Velázquez is painting the royal family in *Las Meninas* in the materiality of the moment, by means of mimesis, depicting people’s physical appearance, the material objects, the dog, the light, etc. The whole composition gives an impression of a mirror-like representation or a photograph. Velázquez provides information about the appearance of every royal member at that moment: their faces, their attires, their bodies, etc. While people are posed standing still, at the same time there is action (the maids are bending down, Nicolasito is teasing the dog, etc.). Velázquez performs the *pictoric representation* through a process of primarily imitation, *i.e.* recognition, resemblance and correspondence.

The point here is to concentrate on the “reflective reproduction of reality” as a mimetic process that can be achieved through certain standardized techniques (in this case, composition, three-dimensional perspective, etc.). At this level the painting is a mimetic process representing the bodily identifications by depiction of their physical external characteristics. To be sure, this is a representational strategy where Velázquez characterizes people, objects, light and space with objectual pictorial representations in a mirror-like strategy of making the painting *stand for the absent reality*. As it must be obvious by now, the concept “standing for other” is rather important to inform the concept of representation in this thesis. There are of course, other much richer interpretations of this painting, but for the moment I only pay attention to the mimetic characteristics and its depicted materiality. In a similar reflection, Costas Constantinou refers to “the framing” of the representations in mimetic strategies. In his study of Holbein’s *The Ambassadors* and the possibilities to represent “reality from a realist” perspective, he claims that in “reflective representations” the self-awareness of the representation is absent and its own consciousness of “being framed” and “showing a perspective or a point of view” is simply disregarded (1996: ch. 1).

Reflective representations are relevant for this thesis, particularly in the expository chapters four and five, when I study the ways discourses about nations’ identities are constructed as if they were a reflection of a given reality. For example, I am interested to see how discourses about Sweden and the Swedes come about as “true expressions that reflect reality.” For instance, consider the following two excerpts:

Description 1: There are about 8 million Swedes all of whom are tall, blond blue-eyed and socialists. They make love (sin) all day long, pausing regularly to imbibe schnapps. They then work efficiently and honestly to earn enormous salaries, which makes them such bores that they kill themselves! (Phillips-Martinsson 1991: 45).

Description 2: To an outsider, the Swedes at first glance may also appear to be a shy, withdrawn, anonymous people. But don't let yourself be fooled by this surface appearance. Beneath it lurks madness, sensuality, sentimentality and -not least- a well-disguised national pride and self-confidence. Then, of course, we have all those S words -sex, sin, suicide, socialism... (Swedish Institute 2003, *Sweden & Swedes*)

Which one is a “true representation” of the real Swedes? As my research shows, it is rather difficult to address such issues from a reflective perspective because no text can actually mimic the “real Swedes.” Rather the opposite, I am interested in understanding how unsystematic “reflective expressions” based on “labels,” “clichés,” “deictic expressions” or “stereotypes” gain any status as explanations about nations’ identities in Cultural Diplomacy discourses. In any case, Reflective Representations of this type appear in the public discourse, essentially in the media, but also in diplomatic and academic settings, suggesting a reflection of reality as if “a mirror was presenting the information back again,” or as a quick reaction to an event. Again, in Cultural Diplomacy terms, this is very difficult to demonstrate in empirical grounds. Consider, for example, another “realistic depiction” about Swedes made as a foreigner’s advice to come into the country and successfully understand “the Swedes” (Dahlén 1997: 126):

- Handshaking common, touching and back-slapping uncommon
- Punctuality a must but business pace unrushed
- Many seem stiff and overly serious at first
- Take great joy in nature
- Pride taken in Viking heritage
- Good topics: Sweden’s high standard of living, sports
- Bad topics: High taxation, neutrality during World War II

During informal talks, this may be a popular view of a nation and its citizens that has limited consequences as to be taken seriously. The problem comes when some official diplomatic representational strategies want to assume that the previous illustrations are in fact “realist impression” of Sweden, and thus place these basic depictions under “reflective representations.” As it is shown in chapter five, some cultural diplomatic practices used in Sweden border these types of assumptions against other nations and their citizens. In this, reflective representations can be subsumed to strategies in cultural diplomacy where nations assume that they can portray with “high fidelity” a resemblance of their national identity and culture abroad. As discussed further on, this is hardly ever the case. However, some of these policies are studied in the case of Mexico and Sweden.

2.4.2. Symbolic Representations

The initial argument here is that symbolic representation is a higher level cognitive function exclusive of humans, therefore anthropologically identified (Van Oort 2003). Departing from a pure “mechanistic cognitive model perspective,” it is only the human brain which possesses the capacity to symbolize through a

well-known and thoroughly discussed process defined both as *decoupling* (Hernadi 2001) and as *displacement* (Burling 1993). This representational system works by the symbolic referent having the capacity to “decouple” or “displace” the representation from the direct objectual proximity (essential for reflective representations). The decoupling from the referent has, as a consequence, the appearance of an artificial substitute: the symbol, understood as an *identity carrier*, with no necessary resemblance to what it stands for. In other words, the abstract cognitive pre-requisites for symbolic representation to happen are to be seen as the human ability to construct identity through a process of discourse formation. I argue that the other functions of the symbolic widely recognized (*i.e.* the aesthetic, ritual and sacred) are subsumed to the identity dimension since they are aides to construct our sense of the self and that of moral reciprocity. The next chapter deals with this issue in more detail.

A second argument, using Stuart Hall’s social perspective, “holds that it is the speaker, the author, who impulses his or her unique meaning on the world through language. Words mean what the author intends they should mean” (1997: 25). In this approach, the main concern is language as a symbol, and the meaning it conveys. It is the unfolding of the symbol and the decoupling of it into language, which actually produces meaning. Symbols here can be iconic, stereotypical and/or tautological. Semantics are performed (how meaning is encoded in language) and *locutionary acts* can be detected (the uttering of meaningful linguistic forms). This is in principle, an analytical discussion because it is obvious that language (and for that matter discourse) is beyond private practice and requires socialization.

A third argument, using Hanna Pitkin’s thoughts indicates that symbolic representations have two functions, *to represent* in the sense of substituting for, standing as a referential concept (the national flag, the Christian cross, etc.), and *symbolizing*, in the sense of producing relations of significance beyond the referent (*e.g.* the Presidential role in France, Marylyn Monroe as pop icon, etc.). The first function is the all obvious mechanic discussion presented earlier when talking about the etymology of the word –with the precaution that the symbol is different from the sign, in that the former does not require a likeness or correspondence with the referent. The second function is much more interesting, since it assumes meaning beyond the thing represented, and serves as a carrier to display socially accepted beliefs, thoughts and values about the significance of something for a group of people. Pitkin further develops two more angles that I just mention marginally: “symbolic representation may even require a certain amount of ritual activity” and, that it also requires a certain degree of acceptance and agreement between the symbol maker and the represented (1967: 103-106).⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall have a discussion on “diplomatic representations” (2005) where they bring a definition borrowed from Alfred de Grazia who claims that representation can be understood as “a relation between two persons, the representative and the represented or constituent, with the representative holding the authority to perform various actions that incorporate the agreement of the represented” (2005: 99).



Illustration III: Picasso, P. "Las Meninas After Velázquez" 1957. Oil on painting. Picasso Museum, Barcelona.

Just as I did with reflective representations, I now illustrate this analysis of symbolic representations by introducing a discussion on a second painting. In 1954, Spanish painter Pablo Picasso engaged in a *tour de force* to produce 45 plus⁴⁶ pictorial variations of the classical masterpiece *Las Meninas* by Velázquez. From all, I only discuss his very first painting

Las Meninas after Velázquez I, from 1957. Initially, Picasso

is making a pictorial replacement, accepting the materiality of the original Velázquez's, but in symbolic terms (as explained above). The identities of the original characters of Velázquez' painting have been preserved as "blurred mimetic references" and signified further. To be sure, every member of the Royal family appears again, in approximately the same position as Velázquez's, just *decoupled* from its visual mimetic tyranny. Picasso makes a representation expressing the symbolic condition of designating *the identity of the painting* to stand for something absent –i.e. *the concept Las Meninas*. The designation is a mix of both physical and symbolic, incorporating a basic social arrangement as a precondition for the interpretation.

As explained in the reflective representations, *Las Meninas* appeals to the naturalistic representation of reality, depicting the royal scene with such staggering realism that, at first sight, the characters, the objects and the moment seems to be preserved in time, expanding to our own spatial experience as well. Théophile Gauthier revered the naturalism of the painting by asking a question "Where, then, is the painting?" (Grace 1997:150). In the same manner, when Luca de Gordiano saw the painting, he exclaimed -when asked his opinion by King Charles II- "Sir, this is the theology of Painting!"⁴⁷ (Stratton-Prouitt 2003: 4). As a last compliment, Antonio Palomino, Velázquez' first biographer and art *connoisseur*, concluded in 1724 that "it is impossible to overrate this painting because it is truth, not painting" (Grace 1997: 150). *It is truth, not painting.*

⁴⁶ The whole Suite of *Las Meninas After Velázquez* consists of 58 oil paintings, divided in forty-four direct interpretations of the original *Las Meninas*, nine dove scenes, three landscapes and two free interpretations and was accomplished in a period of four months, from mid August to early December 1957, almost 300 years after the original was painted. The dilemma Picasso encountered was the appropriation of the old masterpiece in itself, which could be seen as a mere copy, when he intended to make a full representation of it instead. A letter sent to his friend Jaime Sabartés, Picasso wrote "I would create a painting of The Maids of Honor sure to horrify the specialist in the copying of old masters. It would not be *The Maids of Honor* he saw when he looked at Velazquez picture; it would be *My Maids of Honor*" (Erenkrantz 2001).

⁴⁷ As Explained by Palomino (Stratton-Prouitt, S. 2003), theology was at the time in Catholic Spain the highest discipline among the branches of knowledge, implying that the same was for this painting, the best ever.

In Picasso's work, we see a dismantling of the pictorial tradition, based on a foundational figurative representational style. For example, Picasso's first violation of tradition rests in leaving the painting with an unfinished sense of completion (as it can be seen in the lower-right, where Nicolas Pertusiato teases the dog). A second violation can be appreciated in the proportions and logic of the characters: Velázquez is the tallest figure of all, holding two palettes, and his body is camouflaged with the triangular composition of the background; the star of the painting, Infanta María Margarita is a small uninteresting, stubborn figure with crossed-eyes. Instead of the *Menina*, María Sarmiento, (the servant) receives full attention from the painter who dedicated detailed strokes in the mixed identities of the face, and in the careful depiction of the dress itself (becoming the second largest figure in the painting). King Phillip IV and Queen Mariana are the subject of Picasso's mockery by using innocent childish strokes to reflect a couple of dim smiling faces in the mirror, etc. Picasso is symbolizing the painting further and in that, constructing new sets of meaning from which to read the concept "*Las Meninas*" enacted by Velázquez. In his painting, Picasso makes a personal commentary on the people's identities and re-signifies each of them with the use of synthetic and analytical cubism, leaving aside the mimetic view enacted three hundred years earlier by Velázquez.

Now, the symbolic argument Picasso puts forward in his painting *Las Meninas after Velázquez* rests on his questioning of the foundational character of Velázquez work *by turning truth into painting*. As Grace puts it, "By the second part of the century, the picture that had stood for 'truth and not painting' [Velázquez's] came to represent 'painting and not truth' [*in Picasso's symbolization*], reflecting modernism's reductive focus on the nature of representation itself and the reciprocal relationship of the objective world with the subjective experience of the viewer" (1997: 150).

The "hidden" mechanism to represent the truth and reality is a set of socially constructed norms, conventions and techniques which allow the representation of the truth and reality of the time, according to some values and interests in particular. Or, as John Searle (1995) explains, most of our social world in fact depends on symbolic categories, including institutions like money, marriage, citizenship, science, or in this case, painting. The main point being that social institutions require a symbolizing function (in our case painting, but most often language) because in order to represent hierarchies, power relations and norms, we have to go beyond the straightforward perception of objects, into the realm of symbols and culture.⁴⁸ In other words, if Velázquez's *Las Meninas* became the epitome of painting it is in part because the painting commands the accepted pictorial rules for a court painting, and it is placed inside the institutional framework of the Spanish monarchy, fulfilling a social symbolic function (authorization and accountability in representational theory). While there is no doubt of the aesthetic merits of the painting, my point is that one cannot forget that it is part of

⁴⁸ I kindly thank Lena Agevall for pointing to the similarities between these ideas and those expressed by Mary Douglas in her well-known book *How Institutions Think* (1987). Chapter 5 "Institutions confer identity" is of special importance for my arguments here.

an institutional social construction.⁴⁹ And it is from that perspective, at least in the political sciences, that it should be read.

Now, in my analysis of Cultural Diplomacy, symbolic representations also fulfil a very specific role. This is a step ahead from the problem of image simplifications, stereotypes and simplified alterities. An example would be when countries have to navigate against negative symbols in the forms of images: “The goal of erasing [*negative symbolic*] stereotypes comes up repeatedly. Paolo Riani, director of the Italian Cultural Institute, is intent on ‘presenting an image of the country that is not just Mafia, not just fashion’. Flavio Perri, the Brazilian consul general, wants ‘to show we are more than Carnival’” (Wise 2002). Image and symbolic issues are already national security concerns for many states (Boulding 1959). In effect, the problem of symbolic stereotyping in diplomacy is pervasive, and the identities of nations and people are constructed in very simplistic terms. As for symbolic representations, this is a concern for the institutions and the state. Symbolic representations can only accommodate for *authorized* national players, identities and discourses to *stand for* a nation. Cultural diplomacies invite artists to perform on their behalf, construct discourses of national cultural identities, rewrite histories and set up the representations that *stand for* and *act for* their nation abroad. Cultural diplomacies are *accountable* for their representations since they still seek a string that attaches the symbol to a source of nationhood. Under this assumption, companies, singers, artists, films and *attachés* all perform a cultural representation of a given nation abroad (see charts 2.3. 4.2 & 5.1). At the same time, symbolic representations question whether or not these representations *can act on behalf* of the nation, based on the constitutive effects of their interests, either public or private. To be sure, under symbolic representations an *attaché* pursues cultural diplomacy and foreign policy; a firm promoting national cultural products pursues cultural relations and business. The institution and the public interest matter (*cfr.* chart 6.1).

2.4.3. Postmodern Representations

In this thesis I present postmodern representations as discursive strategies to challenge the predominance of “master discourses,” particularly oriented to the construction of social identities. As it is evident, discourse and identities are at the center of this debate. As Richard Harvey Brown argues, “The postmodern argument that representation constitutes the world is also an argument against earlier ideologies that legitimated social institutions by grounding them in truths about reality that was viewed as outside representation altogether” (1995: 6). Further on, Harvey Brown adds something that summarizes the point of the postmodern agenda in this book: “rather than focusing on the impossibility of

⁴⁹ The field of social constructivism is wide and contradictory in essence. Depending on the field of research, we can find authors going all the way from neo-positivist to post-modern constructions where there is very little, if any, dialogue between them. For this research I will work along the lines of Institutional Social Constructivism, close to the reflections posed by John Searle (1995) in sociology and Alexander Wendt (1999) in International Relations. By this I mean to study the ways in which institutions happen to construct the mainstream values, norms and identities of players to articulate a cultural sphere of hegemony and domination.

objectivity or total truth, it would be more fruitful to understand the conditions in which statements or actions are nonetheless accepted as objective, valid or legitimate” (1995: 7).

Postmodern representations pose a challenge to reflective and symbolic representations on three grounds: first they question the metaphysical presence assumed in the “reflection” and the “symbol”; then, they strive for understanding the identities of the represented by questioning the alterities left outside the representation; and finally, they assume that the world is a biased fragmented social construction where dominant powers reflect their influence in discursive terms. The enormous plurality of approaches in the postmodern camp, make it very difficult to summarize all debates properly. Harvey Brown says in relation to postmodernism that one of the main issues at stake is actually to answer the question of what reality means in a mass media and information society. A second difficulty, he claims, is to establish whether postmodernism is a continuation of modernity or a final break. And also, critics argue that postmodernism is a reflection of late consumer capitalism where we are experimenting modes of articulating reality and representations differently under flexible accumulation (1995: 2-4). Iver B Neumann summarizes a few of these debates taking place in IR suggesting that there are first-order and second-order representations, in a clear reference to the work of Roland Barthes (1972). The former “seek to directly re-present political events. In this terminology, television and print journalism are also examples of first-order representations” (2006: 7). In the latter, “Popular entertainment usually takes the form of *second-order representations*, in that its narratives represent elements of social and political life through a layer of fictional representation. If a politician is always a kind of actor, attempting to convince us with her speeches, “act presidential,” or “feel our pain,” then a professional actor playing a politician is an actor portraying an actor” (2006: 7). *If an actor portrays an actor*, where is the real referent then? This is a postmodern situation. In my research, the *first-order* types can be seen as reflective representations while symbolic but more specifically postmodern are *second-order* representations, since they blur the fiction with reality. These theories should not allow, however, to deflect attention from the questions related to *authority/accountability* but also to *standing* and *acting for* (in Pitkin’s terms), as they also help me accommodate cultural diplomacy later on. Postmodern Representations are also accountable of delivering content and acting in the public space.

As for an illustration of the matters discussed here, and in reference to the previous discussions on “*Las Meninas*” by Velázquez and Picasso, I continue the discussion on postmodern representations by analyzing a piece by the Mexican-Spanish artist Alberto Gironella. *El Gran Obrador* (“The Great Obrador”) from 1964, a painting-assemblage-collage, is in fact an accurate example of representations at work from a “postmodern” perspective. This is, just as in the case of Picasso’s painting, “a representation of a representation,” but in a dissimilar way. One could say that Gironella has “de-centered” or “de-stabilized” the fundamental meaning of the original representation, by pictorially depicting a discourse where the main master discourses disappear, identities change, and ironically, the *Infanta* Margarita and her *Meninas* are nowhere to be found.



Illustration IV: Gironella, A. "Gran Obrador" (1964), collage, oil on canvas, assemblage, carved-wood.

Discussing the painting in more detail, it is safe to say that the characters' social identities as painted by Velázquez are reinterpreted in a radical way. Another's tales are enacted. If we compare this work as a representation in relation to *Las Meninas*, searching for its accuracy in replicating the "original," then we may be disappointed. For example, at the center of the piece, the wooden sculptured face of the *obrador* dog standing still. To the right the image of Queen Mariana as a Pekingese

lapdog (originally a Chinese royalty toy breed) is actually staring hard at the loyal dog, who in fact is the King of Spain, Philip IV, who by means of witchcraft has become a loyal *Obrador* canine.⁵⁰ In fact, this transformation of the Queen of Spain is based on the witchcraft histories of the times that required the witches to take the form of a female dog to exercise their magic powers. Velázquez' self-portrait as a court painter has also been de-centered, but still a presence is recalled, as having a place to the left in the face of Francisco Lezcano, known as *El Niño de Vallecas*, a retarded dwarf acting as a court buffoon to the Spanish royal family at the time. Maribárbola and Nicolasito's presence is minimized, having only a "semiotic appearance" as two fat-table legs, also a trace to the baroque decadence. Marcela de Ulloa and the *Guarda Damas* are signified by a piece of wood and a mask. José Nieto has become a blurred spatter. The panel to the center-right is a real fur, carefully assembled with nails and tin-taps, which shows the external coat, the real skin of an animal. However, the materiality of the fur is immobile, standing still as an object of contemplation, perhaps also a reference to the tyke of *Las Meninas*, that lazy mongrel dog lying in the foreground of the painting. The two boxed sculpted hands in the center, a single one on the top and the two fused together on the bottom are semiotic objects that should hold their "primareness" as signified objects. However, the assemblage easily takes them, by means of surrealist-Dada methodology, as signifiers of the mannerist style, present in the *Ladies in Waiting* in Velázquez painting (baroque style), but also show a sign of religious faith (as the hands of Maribárbola or Marcela de Ulloa in *Las Meninas*) into signs of deep anxiety. The assemble on the upper central panel, in allusion to Velázquez atelier Ovid's reproductions, is

⁵⁰ When Gironella read Julio Caro Baroja's book *Las Brujas y su Mundo* ("The witches and their world"), he confirmed that queen Mariana had allegedly practiced her supernatural powers over the husband and other people in court (Serra 1967: 9).

in fact the transversal representation of an animal's blood, bone and flesh in an act of vomiting, signifying the material eschatology of the royal family.

In el "*Gran Obrador*" Gironella reasserts his ontological claims: there is no "three-dimensional metaphysics" behind the art piece, no painting tricks; the identity of the characters' painting is reconstituted in new representations again and again; and "the story" of the painting, the "grand narrative," fades away in the multiplicity of discourses that appropriate it in ironic forms. In a sense, Gironella is shooting down the idealistic artistic veil of *Las Meninas*, using irony and fragmentation. Or as art expert and critic Rita Eder puts it: "Gironella, with the agile, stuffed stroke, tries out, undoes, disorders, changes the characters from the original place, transforming them in masked death-ones. The palace's opulence loses its dignity, showing the passing of time" (Eder 1981: 57). In a sense, Gironella's work has a life of its own. If we were not familiar with the Velázquez' painting it would be difficult to relate them both. In this sense, Gironella's collage cannibalizes Velázquez masterpiece and in a strange artistic "creolization" acquires an identity of its own, separating himself from the "masterpiece," but tangentially breeding from it still. Mexican critic Juan García Ponce expresses his view in this way:

in the art's world, *Las Meninas* are the clearest example of a reality perfectly objectified, leaving very little room for any subjective comments beyond the weight of the master piece[...] Instead of accepting reality as such, [Gironella] establishes an arbitrary reality –that other side of the master piece that holds the exclusive absolute say- and proceeds to its destruction, not through a mechanical method, but by artists' intuition, which in return shows us the impossibility of pure, total and harmonic reality of order in itself (García Ponce 1964).

In sum: Gironellas assemblage is in fact a radical de-centering of *Las meninas*, in a deconstructive way. Very much what Jacques Derrida does by putting "the otherness of another subject" on the same level with "the otherness of the indicative sign" and the otherness of the representation of the past (1982), thus invalidating the relevance of the internal differences between the various forms of otherness (a radical take on alterities). This artistic assemble is also full of traces in a de-constructive sense, since for Derrida it is the trace that constitutes the root of otherness, but this trace is not necessarily the trace of *the Other* (1983). Rather, *the Other* is just another trace (Hall S. 1996). In other words, this piece of art is changing the identities of the master characters, bringing a trace, or an otherness so far hidden by the masterpiece.

In terms of Cultural Diplomacy, a postmodern representation mainly signifies two things: the acceptance that a plurality of cultural identities can *stand for* a nation's discursive construction in representational forms, and that it is still necessary to distinguish the *acting for* of the identities' interests behind the representations, beyond their naturalization and metaphysical appearance. In other words, postmodern representations do in fact accommodate for a wide plurality of players, identities and discourses to *stand for* a nation, as cultural representations. Under this assumption, companies, singers, artists, films and *attachés* all perform a cultural representation of a given nation abroad. At the same time, postmodern representations while questioning the effects of the actors interests, still invite cooperation between the public and private areas, blurring the bounda-

ries of action. In this case, an *attaché*, a firm or an NGO pursue cultural diplomacy. In so doing they acknowledge that a plurality of forms and identities coexist, and that international relations is a fragmented camp full of different identities and actors.

At the end of the day, however, these postmodern representations must also address the question of authorization and accountability, especially if operations take place inside public offices using taxpayers' money. For example consider the incident in cultural diplomacy between the governments of Sweden and Latvia. In 2001 the Swedish director Pål Hollander's film *Buy Bye Beauty* was aired on Swedish television, depicting Latvia as a country with a rampant sex industry –making unproven claims that “about 50 percent of Latvian women have had sex for money.” The film was so disturbing that the Latvian Prime Minister “Andris Bērziņš asked the Latvian Institute to evaluate the controversial film in terms of the damage it has done to Latvia's image” even suggesting that the country could file an international criminal case against the film's authors and the Swedish Institute –where the funding from the movie came from. Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga reacted saying that the film was a “political propaganda” that did not meet the standards of objectivity and told the Swedish Embassy in Riga that they were “concerned about the negative effects [...the movie] could have on Latvia's image in Sweden as well as on Latvian-Swedish relations” (Raubiško 2001). Later on, TV3 Sweden, which had aired the film in national television, apologized to Latvians acknowledging the highly subjective negative contents of the documentary. There are some questions that Cultural Representations can help answer in this case. If the main “truth claim” the movie makes is that half of Latvian women were prostituting themselves in 2001, then the question is not whether the claim about the social situation in Latvia regarding women is real. The point behind is to show who has the power to describe the identities of others in their own terms. It seems obvious that the film's intentions are not the realist depiction of social phenomena in Latvia. This is just an exploitation of a symbol in the form of a sexist stereotype against women of a former communist nation. Swedish director Hollander is constructing a discourse about women's alterities in Latvia, where he can show his superiority as a member of the developed world and as a male.

Finally, postmodern representations assume in this book that language is public, social and communicable. Therefore, “It acknowledges that neither things in themselves nor the individual users of language can fix meaning in language. Things do not mean. We construct meaning, using representational systems – concepts and signs” (Hall S. 1997: 25). According to this approach, “we must not confuse the material world, where things and people exist, and the symbolic practices and processes through which representation, meaning and language operate. Constructivists do not deny the existence of the material world. However it is not the material world which conveys meaning: it is the language system or whatever system we are using to represent our concepts” (1997: 25). As is again obvious, a postmodern representation aligns itself with the cultural system seen as a context where discourses are constructed, meanings negotiated and identities shaped. This approach also brings along the aesthetic arguments presented for

Picasso’s painting seen in its cultural context and reinforces the whole discussion on constructivism along the thesis.

Summarizing, it is important to bear in mind that there are two distinctions to be made when discussing Cultural Representations: these are discourses of resemblance-and-difference in relation to the both ideas and the material world (mirror, symbol or abstractions); and the discourses contained within the representations also address the interests of the players (national interest, institutional, or a blend of public and private). In the former distinction, the analysis of the three paintings makes sense since a prolific aesthetic discussion on the forms, symbols and resemblances serves as an illustration of how they can operate in a cultural field such as Cultural Diplomacy. The latter distinction is also served by the analysis of the paintings, particularly in Picasso’s and Gironella’s since they both show the artificiality of our representations and help disclose the identities and interests of the actors depicted. However, these dense discussions can be simplified, attending a more pragmatic view of cultural diplomacy in chart 2.3. where we can realize how postmodern representations are sensitive to the questions posed by Hanna Pitkin from the very beginning in the form of *standing for* and the *representing* proper.

Table 2.3. Cultural Representations and Standing For and Acting For

	Reflective	Symbolic	Post-Modern
<i>Standing For</i>	<i>Mirror</i>	<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Abstraction/Plurality/Fiction</i>
<i>Acting for</i>	<i>National interest</i>	<i>Public-Institutional</i>	<i>Public-Private</i>

In reflective representations, cultural reality is depicted as it appears, in a naturalized form, and the actors participating in a representational practice with other nations, would prefer the traditional Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad approach based on the national interest. This is close to our understanding of Soft Power. Symbolic representation emphasizes the importance of the symbol in a cultural context and would look for its significance. At the same time, symbolic representations in relation to diplomacy insist that there is some string to the symbol in the form of public interest and the actors’ accountability, thus accommodating views in relation to Cosmopolitan Constructivism. Finally, postmodern representations allow for almost any strategy to be enacted as the *standing for* of the representation. At the same time, postmodern representations insist on the blurring of the public/private divide, thus creating a new authorization but leaving accountability still within the realms of the official cultural diplomacy (government). This view is much closer to Nation Branding.

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I claim that cultural representations are social constructions on identities in the name of nations, thus also connected with political representations. The way these representations are organized will depend on how we look at Cultural Diplomacy. The discussion of Political Representations in Pitkin’s

“standing for” model emphasizes a loyal relation index-referent both in form and contents, while the “acting for” requires less immediate relation since it is based on symbols, which is the foundation of culture. The concept of culture was discussed as part of the representations of Cultural Diplomacy. The end result was that Soft Power and Nation Branding have a more instrumentalist use of culture, and Cosmopolitan Constructivism has a much more comprehensive view, based on an anthropological and multilateral tradition of diplomacy. In Cultural Diplomacy terms, if domination and control are sought, then the two former approaches seem to fulfil these goals better than the latter. The chapter presents three types of cultural representations (Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern) further discussing issues related to accountability and authorization as viewed by Pitkin, which is one of my original contributions in the discussion. The key issue was to realize in form and substance how *representing* and *standing for* national culture affects both the representational form and the interests of the participants. This is key contribution of this thesis in the field. As a result of this study, one can argue that Soft Power is more compatible with concepts related to reflective theories of representation, while Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Nation Branding communicate with both symbolic and postmodern representations.

My illustration of the theories using artistic interpretations of three paintings showed that objective, true representations are impossible, simply because any “representing” strategy has motivations and interests. By introducing Gironella’s piece, I make the statement that representations are often arbitrary and contingent arrangements, which call for a political strategy (showing and hiding as fits best), thus de-stabilizing the correspondence between represented and representation. Also, this painting shows the possibility of de-centering and thus deconstructing the master-representation *Las Meninas*, stripping out its metaphysical content into a more pluralistic, inclusive discourse and interpretation. Since this is at the core of identifications, the following chapter investigates how identities are represented in Cultural Diplomacy.

Representing Identities/Alterities


I t is time to take the previous ideas a step further. The main objective of this chapter is to theorize different possibilities for representing identities and alterities in a context of Cultural Diplomacy (CD). I begin by discussing how cultural diplomacy representations accommodate to the concept of identity, suggesting that this has been an overlooked theoretical problem in the field. Nation Branding (NB) fundamentally sees identity and alterity as an issue of nation image, profiling and successful stereotyping. Soft Power (SP) sticks to the principle of National Interest and the dichotomy between friends and enemies, where image discourses are secondary. Cosmopolitan Constructivism (CC) enjoys a very powerful and wide theoretical ground where identity and alterity are seen as a dynamic relation shaping intersubjectively, the relations of diplomacies and nations. This is a continuation of the debate initiated in chapter one, but now geared into an identity/alterity discussion, which I take as one of the original contributions of this thesis to the field of Cultural Diplomacy. I take that as a point of departure to discuss the identity and alterity divide, and its necessary dependence. I then engage in the elaboration of an Endo-representations (ER) model for understanding collective and individual identities based on their ontologies, in which I distinguish four possibilities: psychological, corporeal, national and the cultural proper. Then I move into a discussion on the alterities seen as Alter-representations (AR), making a similar organization in threat and security, based on their homologous or eccentric ontologies: the rival/enemy, the ally/friend, the exotic and the barbarian. This chapter is intended to shed light into the representational strategies to see the *Self and Other* from a Cultural Diplomacy perspective, particularly useful in chapters four and five when I present the expository cases of Sweden and Mexico.

3.1. Identity inside Cultural Diplomacy Representations

As I discussed in chapter one, the three cultural diplomacy representations, *i.e.* Soft Power, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Nation Branding function as templates that conceptualize, structure, and constitute diplomatic action in nations. In chapter two, I also developed the idea that the outcomes of cultural diplomacy can be understood in terms of representations. I hinted then, that the cultural representations are usually approached by looking at the identities they constitute in discursive terms. Figure 3.1. shows the transition I suggest in this chapter: Cultural and National Identities fixe the type of Representations the nation holds for *Itself* and for *Others* (endo-alter), which is the main platform for the construction of an image abroad. In this process, nations traditionally rely on their foreign ministries, their foreign policies and their diplomatic apparatuses, which in turn define where the emphasis must be (in discursive terms). This process occurs in

relation to the cultural diplomacy and the representations foreign ministries decide for a country (CC, NB and SP). In this chapter I do not discuss the whole process, but only concentrate on how Cultural Diplomacy representations approach identity.

Figure 3.1. Identity influencing Representations and Cultural Diplomacy



Established research looks at Foreign Policy in relation to how states see themselves in the international system (hegemony or peripheral, small or great, etc., *e.g.* see Carlsnæs 1981 and Jervis 1976, Walker R.J.B. 1992), their capabilities (economic, political, cultural, *e.g.* see Nye 2004 and Huntington 1999), their goals (conquer, status quo, change, survival, *e.g.* see Palmer and Morgan 2006 and Keohane and Nye 1998), their constituency (the people, the elites, *e.g.* see Buzan 1991, 't Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B. 1997, Foyle 1999 and Smith G. S. 2000), their interactions, roles, behaviors and more recently, their representations (of themselves and others, *e.g.* see Wendt 1999 and Hopf 2002) and discursive practices (language and performativity, *e.g.* see Wæver 1990, Campbell D. 1998). In this sense, diplomacy can also be discussed in terms of its relation to Foreign Policy (subjugation, complementarity or independence, see Kissinger 2002, Keohane 1989, Aguilar 1996) and the outcomes such as war, alliances, cooperation and international trade are all manifestations of it. The answers foreign ministries give to these issues define the tradition in foreign policy.⁵¹ For example, Sweden has traditionally emphasized its principles of multilateralism, neutrality and non-alignment as cornerstones of foreign policy and Mexico has chosen to stress self-determination, non-intervention and peaceful resolution of conflicts as its core principles. Their diplomacies are usually aligned to these values and perform accordingly in their relations with other nations. The matter is to see how these values filter down to set cultural diplomacy representations in practices.

Initially, Nation Branding and similar representations (such as cross-cultural business and communications), consider identity as an unproblematic fixed concept, a given and taken for granted dimension of a nation's culture. At most, it is

⁵¹ for a good overview of foreign policy theory and positions see Carlsnæs 1987 and 2002, Hill 2003, Smith S. 1986 and 1988.

seen either as an asset or a burden, depending on the competitive market of identifications, where identities are tested in their ability to boost the country's image for foreign audiences. For Nation Branding, identity is a frozen unified block which poses, technically speaking, few challenges for wrapping up as a commodity for external export. In this, Nation Branding has no objection to cherry-picking features of a nation's identity and packaging them as symbolic product to assemble an image that actually sells intangible, immaterial expectations. In any case, the emphasis is on the end product, the image and the public relations. As Ying Fan explains "The concept of nation brand or country equity refers to the nation as a whole; it describes the country's intangible assets without any explicit links with a product. Product-country image is a subset of the country image." (2005: 6). In this sense, a substantial discussion on identities and Cultural Diplomacy finds very little relevance in Nation Branding, or as Fan insists "Other terms such as national identity and cultural stereotypes have little direct implication in branding or marketing because they [*identities*] have a clear focus on the culture and people of a nation" (2005: 6). As a result, Nation Branding recreates a discourse that opposes and differentiates national identities, staking on a disconnection of the "representing bond" where image is unconcerned with a coupling of identities. Nation Branding assumes that a nation identity is fixed, but its image can be constructed *on-demand*, tailor-made to the requirements of the international market of symbolic representations. In this, Nation Branding clearly presupposes a postmodern representation of identities. It is fair to say that Nation Branding encourages a world of simulacra and hyperrealism of identities. Jean Baudrillard makes the point clear: "Abstraction today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal" (quoted in Der Derian 1992: 89).

The beauty of Nation Branding representations lies in its simplification of the otherwise problematic issues surrounding debates on identity of nations and cultures. *Nation Branders* assume it is possible to concentrate solely on the skin level of nations, the *façade* of the country or the superficial discourses since average people can hardly grasp anything more than countries' simplifications (a cognitive argument).⁵² In a more advanced twist, Nation Branding actually accommodates identity as an objectified commodity that pumps up sales for products. The O'Shaughnessy brothers argue that it is commonly accepted that "the nation as a brand has an instant and even populist resonance. For some brands, identity is bound up with their national affiliation: brands of Swiss chocolate, French perfume, Italian sports cars, and Japanese electronics are instantly meaningful partly because the sponsor nations do function as a brand—a brand moreover that can signify an entire cultural history" (2000: 56).

The main advantage of Nation Branding is that it offers a *ready-made* scheme to organize quickly an otherwise multifaceted debate. The main disadvantage is that there is very little evidence that this view works in diplomatic terms, and actually

⁵² James Rosenau observes that for most citizens "foreign policy deals with remote and obscure matters," that seem "too distant from the daily needs and wants at home" (1980: 284).

its “discursive manners” are counterproductive for diplomacy from the very beginning. In the case of Sweden, the use of this approach as a template for its public and cultural diplomacy seems to be one of the strategies enthusiastically embraced by the Swedish Institute (SI) during the late 1990s and early millennium (Wästberg 2003, 2004, 2006 and, 2007 and Wästberg & Wästberg 2003, and SI 2005). As is shown in chapter five in more detail, Sweden has been debating inside government the issue of how to “market its culture abroad” better since at least 1992. The Nation Branding approach entered the picture in the early millennium and has been tangentially used as a strategy to complement other approaches for the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA), the Ministry of Culture (MC) the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (NCCA). However, this representation has not been exempt from controversies. Ingrid Dahlberg, one of the most prominent informed politicians on this issue, has been the most visible face questioning the uses of public and cultural diplomacy of Sweden under such views (2003).

For Soft Power, identity has a more complex role to play inside theory than Nation Branding. The principle is that foreign policy rests upon the “national interest” and, in turn, the latter is a representation standing for identity. Therefore, values, roles, myths and history would forge the understanding of a nation’s own identity and its role in the international society. In Soft Power views, however, identities are treated as malleable, often dichotomous-objects to dispose of (positive-negative, etc.). Also, identities are seen as the subject’s will that can be manipulated and controlled according to an information program or political script. Or, as Nye keeps reminding us, Soft Power “works by *convincing others* that they should follow you or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce behavior you want. Soft power depends largely on the persuasiveness of information” (1999, my italics). In representational terms, this is to make other identities represent a nation’s interests in a reflective way, both in the form of *standing* and *acting for*. As already mentioned in chapter one, Soft Power’s solution is to improve the persuasive channels of bilateral and multilateral communications, refine the tools for the conquest of the “hearts and minds” of the peoples abroad and make respect and admiration a goal in itself in foreign policy (*cf.* Lennon 2003, Nye 2004a and 2004b). In Cultural Diplomacy terms, Manuela Aguilar has already defined cultural diplomacy as the “way a government portrays its country to another country’s people in order to help achieve certain foreign policy goals” (Aguilar 1996: 8) while Louis Bélanger insists that supporting the idea that cultural diplomacy is a reflection of foreign policy, or the “expression of a national interest profoundly rooted in some cultural denominator,” is *passé* (1999: 695).

The advantage of using Soft Power lies in its compatibility with the more established tradition of foreign policy for most countries (*i.e.* the national interest). Soft Power is a discourse many diplomacies are accustomed to and find reasonable to deal with. In fact, a great deal of the Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad diplomacy discussed in chapter one can easily accommodate the demands of Soft Power, both materially and conceptually. In representational terms, Soft Power fulfils a pragmatic *standing for* cultural diplomacy, and even, it could be

argued, a reflective representation of cultural relations *à la* Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad. Also, Soft Power has proved to be a functional template in the short run for some nations, such as Canada, the UK or Germany in the 1990s. Its main disadvantage is that the world affairs are changing rapidly and identities cannot be only treated as malleable frozen blocks to be customized at will. In fact, identities are quickly shaping themselves in different forms along with the information and multicultural society, requiring a consideration of alterities as well (*cf.* Neumann 1999). In chapter four I suggest that Soft Power has been one of the main templates used by Mexican cultural diplomacy during the 1990s and early millennium. Soft Power's short term success is unchallenged. As already mentioned in chapter one, Mexico persisted in improving its image *vis-à-vis* the US by launching colossal exhibitions of a long-gone glorious past and a picturesque and exotic identity for external consumption such as "México: Splendor of Thirty Centuries," studied in detail in chapter four.

Finally, in recent years, a third theoretical debate on identity, state and foreign policy has been carried out mainly by constructivist and post-modern scholars who have emphasized in one way or another, the relevance of norms, identities, interests and ideas in the field of international politics and diplomacy (*cf.* Campbell 1992, Der Derian 1987, Goldstein 1993, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, Reus-Smit 1999, Ruggie 1993 and 1998, Walker 1992, Wendt 1992, 1999). In IR, the leading discussion has been conducted by Alexander Wendt under an idealist-constructivist agenda (see chapter one). Initially, Wendt posed a challenge to the Neo-Realist camp with the publication of an article where he reversed the logic power constitution by suggesting that interests and identities of nations are constructed and not given (1992). Later on, he made his argumentation more dense and sophisticated with the publication of the book *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) where he clarifies his constructivist points further. This is, I claim, the foundation of the Cosmopolitan Constructivist representation I am proposing throughout the book.⁵³ In particular, Wendt's analysis of identities leads him to suggest what he calls a "tentative typology of identities and interests," which he sees as a constitutive combination of factors that ultimately define the identification of a state with something in particular. Wendt suggests "this particular" is the "national interest" –while I suggest that for a cosmopolitan view it is actually the "public interest".⁵⁴ Wendt's model assumes identities in four different typologies: corporate, role, type and collective. I argue that it is more productive for a cultural diplomatic perspective under a "cosmopolitan template" to use both identities in the form of *corporeal, psychological, national and cultural*; and also alterities in the form of *Rival/enemy, Ally/friend, Exotic and Barbarian*. For Wendt, the objective "national interests" lies in the survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem of the State (1992: 224-243). For the reflexive position suggested here, Cultural Diplomacy

⁵³ To be consistent, it is John Ruggie who has been one of the most visible scholars using a frankly "cosmopolitan" language in "constructivist" terms, where multilateral diplomacy is truly a goal in itself. His main books (1993 and 1998) refer to concise examples in world affairs from a UN institutional perspective.

⁵⁴ For more references see chapter two on the "standing for" model.

under a democratic state is the “public interest” in the form of *understanding how one’s culture is constructed in the context of other cultures/nations*. The core reason is that Cultural Diplomacy helps other cultures/nations abroad understand who our cultures/nations are (and *vice versa*) producing in return peaceful relations, cultural cooperation and collective well-being.

There has been no little criticism of Wendt’s views, and part of it also applies to the reflexive diplomacy’s view of identities. For example, Wendt’s choices of concepts like “type identity” or the use of “culture as a system” are not explained in his book, leading to a capricious and inconsistent conceptual apparatus, lacking a strong anchor in social and cultural theory (Guzzini and Leander, 2006, Zehfuss 2006). For example, while the type identification is strongly discussed in social theories,⁵⁵ Wendt sketches a discussion of types without really fully engaging into it. He does not even talk about alterities. He refers to Jim Fearon’s concept of type identity as a “label applied to persons who share (or are thought to share) some characteristics, in appearance, behavioral traits, attitudes, values, skills (*e.g.* human language), knowledge, opinions, experience, historical commonalities (like religion or place of birth), and so on” (Wendt 1999: 225), and quickly moves to an explanation of basic applications for IR theory, such as regime type or the democratic type. Since a great deal of his argumentation and academic program is based precisely on the identities states take, and the interests they bring within, it is odd not to see a more sophisticated discussion on the topic and the full implications of it.

In summary, the three representations I have been dealing with throughout the book have different approaches to identity as we can see in table 3.1. In the case of Nation Branding, I showed that the identifications are treated unproblematically, as secondary concepts that help enhance the image of the nation. Fixed stereotypes are used to construct a discourse of distinction and difference where the other cultures/nations are mainly treated as competitors in a market of country’s images.

Table 3.1: Identifications of Cultural Diplomacy Representations

	<i>Identities</i>	<i>Interests</i>	<i>Alterities</i>
NB	<i>Fixed stereotypes</i>	<i>Country Image</i>	<i>Competitors only</i>
SP	<i>Malleable-dichotomies</i>	<i>National Interest</i>	<i>Ally-enemy dichotomy</i>
CC	<i>Endo-representations</i>	<i>Public Interest</i>	<i>Alter-representations</i>

Soft Power makes use of identities as sets of dichotomic individual subjects that behave to protect the national interest disguised in a set of national identifications. In this way, identities can be good or bad, weak or strong, attractive or repulsive, etc. while alterities are treated similarly, commanding-cooptive, ally-enemy, etc. Finally, Cosmopolitan Constructivism presents a model that I want to summarize in more detail below since I think it aggregates most of the Ra-

⁵⁵ Since at least Emile Durkheim, all the way to Edward Said, just to mention a couple of important figures who problematize collective and individual identities, for example.

tional-Instrumental identity discussions in a more complex manner. In this, I want to understand how identities are explained under a *four-dimensional* force, bringing to the discussion the traditional philosophical debate of essentialism and anti-essentialism, along with the sociological debate of individual and collective identities, in order to depict the emergence of four distinct areas of identity discussion: psychological, corporeal, national and cultural identities.

3.2. Endo-Representations: Four Forms of Identity

It is now a time to organize a platform from which identity can shed light into the theoretical problem of representation and culture. Endo-representations are seen in this work as the discursive process through which identities are constructed and discursively fixed in a core-culture/nation. The four *Endo-representations* (ER) I work with comprise four forms of identity: corporeal, psychological, national and cultural. To lay the discursive foundations, let us just mention that the word “identity” in its Latin root refers to the term *identitas* which means “sameness of essential character” or simply “the same,” from which the word *identical* is derived. This starting point leads us into the idealistic debate of *identity as a representation of essence*. The assumption being that the fundamental nature of all things and beings in nature is identifiable and distinguishable in form and matter, by the means of a “supreme mind.” Plato clearly stated in the *Laws* (Preamble Book V) that “Of all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man’s own.” For Plato, a person’s identity resides in his soul, specifically its rational faculty, whereas his body is merely a semblance or image of who he is (*Laws*). Plato’s commitment means that a person’s identity is equivalent to the soul’s rational faculty. This also implies, in representational terms, that the soul’s rational faculty is authorized to act for the identity of the person. This line of reasoning regarding identity is very much in use in the social sciences up to date, and has been identified as an *essentialist position* (Hall 1990, Friedman 1994). The main features of *essentialism* imply a monopoly of the “authenticity of the soul” or essence, a static self-referential being over time, and positing itself in an essential distinction from other historical subjects. In Cultural Diplomacy terms, essentialism suggests that representational subjects and their cultures operate in a sort of unitary idealized foundation that passes through time and is capable of capturing trans-historical essences. For example, Aztecs are Mexicans’ true identities just as the Vikings are the Swedes’. I contend here that this view may be closer to the Nation Branding and Soft Power approach in the way they conceive of identities.

As should be obvious, the opposing view presents a critique to identity’s essentialism and therefore is regarded as *anti-essentialism*. One of the strongest observations that informs the view comes from relevant aspects of the philosophical approaches presented by Friedrich Nietzsche, particularly when discussing the terms “metaphysical philosophy,” “will to power” and the origins of “moral discourses.” The main line of reasoning behind the position departs from the proposition that identity emerges from the material conditions of life, *i.e.* the way that

people live and interpret their everyday experiences, embroil structural inescapable assumptions that is constitutive of thought. Thus, identity is not fixed and has to be seen under historical changes, shaped by circumstances (context), actors and discourses that facilitate power domination by a group. Nietzsche's book *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), exemplifies how religious and moral systems of belief shape and guide identity. For example, morality, one of the main traits of human's identities, departs from material interests and power struggle subjacent in the hierarchy of social values. The idea of the "noble morality" and "slave morality" defines positions in society, either as a dominant subject or a victim of domination, from where identities can also be inferred. The result is the materialization of specific *discourses of power* that allows the attaching of value and status to each member of societies' own identity. In Cultural Diplomacy terms, anti-essentialism treats identities in terms of subjugation and estrangement, looking at how a culture and subject's identity has been shaped by power struggle and domination (*cf.* Der Derian 1992). For example, the representations of "Mexican backwardness" or "Sweden's crypto-communism" can only be understood in relation to dominant powers constructing other's identities in inferiority terms to subjugate.

These two positions inform chart 3.2, where a second division in individual and collective identities is suggested, as describing analytically distinctions relevant for Cultural Diplomacy discussions having the State as the key actor. In the chart we can recognize four different identities: Psychological, Corporeal, Cultural and National. This work particularly requires a detailed account of the Cultural and National Identities, and to a lesser extent, the Psychological and Corporeal, since the main units of analysis in this study are countries.⁵⁶

Table 3.2. Endo-Representations: Analytical Distinctions

IDENTITY	Essentialist	Anti-essentialist
Individual	<u>PSYCHOLOGICAL</u> Ego-Soul-Psyche-Morals	<u>CORPOREAL</u> Genes-Race-Sex-Class
Collective	<u>NATIONAL</u> Ethnicity-Religion- Primordial & Foundational signs	<u>CULTURAL</u> Power-Production- Interaction-Legitimizing Symbols-Civilization

3.2.1. Psychological Identity

Psychological Identity from an essentialist perspective refers to the construction of the self and the consciousness (mind), based on the study of the individual psychological mechanisms of a psyche, a soul or an ego, which ultimately determines and shapes the personality. In this view, identity emerges in people's mind as a result of an independent construal of the self, which becomes a

⁵⁶ However, this is only a schematic map which aims at making analytic distinctions between different identities and their representations, and it is not a fixed matrix. In fact, Iver Neumann suggests (following Chantal Mouffe) that identities are "nomadic" i.e. they are "context-bound instantiations, and so they cannot be stable" (1999: 212).

bounded entity with a number of “given attributes” such as needs, motivations, cognition, abilities, emotions and behaviour. The end result is a discussion where Psychological Identities are pre-fixed by individual and essential forces, claiming to capture the *quintessential* nature of the self, which is very difficult to change or influence by the milieu. As it should be obvious at this point, the roots of modern discourse of the self can be tracked down to the work of René Descartes (1596-1650), as a proponent of individualistic and atomistic views of the self. A classic phrase in Descartes’ *Meditation II* says: “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (Cottingham *et. al.*, 1991: 2 vol.:19). The consequences of this discourse lead us into a self without a body, and with no evident social world, where the individual is, above all else, a “thinking thing” inhabiting subjective worlds where mental life exists independently of the interaction with others. The Psychological Identity is thus based in a mind-body dualism as separate entities, which create a dichotomy fundamentally distinct from a social characterization of the world. More radically, one can argue that the key assumption behind this discourse is the belief that “the self is an entity and, like any other entity or natural physical object, it can be described definitively and once and for all” (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 95).

In terms of Cultural Diplomacy, Psychological Identity is not visible since its main assumptions are State-individualistic and leave very little room to understand cultural and international contexts. However, the influence of these ideas can be found in Soft Power views, under a political disguise, particularly in some Post-War Realist approaches. Reinhold Niebuhr (1959 and 1960) and Hans Morgenthau (1993) have incidentally used essentialist psychological elements to elaborate their arguments (cf. Bryder 1998: 5-6 and 2005). For example, Morgenthau defined power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men... [as] a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” (1978: 30). The identity of the model, as it is clear for all, relies on the assumption that the interstate system is anarchic by nature and that the only option left is the “balance of power.”

3.2.2. Corporeal Identity

Corporeal Identity is the search of the material traces that give form to the self, based on structural (and anti-essentialist) facts such as the genetic origin, the racial features, sexual determination, historical epoch or class origin. This position relates identity as being a “social trait,” as opposed to something natural. Identity is thought to be heavily influenced by the different combinations of traits that people possess (character, class, gender, etc.), but that are constructed in the outer meaning (position in society, leadership, personality, etc). In this sense, corporeal identity, although being a multi-discursive term, generally refers to (a) the distinctive and relatively stable qualities and characteristics of individuals, which produce a stable trait or a pattern (fixed), with (b) certain connotations (open). The end result is radically different from the psychological identity and

asserts that the individual self is inevitably culturally and historically contingent, however dependent on individual “structural” qualities. Put differently, Corporeal Identity sees the construal of the self as an interdependent fact, where social relations and contexts produce a culture bound individual. It is hard to pin-point a specific theory behind this model, but the work of Charles Taylor can illuminate this position, particularly in his book *The Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (1989). Firstly, the book discusses Augustine’s Christian doctrine as the road to God passing directly within the self, and the implications that the inner sacred word has, as the source not only of the innermost self, but of conscience as well. Or, as Augustine puts it, “God is to be found in the intimacy of self-presence” (quoted in Taylor 1989: 362). Secondly, Taylor acknowledges that the notion of self changes through Western history, but in the modern era, identity is constituted by reason as a “proper procedure of thought,” from where one’s personal “moral judgment” derives. What makes Taylor inform Corporeal Identity is his linking it to modernity where the “theist self” is replaced by the individual’s inward journey based on modern reason; but particularly, in his insistence that this is the “embodied understanding of the world,” or the practical mastery individuals incorporate into their bodies in the form of habits, dispositions, and tendencies. Taylor puts it this way: “our body is not just the executant of the goals we frame... Our understanding is itself embodied. That is, our bodily know-how, and the way we act and move, can encode components of our understanding of self and world... My sense of myself, of the footing I am on with others, is in large part also embodied” (1995: 170-1). These are some of the reasons that make Taylor an “anti-essentialist” and therefore a key figure in the search for corporeal identities.

In Cultural Diplomacy terms, Corporeal Identity can also be interpreted with Michel Foucault’s theories and what Alexander Wendt calls “the Foucault effect.” Wendt says that “the self-regulating, possessive individual is an effect of a particular discourse of culture” (1999: 290). Translated into my Cultural Diplomacy vocabulary, this means that States behave in terms of a rational discourse that disciplines their “diplomatic corpuses” and make the diplomatic system construct like-units via modern discourse. In this sense, for example if Soft Power is the dominant discourse every State internalizes as “normal,” diplomacies would behave accordingly, treating each other as a potential “cultural master/slave” or “seducer/seduced,” depending on their position in the diplomatic concert. This may be seen as a “normal” cultural diplomacy behavior, whereas it is a result of a naturalizing representation of rationality *à la* Soft Power.

3.2.3. National Identity

“Nation-watching would be simple if it could be like bird-watching.”

E.J. Hobsbawm (1990: 5)

The first assumption here is that National Identities (NI) are in principle collective and essentialist construes that appeal to the community as a whole (opposed to the individuals) and set up a group of mostly artificial signs of assimilation to

glue political interests in the form of ethnicity, religion, mythology, language, geographies and/or common heritage. Secondly, National Identity is a political discussion on how nations construct their internal coherence, belonging and identifications, based on an “internal-external” divide. Or, as Bahar Rumelili claims, “Identities in the modern nation-state system rest on the construction of clear and unambiguous inside/outside and self/other distinctions” (2004: 27). From a Cultural Diplomacy perspective, it is important to clarify the theoretical foundations of the representations of National Identity, because it helps us to understand three issues: self-naturalization, sources and ideology.

Self-naturalization is related to the matter of cultural diplomacies representing the “normal and natural” emergence of nations and their collective identities. David Boswell and Jessica Evans mention in their book *Representing the Nation* that “particular ideas of the nation are created and embedded in the exhibitionary forms of a range of cultural practices and institutions, such as tourism, museums, expositions and heritage displays” (1999: 2). Many of these ideas function under the so-called “primordialist view” in opposition to the “modernist view” (see Özkirimli 2000: 64-84). The former claims that ethnic and cultural identifications (of any political kind) have always existed and evolved in a consistent path all the way into the present days, therefore making claims of an *ex nihilo* essential identity that naturally evolves and emerges through “primordial symbols” and “mythical foundational origins” into the modern nation-state (Hastings, 1997 and Smith A. 1991 and 2001). The latter view argues that the so-called modern times (industrial economy, democratic rule and urbanization) facilitate the creation, construction or imagination of “national identities,” instrumental in the defense, expansion and dissemination of capitalism and state-community cohesion (Anderson 1991, Gallagher 1984, and Hobsbawm 1990). The chief argument is that nationalism is largely built on constructed mythical historical foundations and lacks any substance other than the convenience to the society in question at that present moment. In other words, National Identities are social constructs, as opposed to something natural, therefore subject to political interests.

As for the “sources” of National Identity, it is relevant to quote the hard-core position presented in a study by Joseph Stalin in 1913 (at Lenin’s request) where he poses the central question: “What is a Nation?,” and he answers that “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (in Smith A. and Hutchinson 1994: 20). The implications of this answer have to be seen under a pragmatic political motivation for Stalin and his group on the one hand, but also as a philosophical approach (ironically called “objectivism” by the Marxist Stalinist) on the other. In reality, to call for specific “true sources” of national identification in the way that Stalin does is to call for primordial signs that have very little chance to hold in the complexity of the contemporary nations. However, it is not uncommon to find cultural diplomacies operating under such assumptions, particularly if they hold a rational-instrumental representation. The appeal for objective characteristics to define a Nation is confronted with the reality of countries like Mexico, which has more than sixty languages, two or three salient religions, three or four races, intensive

migration, different economic systems, etc. Or even with much more consolidated democracies like Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, three different ethnic groups... Ernest Renan's lecture "*Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*" (*what is a nation?*) delivered in 1882 has some points that contradict the possibility of true sources of national identity when claiming that "a nation's existence is, if you pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life" (in Smith A. and Hutchinson, 1994: 17). The answer is remarkably essentialist: "nationality exists when its members believe it does." This is a way of legitimizing popular belief: if people believe in witchcraft, then it too exists. This is the same as saying, if people believe that the streets of Stockholm are inhabited with polar bears, let them think so. It may be argued that this is not only a question of a group of people sharing some common attribute such as race or language since "These features does not themselves make nations, and only become important insofar as a particular nationality takes as one of its defining features that its members speak French or have black skins" (Miller 2000: 28). The underlying argument is that National Identity does not hold "true sources" and are not fixed categories, but at the same time, they may be helpful to define national traits in general.

The more substantial debate accepts that Nationalism is indeed a form of ideology. In this sense, the "Romantic approach" provided by Herder and the followers everywhere rests on the premise that Nationalism is a way to erect (or restore) the original state of nature, *i.e.* the authenticity and uniqueness of each nation, by appealing to the essential links, symbols, traces or cultural codes in tandem with the community, the region and the histories where they originated and developed ("*a priori* objectivism" Hobsbawm *dixit* 1990:7). This *quasi*-metaphysic appeal is mainly concerned with the presumed given structures and processes, such as languages, traditions, folk songs or fairy tales, but at the same time is rather blind to the agency that possibly sets forth a motivation for this to be the case. The first reason for subsuming Nationalism to ideological discourses is historical. For the most part, the concept *Nation* did not appear in most languages in Europe until modern times, *i.e.* until the coming of industrial, social and political revolutions.⁵⁷ Hobsbawm concedes that "without entering further into the matter [*we*] accept that in its modern and basically political sense the concept nation is historically very young," recommending that "the best way to understand its nature, I suggest, is to follow those who began systematically to operate with this concept with their political and social discourse during the Age of Revolution, and especially, under the name of 'the principle of nationality' from about 1800 onwards" (1990: 18). The second reason and a more relevant one for my study is of a political nature, as Hobsbawm also acknowledges, "The primary meaning of 'nation', and the most frequently ventilated in the literature, was political" (*idem*). Indeed, the real question is not whether or not Nationalism

⁵⁷ However, many Latin-American nationalist movements also mushroomed at the beginning of the XIX century for different reasons than the ones presented here by Hobsbawm. The Mexican case, for example, had to do with the Mexican creoles challenging the parasite politics of the Spanish crown, and looking for wider political and economic manoeuvring of their social group (cfr. Meyer 1998).

is ideological or not (of course it is!) but whether the political role of nationalism can be derived from the *ideological* motivation of any sort of agency in the form of a political discourse of unity. It is clear that the most relevant literature in the field connects ideology and Nationalism as a political tool with specific agency.⁵⁸

For Cultural Diplomacy, the use of National Identity as an Endo-representation poses many challenges. The first one is the appeal to foundational and essentialist signs of national unity that erases diversity and plurality, thus functioning as a Cultural Diplomacy hegemonic practice of domination (NB). The second is to avoid a sense that the sources of nationhood are fixed and frozen, thus closing the national-self in a metaphysical institutional discourse (SP). The third challenge is in coping with the exacerbation of the nationalistic division of the world between “us” and “them” (CC). Also, if we briefly visit the cultural representational program of chapter two, National Identity is easier to understand under a reflective approach (*e.g.* in Mexico, the national anthem, the colours of the flag and the mythical foundation of Mexico-Tenochtilán by the Aztecs), possible under a symbolic representational scheme (*e.g.* in Sweden, the Vasa family, the Bernardottes and the Social Democrats) and frankly problematical under a post-modern approach (*e.g.* Sweden is about peace development and military aircraft sales).

3.2.4. Cultural Identity

Cultural Identity (CI) is presented here as a collective anti-essentialist phenomenon that stresses the relevance of power relations, discursive formations and social interactions in the formation of identities. In this Exo-representation, it is necessary to concede that “culture” passes the test as a referent for identification. This is not self-evident because, as reviewed in chapter two, cultures are broad, rich concepts but difficult to encompass and define. Following Stuart Hall’s leading discussion on the topic (1990, 1993, 1996), my claim is that Cultural Identity must be seen as the production of collective anti-essentializing and ever-changing *selves/identifications* based on points of difference (class, gender, age, etc.), where the selves themselves are never fixed but they are rather irregular, multiple and fragmented. The suggested way in which Cultural Identities can have a concrete hold is by looking at them as performative and discursive constructions via representations. This idea means that Cultural Identity can only be sustained if we look at them as a set of practices and discourses anchored in common history, ancestry and symbols. Yet, as Iver Neumann argues, “political

⁵⁸ See Smith A. (1993: 84-95) where he discusses the point in terms of a “Modernist” drive or mentality and also the role exercised by the “intellectuals.” Smith A. (2000: 72-77), also discusses nationalist ideology in terms of popular liberation movements and the leaders. Anderson 1991: 5-7, and the active role of “imagination” in setting in motion the political community in form of fraternity, comradeship or commonality. Finally Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983: 264-265), using the concept of the “ruling elites” and their imposition of “invented traditions” to defy the political threat posed by mass democracies.

discourses consist, among other things, of essentializing representations of identities” and these in return make communities make sense of their world (1999).

Sociology and Cultural Studies brings a complementary discussion arguing that identity is formed in relation to significant others, in the interactions between self and society, making identity not only a matter of description but also a social ascription (Giddens 1984: 282-89). Identity then, becomes a field on review where the subject’s identity is placed into relevant social structures, thereby making social interaction account for collective explanations for the cultural. As a result of this debate, identity becomes the product of processes of socialisation. Alexander Wendt offers a classic argument along these lines: “the most important thing in social life is how actors represent Self and Other. These representations are the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which they determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave. Society, in short, is ‘what people make of it,’ and as corporate ‘people’ this should be no less true of states in anarchical society” (1999: 332).

The result of cultural identities should then be that they are to be seen as a dialectic between self-and-other, assuming that the key is to understand what states represent (culturally speaking) in relation to other states (and their cultures), taking into consideration that this process is bi-directional and many times reciprocal.

The underlying assumption is that Cultural Identity is better grasped if we see it as a social construction in the form of a representation. In other words, Cultural Identities can only exist if we assume they are unfixed constructions that look into a set of social practices such as roles, hierarchies and productive actions, but also in the constitutive aspect of discourses, seen as norms, values, ideas that allow for the practices to take a specific representational form. Through such optics, it is possible to speak of a “Mexican culture,” implying *mestizaje* (Spanish and indigenous blending), a colonial heritage, authoritarian governments, and Catholicism (seen as practices), as well as a liberal political tradition, strong family and communal bonds, the Mayan arts, and “machismo” (seen as discursive constructions), as components of a cultural representation. Giddens’ explanation of “identity project” is similar to this idea for he claims that self-identity is constituted by the reflexive capacity to sustain a narrative about the self, therefore building a sort of “biographical continuity,” always in change, “moving towards” rather than standing still at the harbor (1991: 51-75).

However surprising, International Relations (IR) and diplomacy had very little new to say about identity until recent years.⁵⁹ The accepted stable models in the social sciences assumed that modernity was the explanatory force modelling identities (cf. Friedman 1993, Giddens 1990 and Tomlinson 1999). In this, political orientation, class belonging, music or sexual preference shaped solid explanations for cultural identities for years, but rarely did they refer to international phenomena (see e.g. Inglehart 2003, and Wendt 1994). Because of this, it is not

⁵⁹ Many dictionaries of diplomacy or political science do not have the word identity as an entry or a developed concept, especially if you compare with areas such as sociology or history, e.g. Berrige and James 2003 and Bellamy 1993 and Neumann 1999.

surprising to see how poorly developed the concept of identity is inside theories of cultural diplomacy, particularly observing the rational-instrumental representations.⁶⁰ Having said this, it is fair to add that in general terms, identity is not a very interesting problem for Nation Branding and Soft Power. It does not go very well with mainstream ideas and theoretical assumptions, because identity has little explanatory power under such models or worse, it questions the core principles of the rational-instrumental representations. Cultural Identities are seen as rare sub-divisions generally subsumed to the National Identity or the general idea of identity. Under rational-instrumentalism, Cultural Identity is referred as an orthodox notion of identity based on individual characteristics, where “the essential centre of the self is a person’s identity” (S. Hall 1992: 275). The end result is that Nation Branding and Soft Power can only interpret Cultural Identities as a/the sum of rational individuals who construct their identities based on the instrumental use of others, assigning culture an external secondary place, as a context or playground (cf Nixon 2003, Ind 1992, Nye 2004 and Lennon 2003).

I here claim that Cultural Identities are better understood as being part of “post-modern subjects” (S. Hall, 1992, 1996). The postmodern debate on identities is gaining terrain in the social sciences.⁶¹ There, identities are to be considered as fragmented selves with multiple forms and references, often contradictory and incoherent (Denzin 1995, Woodward 2000, & Hall S. 1993). In this sense, Cultural Identity can be understood in relation to ideology and context (ideological subjugation), a fractured self where the subconscious plays a role (psychoanalysis), subordination roles (women-men, modernization-nature, colonizer-colonized), language and representations (as resources lending form to identities) and through genealogies and discourses (self is a product of history and the conformation of the discursive practices). In this sense, Hall suggests that identity is

a meeting point, the point of *suture*, between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’. Identities are thus point of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us (1996: 5-6).

Assuming this idea, Cultural Identity can also be seen as strategies to “de-center,” “de-stabilize,” “deconstruct” or “*suture*” the modern representations or discourses about self, leaving room for a much complex explanation of the processes through which we understand selves. This view accommodates two concepts worked throughout this book, cultural representations and cosmopolitan

⁶⁰ A review of the most recent books in the field shows how rare and underrepresented the approaches to identity and diplomacy are. Many of these books do not even consider an entry for the theme. See Jönsson and Langhorn 2004 vol. III, Melissen 2005, Nye 2004, Riordan 2003, Lennon 2003 and Jönsson and Hall 2005.

⁶¹ Suffice it to say, then, that “post modernity” is not one but many academic approaches, ranging from different types of constructivism (reflexive, idealist, post-Marxist, discursive, etc.), discussions about the minorities and unrepresented groups or themes (women’s issues, indigenous groups or the environment), debates over to a more far-reaching debate that sees academia as a conscious battleground for “active politics” or the merging of fictions and textual forms as possibilities for inquiry. However, all of these positions share the common critical view of “modernity,” assuming it has reached a point of exhaustion and needs to be re-elaborated or discarded.

constructivism. The former must be seen in relation to the lack of coupling between referent and representation. If we consider the discussion on the painting by Alberto Gironella “El Gran Obrador,” the identities of the people in Velázquez’ painting disappear as a clear reference, not only in reflective terms, but also symbolically. Identities are dislocated traces where we can only construct a narrative. Salvador Elizondo, in reference to the painting “El Gran Obrador” develops an idea that help me make my own point here:

This [*assemblage*] is of course a problem of identities. The *impersonatio* works this way. First there is the mirror. The unalterable, ubiquitous, imprecise and definite mirror of *Las Meninas*. This is to say that what you see is the reflex of what it is. Then, what you see is not that, it is another thing: it is a disguised thing of a spectacular reflex. The buffoon has taken the place of the king (who is the king anyway? Phillip IV? Velázquez?) But if this is a mirror, who is in fact looking at it? There are here arguments to believe that we have an optic paradox which resists traditional rational solutions. This maybe simply a point of view (Elizondo 1967: 72).

The reflexive approach can also accommodate for a view of a plural, diverse and fragmented cultural identity. For example, what I call “identity diplomacy” can be referred to as existing whenever “there are boundaries for identity and those boundaries of identity are crossed” (Constantinou *dixit*, quoted in Jönsson and Hall 2002: 198). More importantly, as Paul Sharp reminds us, studies carried out by James Der Derian and Costas Constantinou hit the nail on the head “because they draw our attention away from positivist interpretations of diplomacy that focus on how the substantive interests, ends, and means of actors whose identities are treated as unproblematic are set, and then increasingly struggle to find a place for diplomacy in that process” (1999: 50). Instead, I claim, Cosmopolitan Constructivism embedded in diplomacy can potentially “direct our attention to how much of diplomacy is about representation, the production and reproduction of identities, and the context in which they conduct their relations. [...] By diplomacy, the actors and their relations are constituted” (1999: 50).

In this thesis, I will be using the concept of *Endo-Representation* during the following two chapters to show how discourses of identity are shaped by the diplomatic apparatuses of Mexico and Sweden. In particular, I pay attention to the ways national and cultural identity concepts are internalized by foreign ministries to become representations of nations abroad. I look at specific official materials; for example, in Sweden I look at how discourses are made in relation to Nation Branding but also look at the catalogue “Sweden and the Swedes,” produced by the Swedish Institute (2002-2005); for Mexico, I also investigate materials related to the exhibition “Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries.”

3.3. Alter-Representations: The Process of Alterity Formation

Alter-representations (AR) are in this thesis *a discursive formation of four alterities* in the form of *Other-different*: Rival/enemy, Ally/friend, Barbarian and Exotic. They represent ways of defining difference from identifications of self. According to the *OED*, the word *alterity* comes from the Latin noun *alter* which means “another” understood as “something” or “someone” considered as having an existence clearly outside the self. The word *altérité*, in French, carried on the same meaning, as the “individual’s conception of other beings as distinct from himself.” Alterity as “the state of being other or different” is also referred to as *otherness*, *differentness* or sometimes simply as *diversity*. As we previously discussed, the definition of the individual’s identity can also be seen in relation to what the self is not. In other words, alterity departs from the study of similarity and difference, or as historian Thomas Stanley puts it “The Maker of all things took Union, and Division, and Identity, and Alterity, and Station, and Motion to complete the soul” (*The history of philosophy 1701: 1655*, quoted by the *OED*). This is an important distinction that allows me to challenge the definition by reversing it: alterity is *the individual’s lack of identification with a given referent* (e.g. I am an Australian but I do not feel I belong there), the recognition that *part of the self is not in coherence with the reference* (e.g. I am a male, but do not have male preferences), or simply that *the self is many selves* (e.g. I am a Swede-Canadian with a Spanish culture). In this part, I do not take the route of fragmenting alterity (except when discussing postmodern representations). I basically concentrate on the unity of alterity and its constitutive part, identity.⁶²

Similar to the case of identity, these discussions inform figure 3.3. On the horizontal column I present the *Homologous* and *Eccentric* possibilities (in relation to Self) and the vertical column signifies a division into threat and security. In this, I recognize the constitution of four different alterities in their associations: rival, barbaric, ally and exotic. These are artificial illustrations that aim at bringing some analytical distinctions relevant for IR and particularly for Cultural Diplomacy discussions. My research takes these as dynamic processes, assuming states have an anthropomorphic construction of alterity. However again, this is only a schematic map which aims at making specific distinctions between different alterities, but should not be seen as a fixed matrix (*cfr.* Neumann 1999). In chapters four and five, I come back to this figure in order to discuss how Sweden and Mexico are characterized as alterities in the media abroad.

Table 3.3. Alter-Representations: Analytical Distinctions

ALTERITY	Homologous	Eccentric
Threat	<u>RIVAL/ENEMY</u> Economic-Political-Legal	<u>BARBARIAN</u> Social-Religious-Military
Security	<u>ALLY/FRIEND</u> Ethnic-Geographic-	<u>EXOTIC</u> Power-Domination / Utopia-

⁶² I thank Stanley Katz for suggesting me to take a look at John Dower’s book *War Without Mercy* which I refer in this part sometimes.

	Defense-Civilization	Sympathy
--	----------------------	----------

Table 3.3. is inspired by the theoretical discussions brought by Edmund Husserl.⁶³ In his research he explores the subject's ego in relation to *Other*, and empathy as constituents of the identity-alterity. Also, Husserl reflects on alterity types such as infants/children, animals/beasts, mad people/the insane and aliens/foreigners/strangers as social types that help think the actual differentiation of *Others* in society. Husserl's program is based on phenomenology, which is understood as a philosophical method to examine the ways objects present themselves and the actions required by the subject to make the objects appear (Kockelmans 1967: 24-36).⁶⁴ One of the key aspects that I pay attention to in Husserl's investigations is the accepted interdependency of "self" and "other," which gives room for constitutive theorizing.⁶⁵ In other words, Husserl's phenomenology accommodates for a constitutive approach to identity and alterity, and explains the logic of the latter in particular. Husserl finds the physical things in front of the self, furnished not only with merely material determinations, but more importantly, with value-characteristics: beauty, elegance, obnoxiousness (1973). The immediacy of the physical phenomena stands there as objects of use: a bike, a store, a bomb, etc. This path leaves the door open not only to material things, but more importantly, to the case of subjects, human beings, be they children, older people, women, or foreigners, etc., all of them part of a context. Thus, I can perceive of *them-others* as "friends" or "enemies," "allies" or "competitors," "strangers" or "family members." These definitions are not to be taken at face value. However, the conceptualization of "representation of the Other" and the "constitution of co-presence as intertwined," allows me to theorize for alterity as a constitutive representation of *The Other* (cfr. Neumann 1999). Husserl's concern for a "transcendence of egocentrism towards the Other" stays mainly within a theoretical and cognitive orbit (idealist), which in itself creates a distance difficult to overcome in practice. This is one of the points of criticism advanced by Emmanuel Levinas in regard to Husserl's work. Levinas shifts the orbit where empathy, affection and ethics play a role in the understanding of the Other. His approach develops a more sophisticated take on the word "alterity," shifting the focus from philosophical concerns away from the "epistemic other" into the concrete "moral other," which includes subjects, values and practices (a whole field of culture). Levinas' programme is simple on the surface: encourage face-to-face encounters having common language as the vehicle of recognition, since plain direct conversation allows for the *recognition of the Other in dis-*

⁶³ His book *Cartesian Meditations* is a standard book on the topic, where he sustains a critique of Cartesian rationalist approaches to scientific inquiry, labeling them as a form of transcendental materialism. He expresses his view that "Positivistic science, like common-sense is naive, filled with paradoxes and crises, bedeviled with "unclarified intentionalities," etc. So is formal logic." (1973: 153).

⁶⁴ In this respect, Husserl's program is anchored in an idealist venue which comes from the work of Hegel and Heidegger, and is deeply influenced by Marcel Merleau-Ponty, allowing for reflexivity and deconstruction through Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas.

⁶⁵ Iver Neuman's *Uses of the Other* clearly develops an understanding of the constitutive aspects of self and other. He says that "The theorist who specifically relates the question of identity formation to the concept pair self/other, however is Hegel. He refines the idea that by knowing the other, the self has the power to give or withhold recognition, so as to be constituted as self at the same time (1999: 3).

course. This is, in principle, an ethical act which is not *naïf* in his understanding of the asymmetrical relationship between the “Other and me.” He contends that “To speak is to make the world common... It abolishes the inalienable property of enjoyment. The world in discourse is no longer what it is in separation, in the being at home with oneself where everything is given to me” (Levinas 1969: 76). The concept of Otherness is fundamental to diplomacy (see Der Derian 1992). What distinguishes “us” from “them” is essential to ethical/political discourse and behaviour (see Carl Schmitt 1976 [1932] and Neuman 1999: ch. 1). Levinas emphasises alterity as an intersubjective relationship which is the basis of all ethics, and hence the precondition for politics.

In diplomacy, Alter-representations are rarely discussed. More surprisingly, people writing on Cultural Diplomacy have not yet, to my knowledge, accommodated for a theoretical discussion of “alterities.” Perhaps the five more advanced discussants of the alterities in reference to diplomacy (not CD) are Costas Constantinou (1996, 2004 and 2006), Paul Sharp (1996, 1999, 2001, and 2003), James Der Derian (1987 and 1992), Raymond Cohen (1991, 1997 and 2004) and Edward Said (1993 and 1995). All of them bring an angle of alterities to diplomacy that I find helpful for developing my own arguments on this matter. In the three models of cultural representation that I have studied in this work from chapter one, I have found very little references to the idea of alterity in the rational-instrumental discussions, and many more in the reflexive ones.

For Nation Branding, the alterity issue is mostly uninteresting because as I expressed earlier, this representation is based on distinguishing a nation’s self from others, as in a market competition of identities. So, whenever Nation Branding alludes to “others,” it is usually to make national and cultural differences bolder and wider, at the expense of the second nation represented. Take for example one of the arguments presented by the Anholt Nation Brand Index: Special Report Denmark (Q1 2006), to justify the inflammatory diplomatic fiasco on the Mohamed Cartoons’ a couple of years ago:

It is a universal human trait, whether we like it or not, to brand other countries, other races, other religions, other cultures. It is not governments or countries that brand themselves, but public opinion: in order to navigate through an increasingly complex and globalised world, we all tend to reduce countries and peoples to the level of simple stereotypes. No matter how complex or even contradictory they are, we often resort to treating them as single entities (Anholt 2006).

Stereotyping and profiling nations and peoples is something that must be carefully assessed with sensibility and respect, especially in academic and diplomatic circles.⁶⁶ Michael Pickering expresses in his book *Stereotyping* (2001) that

⁶⁶ John Dower explores the risks of exacerbating feelings against others in diplomatic settings that can be conducive to catastrophic scenarios and war. Symbolic discourses of “other” via stereotypes, cartoons and films produce a predisposition that make it easier transform others in enemies and monsters. He argues that during after the Second World War, “there was a free floating quality to portrayals of the enemy—a pattern of stereotyping peculiar to enemies and ‘others’ in general, rather to the Japanese foe or Western foe in particular. This facilitated the quick abatement of hatred once the war was ended—while also facilitating the transferral of the hateful stereotypes to

stereotypes have been regarded as necessarily deficient. They distort the ways in which social groups or individuals are perceived, and they obscure the more complex and finite particularities and subjectivities tangled up in the everyday life of groups and individuals [...]. Politically, they stand in the way of more tolerant, even-handed and differentiated responses to people who belong to social or ethnic categories beyond those which are structurally dominant. Intellectually, they are poor devices for engaging in any form of social cartography, and for this reason should be eradicated from the map of good knowledge (2001: 10).

Soft Power has a similar approach to Nation Branding's alterities and, in its less sophisticated way, even resembles very closely the propaganda programs developed in Europe by fascist regimes (cf. Dower 1986). Joseph Nye seems to express this view when explaining the propagandistic cultural battle in the Cold-War era: "Soviet state-run propaganda and cultural programs could not keep pace with the influence of America's commercial popular culture in flexibility or attraction. Long before the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it had been pierced by television and movies" (2004: 49). The *Other*, in Soft Power terms, is treated as a numbed dummy predisposed as an object of seduction, indoctrination or brain-washing.

Studies embracing reflexive ideas, the way I propose it in this thesis, would readily accept that the contemporary international system is based on the construction of distinctions based on identity/alterity (cfr. Neumann 1999). In IR theory, Alexander Wendt has discussed the dichotomies identity/otherness in innovative terms, exploring specifically their constitutive effects and the interests constructed around them. In this sense, individual countries look at themselves and others in a combination of material possessions and interests, where ideas about the world constitute their positioning in the international system. Culture here, is a systemic force affecting (causally or constitutionally) the performance of states. In this respect, Wendt also accounts for a cosmopolitan view, when looking at state/state or state/community-of-states interaction, and paying attention to the international outcomes they get in their everyday interplay.

A key assumption, unnoticed by traditional IR theory, is that states have each a distinct identity and their counterparts' their own identities different from each other. In their interactions, however, states see each other as different from themselves, creating a marker to characterize and divide their distinctiveness, that is the term *Other*. In this sense, depending on the IR menu, identities and otherness have a deep exchange that conform what they are or can be. For Wendt, identities are "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self" (Wendt 1992: 397). And when it comes to IR, states' identities have to grasp a social component that Wendt characterizes as "social identity" understood as "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. ... [*Social identities are*] at once cognitive schemas that enable an actor to determine 'who I am/we are' in a situation and positions in a social role structure of shared understandings and expecta-

newly perceived enemies. Much of the rhetoric of World War Two proved readily adaptable to the cold war" (1996: 29).

tions” (Wendt 1994: 395), but at the same time allows for an understanding of the *Other*.

3.3.1. Representations of Rival/Enemy

Discussions about rival and enemy figures in politics and diplomacy are vast and diverse. Tom Bryder argues that the debate over identifications and conflict derives from a discussion over political culture, beliefs and motivations (1998). Certainly, political culture understood as collective social thinking about governments and civil society can also be reduced to the values, beliefs and attitudes of what something is all about in the collective psychology. In this sense, enmity and rivalry would be social constructions in a form of political culture that allow for cognitive maps that show a political cartography of threat. Bryder explains that in politics, the process of transforming “normality” in social life into a zone of conflict, begins by linguistically creating “in-groups and out-groups” via symbols and stereotypes, appealing to a process of self-appraisal (usually nationalism). In this sense, Bryder explains, “If we possess virtuosity, are resolute and if ‘we’ are full of good intentions, the implicit presumption is that ‘they’ must be possessed by vice, hesitation and weakness, and that ‘they’ have bad intentions, in short, that ‘they’ are ‘bad and different’” (1998: 31). In this transformation, “They” become “other-enemy” or “other-rival.”

In a similar vein, Alexander Wendt argues that “Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the self to exist as an anonymous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence towards the self” (1999: 260). Using IR theories, Wendt says the distinction between foe and enemy is no longer important, because representations of enemies consolidate a *one-picture*. In this sense, rivalry also occupies a place as *Other*, since its perceived scope of intentions aims at alienating the freedoms enjoyed by *Self*. Wendt goes on to argue that “Enmity and rivalry both imply that the Other does not fully recognize the Self and therefore may act in a “revisionist” fashion toward it” (1999: 261). In a subtle distinction, Wendt argues that “An enemy does not recognize the right of the self to exist as a free subject at all, and therefore seeks to “revise” the latter’s life or liberty [*while...*] A rival, in contrast, is thought to recognize the Self’s right to life and liberty, and therefore seeks to revise only its behaviour or property” (1999: 261). In short, both enemy/rival pose a threat to Self and the distinction lies on the levels of aggression, the former being unlimited and the latter contained. Wendt further argues that “Violence between enemies has no internal limits; whatever limits exist will be due solely to inadequate capabilities [*...while*] Violence between rivals, in contrast, is *self-limiting*, constrained by recognition of each other’s right to exist” (1999: 261). Rivalry is, in this scope, a part of civilization or what Norbert Elias also calls “self-restraint” (1982). In Wendt’s constructivism, Rivalry is part of what he calls a “Lockean Culture,” or a collective representation of Other under sovereignty, law and competition. A difference in approaches is in relation to “other types of Other,” such as the *Barbarian* and *Exotic* (my distinction), which in Wendt’s position is not considered as such. In contrast with him, I argue in

this thesis that both barbarian and exotic representations are actually different, because they are not part of rational calculations but actually “illogical beings” (in relation to self) whose core identity is not very clearly distinguished. For this reason they can become “blind or invisible spots.” One of the most popular views of IR and diplomacy in the 1990s, Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, illustrates my point clearly by linking “the politics of such identity primarily with the establishment of irreconcilable differences and with threat. In the ‘clash of civilizations’, the outsider is always a potential enemy threatening the strength and cohesion within. Huntington himself has remarked: ‘how will we know who we are if we do not know who we are against?’” (O’Hagan 2000: 146). In Cultural Diplomacy terms, the rational-instrumental representations tend to see rivalry, conflict and enmity in terms of idiosyncratic differences, lack of negotiation culture and/or communication dissonance (Cohen, R. 1991: 16-18).

In diplomacy, James Der Derian has taken the most avant-gardist position in defining how images of terror, threat and enmity are constructed in times of high technology, speed and conflict. In his study of the Persian Gulf War, he investigates how the forces of surveillance, terrorism and speed in IR (an anti-diplomacy cocktail), in their use of high-tech, make contemporary civil societies distant observers of the reality of war. We became, he argues, numb TV viewers willing to witness televised direct killings of other humans in the name of eliminating the enemy we do not know anything about. Der Derian poses a significant question “how is my own identity implicated in a study of the killing of others?” His preliminary assessment is that “During the war, the level of killing became inversely proportional to the level of knowing the Other” (1992: 197). Der Derian’s main claim is that the three forces challenging traditional diplomacy are spies (intelligence and surveillance), terror (global terrorism and the national security culture), and speed (the acceleration of pace in war and diplomacy). In addition, he says that the problematic these three forces have generated can be simply put in this way: “the closer technology and scientific discourse brings us to the “other” – that is, the more the model is congruent with reality, the image resembles the object, the medium becomes real-time message – the less we see ourselves in the other. Theoretical reflection loses out to techno-scientific reification” (1992: 4). His view brings the ideas of representation explored earlier in this study and he suggests that post-industrial societies, in their extensive use of technologies such as cyber-space, video games and cyber-reality, make it more difficult to approach otherness, and understand difference between dissimilar identities. This is not only a cognitive difference, but a social discourse and practice that allows for totalitarian powers to chain civil society in the name of high tech entertainment and security (cf. Campbell 1992 and 1998, and Mercer 1995). Or as he mentions, this is a story of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical “other” of life, *the terror of death*, “which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others – who are seeking similar impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness” (1992: 75).

3.3.2. Representations of Ally/Friend

Ally-Friend theory is just as complex in political science and IR as the previous discussion on enemy-rival. Rather than try to summarize this rich and extensive body of work, let me just organize some ideas around constructivist and cosmopolitan theories for its conclusiveness. To be an *Other-Ally* or *Other-Friend* in IR and diplomacy usually implies a reciprocal recognition of the other's self as existentially similar or following/supporting similar goals without obstructing or challenging them. Alexander Wendt says that in friendship, states usually expect to observe two rules: "(1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the role of mutual aid)" (1999: 299). The two concepts are coupled with the non-violence principle and mutual support against other challengers beyond the club. Also, Wendt suggests that friendship concerns national security only, but there are no spill-over effects in other areas. In Cultural Diplomacy terms this would be a challenge, particularly in a cosmopolitan view of constructivism. And finally, Wendt distinguishes allies from friends, saying that the former "engage in the same basic behaviour as friends, but they do not expect their relationship to continue indefinitely" as is usually the case with the latter (1999: 299). This description of the State's calculations on *self and other* enters the realms of what Wendt categorizes as Kantian culture, or an international structure where "a new international political culture has emerged in the West within which non-violence and team play are the norm" (1999: 297).

In Wendt's analysis of Kantian culture, the internalization process plays a major role in understanding why, for example nations are willing to cooperate by themselves, leaving aside sanctions or selfishness. Wendt explains that beyond *coercion* (first level degree, for example a treaty or a mandate), *self-interest* (second level degree, for example fears of nuclear disaster or cultural clashes), *legitimacy* (third level degree) is the most developed of these actions courses pursued by states, since it emerges from the state's principles and convictions. Wendt explains that in the "Third Degree case actors identify with other's expectations, relating to them as part of themselves. The Other is now inside the cognitive boundary of the Self, constituting who it sees itself as in relation to the Other, its 'Me'" (1999: 273). In other words, Self is not *self-interested* but rather it is truly *interested* in the *Other*. Cosmopolitanism draws from this very idea. Multilateral diplomacy, collective security "one for all, all for one" reciprocity, cooperation, and open, transparent political systems, help develop *Other* and *Myself* as friends. Wendt goes on to say that "International interests are now part of the national interest, not just interests that states have to advance in order to advance their separate national interest; friendship is a preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy" (1999: 305). In fact, Wendt never uses the term "cosmopolitan" to refer to this or any other of his main proposals, but I find many coincidences with how Cosmopolitanism thinks about Other, particularly in friendly relations among parties. The cultivation of friendship in a global world among nations permits the achievement of the Kantian notion of a "perpetual peace order," where the interests of the humanity must prevail over those

of the individual (Fine and Cohen 2002). But this cosmopolitan view is not a given, rather, countries must labour against prejudice and blindness. Rather the opposite, John Tomlinson suggests that the cosmopolitans should have a sense of commitment to belonging to the world as a whole, suggesting that a cosmopolitan agenda of human rights, environmental concerns, cultural integration and economic and political progressive demands, can be a link to the development of friendly relations among peoples and states in a challenging global culture (1999 & 2002). More interestingly, Tomlinson's view also draws from Ul Hannersz when affirming that Cosmopolitanism is "first of all... a willingness to engage with the *Other*. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrast rather than uniformity" (1999: 185). In similar terms, friendship can be developed, according to Zygmunt Bauman by looking at the universality of the "ethical humanism" as an honourable aspiration, which is challenged by narrow economic and political views in a paradoxically global world. For Bauman, universality is a communicational capacity to achieve mutual understanding taking into consideration the other's responses and moves, allowing for a conversation across domains of cultural difference (1995 & 1999). In diplomacy, Raymond Cohen has questioned the legitimacy of this "cosmopolitan view," saying that it is "right to reject 'ridiculous stereotypes,' such as 'inscrutable orientals' and 'haggling Arabs'. No serious student of culture would really propose such travesties. But is not the image of the cosmopolitan diplomat, free of all narrow cultural limitations, an equally questionable stereotype? Is the impact of culture really so superficial that it can be removed by a few years of foreign travel?" (1991: 17). I come to this issue in the conclusions of this chapter.

3.3.3. Exotic as *Other*: The *Orientalist* Effect

It is time to discuss alterities and what I refer to as the "Orientalist effect" in the discursive representations of nations. Edward Said is the main organizer of this idea, specifically in two of his books, *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1992). In short, Edward Said postulates that *Orientalism* is the Western ideological constitution of the East in relation to its own occidental identity, thus transforming the Orient into an *inferior-Other*. The Western world, claims Said, has projected itself into the Occident as a rational essential force, a changing and practical mind with a progressive attitude and superior methods. Said claims that the material imperial forces shaping the world's politics and economics in the 19th and 20th centuries come in the form of unprecedented power, concentrated in Britain and France and later in other Western countries in Europe and in the United States (1978: ch. 1). Thus, the imperial metropolitan centers acquired and accumulated territory and subjects on a massive scale. No other associated set of "colonies in history has been as large, none so totally dominated, none so unequal in power to the Western metropolis," Said claims (1992: ch. 2). The economic forces were expansive and looking for markets anywhere in the world. They were also looking for raw materials, cheap labour and profitable land where to found their production. The political camp and the foreign policies had the mission of maintaining the legal and administrative processes to secure their

distant territories and the subjugated peoples. However, there is only so much that can be done through “hard power” and culture became a realm from where to continue the control. Said describes how India, the Middle-east and North Africa have played a key role in the imagination of “other” in the lives and the social interactions of Western society. Names like Edmund Burke, Eugene Delacroix, John Ruskin, Thomas Carlyle, James and John Stuart Mill, Rudyard Kipling, Honoré de Balzac, Gérard de Nerval, August Flaubert or Joseph Conrad, are referred to in Said’s work to map the different “representations” of peoples, countries and territories they helped shape in the imaginaries of Western societies (1978: ch. 2). These travellers functioning as “alterity makers” were scholars, administrators, politicians, merchants, novelists, philosophers, speculators, adventurers, painters, poets, diplomats and every variety of eccentric in the outlying possessions of the imperial powers, each of whom contributed with his imagination (mostly men) to the formation of a colonial discourse running across the metropolis.

In this, Said sees colonialism as a consequence of imperialism, and in the beginning the latter implies a material control of both economic and political sovereignties of other societies (“other” has a place outside), by means of force, coercive collaboration, and cultural dependence. This is the crux of Said’s argument: neither imperialism nor colonialism in their basic act of accumulation and acquisition function with the raw material powers only. They need culture and cultural discourses to be disposed in a peculiar way: master and slave identities (1978: ch. 3). In this sense, the “Oriental effect” is a form of post-colonialism by means of exoticizing and transforming *Other* into an object of domination, via discourses of differentiation, for example sensual, erotic, glamorous, shocking dispositions or intellectual, scientific and cultural superiority.

Colonial practices are supported by constituting discursive formations in the form of ideas implying that “certain people and certain territories require and request domination and forms of knowledge.” Said’s investigations reach the point of looking into the vocabularies of domination in words referring to otherness as “inferior,” “subject races,” “subordinate people,” “dependency,” and “authority.” This vocabulary crystallized in the right and obligation to improve the lives of indigenous peoples in the colonies by showing them the advances of civilization. The idea behind the “*mission civilisatrice*” of the French empire was that France was in the colonies to civilize the natives. It is also similar to the American obsession to present itself as the leader of the world, the guardian of Western civilization, and the construction of its “uniqueness” based on the “American exceptionalism.” These forces help shape subject positions in identities and alterities that, through the years, solidify and naturalize representations of individuals, societies, nations and regions. This is why the Huntington’s discourse in the “clash of civilizations” and Joseph Nye’s Soft Power is very problematic for Said’s work (2002). He considers that these approaches, similar to the stories, narrations or paintings of the colonial period actually emphasize the differentiations as a strategy to impose power relations. Stereotypes function very well in this case to emphasize and consolidate the subjection strategy.

3.3.4. Representing the Barbarian-Other

Similarly, the representation of the *Barbarian-Other* in discourse runs a radical version of alterity, beyond enmity. My reading of barbarian representations is that Other becomes so extreme, to the point of “dehumanizing the human” or making “human a post-human,” turning Other into a uncontrollable threat, an irrational force, or a high-tech menace (*cf* Dower 1976). The barbarian-Other can operate as monsters or animal-humans in our natural environment, as demons or spirits in a supernatural world, or as robots, cyber-humans or aliens in a futuristic setting (Graham 2002, Sepúlveda 2005, and Haraway 1991). The construction of the Barbarian representation can only be accomplished in a totalitarian regime or in fiction. The distinction is two-fold: for once, we can fight enemies, pin-point their strengths and weaknesses and assess their power; also, enemies have a similar constitution to us-humans, and react under similar rules (*e.g.* behaviour in war). Barbarians fall outside the scope of enemy in these two senses. They embody madness, irrationality and menace. Barbarians are imaginary constructions to transform a human into an irrational threat; therefore total annihilation is the only chance left to “us-humans.” In this way, human traits such as ethnicities, racial traits, gender, sexual preferences, languages, cultural behaviours or nationalities can be transformed into barbarian alterities, which in a radical twist can call for extermination of those having such qualities. Stereotyping here, again, plays a big role in the transformation of how we understand others, via simplification. Michael Pickering argues that, concerning “race” for example,

these senses have developed through the accretion of meanings and values derived from racist ideology and racial theory, and from their now indelible associations with the hell and horror of Nazi genocide and Fascist abuse in the 1930s and 40s, not to mention black lynchings and castration in the American South or the torture and murder of blacks during the apartheid period in South Africa (2001: 114).

In a futuristic scenario, these alterities are also being enacted in fiction. Luz María Sepúlveda raises the question: what is the destiny of the human race given the technological progress we witness before us? And she embarks on a debate over the potentially alienating capacities of high-tech, particularly in what she terms “bio-ideology” which claims to have solutions to genetically design and modify humans, all other animals and plants, in the quest of a hyper-rational pan-capitalist society where military order and fascist rule are the features of this future society in between fiction and reality (2005).

In diplomacy, Costas Constantinou exposes some of the alterities in a joyful analysis of Virginia Woolf’s *Orlando*, which as a fictitious narration tells nothing interesting about *the world as it is*, but the world as *it was imagined to be*. Constantinou says that Woolf’s grotesque image of the duties of the English diplomats in the Ottoman Empire “is possible and comprehensible because her writing is borderless. It subverts and reformulates the known by crossing the boundaries of the ideal form. Her encounter can be anti-imperial and post-colonial” (2004: 88). Harold Nicholson, the so-much-quoted diplomat happened to be posted to Istanbul when Woolf was writing her novel. He met with her and lectured on British colonial views, arguing that Britain was being helpful and disinterested in its expansion to other territories. “Can’t you see that nationality is

over?” she asked him after his eloquent lecture of diplomacy. Her depiction of *Orlando* as a diplomatic bureaucrat in Constantinople who carries out his daily duties bored and tired of life, finally to find himself mixing with the natives in bazaars, joining mosques and reciting poetry and marrying an exotic dancer of “dubious morality.” His final act: he changes sex and becomes a woman “and, amidst the surrounding anarchy, she left Istanbul on a Donkey and joined the gypsies” (2004: 87). This is a representation where Western-self becomes *barbarian-other* in fiction, and the whole process is full of mockery. Constantinou uses the whole story to make a point about diplomatic alterity: we define the codes, principles and protocols of diplomacy in terms of Western orientations, constantly failing to look at the plans emerging from other sources, (such as the Ottoman, the Muslim or the Aztec diplomacy). They maybe prove to be relevant to get us out of the political trap of rationalism, as Costantinou expresses “Classic realism, for Bakhtin, is the glorification of perfect and incomplete being, the idealization of form. Grotesque realism, however, celebrates incompleteness and abundance. It always exceeds the ‘official’ boundaries of being, and in deconstructing finality, the claims of ideal form, it embraces becoming” (2004: 94). The grotesque came about when we learned that Virginia Woolf wrote *Orlando* under the inspiration of Nicholson, with whom she was having an affair. Other meets Self and the real melts with fiction.

In sum, alter-representations are useful in diplomacy when we look at their processes for alterity formation. The four different representations explored here (enemy, friend, exotic and barbarian) are useful schemes to navigate discursive formations of alterities, and have applications in diplomacy representations. As we mentioned in this section, the rational-instrumentalist representations have very limited capacities actually to process complex alterities, beyond stereotyping and dichotomy analysis. Cosmopolitan Constructivism is here developed as a theoretical contribution, looking into the work of Alexander Wendt and his constructivist analysis of how Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures assimilate enmity, rivalry and friendship. In this section, it was made clear that Cosmopolitan Constructivism internalizes norms and values in relation to friends and rivals at the level of legitimacy, where this becomes an option for decision-making in IR and diplomacy. The construction of the exotic and barbarian other poses many questions as to what extent many of these representations are built into discourses of power/domination and/or fear of the unknown.

In Chapters four and five, I use the concept of *Alter-representation* to understand how discourses of alterity are shaped by the diplomatic apparatuses of Mexico and Sweden. I study different ways of describing both countries in the media, and global international public opinion, in particular the way these nations describe themselves in their programs (*e.g.* “Modern” vs. “Traditional” or “Indigenous” versus “European”) which become discourses about a nation’s alterity. In turn, it was difficult to trace many signals of how official CD represents alterities of other nations. It is possible, however, to see the global cultural industries doing this much better than others. Take the case of the American propaganda in

the Cold War and the Hollywood industry. The Swedish Institute brochure *Sweden & Swedes* says explicitly “Especially in American propaganda, Sweden in the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s was often portrayed as a half-communist nation [*crypto-communist*] where the freedom of the citizenry was tightly restricted” (2003: 15). Daniel Leyva, Mexican diplomat remind us that “the US film and entertainment industries have had as sports the creation of different stereotypes about the Mexicans that serve both commercial and political objectives. For example, the little happy Mexican mouse running across the desert in the children’s cartoon *Speedy González* was a character made to interpret in a positive-comic way the Mexican other. Also, in recent international films, such as “Traffic” or “Man on Fire”, the Mexicans were portrayed as corrupt and dangerous, sending a message to the political *status quo* and the Mexican society, getting a few bucks to the box office at the same time. This is the business of manufacturing identities abroad” (interview 11).

3.4. Conclusions

In this chapter I have explored the possibilities of representing identities and alterities in Cultural Diplomacy. I engaged in a theoretical discussion on how Nation Branding, Cosmopolitan Constructivism and Soft Power approach the issue. As said earlier, for the most part, identities and alterities have not been thoroughly discussed in the field of Cultural Diplomacy, and the traditional approaches (united in the Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad), and the realist-instrumental representations (SP and NB) fail to take the challenge any further. For the most part, these two characterizations assume identities are fixed variables. In this sense, Cultural Diplomacy is transformed into a marketing problem, an issue of cultural seduction and power influence, or an inter-cultural communication game. Cosmopolitan Constructivism, as viewed here, takes the discussion over identities and alterities seriously. Alexander Wendt’s ideas on the identities of nations in the international system proved to be a relevant theoretical discussion here. His view that the representation of *Identity* and *Alterity* is at the top of social discussions, recognizes the primacy of the constructivist argument over the realist-rationalist ones. Wendt also made it clear that representations are not only the starting point for interaction between nations (and cultural diplomacies), but are also the medium by which nations determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave. In short, paraphrasing Wendt one may say that his view is that Cultural Diplomacy is “what States and their foreign ministries make of it.” However, Wendt’s constructivism is not readily suited to a penetrating “cosmopolitan” approach.

In my theoretical exploration of Endo-representations, I presented the psychological, corporeal, national and cultural identities. They were discussed in relation to how theories of Self cope with the state, and thus, how cultural diplomacies can view the problem. Even when Endo-representations are seen in separation for analytical reasons, in my study of Mexican and Swedish cultural diplomacies, I have recognized that they should be considered as a composite whole.

In other words, it is important that the Endo-representation model is seen as a joint representation that holds together forms of identifications that stand for state and culture. An advantage of this model is that it actually accommodates realist-instrumentalist debates as well (in national and psychological identities). This model will be explored on empirical grounds in the next two chapters, when I study the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden using what I call entry-discourses, seen as basic units of analysis capturing general descriptions in official documents, magazines, dossiers and newspapers.

Alter-representations aggregated a complex discussion over alterities in nations. Initially, Alter-representations functions as a constitutive discussion to carry the Endo-representations' debate on identities further. In other words, the assumption is that the identities cannot be effectively discussed if we do not pay attention to how *Other* is constructed at the same time. My exploration of ally-friend, enemy-rival, exotic and barbarian considers traditional IR concepts such as threat and security blended with sociological ideas, homologous and eccentric cultures or groups. This debate in Cultural Diplomacy representations under the realist-instrumental guise is rather simplistic and stereotypical as shown above. In IR theory, Alexander Wendt explores these concepts in detail under a constructivist agenda, paying particular attention to the friend/enemy conceptions. I venture to add the exotic and barbarian debate since I consider it applicable for conceptions of Cultural Diplomacy as well.

All in all, a concrete contribution of this chapter is that the Cosmopolitan Constructivist debate is equipped with a solid theoretical base to explain the Endo-Alter representations. However, this is still an emergent and underdeveloped proposal as a challenger Cultural Diplomacy representation to Soft Power particularly, and thus requires further exploration. For example, while Wendt engages in the constructivist discussion of identities and alterities, he is suspiciously unaware of the cosmopolitanism of his own ideas. Even when he discusses international relations and innovative ways, revisiting and challenging neo-realism and neo-liberalism, he does not venture to explore the cosmopolitan attitudes he encourages in his theoretical reflections. His main book (1999) does not even have an entry for such a concept. As I explained earlier, I argue that the source of his cosmopolitanism lies in his view of how states internalize the norms to be friends, especially in the third level (legitimacy). Lastly, I am aware that using this concept has its own theoretical risks as well. Cosmopolitanism can be equated with a superficial judgment of the universal, or a form of imposing superiority via sophistication (Bauman 2002 and Harvey 2000). It can also lack responsibility of understanding the local and rural or engage in a festive discourse of triumphant globalization (Calhoun 2002 and Hall. S. 2002).

The next two chapters afford excellent opportunities to illustrate, exemplify and expand these concepts further, particularly scrutinizing the cultural diplomacies of two such different nations as Mexico and Sweden.

CHAPTER FOUR

Representing Mexico Abroad: Tradition and Modernity at Crossroads

The main objective of this chapter is to illustrate some of the main categories presented in the theoretical corpus on representations, via the Cultural Diplomacy (CD) of Mexico, as an expository case. The central problem is to understand how the Mexican government has defined the task of representing Mexican culture abroad in recent times. To do this, I explore the applicability of three categories presented in the previous chapters: conceptual discursivity of cultural diplomacy, political representation, and Endo/Alter representations. I begin by addressing the conceptual understanding of Cultural Diplomacy in official discourse, using Mexican official reports, interviews and dossiers. Next, I present the official definitions and three illustrations on how cultural *attachés* see the practice in their everyday duties. The result is that during the 1990s and the early years of the millennium Mexican cultural diplomacy was caught up in a dual strategy of Cultural Diplomacy representations, between a strong emphasis on Soft Power (SP) and the low-profiled Cosmopolitan Constructivist (CC) agenda. In a second debate using the categories of chapter two, I analyze the institutional arrangements of the Cultural Diplomacy apparatus in relation to questions of political representation posed by Hanna F. Pitkin. Through a representational analysis of Cultural Diplomacy institutions, I claim that the Secretary of Foreign Relations (SFR) and the National Council for Culture and Arts (CONACULTA) make the functions of *standing for* (SF) official cultural diplomacy, but that the *acting for* (AF) is carried out also by other actors (*e.g.* television companies, Catholic church or the film industry), in what is “cultural relations” proper. I study the role of the Secretary of Foreign Relations’ Direction of Cultural Affairs (DAC), the Mexican Institute of International Cooperation (IMEXCI) and the Institute of Mexico (IM) as specialized agencies of cultural diplomacy. Finally, taking theories from chapter three I show an emblematic cultural diplomacy practice carried out between 1990 and 1992, the international exhibition “Mexico Splendors of 30 Centuries” (MS30C) where the idea of Soft Power is clearly used as a baseline for cultural diplomatic practice. MS30C also functions as an illustration of how Mexican identities are treated in Cultural Diplomacy representations. Under this identity discussion, it is fair to say that Mexico has built a Cultural Diplomacy discourse in between “modernity” and “tradition,” depending on the public and the political interests. In constructivist terms, I argue that there is also a confusing representation of identities between the aim of showing a modern Mexico, and the discourses recalling tradition. Thus, MS30C shows Mexican identity at a crossroads; an identity divide between different versions of modernity and tradition.

Introduction

The study of Cultural Diplomacy in Mexico has been rather limited. A few papers have explored theoretical and empirical angles of Mexican cultural diplomacy, particularly related to cultural cooperation (Nualart 1999 & 2000), literary traditions (Domínguez 2003), the cultural attaché and the job itself (Ochoa 2002, Ehrenberg 2002, Orestes 2002), the question of Cultural Representation (Villanueva 2003 and 2005) and experiences in culture and diplomacy (Astíé-Burgos, W. 2003). Not that Mexican Cultural Diplomacy would be an appealing political issue to write about for most scholars, but in some instances, this topic can show the bigger picture of Mexican politics from an angle rarely unexplored. In this sense, the study of Mexican cultural diplomacy is a novel field of research (interviews 14 and 17). For example, the analyses of cultural diplomatic dossiers and reports coming directly from the embassies have not been documented properly, and as a result have failed to provide effective feed back to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (interview 19). In turn, the SFA has not made it a project of its own to acquire empirical systematic knowledge of how Cultural Diplomacy can be properly set up to benefit the country and its own relation with other nations abroad. Thus, the execution of cultural diplomacy seems to lack a navigation compass, both to locate areas of international perception about Mexico, and to analyze the implications of them for the representations they struggle to construct for foreign audiences. In order to deal, at least in part, with this academic and political lacuna, I engaged in an analysis of Mexican cultural diplomacy via papers, dossiers, documents, interviews and reports, taking into consideration the theoretical debates of the previous chapters.

For those not familiar with Mexico as a state, it may be difficult to understand why the country is sometimes placed along with North-America, other times as part of Latin-America or –less frequently– as being a Central American nation. People with a loose interest in Mexican issues may have heard of figures as divergent and unconnected such as Octavio Paz, Mario Moreno “Cantinflas,” Frida Kahlo, Hugo Sanchez, Salma Hayek or Aztec emperor Moctezuma. However, even assuming that Mexican culture is not part of a world citizen special interest, it is possible to argue that most people have been exposed to a version of Mexican food (tacos, burritos or “chili con carne”), a taste of Mexican arts (the Mayans, Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo or Octavio Paz) or have thought, at some point, about visiting any of the worldwide famous tourist resorts (Can-Cun, Acapulco, Puerto Vallarta or Baja California). A small knowledge of Mexico, its culture and history will get anyone far. For example, a basic history class will show the intricate episodes of Mexico, from the pre-Hispanic to the colonial periods, all the way into the independent and post revolutionary years. Again, a minor entry door into the culture will show the origins of *Mestizaje* and the rich indigenous world, the complex inter-connections with Central and South America, the defining European influences and the origins of the “love-hate” relation with the dominant northern neighbor, the US. In any case, I here want to understand how these complicated cultural representations, entrenched in symbolic worlds, actually construct what Mexico can be in world affairs. However, the intellectual

journey I undertake in the following pages looks inside the political mechanisms that facilitate or prevent the actual performance of these symbols. This is, in many ways, a trip into the “belly of the whale” where representations, discourses and institutions make up for a complex diplomatic practice in the field of culture.

4.1. Mexican Cultural Diplomacy Representations in Discourse

What type of cultural diplomacy characterizes the Mexican case in the nineties? Or to put it differently (paraphrasing E.T. Hall): How did Mexico “gain the affection and esteem” of other nations in the 1990s? These are empirical questions that require looking at how Mexico conceptualized and performed its own cultural diplomatic practice. In this part I argue that, during the nineties, the official discursive formation of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy can be best understood via both the basic Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad and the use of Soft Power. It is also possible to argue that multilateral diplomacy, suggesting a mild reflexive approach, was also present.

In my interviews with different Mexican cultural *attachés*,⁶⁷ there are interstices where their comments converge with three visions, which I take as discourses: legal, political and cultural. Let me simplify and argue for a basic profile of the Mexican cultural *attaché* in the nineties, one of the operators and key agents of cultural diplomacy as I understand it.⁶⁸

The legal discourse: The Mexican cultural diplomat must comply with the Law of the Mexican Foreign Ministry (*Ley del Servicio Exterior Mexicano, SEM*), and it is mandatory for all Mexican diplomats to “promote the knowledge of the national culture abroad, and to expand the presence of Mexico in the world” and in an supplementary addition to the law in the year 2002, article 2 incises VI, VIII and IX makes it also mandatory “to cultivate the prestige of the country abroad” and to “promote knowledge about the national culture abroad and expand the presence of Mexico in the world” and “to collect information overseas that may be of interest for Mexico and to disseminate information abroad that that may contribute to gain a better knowledge of the Mexican national reality.” As a discourse, this legal mandate allows for three types of practice: promotion, advertisement and dissemination of information about Mexico. To be a fully Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement triad (as discussed in chapter one), “the exchange” part is missing. However, in practice, Mexico carries out cultural exchanges. The instrumentality in discourse is clearly subjected to the idea of the national interest understood as the way a government *portrays its country to another country* in order to *achieve selfish policy goals*. In this sense, culture is

⁶⁷ The list of interviews is included in the references. For most of the interviews I had a set of questions that was sent to the people who accepted to talk to me. While the information collected is invaluable material, I decided to use them as ways to inform my theories and gain knowledge of a field I have only read about.

⁶⁸ This basic summary is also based having in mind the 278 cultural diplomatic dossiers from the SRE diplomatic archive, and the 13 interviews I carried out with Mexican experts on the field.

alienated to the “national interest” and is only a secondary device in discourse. In another angle, both in discourse and in practice, Mexico also emphasizes the idea of cooperation (see *infra*). The “unidirectionality” of the discourse is remarkable, and when information is needed from other nations, it is in the realm of the Mexican interest. In practice, though, Mexico also has bilateral and multilateral contracts with many nations. As a Cultural Diplomacy representation, this is much closer to the idea of Soft Power as explained in the previous chapters (see table 4.1.).

The political discourse: The cultural activity abroad is mainly political in the sense that Mexico must “project an image,” “promote cultural values” and “disseminate information about the Mexican reality.” In principle, these goals can only be accomplished by political means. In this sense, the political agenda of Mexican cultural diplomacy has been operating under a Soft Power assumption. Also, with a few exceptions, career diplomats (officially belonging to the Foreign Service Corpus, *SEM*) see the cultural activity as a ladder for other more prestigious and powerful positions inside the ministry. The tradition of offering non-career diplomats to assume roles as cultural *attachés* has created an impression that “anyone with some relevant knowledge of Mexican culture and some common sense can perform the job fine” (interview 12, a view corroborated by many others). As theorized in chapter one, this approach to diplomacy is mainly sustained by any of the rational-instrumentalist representations. As a political discourse, however, the conception of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy is limited: there is no mention of public diplomacy (target groups), no definition of spatiality (regions, countries, the global dimension) and no view of the need to securitize (or not) the national culture. It is true that Mexican cultural policy addresses some of these issues and securitizes national culture in discursive terms (*e.g.* Tovar y de Teresa 1994). In my interviews, all diplomats accepted that the protection of Mexican culture is a political matter that needs to be addressed, but in official discourse this is not properly articulated (interviews 11, 19 and 20). Despite the limitations, the Mexican Cultural Diplomacy discourses and practices sometimes hint at Cosmopolitan Constructivism when making references to multilateral diplomacy, UNESCO views on the dialogue of civilizations, or the setting up of a functional educational exchange program, with a number of countries in bilateral agreements (*cf.* Tovar y de Teresa 1994 and SRE 2000).

The cultural discourse: Mexican Cultural Diplomacy seems to operate under the assumption that culture is too important a business to be left to the cultural *attachés*. Diplomats are following the most regular careers (*e.g.* political, economic and legal) and, in most cases, culture is a secondary and decorative issue. In addition to this, career diplomats have very little cultural training. Moreover, in some of cases, experts in the field argue that it is frequently to find that career diplomats are even blatantly uninformed about basic cultural traits in Mexico, the history and the society they represent (interview 20). On top of this, the cultural *attaché* is traditionally seen as having a minor role in the diplomatic corps, in terms of both rank and salary. Ironically, outside diplomatic circles, the *attaché* enjoys prestige and status in the intellectual and cultural groups of Mexico. There, the *attaché* is seen as a potential “career developer,” *i.e.* as an agent to in-

ternationalize the cultural and artistic careers. Some of my diplomatic informants mentioned that in Mexico, the *attaché* can be instrumental in legitimizing the intellectual or artistic careers of people who otherwise could not have access to international circuits where symbolic power is accumulated, e.g. museums, galleries, book fairs, etc. Therefore, the nomination of cultural *attachés* may every now and come to the attention of the national media, and provoke controversies about their experience, knowledge or influence. In a normative parallel, Ernesto Sosa⁶⁹ mentioned that the Mexican cultural *attaché* must be part of a “strong cultural program” to gain knowledge of both the basics of Mexican domestic intellectual life and truly to understand the relevance of this task. Sosa said that he believed the cultural task in diplomacy implies not only “projecting culture” in one direction, but receiving and assimilating other influences as well (interview 13). However, the question remains as to what extent these views are discursively internalized by practitioners in the field. For example, it is paradigmatic that the issue of looking at Mexican culture in popular or mundane way was less interesting or seen as an exotic alterity, and the issue of using culture as an industrial and business opportunity was mainly disdained. In my study of the diplomatic dossiers at the Secretary of Foreign Relations, I saw a clear trend emphasizing the arts as a high-brow activity and de-emphasizing popular arts and crafts.⁷⁰ However, the issue of globalization and its effects on Mexican Culture was hardly addressed.⁷¹

All in all, my claim is that the Mexican cultural diplomacy is more inclined to assimilate the agenda of Soft Power in its conceptualization of the activity as a nation. The key concepts addressed in chapter one are there: instrumentally, it responds to the logic of power, there is a discursive agenda for the promotion (external) and protection (internal) of the cultural assets of the nation, its scope of action is mainly international, its directionality is mainly one-way oriented and the funding for programs is primarily public. Some of the issues will be exemplified and illustrated below. The reasons why the Soft Power is more appealing has to do with three interrelated aspects: tradition in history of Mexican cultural affairs (cf. Tenorio 1998), a reaction to the propagandistic machinery of the US and the USSR (cf. Prevost 1998) where Mexico was a cultural battlefield and reacted by protecting its “national interest” in every sense (including the cultural) and because Mexico can afford to display a potent variety of cultural manifestations that are the envy of many nations (interviews 12 and 17). These aspects, however, are not part of this study.

⁶⁹ Director of diplomatic training at the “Matías Romero School of Diplomacy” at the SRE in Mexico (1994-2003).

⁷⁰ During the months of January, February, April, May and December 2005 I engaged in a study of historic archives at the SRE. The Diplomatic Archive “Genaro Estrada” located in the Tlatelolco area in Mexico City, next to the SRE main building provided me with access to the materials needed to conduct my study. I first wanted to find out the disposition of the material, its availability and the uses it has had in the past. In my results (unpublished) a great proportion of the Mexican CD activities abroad were characterized by the arts and to a much lesser extent the design and popular activities.

⁷¹ For instance, Tyler Cowen’s book *Creative Destruction: How Globalization Is Changing the World’s Cultures*, makes a pretty strong case on how some cultures are being eroded by commercial and factionary tales of consumption (2002). See also Villanueva 1997.

4.1.1. Three Illustrations from Mexican Cultural Attachés

As discussed in chapter one, I am here studying the specific ways cultural diplomacy is described by the official discourses. For this purpose, I present three essays where three Mexican cultural *attachés*⁷² discuss their experiences and reflect on their official and unofficial tasks in radically dissimilar ways (Ehrenberg, Ochoa and Arestes 2002).

Felipe Ehrenberg is a well-recognized artist in the circles of the visual and conceptual arts in Mexico and Latin America. He was appointed cultural *attaché* to Brazil at the beginning of 2001, having in his *résumé* a vast experience in the field of artistic promotion, but with no prior diplomatic experience. He declares that his work as an *attaché* rests on three basic grounds

the first, is that there is a very warm relation between the two colossus of Latin America (*sic*), both aggressive competitors in the world markets [talking about Brazil and Mexico]; the second is that the budgets for these two countries are limited in the extreme; the third is that Mexico requires to establish *current guidelines of operation* in order to carry out clearly directed actions [...] the last premise demands, of course, to expand the idea that anyone has of the cultural *attaché*. The tasks of the job cannot be limited, as it was the case, to only work with the arts or the academic affairs; it is required that his actions be subscribed precisely inside an integral concept of culture. This means, on the one hand, that Mexico should stimulate the self-organizational exchange (*sic*)⁷³ of products and services between cultural industries; on the other hand, that the public funds must be devoted to support and encourage those cultural and artistic manifestations outside the commercial circuits. It is, then, necessary to clearly distinguish between the differences between the manifestations which are considered emblematic, and those which are the everyday expression, in order to bring equilibrium to the attention they must get in each case, at the time of showing them to the public eye abroad (Ehrenberg 2002: 136-137).

Ehrenberg brings three important discursive issues not captured by the official documents: the lack of a conceptual precision to define the role of the *attaché*, both in theory and in practice; the need to expand the idea of culture as an integral organizing practice; and the necessity to make public and private funds cooperate to show the Mexican culture “to the public eye abroad.” His diagnosis reflects the public/private discursive preoccupation as discussed in chapter one, and points at the necessity to have clear political orientations on how to perform as an *attaché*. The way I read Ehrenberg’s claims on cultural diplomacy is under a mix of Soft Power and Cosmopolitan Constructivism, the former because he emphasizes the need to make foreign policy pay attention to the collaboration be-

⁷² Víctor Sandoval (Mexican Poet and former Minister for Cultural Affairs at the Embassy of Mexico in Madrid was also the director and founder of Institute of Mexico in Spain in 1992), expressed his idea that about the relevance of the cultural attachés for the SRE: “...the attaché had a lower hierarchy in the rankings of the SRE and had always entered the foreign service as a “second best option jobs” or having the attitude that “nothing is worse.” Of course this had to do with the ambassador, because there are many of them allergic to the artistic culture, this being for the reason why the cultural attachés become their nannies or *chauffeurs*, which is a lack of recognition of their relevance. When they send off a politician [and not a career diplomat] abroad, it is almost interpreted as an act of getting rid of him since he had become a hot potato, and of course in return the ambassador would not be preoccupied for the culture and arts of Mexico.” Quoted in Olivares (2005) from *Jornada Semanal*, April 8, 2001, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2001/abr01/010408/sem-magali.html>

⁷³ The author uses the term “*intercambio autogestivo*” which I find difficult to translate.

tween public and private funds and the latter as an instance of focusing on an integral idea of culture.

Héctor Orestes Aguilar, linguist expert, literary analyst and author (career diplomat, SEM), prefers to emphasize the traditional “instruments” of Mexican diplomacy, this is the bilateral programs, accords and the contracts. He claims that the backbone of cultural diplomacy is in the “framed contracts”,⁷⁴ (“*acuerdos marco*” in Spanish) which make it possible to formalize the links of exchange in the areas of culture, education, science and technology. Furthermore he insists that “The fundamental work of the cultural *attaché* is to make these accords, contracts and programs real, not only complying with what it is or following up progress, but also by suggesting new initiatives, discovering unexplored areas of cooperation, expanding the contents and duration whenever possible” (Orestes, 2002: 127). The way I understand Orestes’ claim, is that the official channels of cultural diplomacy should be strengthened, made more operative and functional. His is more of a legal discourse functioning under the influence of the reflexive approach. His expectations are of a well defined bilateral and multilateral cultural arrangement, with different nations in areas of common interest participating in an exchange. He pays little attention to the concept of culture *per se*, however.

Finally, Gerardo Ochoa Sandy, author, cultural advocate and cultural policy writer, was also invited to fill the cultural mission in Prague, Czech Republic at the beginning of the millennium (non SEM). In his text, Ochoa Sandy constructs the role of the cultural *attaché* based on his brief diplomatic experience. He assumes the *attaché* roles must be dependent on the policies and requirements of the Secretary of Foreign Relations (under the leadership of the Direction of Cultural Affairs). His analysis takes into consideration the formalities, protocols and traditional practices of the diplomatic apparatus, such as ratifications of cooperation contracts and the promotion of a Mexican image abroad. However he insists that “the Mexico after 2000” is different from the predecessor (a non-democratic regime) and must be shown in a totally renovated way. He states that

The secretary of foreign affairs, Jorge G. Castañeda has suggested the promotion of contemporary Mexican art as one of the priorities of the cultural policy abroad of the new government. This is, in effect, not only a priority but also an urgent action. The idea of culture in our country is in general limited, in the best of the cases, to some vague notions associated with the pre-Hispanic cultures, the muralists, Frida Kahlo and the so called “Golden Age of the Mexican Cinema”; in the worst case, to the *mariachi*, *tequila* and the dishes with hot chili (2002: 156).

And to clarify his point further, Ochoa Sandy adds that “the new cultural policy abroad” suggested by the new minister of foreign affairs (J.G. Castañeda), “does not replace the older idea of Mexico with a new one, but only emphasizes the relevance of the contemporary Mexican culture and arts, along a cultural process in Mexico.” Ochoa says that the expression “The New Mexico” is not an idealization of the democratic process but something simpler: “the diffusion of the cul-

⁷⁴ They are bilateral and multilateral agreements with countries, where the specificity of the exchanges are clearly “framed” and defined, e.g. type of exchange, areas, timing, resources, etc. This is mainly targeted for the purposes of education and scientific cooperation.

tural-artistic production of the last few decades which has been left unattended; and also something more complex; the dissemination of the perception that our intellectuals and artists possess about contemporary Mexico” (2002: 157). In addition to this, Ochoa says that the Director of Cultural Affairs from SFA, Gerardo Estrada “has indicated that, the planning of cultural activities abroad must not be limited to the execution of the assigned budget by the SFA, but must involve the other party, the country in which one carries out the cultural activity, and the *creadores* [artists, intellectuals etc.] as well” (Ochoa 2002: 156-157).

Ochoa Sandy points at three aspects of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy: respect for the traditional practice of diplomacy, its politicized use (in Mexican local politics), and a concern for a retro-directional practice. These discourses go from a Soft Power towards a Cosmopolitan Constructivist agenda in the sense of keeping traditional codes of diplomacy (clearly hierarchical and Soft Power oriented) towards a more inclusive view of other nations in cultural affairs. In my theoretical discussion in chapter one, I had not considered the use of cultural diplomacy as a *performative* partisan or ideological force. However, in chapter three, when discussing identities I referred to it as a propagandistic strategy of a nation (but not a group or a political party).

In conclusion, what is Cultural Diplomacy for Mexico? My claim is that inside the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cultural Diplomacy is seen as a traditional form of diplomacy that helps to show Mexico abroad, fulfilling the basic Soft Power agenda, having an Exchange-Promotion-Advertisement template, *i.e.* to advance the national interests of Mexico in specific areas or countries, for example Latin America or US. The discursive platform of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy places it closer to the Soft Power profile, where the instrumentality is a combination of culture as power and cooperation; the securitization of culture lies in protection and promotion, with programs targeted at cultural and educational exchange; the spatiality is mainly international and regional; the directionality is one-way (SP) and bidirectional with bilateral and multilateral agreements; and the public funds are mainly the sources to execute cultural diplomacy abroad. In this, the aspects referring to cooperation, exchange and the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels give a scent of a Cosmopolitan Constructivist agenda, especially in the context of some official discourses (see *infra*). Finally, the Nation Branding template has not yet been used as a representational cultural diplomacy strategy in Mexico.⁷⁵ Table 4.1. summarizes this discussion.

⁷⁵ However, as I write in January 2007 newly elected Mexican president Felipe Calderón addressed the Mexican diplomatic corps presenting the “*Marca Nación*” Strategy (NB) as something he wanted them to develop in the diplomatic field during his presidency (see Editorial “El Capital de la Marca México,” *El Universal*, Jan 8th 2007)

Table 4.1: Representations of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy in SP and CC

Discursive issues	Soft Power	Cosmopolitan Constructivism	Nation Branding
Instrumentality	Power	Cultural Cooperation	N/A
Security	Protection-Promotion	Exchange	N/A
Spatiality	International	International-Regional	N/A
Directionality	One-way	Bilateral/multilateral	N/A
Public/Private	Mainly Public	Mainly Public	N/A

In the Mexican diplomatic circles, the cultural *attaché* is a low-ranking diplomat with not very specific functions, that receives orders from the ambassador or the specialized office from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on specific displays or cultural activities to carry on abroad (*cf.* Soler 2005. Also interviews 14 and 18). Conversely, the perception outside diplomatic circles and in the media is that the *attaché* is a high profile intellectual figure enjoying a high life, meeting interesting people and participating in pompous cultural festivities and cocktail parties in major cities all over the world.


4.2. Political Representations in Mexican Cultural Diplomacy

It is important to remember, as mentioned in chapter two, that representational theory must be seen as an interpretative-constitutive device composed of discourses that make it possible to understand and distinguish the public interest of showing a national culture abroad. Assuming Mexican Cultural Diplomacy mostly operates under the Soft Power logic and to a lesser extent Cosmopolitan Constructivism, below I show a way to understand the theoretical debate on representations using Hanna F. Pitkin's ideas. In this part, I take three representational questions discussed theoretically in chapter two: how do authority and legitimacy perform political representations in Cultural Diplomacy? How is the role of culture shaped in the representations of official Cultural Diplomacy? And whom does Mexican Cultural Diplomacy represent?

Let us briefly remember that according to Pitkin, the *formalistic* view of representation is a matter of *authorization* and *accountability*, which in Mexican Cultural Diplomacy is interpreted in the ways the representative acquires the rights to conduct diplomacy and perform representations on behalf of a constituency. In the case of Mexico, authority to *stand for* and *act for* the official Cultural Diplomacy and representations abroad is anchored in ideas on cultural policy/diplomacy, fundamentally embodied in two institutions: the Secretary of Foreign Relations, (SRE) and the National Council for Culture and the Arts, (*Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, CONACULTA*). At the same time, Mexico developed five other institutions to cope with the interests of the constituency and develop its own national identity discourse abroad: Mexican embassies, the Mexican Institute for International Cooperation, (*Instituto Mexicano de la Cooperación Internacional, IMEXCI* 1998-2001), the Mexican Insti-

tute (*Instituto Mexico*, IM, 2001), the National Institute of Fine Arts, (*Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes*, INBA) and the National Institute of Anthropology and History, (*Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia*, INAH). See Table 4.2. Embassies, IMEXCI and IM fall under the jurisdiction of SFA, and INBA and INAH under CONACULTA (cf. Villanueva 2003 and 2005). In a second tier, there are the bilateral and multilateral cultural diplomacy mechanisms such as the UNESCO commission, the Organization of Ibero-American States and its Commission of Culture, or the Council of Europe's Culture Council. A great number of public, private and non-governmental actors also perform functions to represent Mexican culture, both officially and unofficially. In the first case, they happen to have an official mandate to reach out international audiences as part of a domestic cultural policy, thus they *act for* on an *ad hoc* basis. Examples of this are the International *Cervantino* Festival, UNAM Cultural Promotion (*Difusión Cultural UNAM*), etc. In the second case, there are Cultural Diplomacy actors which, though not officially designated to *stand for*, *act on behalf* of Mexican culture. Examples of these unofficial acting bodies are public and private universities, museums and galleries, television companies, radio stations, the President of Mexico (see MS30C below to see the influence), the Catholic Church or Amnesty International section Mexico, etc. Table 4.2 illustrates this point. At times, via symbolic representations, prominent individuals can act for Mexican culture such as in the case of Diego Rivera, Frida Kahlo or Octavio Paz.

Table 4.2. Agents of Mexican CD: Official and unofficial



The Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SFA) must be seen as the propeller and organizer of the main actions aimed at Cultural Diplomacy, particularly through the Direction of Cultural Affairs (*Dirección de Asuntos Culturales*, from now on DAC)⁷⁶. The SFA's legal mandate to stand for Cultural Diplomacy emanates from the Mexican Constitution, (Article 89, fraction X) whose normative principles structure the action of the secretary.⁷⁷ While "culture" is not considered in the principles of foreign policy proper, the Law of the Mexican Foreign Policy (*Ley del Servicio Exterior Mexicano, SEM*) does indeed find a place for it, in particular in the duties of the members of the foreign service (SEM), Article 2, Incises VI, VIII and IX (see *supra*). In addition, Article 43, para. I, of the same Law makes it mandatory for the Ambassadors "to keep the SFA informed on the principal aspects of the social, economic, political and cultural life of the State to which the diplomat is accredited, as well as to its international relations, in terms of the instructions sent by this Secretary." This is usually by means of a variety of reports, dossiers or communiqués, making it possible to understand how the SFA perceives and constructs an "image" of Mexico abroad. In an official sense, the "acting" of Mexican cultural diplomacy falls under the umbrella of DAC, coordinating the cultural agenda in embassies and consulates, IMEXCI and IM. For example, the SFA, through the DAC, selects and appoints the cultural *attachés* and, in coordination with the ambassadors, defines the specific posts. DAC usually deals with the very specific administrative and cultural questions, and the embassies provide the support to make the transitions easier for everyone. It is also possible that the ambassador appoints a *cultural attaché* of his/her preference, s/he being or not part of the SEM, as long as there is consent from the DAC director (Interview 18). This is regarded as an acceptable political or personal action on the part of the ambassador, and normally it has very little repercussions outside the DAC or the SFA (interviews 12 and 13).

Since 1988, CONACULTA has been the overall federal government agency bringing together other domestic cultural institutions. As is obvious, CONACULTA is in charge of establishing and organizing the cultural policy of the nation. In addition to the domestic influences, I take CONACULTA to be a very important actor of cultural diplomacy for two reasons, one coming from the institutional architecture and the second from a series of pragmatic arrangements. CONACULTA has formalized an office in charge of the international relations, the Direction of International Affairs (*Coordinación de Asuntos Internacionales*) which is in charge of coordinating one of the so called "substantial programs" known as "The Projection of the Mexican Culture Abroad." In the 1990s the main objective of this program was "to make Mexican culture one of the princi-

⁷⁶ There have been different denominations and status of this office through the years. In the 1990s it was known as *Unidad de Asuntos Culturales* and had a less prominent role in the hierarchies of the SRE. In 2000, it became the *Dirección General de Asuntos Culturales* directly subordinate to the Secretary of Foreign Relations. The variation is discretionary and is a reaction to specific political interests.

⁷⁷ The principles are the following: the self-determination of the people, non-intervention, peaceful resolution of disputes, the renunciation of threat or use of force in international relations, legal equality status among states, the use of international cooperation for development, and the fight for international peace and security. The pertinence of culture in these principles is a matter of discussion. However, the Organic Law of the Mexican Foreign Service clarifies this issue.

pal elements for the affirmation of cultural identity and expand the presence of Mexico in the world” (PND, 1989-1994). Also, as Rafael Tovar y de Teresa, former President of CONACULTA mentions, in the making of CONACULTA, international cultural relations were considered to be a fundamental task from the beginning. CONACULTA saw an international role (in coordination with the SRE) in the dissemination of *an actual and coherent image of our country through cultural manifestations*. At the same time, CONACULTA assumed the task of *enriching the cultural life of Mexico by making contacts with expressions of other cultures*. In consequence, the further inclusion of a cultural content in the international relations of Mexico via CONACULTA promised to broaden the logic and the quality of cultural relations, diversifying activities and contacts abroad. For example, *through the concept of “dialogue among cultures” the cultural projection of our country abroad has been substantially broadened* (Tovar y de Teresa 1994: 270, my italics). Considering all this, the practical element for the inclusion of CONACULTA as a main cultural diplomacy actor is found in the administrations of a vast domestic infrastructure in the form of museums and cultural centers that are cosmopolitan by nature and receive a great demand from participants all over the world. The size of the budget is also relevant since there has traditionally been a generous appropriation for financing international contacts. For example, the National Center for the Arts is a magnificent arts complex with a number of schools of arts, theatres, galleries, research centers and a library and arts archives. They receive invitations from all over the world from institutions and artists to collaborate or make joint programs with the artists and cultural producers in the field. Also, CONACULTA overlooks the powerful National Institute of Fine Arts (INBA), the National Institute of History and Anthropology (INAH) and the National Fund for Culture and Arts (FONCA), among many other cultural instances. These institutions have a vast infrastructure of museums, archeological sites, teaching and research centers and disseminations of cultural activities nationwide and internationally.

How do these Mexican institutions construct the concept of culture to represent cultural diplomacy? Evidently, it is within the Secretary of Foreign Affairs where the legal and political aspects of the cultural representations lie (*standing for*). It is also the institutional body that negotiates exchanges, agreements, accords and organizes the whole cultural cooperation (*acting for*). In order to do so, the SFA set up DAC in the beginning of the 1970s after the termination of successful work carried out by the Organization for the International Promotion of Culture (*Organización para la Promoción Internacional de la Cultura*, OPIC)⁷⁸, and as a continuation and redefinition of the Direction of Cultural Relations (*Dirección de Relaciones Culturales*). In the 1990s, the DAC was already consolidated and presented a rather complex organizational structure. Its main mission

⁷⁸ Its first and long-serving director Miguel Alvarez Acosta managed to promote and develop a complex system of artistic presentations abroad, making sure that activities were also brought in from other countries, thus setting up cultural centers and galleries financed by the office such as Centro Cultural Cozumel and the Tlatelolco theatre. The DAC gave support to the most successful folk dance group, The Folk Ballet Amalia Hernández and promoted music and theatre throughout the world. For more detailed information see Alvarez 1971.

was established as being “to carry out an efficient management of cultural promotion as an instrument to achieve the political and economic objectives of Mexico abroad and set its diffusion in motion.”⁷⁹ In this sense, it is fair to say that the representation of Cultural Diplomacy can be seen in its definition and appropriation of the idea of culture in discourse.

Table 4.3. Mexican Cultural Diplomacy Representations and Culture

	Definition	Appropriation
SP	Mexican culture is one of the principal elements for the affirmation of cultural identity and to expansion of Mexico’s presence in the world (PND, 1989-1994)	Goals: to carry out an efficient management of cultural promotion as an instrument to achieve the political and economic objectives of Mexico abroad and set its diffusion in motion (DAC, 1994). To disseminate in the world an actual and coherent image of our country through cultural manifestations (Tovar y de Teresa 1994).
CC		The idea is to enrich the cultural life of Mexico by establishing contacts with expressions of other cultures. Through the concept of “dialogue among cultures” the cultural projection of our country abroad has been substantially broadened (Tovar y de Teresa 1994).

The DAC performs two kinds of activities, one external and the second internal. Initially it formulates the guidelines for the cultural activities abroad in the different embassies and follows up the specific cultural events in the embassies.⁸⁰ DAC has constant communication with the cultural *attachés* and sends materials and specific suggestions on activities and programs. Internally, DAC deals with the daily operation of the cultural exchanges covenants, accords and administrative arrangements for cultural educational activities to take place. DAC also follows up propositions sent from embassies on possibilities and suggests routes of action on how to make the projects realistic and manageable (Interview 16). There have been changes through the years in DAC, specially atone with the interests and needs of the director in turn. The 1990s saw different approaches and organizations of cultural diplomacy; however the two constant lines were those of *international cooperation* and the *expansion of Mexican cultural compounds abroad*, particularly in North America. The three different “shifts” were the bid for an active and aggressive campaign promoting Mexican culture through “mega-exhibitions,” intense presence in international fairs and a continuous rallying for Mexican culture (1990-1997); the setting up of the short-lived IMEXCI (1998-2001), in tune with the idea of managing international issues using coop-

⁷⁹ In Spanish “Llevar a cabo un manejo eficiente de la promoción cultural como instrumento para el logro de los objetivos políticos y económicos de México en el exterior e impulsar su difusión.”

⁸⁰ The budget for the performance of DAC’s mission is of great interest in order to understand the practical part and the priorities both in activities and regions. It is important to mention here, just to have a preliminary idea, that the annual budget for 2004 for the whole cultural diplomacy abroad (from the SRE’s angle only) was in the sum of \$51,674,135.00 pesos, or an approximate equivalent to 4.8 million dollars (DGAC, Informe 2004). This amount is, by any standards, rather low taking into consideration the size of the Mexican economy and what other countries invest in the sector (cf. Haw 2002 and Wyszymirski et al. 2003).

eration as the main tool; and the reorganization of Mexican cultural diplomacy in a complex network of the Mexican Institute abroad (2001-2007). Perhaps the third more obvious shift in the area comes from an approach close to the idea of “soft power *à la Mexicana*” in the Carlos Salinas government to a “Soft neo-liberal discourse” in the administration of President Erenesto Zedillo. During the brief period of President Fox, when the Secretary of Foreign Relations was Jorge G. Castañeda, there was a return to a “new soft power *à la Mexicana*” approach.

As to the question of accountability, it is appropriate to ask whom does Mexican Cultural Diplomacy represent? Let us remember that for Pitkin, in the action of “representing” the representative should ideally promote the interests of the represented, looking for the public interest and the opinion of the public. Translating this idea into Mexican cultural diplomacy, the SFA and CONACULTA must represent Mexico abroad, having in mind the best interest of the national culture (public interest) and the opinion of the people who constitute it (constituency). With this in mind, the accountability of Mexican cultural diplomacy in the 1990s is difficult to assess, and depends on the principles that organize it. For example, assuming that it is concerned with the international cultural promotion of Mexico to advance political and economic objectives, we are in a Soft Power agenda. Thus, the “national interest” and the economic logic alienate the cultural goals. If we assume Mexico follows a Cosmopolitan Constructivist agenda, then cultural cooperation and exchange helps affirm the cultural identity of the nation. The problem is that these two forces coexist in the Mexican cultural diplomacy and it is difficult to disentangle them. The first is the traditional one; and let us call the second, “the modern.” As Pitkin suggests, this requires disentangling the “selfish wishes of parts of the nation” from the “the good of the whole” (1967: 171). Table 4.3. illustrates this debate, discarding the use of Nation Branding since it does not exist in Mexican cultural diplomacy.

Table 4.4. CD Representations for Mexico (based on Pitkin’s view)

	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Sources</i>	<i>Accountability</i>
SP	SRE - CONACULTA (Political & diplomatic elites)	National interest and country image	Quantity & impact of national cultural events abroad & nation’s image perception abroad
CC	IMEXCI- Instituto Mexico: Public & cultural diplomacy	National identity (Culture) & International cooperation	Cultural & educational exchange & Cooperation. Diversity of opinions and cultural groups
NB	N/A	N/A	N/A

Accountability, in the case of Mexico’s Cultural Diplomacy during the 1990s and early millennium, has mainly relied on a quantification of cultural indicators trying to measure the impact of national cultural events abroad, both in terms of attendance by visitors, the number of “cultural actions” carried out by embassies and the assessment of the nation’s image abroad (see *e.g.* Tovar y de Teresa 1994). In other words, “accountability” has been fulfilled with quantitative discourses in the form of descriptive reports referring to the performance of cultural

diplomats and the actions set up abroad. While the value of this approach as a “tracking record” is relevant, as a tool for accountability in a political representation dimension (specially looking at constituencies) it has little explanatory power. In my investigations, I have found that the substantial *Acting for* of Mexican cultural diplomacy is geared towards the elite groups and high-brow activities, particularly favoring some individuals, cultural groups and cultural manifestations. I do not develop this idea further here, but the evidence I have been confronted with shows a clear deficit when it comes to making participation, plurality and transparency three guiding principles for cultural diplomacy (see for example the way decisions were made in the MS30C in the next section).

All in all, the coexistence of structural and hierarchical Soft Power principles informing Mexican cultural diplomacy is counterbalanced with Cosmopolitan Constructivist efforts to serve the cultural constituencies in a more inclusive form. For example, the establishment of IMEXCI, another of the “cultural acting” agencies, enjoyed great initial support. The masterminds behind the project were Rosario Green and Jorge Alberto Lozoya, well-informed and experienced career diplomats. Jorge Alberto Lozoya was presented as the first executive director in 1998. He had gathered a group of specialists to work with, among whom were Jaime Nualart, Abel Abarca, Martha Bárcenas and Jaime García Amaral to mention a few names (interview 17). IMEXCI was officially inaugurated as a “deconcentrated organ” (*órgano desconcentrado*) of the SFA in August 1998, which basically meant that it was hierarchically subordinated to the organization and faculties specified by the SFA (SRE, Glosa VI Informe 2000). This also meant that the life of IMEXCI might prove to be limited, depending on the disposition and plans of the SFA (as it indeed turned out, a few years later). The Internal Regulatory Book of the SFA (*Reglamento Interior de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*, 1998), article 33 specifies in detail all IMEXCI’s attributions, which I briefly summarize here as giving all support to the SFA in the planning, design, implementation, training, follow-up and evaluation of policies for international cooperation, in line with the constitutional mandate and according to the National Plan of Development each president presents to the nation as a government plan. Regardless of the initial optimism, when the change of government came in Mexico in 2000, the future of IMEXCI was decided, and it brought to an end its activities in 2001.

After this decision, the Institute of Mexico⁸¹ (MI) became the important institution pushing for a new Cultural Diplomacy at the beginning of Jorge G. Castañeda’s time in office as Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2000-2003), during the government of Vicente Fox. Mr. Castañeda had the idea that countries like England, France, Spain or Germany had succeeded in setting up respectable international cultural institutions to organize the cultural diplomacies of their na-

⁸¹ A precedent for these institutions goes back to the foundation of the *Instituto Norteamericano Mexicano de Intercambio Cultural* (INMIC) in the middle of the 1960s in the United States, and particularly in San Antonio. For more on this, see Miguel Alvarez’s article “Casa de México en HEMISFAR” in (1971: 43-47).

tions abroad, and that Mexico could emulate these same efforts. Jorge Volpi adds to this that

making an old idea by Carlos Fuentes current, Castañeda announced the creation of the *Instituto de México*, a cultural organization that in resemblance of the Spanish Cervantes Institute, the German's Goethe Institute and the Alliances Françaises or the British Council, would make efforts to promote Mexican culture and the Spanish language from Mexico. Even when nobody recognizes it today, it was [*the IM*] *the most important cultural project set in motion by the government of Mexico abroad*. Understanding that the image of Mexico is indisputably linked to its cultural tradition, the creation of an autonomous organism capable of coordinating the work of different instances could not have been more to the point (Febrero 2004, my italics).

The relevance of the MI for the “acting of” Mexican cultural diplomacy follows very much the traditional Soft Power template, and even when it seems to be an intelligent political decision, the structural components make it very difficult to accept from a representational perspective. Since the very beginning, the selection of the *attachés* was full of controversies and intrigues. People with domestic cultural experience but no practice in diplomacy took positions as *attachés*, making the career diplomats feel they were not trusted and considered in the decision making process. These days Mexico has 38 Centers and Cultural Institutes abroad, twenty-two of which are set in the US, four more in central America (Belize, Costa Rica, The Salvador and Paraguay), five in South America (Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay), four more in Europe (Austria, Denmark, Spain and France) and finally, three more in Asia (Korea, Japan and Iran) (SFA homepage, www.sre.gob.mx).

In conclusion, the strongest side of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy should mainly be seen under the idea of the National Interest and the unidirectional diffusion of Mexican cultural identity abroad. At the same time, a more reflexive Mexican Cultural Diplomacy is also concerned with cosmopolitan ideas, pushing for extended programs aiming at exchange, development and cooperation as a platform to increase the understanding of culture abroad in a much richer sense. These last efforts have a Cosmopolitan Constructivism component, as presented in chapter two. It is also fair to say that accountability has been, in the past, a rather difficult category in all areas of public administration for the lack of democratic credentials. Stories about people misusing diplomatic posts abound and are shared among diplomats.

4.3. Cultural Diplomacy and the Representation of Identity: The Case of “Mexico, Splendors of Thirty Centuries”

It is now time to examine the exhibition *Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries* (MS30C) as a clear example of how cultural diplomacy operated in Mexico during the nineties. The reason why I have selected this particular exhibition illustrative as an expository case must be located in its exceptionality, the availability of sources to discuss it and its international political relevance. In effect, the

show was exceptional in the sense that up to that date in 1990, no other Mexican exhibition had taken abroad as many pieces of the Mexican cultural heritage, nor had any other show cooperated so effectively with the different actors of the Mexican cultural diplomatic apparatus. For the most part, MS30C has an abundance of information from primary and secondary sources; it had been carefully documented in its objectives, the curatorial narrative and the administrative actions, as will be shown below. Finally, the political and diplomatic relevance of the show was unparalleled, for it can be seen as a pivotal cultural diplomacy action that helped the Mexican government to construct the “cultural prestige” (in Soft Power terms) which further eased the negotiations towards the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).⁸² The colossal show was also one of the main catalysts for cultural actions abroad throughout the nineties, defining very clearly what identity meant for the Mexican government both in discourse and in practice. However, I argue that the cultural representation of MS30C was restraining and the end result rather alienating, thus projecting an image of a folkloric nation frozen in the past, where Mexican identity became a metaphysical object embodied in “high-brow aesthetics.” Belief and admiration is a prerequisite to enjoy a shocking experience in MS30C but a much desirable understanding of aspects of the Mexican culture and the analysis of its importance for the US-Mexico bilateral relation is nowhere to be found.

4.3.1. Mexican Cultural Diplomacy at Work

Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries was an international exhibition of Mexican art and culture organized by the Mexican Government between 1990 and the year 1992 in museums of the US and Mexico. It took place at the Metropolitan Museum of New York between October 10, 1990 and January 13, 1991. The show then traveled to the San Antonio Museum of Arts in Texas (April 6 to August 4, 1991) and to Los Angeles County Museum of Art (September 29 to December 29, 1991) where many of the 365 cultural and artistic objects account for thirty centuries of Mexican art, beginning with pre-Hispanic pieces from 1000 B.C. and ending with modern paintings from 1949. After these museums, the show traveled to the Museum of Contemporary Art (MUCA) in Monterrey Mexico (April-August 1992) before finally being displayed in Mexico City, at the Ancient “San Ildefonso” College (*Antiguo Colegio de San Ildefonso*), a majestic museum property of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) (November 1992-february 1993). Since MS30C only displayed the cultural works of ancient civilizations, and artists no longer alive, the organizers decided to run parallel activities with contemporary Mexican artists, the most important being “Mexico: A Work of Art” (*Mexico: Una Obra de Arte*) in the United States. Officially, the objectives of MS30C complied with at least three aspects of the Cultural Policy of President Carlos Salinas’ administration explained before, i.e. 1) *Protection and Promotion of the Mexican archaeological, historical*

⁸² Key studies in the topic argue in similar terms. See e.g. Gevara and García C. 1992, Nivón 2002 and Tovar y de Teresa 1994.

and artistic heritage; 2) *Promotion of Mexican art and culture*; 3) *the strengthening of cultural identity* and also, when carried out in Mexico, 4) *the guarantee of unrestricted access to cultural services and goods for the Mexican people*. Unofficially, the show had at least four main goals for Mexico, 1) to change negative perceptions about Mexico among American elites; 2) to create a positive cultural climate as a foundation for a possible free-trade agreement between the two countries; 3) to legitimize Salina's government cultural plan among the Mexican *intelligentsia*; 4) to bring an aspect of a symbolic Mexico closer to the Mexicans, Chicanos and Latinos living in the US, thus legitimizing their cultural roots in official discourse.

Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico during 1989-1994 says in his memoirs that the initiative to carry out the show *MS30C* was initially presented to him by the poet Octavio Paz and the architect Pedro Ramírez Vázquez, followed by a visit by Philippe de Montebello, then Director of the MET. Salinas writes,

at the beginning of my government I had a visit from the Director of the MET. De Montebello argued that in previous months a group of Mexican and American intellectuals and artists had contemplated the possibilities of developing an art exhibition that would summarize three thousand years of Mexican culture (...). Montebello told me he needed the firm support of the Mexican government, and asked for a name of a government official who would support the initiative. I told him he had that person in front of him" (Salinas de Gortari, 2002: 650).

The leadership of Salinas during this event was self-evident to the point that the media captured this personal initiative at different moments, for example *Time* magazine's art critic Robert Hughes poignantly expressed "So Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari made sure all the stops were pulled out for this exhibit" (1990). It is possible to argue in this case that the main institutional advocate of cultural diplomacy was the president of Mexico, for reasons not necessarily associated with his passion for Mexican culture, but for economic and political ones, as we will see later.

In this context, from its inception in 1989, the recently created government cultural master council CONACULTA made all possible efforts to rally all necessary support in order to make the presidential initiative a success. CONACULTA gathered, through other government institutions such as INBA and INAH, the expertise, the cultural pieces and the resources to organize the show quickly. Victor Flores Ólea, then President of CONACULTA, expressed the official position by saying that through *MS30C* "communication between peoples is enhanced. Mexico and US have the opportunity of knowing each other better. With this show, we open a new solid and lasting bridge of understanding" (García and Abelleira 1990: 28). Rafael Tovar y de Teresa, former president of CONACULTA, made it even clearer when arguing a few years later that the making of mega cultural programs and fairs of Mexico in cities around the world had left a "profound positive imprint" in the perception of Mexico. He adds that the multidisciplinary character of those activities (dance, music, theater, cinema and editorial production) offered an integral vision of Mexico, and *MS30C*

has been an innovative experience and one of a fundamental importance in the promotion of the image and that of Mexican culture abroad. The results reveal this

too: the exhibition, Mexico: Splendors of Thirty Centuries had 650 000 visitors at the Metropolitan Museum in New York, and around other 800 000 people in the museums of San Antonio and Los Angeles, without considering the attendance to the multiple parallel activities organized in the frame of the program “Mexico: A Work of Art,” in those three cities. The same exhibition was set up at Marco Museum in Monterrey with 150 000 visitors and at the San Idelfonso College, where it concluded its long trip, had an estimated additional 800 000 visitors. (Tovar y de Teresa 1994: 272).

All in all, the other important actor for cultural diplomacy, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs, began the tedious but necessary administrative work to bring all the cultural pieces out of Mexico, considered part of the historic and artistic heritage of Mexico, thus protected under a strict nationalist legislation.




Illustration V: Frida Kahlo, “Self-portrait with monkeys” 1943 oil on canvas, Mexico.

Many of these pieces had never traveled abroad and had to meet special legal exceptions, and comply with unexpected travel complexities in minor details such as special transportation and insurance under very strict conditions. For example, the decision was made to take along an Olmec colossal head (Veracruz State, 2,500 years old) –whose height was 2.18 meters and weighted 5.5 tons– as the welcoming piece for MS30C at the MET. The SFA cleared the way for all of these potential technical and legal problems. In the logistics, the SFA was also very resourceful and creative: the decision was made to run a whole Mexican cultural event in Manhattan, having the exhibition

MS30C as the cherry on top of the cake. The idea took form in what was known as “Mexico, a Work of Art” (from now on MWA). In the beginning of October 1990, Mexican artistic activities took place in New York City, ranging from a selection of Mexican theatre, cinema, poetry and literary discussions, and the visual arts. The whole concept of the festival MWA had a rather sophisticated approach appealing mainly to the smart and demanding New Yorker high-brows, where the elite and decision-makers were concentrated and had influence and power. *Time Magazine* is sharp when expressing that MWA was

a series of events designed to promote culture, tourism and commerce, as well as a better understanding between the American public and the rich cultural identity of its neighbour. Framed by a hundred and fifty activities which will take place in NYC during the fall, Mexico: a work of art is a celebration of the creativity of the country and expresses the abundance of forms, colors and ideas from the most prominent artists and intellectuals in Mexico (*Time Magazine*, Oct 15, 1990: 1).

The public campaign for MWA was carried out using the image of a famous Mexican painter who, at that time had not yet received the international art recognition, but would after this event become an art icon and one of the most sought after artists ever: Frida Kahlo. In effect, her painting “Self-portrait with Monkeys” (1943) became the visible face of the whole event (see Illustration V), bringing a rather shocking and unexpected image of the “southern neighbour.” The painting shows Frida Kahlo, the daughter of a Jewish German immigrant and raised in Mexico city, with a masculine face (hairy moustache), her long black hair drawn up and arranged in indigenous style, wearing a typical dress “as a Tehuana,” surrounded by tropical foliage and a horde of black monkeys. The slogan below the painting in the promotional said: “Manhattan will be more exotic this Fall” (see illustration VI.), and then rhetorically asked what could make Manhattan more extravagant and exotic, followed by the answer “the mystery and marvels of Mexico.”

In order to capture the Cultural Diplomacy dynamics of the event MS30C, I present as an example an interview I held with an accomplished Mexican diplomat with a long experience in the field of cultural diplomacy, who gave a rather explicit description of how the global prestige of Frida Kahlo-the-myth was given a strong push from the SFA in the beginning of the 1990s:

Interview 4.1.

Interviewee: “...in the organization [*of MS30C*], we decided to contract one of the best agencies in the world [...]... Having an impact in NYC? Difficult goal.

“First task [*the agency said*], is to bring 400 images of your country... you present your decisions, we discuss them together and decide. This is the format, and so on, etc...

“Then I come back [*to Mexico*] and get the best photographers of the country, and we think on different issues: archeology, artistic heritage, society, indigenous peoples, contemporary arts, urbanism, the country side, etc...

“I come back to NYC to show the images. After a while, from the 400 images, in the crisscrossing of them, taking opinions from youngsters, older people, rich, poor, white, blacks, foreigners, *New Yorkers*... only five made it [...].

“I asked about the ones that did not make it... what about *Mole Poblano*? [traditional Mexican dish], “not even on pain of death will I eat that! [*they answered*], It looks like shit!”

“One older lady [*’s photograph*] who I loved so much, [*what about her? I asked, and the reply was*] “She is a crazy one [...] can’t be, I have to project out...”

“After a while, [*we learned that*] the company won the Golden Apple [*prize*] as the best publicity campaign of the year.

“Then the images... I invented Frida Kahlo, with the monkey, in all the airports, and bus stops”...

Interviewer: *Why did they chose that particular image?*

Interviewee: Well, because it was marvelous: elegant, mysterious, exotic, feminine, semi-lesbian... It is obvious she is not indigenous, but it is clear she has the guts, literally “the guts.” She has the courage to be as she likes. She is not pretty. She is an artist. She paints beauty. There is creativity. There is nature. And she was Jewish...

The dialogue has to be placed in context. The diplomat expressing these views has a record in the field of Cultural Diplomacy, holding position in government from the very beginning of his/her career, and is quite frank and direct on his/her views.⁸³ The references to MS30C must be placed in the 1990-1992 context,

⁸³ The conversation took place in Mexico in 2005. I asked for permission to tape and publish his/her points of view, which s/he agreed upon. For confidential reasons I do not disclose the name here.

when Mexico was a one-party ruled country, with modest signs of democratization in the government, and the main federal goal at the time was to join NAFTA.

MS30C must also be seen through other actors as well. A few years before this, in 1987 the Mexican private TV company, Televisa S.A., had shown much interest in supporting Mexican cultural and artistic activities in the US. Emilio Azcarraga Milmo, owner and president of Televisa S.A. had expressed his ambition to expand his influence to the American audiovisual market, and had urged the Mexican government to cooperate in order to put the Mexico-US relation in a closer and more realistic perspective, thus benefiting from commercial and cultural exchange with the biggest market on air. In fact, Televisa S.A. was already one of the most active companies in seeking cultural exchange with the US. As Alan Riding argues, “Control of the [Mexican domestic] market was assured through its fare of music, sports, soap operas –or telenovelas- and a great variety of cowboy, comedy and crime series bought from the United States. Looking to the middle classes, Televisa founded Cablevision S.A. to bring American network programs into Mexican homes,” having in return a heavy criticism “for ‘denationalizing’ the country by presenting the American way of life as a new ideal reachable through obsessive consumption” (1989: 312-313). The interest of Azcarraga to bring the US and Mexican commercial and cultural interests closer was not hidden but publicly admitted through the years, thus becoming one of the most enthusiast economic supporters of MS30C (cf. García Canclini, 1992: 9-11 & Hughes, 1990: 80)



Illustration VI: “Mexico A work of Art” campaign in San Antonio, Texas 1991.

Mexican artists, cultural companies and independent intellectuals were persuaded to join the activities in NYC through MWA, either directly or indirectly. Most artists accepted with enthusiasm the invitation coming directly from Victor Flores Olea, then the President of CONACULTA or by Jorge Alberto Lozoya, the head responsible for the activities in NYC from the SFA. Recommendations came from different groups and “cultural gurus,” mainly divided in two

bands, those having strings and ideas closer to Octavio Paz and the so called *Vuelta* group (named after the Mexican literary magazine led by the poet), and those led by Carlos Fuentes and the so called *Nexos* group (for the cultural magazine under that name). Since Fuentes and Paz were personally at odds and had clashed in their artistic perceptions since at least the 1970s, affiliation was fated here. Each group pulled its strings to obtain a presence in the NYC cultural show-case, and resources and influence were divided. However, just at the time

MWA was beginning, the Nobel Prize Committee announced its decision to grant the 1990 literature prize to Octavio Paz, who afterwards got all the media attention. Some NGOs also joined MWA and/or MS30C by providing economic resources, promotional campaigns or technical advice, which was the case for example of “*La Sociedad Amigos de las Artes de México*” (The Society Friends of the Arts from Mexico).

To be sure, the different institutional actors participating in the cultural diplomacy of the show MS30C had a common goal to reach, and they worked rather well to achieve it, given president Salinas had decided this particular exhibition was important for his administration. Prior to this, there was very little indication in the cultural diplomatic apparatus and the cultural policy plans that this would be the path his administration would follow. In other words, MS30C’s idea came out of an individual initiative by leading powerful cultural actors (Paz, Ramírez, Montebello) who gave the Mexican cultural diplomatic apparatus a mission, which was seen by the president of Mexico as an opportunity to advance his political bilateral agenda focusing on relations with the US. In the Mexican presidential system, this decision sent a strong message to all cultural actors who aligned their expertise and resources to make the event a media success. However, having in mind the historical templates, Mexico repeated the same formula applied since the 19th century, and made MS30C a show where the Mexican cultural identity was “exoticized,” thus making use of stereotypes and simplifications, making Mexico look even more distant and exotic in the American eyes. As a result, a much deeper process of alterity making took place between the two nations (see chapter 3). As an example of this, take the interview 4.2 where a diplomat expresses his view on how Mexican culture was exoticized to enter the American market:

Interview 4.2

Interviewee: “Another strikingly widespread image was the dancer in the “deer’s dance.” “Handsome, elegant, animal-like, mystic, deer (a good animal, not aggressive, it is not the lion, it is not the eagle (they are the eagle), noble, modern, kind of gay, open, chic, New York...

“[*The publicity company was very thorough, methodical*]... they had a wonderful calendar. “Fridays were the days when we had the Monday’s campaigns: [*slogans follow*]

“Wedding magazines in the US: “Have a Mexican wedding now...”

“Did you know that the best “*bordado*” [*embroidery*] of this type is made in Agusacalientes... well you can have one in L.A., in N.Y., in this, in this...”

“The campaign was from NYC, the center of the origin...”

“The dogs: “did you know that *Chihuahua* dogs come from Mexico?”

“Do you want to buy your husband a pure leather vest made in Jalisco?”

“Be in! be Mexican!

“Did you know which was the biggest success? *Corona* [*beer*]... But they did that themselves [*the company*], but we came all together...”

“This was the cultural diplomacy I participated in. With its own mistakes and successes. It was not a trick. It had a strategy and rationality. It followed its own objectives...”

Once the decision was made to support the show in 1989, human and material resources had to be gathered to attain success. The human resources were required in the Mexican part to organize the cultural context under which this event would take place, since the concept of the show was mostly decided by the MET authorities. However, there were several consultations among the experts inside the Mexican institutions INBA and INAH, both for technical/legal reasons

and to design the concept of the whole show. Federico Gamboa (museum expert and international exhibitions expert), Miriam Molina (curator) and Eduardo Matos (archaeologist) came into the picture, their views diverging fundamentally from those of MET's experts, especially in the selection of the pieces. Gamboa guided opinion and was more inclined to continue a tradition he inaugurated, producing colossal exhibitions, like those he had already put on, from the surveys of Pre-Columbian art assembled in NYC through the 1930s and 1940s, in Europe twice in 1952-53⁸⁴ and in 1961-62⁸⁵, enjoying enormous impact and relative success. He had also been the organizer of a Mexican exhibition in the 1960s that travelled sixteen years throughout the world, under the name of "Portrait of Mexico" [*Retrato de México*], becoming the official Mexican cultural commissary for Mexican international exhibitions in the late 1960s and 1970s, gaining recognition by many experts in the field. Miriam Molina had been a close co-worker for many years and supported the idea and Matos preferred to keep a low profile. Therefore, it could be argued that the main mastermind behind the "mammoth exhibit" MexS30C and the way objects were treated was in fact suggested and/or influenced by the Mexican team led by Gamboa. Unfortunately, Fernando Gamboa passed away a few months before the inauguration took place in October 1990, but Miriam Molina kept the same basic principles and at the time, the MET team had already made their choices and main decisions regarding the show. In an interview with curator Miriam Molina, she said that it was clear from the start for the Mexican team that in order to exert a positive influence on the commercial or political foreign policy of the US during the 1990s Mexico needed to exploit its cultural heritage and traditions in the very best way. She also suggested that this was easier when departing from preconceived cultural ideas and stereotypes among decision makers and the American public (interview 20).

4.3.2. Identity/Alterity Discussion

What is the identity/alterity discussion behind MS30C? Let us first assume here that every international exhibition that a nation presents abroad conveys discursive sediments, roots or evident signs of identity. However, as established in chapter three, identity is not a given feature, but a socially constructed dimension. Let us remember that the four Endo-representations in this study are corporeal, psychological, national and cultural. From those, national and cultural identities seem more appropriate categories to analyze MS30C. National Identity re-

⁸⁴ The exhibition was called "Mexican Master Works of Art from the Pre-columbian Times up to the Present" [*Obras maestras del arte Mexicano desde los tiempos precolombinos hasta nuestros días*], presented at the *Musée National d'Art Modern* in Paris, the *Liljevalchs Konsthall* in Stockholm and the *Tate Gallery* of London, with great success.

⁸⁵ The exhibition was called "Mexican Modern and Ancient Art" [*Arte Mexicano Antiguo y Moderno*] which began in Zurich, Switzerland, then Cologne and Berlin in West Germany, The Hague, Netherlands and Vienna, Austria. Then it travelled with even more pieces to the Soviet Union, as the jumbo-exhibition "Master Works of Mexican Art" [*Obras maestras del Arte Mexicano*], presented at the Pushkin museum in Moscow and the *Hermitage* in Saint Petersburg. After that the show travelled to the National Museum in Warsaw, the *Petit Palais Museum* in Paris, France, the *Palazzo delle Esposizione* in Rome, Italy and the Louisiana Museum in *Humblebaek*, Denmark, having as final destination the County Museum of Art in Los Angeles, California, US. (cf. Tenorio 1998).

sumes a political discussion about the ways nations construct their internal coherence, belonging and identifications, based on an “internal-external” divide, self-naturalizing identifications, essentializing the sources and constructing an ideology. In MS30C, national and cultural identifications exist and evolve in a seemingly “consistent path” from the past all the way into the present days, “naturalizing” the Mexican nation through “primordial symbols” (pre-Hispanic cultures) and “mythical foundational origins” (e.g. the Aztecs) into the modern nation-state (see Octavio Paz’s description of symbols below).

It is clear that Octavio Paz led the definition of Mexican identity in MS30C. He had the contacts, was well informed on US’ intellectual life, and was the leading figure defining Mexican identity from the early 1950s when he wrote *The Labyrinth of Solitude* (1992 [1950]) which makes a harsh socio-psychological interpretation of Mexican identity using idealist philosophy. Ever since, the book has been a basic reference for any debate on *Mexicaness* and the sources of the Mexican soul. The introduction to the MS30C catalogue was written by Paz using his authority to speak freely about “Mexican art in relation to its soul,” hence constructing a powerful and popular angle of the national identity.

On the other hand, Paz uses alterity to “exoticize” Mexican culture and make it appeal to the American eye. His strategy is to make MS30C otherness, using metaphors to induce awe and surprise in the viewer, provoking an experience of cultural alterity *vis-à-vis* the Americans. He declares,

Each civilization provokes in us a different response –mixing in an indistinguishable manner taste and concept, sensation and idea. The ancient works of Mexican cultures invariably leave an impression of *foreignness*. This word designates, in the first place, the surprise we feel in front of something that looks unexpected, unique and singular. Surprise before the alien, that comes from abroad, in the same manner as for anything rare, extraordinary (1990: 5).

As is clear in his statement, he invites the American public to enter the exhibition looking for “the other,” the different and surprising “other,” because he obviously thinks that the value of Mexican culture is high and can surprise, astonish or shock the public. It is important to remember that MS30C covered all periods of Mexican art (except for the contemporary), and “the most alien” of all objects came from the pre-Hispanic period. After that, Mexican art was, partly at least, influenced by events in the western world. It is possible, then, to speak of a combination of traditions and ways of making arts after the 16th century. But Paz prefers to use the opposition technique, to make Mexican art (and culture) an artifact to be looked at in admiration, but with distance. He writes,

I have written these pages on Mexican art under the influence of three emblems: the eagle, the jaguar and the Virgin. The first two were representations of the cosmic duality: day and night, earth and heaven. Their fights make the world, create space and time, rule the rotation of the days and the changes in nature. These two venues are also reflected in different ways through our history; for example: Indians and Spanish, symbolized by east and west; North Americans and Mexicans, by north and south [...] In the 16th century, the religious imagination revealed us with a figure of mediation: Guadalupe the Virgin. She is more mysterious, profound and vast; for once she is a mediation between the old and the new world, Christianity and the ancient religions; and also she is a bridge between this world and beyond (1990: 7).

The way Paz uses the symbol of Guadalupe the Virgin to develop a discourse of cultural unity is peculiar. It may be natural to inscribe a great number of Mexicans around Guadalupe, Mexico being a Catholic country. However, to claim transference of these assumptions into a cosmopolitan NYC is to place Mexico in the exotic alterity, where mystery, strangeness and mysticism produce a symbolic cultural distance. In any case, NYC is a sophisticated city and the US a nation that has Protestantism as its founding religion. In my opinion, the religious aesthetization of Mexican culture was a poor strategy.

This way of developing an opposition in identities/alterities (which Paz claims to be a “complementary opposition”) can be quite distressing for diplomatic purposes, especially if one of the parts is the underdog nation. Diplomats want to be seen as equals, and very rarely do they play the “exotic card.” Diplomatic rules, protocols and *etiquette* are aimed at bringing a fair communication and equal standing among parties (especially in reflexive terms). Paz frequently argued that he was not a diplomat, but a poet. That is fine. But his actions and discourses were enacted in a politically loaded context where he pre-conditioned and defined the ways through which foreign audiences should enter the Mexican arts. And he chose, along with the Mexican government, to elaborate on the experience of alterity. As explained in chapter three, this is usually an uncertain situation in which to frame identity. Using chart 3.3 (chapter three) the whole range of strategies used to display Mexican arts placed the identity of Mexico as “other” for the Americans from the beginning. Once in alterity, the strategy of the Mexican government was to use the Exo-representational program, to bring Mexico closer to the US from a blind representation (“Mexico does not exist for the Americans,” as they thought it was the case). As explained in chapter three, Exo-representations can be *exotic* but also *barbarian*. When Paz says that “The sculptures and monuments of the ancient Mexicans are works at one time *marvellous and horrible*; I mean, the works are embedded with the feeling of the *confused and sublime* of the sacred” (1990: 5, my italics), he not only constructs an essentialist position for Mexican identity difficult to contest but more importantly, he reiterated, the solitude of the Mexican soul he had depicted in the 1950s. Continuing with the dichotomist characterizations, Paz reiterates, “The history of Mexico is no less intricate than its geography. Two civilizations have lived and fought not only across its territory but in the soul of every Mexican. One is native to these lands; the other originated outside but is now so deeply rooted that it is a part of the Mexican people’s very being” (1990: 9), which is in line with his criticism of the traditional isolation of the Mexicans from the rest of the world, as he claims “Any contact with the Mexican people, however brief, reveals that the ancient beliefs and customs are still in existence beneath Western forms” (1992: 71). Therefore, the self-imposed alterity strategy of placing the art works of Mexico (and by substitution *Mexico-the-nation*) in official discourse made it more difficult to break any negative preconceived stereotypes associated with the “strange” the “foreign” and more complex, “the distant” southern neighbour.

Jessica Evans explains the risks of these types of exhibits very eloquently: “It seemed that the representations and displays of the members of non-western cul-

tures and societies, based on an evolutionary hierarchy from primitives to civilized with racial types, could reveal the integral relationship between the stages of people and the stages of national cultural achievement” (1999: 236-237). If Mexican identity is presented in a linear-evolutionary form, as if “God had a plan,” this provides a framework for justifying the Modern-Nationalist Mexico, which politicians wanted to emphasize. Artifacts are then prepared in a logic of progression, where “good defeats evil,” and the apex is the present. Mexican identity is then a collection of relics inserted in the flow of time, producing an aseptic and de-contextualized narrative where peoples and their cultures are suppressed and transformed into *objets d'art*, or objects of adoration, which require aesthetic appreciation, only possible by an exclusive social membership.

As a Mexican Cultural Diplomacy under Soft Power strategy, MS30C proved to be a very successful event, but also rather limited. The analysis of the Cultural Representations is two-sided. On the one hand, I pay attention to the set objectives: “Success in NYC,” “Influencing the American Public,” “Making Mexican products sell”... with those of values disguised in a soft-power strategy, “to conquer the hearts and minds of Americans,” “sell images that appeal to them,” “strengthen stereotypes that may be positive,” “play the exotic card,” etc. On the other hand, this strategy worked for the political objectives at hand. The campaign was a total success, Mexican culture was noticeable in more parts of US, and NAFTA was put in place. However, a diplomat acknowledged in an interview that this was only a short-run event, which had no future thread or noticeable impact in the ways Mexican culture would be constructed in diplomacy:

Interview 4.3.

Interviewee: “As a model [for cultural diplomacy, this] is rather difficult. It was an extraordinary experience, which exhausts itself. It was so big, that it empties itself. And then the criticism. “*Why did you spend so much there and not here? [in Mexico]*” Because it was for them, not for us. NYC is the cultural and media capital of the world. “*Why don't you make different types of shows?* Because we did not make it alone, we had it in collaboration with the American institutions... that is the interesting thing [...] we did not impose ourselves. How can anyone [dare to] impose themselves over NYC? Secondly, we were rather disciplined. Salinas [former president of Mexico] was a highly disciplined man. A harsh discipline inside the government and towards society.”

In terms of accountability, for example it is easy to forget that the Mexican society in the 1990s still had a non-democratic Presidential system.⁸⁶ The President was, in many ways, the main actor deciding the what, when, where, and how much of the whole diplomatic apparatus, not only in Cultural Diplomacy, but in many other fields as well. Cultural diplomacy à la Soft Power in Mexico was very much an authoritarian top-down approach that worked, at least in one of its directions, to build international reputations and prestige for selected individuals, and to gain an ephemeral fame whose international economic purposes were to accommodate the business/industrial community calls for more free trade, at the expense of “exoticizing” and “orientalizing” the representations about Mexico.

⁸⁶ Once, in September 1990, Mario Vargas Llosa called the PRI and the Mexican political system “the perfect dictatorship” during a Mexican literature gathering in Yucatan. It was not by chance that he had to flee the country almost immediately. See Vargas Llosa, Mario (1992).

4.4. Conclusion

For Mexican diplomacy, tradition matters. This chapter shows that Mexican Cultural Diplomacy has been constructed following traditional strategies from experiences in the past. In this chapter I contend that the most visible Cultural Diplomacy representation in the 1990s and early millennium was to follow the basic Soft Power agenda, *i.e.* to advance the national interests of Mexico in specific areas or countries. At the same time, aspects referring to cooperation, exchange and the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels leave an imprint of Cosmopolitan Constructivism. The discursivity of Mexican Cultural Diplomacy can be characterized as instrumentally following a combination of culture as power and cooperation, securitizing culture via protection and promotion, having programs targeted at cultural and educational exchange, operating in an international and regional arena under bilateral and multilateral agreements, and essentially making use of public funds in the execution of the cultural diplomacy apparatus. This is a key contribution to understand Mexican Cultural Diplomacy in this chapter.

I also say that the Mexican cultural *attaché* is in fact a low-ranking diplomat with general unspecific functions, operating in a highly hierarchical milieu. The *attaché's* freedom of action is rather limited in funding and possibilities to perform, depending frequently on the ambassador's interests or following the DAC-SFA agenda on specific displays or cultural activities abroad. In contrast, the perception outside diplomatic circles and in the media is that the *attaché* is a high profile intellectual who enjoys an exciting cosmopolitan life traveling all over the world talking about Mexico.

In this chapter, I analyzed the institutional arrangements that shape the Mexican cultural diplomacy apparatus in relation to the concept of political representation. I showed that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and CONACULTA fulfil the main representational functions of standing for official cultural diplomacy and also provide institutions that act on behalf of organizations such as DAC, CAI, INBA, INAH and the embassies. Other actors also act for unofficial Cultural Diplomacy such as television companies, the Catholic Church or the film industry, accounting for cultural relations proper. I also showed that accountability has been fulfilled with a Soft Power agenda, where the national interest via national identity and the promotion of Mexico abroad seemed to be enough for the government. In a Cosmopolitan Constructivist perspective, however, there were efforts to develop bilateral and multilateral agreements using cultural cooperation.

In the last part, I showed the case of MS30C where the idea of Soft Power was used to stage multiple cultural events. MS30C served as an illustration of how Mexican identities are treated in Cultural Diplomacy representations in practice. I showed that within this range of identities Mexico constructed a Cultural Diplomacy discourse using "modernity" and "tradition" at will, depending on the public and the political interests at stake. "Mammoth exhibitions" or cultural "home runners" abroad were the pedagogic representations to show Mexico to foreign eyes during the 1990s, and MS30C is the epitome of all. It is also em-

blematic because it put into practice the premises of Nye's Soft Power discourse to great acclamation but paradoxically with short-term results, presenting Mexico as an exotic nation (Exo-representation) to visit and be entertained by, but lacking the modernity needs of a country requiring to be understood and counted among the developed nations. This was tradition and modernity at a crossroads. Having discussed some aspects of the Mexican Cultural Diplomacy here, it is a moment now to turn to Sweden in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

Representing Swedish Culture: Sources of Sweden's Diplomatic Success Abroad

The main objective this chapter is to illustrate some of the key concepts presented in the theoretical part of the thesis with aspects found in the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy, used as an expository case. From the discussion in chapter one, I take the theoretical debate between Public Diplomacy (PD) and Cultural Diplomacy (CD), arguing that the way Sweden conceptualizes this debate draws mainly from a Cosmopolitan Constructivist (CC) vein, and until recently, the deviant appropriation of Nation Branding (NB). From chapter two, I pay attention to the representational concepts of *standing for* and *acting for* to understand how Swedish Cultural Diplomacy organizes its own actions *vis-à-vis* other challenging actors with their own identities and agendas, such as the Nobel Foundation, Swedish companies, media or popular icons such as Ingmar Bergman or Pippi Longstocking. I also study how cultural representation templates are implemented in cultural diplomacy, especially in the case of the Postmodern Representation strategies, in some Swedish official cultural materials. As a special study case, I also discuss the way Sweden is exploring Nation Branding strategies as embedded in forms of cultural diplomacy where the representational question of the “public interest” is posed.

Introduction

People outside the Nordic countries tend to hold unclear ideas about Scandinavia in general and Sweden in particular. Often, people confuse Sweden with the other “Viking nations” such as Denmark and Norway, or more bizarrely, with Switzerland. Most Scandinavians probably know Sweden as persons, in relation to their own common history but I guess only a few could pass an examination on Swedish basic history or institutions. And taking the issue one step further, Europeans in general seem to have a diffuse exotic idea about Sweden, according to different studies and reports. It may be that the many features which the Scandinavian countries have in common present a difficulty in themselves. Similarities can be misleading. This does not tell us anything especially interesting about Sweden or Swedish Cultural Diplomacy in particular, since we can find the same confusions regarding other countries and regions in Asia, Africa or America. This is more a case for basic education in geography and world affairs than the failure of countries to explain their special features. In any case, people in many countries are aware of the Swedish monarchy, the Nobel Prize, Ingmar Bergman,

Pippi Longstocking, Björn Borg or the music of ABBA, as popular emblematic representations of the country. What should people of other nations know about Sweden anyway? How has Sweden constructed its Cultural Diplomacy in recent times? Is it appropriate to hold two Cultural Diplomacy representations competing against each other (CC and NB)? Why are some Swedish cultural representations post-modern? This chapter is designed to address some of these issues, relating them to reflexive theories of identity and representation.

5.1. Cultural Diplomacy Representation à la Suède and the Cosmopolitan Constructivist Discourse

For more than 175 years Sweden followed a policy of staying outside all alliances seeking security in its cornerstone policy of neutrality. Changes in Europe in the beginning of the 1990s, including the collapse of the Soviet threat to northern Europe and the emergence of transatlantic cooperation between the US and the European Union (EU) have made Sweden to reassess its traditional policy, particularly after its decision in 1994 to join the EU (Hadenius 1997 and Petersson et. al. 1999) Sweden's foreign policy in recent years emphasized the traditional cooperation and development strategies (especially towards some developing nations), along with European integration, environmental protection, human rights and support for Eastern European countries (specially the Baltic States). By and large, endorsing multilateral diplomacy and respect for international law, particularly through the United Nations system, has been Sweden's code of conduct. Swedish foreign policy also views a more active promotion of its own interests, political, economic and cultural, as a viable strategy to gain a broader involvement in global affairs (Carlsnaes 1987, SOU 2003: 121, and DS 1993:72).

Under this brief description, it's not very difficult to argue that Sweden constructs its Cultural Diplomacy along with its new international and global importance as an advanced post-industrial society during the 1990s. But to avoid confusion, it is important to make it clear that Sweden is a rather small country compared with other developed nations, both in material and human capacities, performing, however, as a large nation economically and politically. My claim in this section is that during the 1990s, Swedish Cultural Diplomacy mainly operated under a Cosmopolitan Constructivist foundation, consistent with its foreign policy principles and diplomatic traditions. At least, the evidence in discourses and the conceptualization of the field of action make a clear case for that claim and give a pertinent illustration in this chapter.

Political events in the domestic cultural sector during the 1990s, both structural and contingent, gave way to a definition of a what I will call "Cultural Diplomacy à la Suède," that is, a reflexive Cultural Diplomacy concerned with *self-and-other*. Three main institutional forces structure this: international cooperation-development programs embedded with cultural activities, the professional systematization of cultural promotion and exchanges, and functional bilateral and multilateral diplomatic work with nations and institutions in the field of cul-

ture. The contingent factors have also shaped the Swedish diplomacy in the 1990s: changes in government, a more salient business mentality inside government, and the emergence or realization of other non-official actors that had a contribution to cultural diplomacy, e.g. education ministry, the Nobel Foundation or the Swedish Royal Court.

5.1.1. Swedish Cultural and Public Diplomacy

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Utrikesdepartamentet*, SMFA) has assumed the task of realizing the Government's overall foreign policy objectives. And the translation of those goals in the field of Cultural Diplomacy to areas of responsibility includes cultural exchange, the promotion of cultural activities and international cooperation, as well as Swedish investment and trade. In this instance, it is assumed that any Swedish cultural requests are received most attentively when the foreign citizens are more familiar with the Swedish' scene, its individual figures and achievements (Interview 3). Officially, it is a prime goal of the government to

inspire confidence in Sweden as a country, and spreading goodwill on its behalf is an important part of Swedish foreign policy. As international interdependency and cooperation increases, it has become more important than ever for a country like Sweden to establish a place for itself on the world map [...and] Disseminating knowledge and heightening awareness about our country is a way of achieving this goal (SI, mission statement, my italics).

The relevance of these discourses for my study is palpable, since they reveal that the Swedish government has made the effort to investigate and discuss Cultural Diplomacy issues formally, and make specific proposals to establish commissions that look at international cultural relations. For example, earlier inquiries were made to get deeper into the issue⁸⁷: the most important previous reports were presented as early as 1978 "Culture and Information Overseas" (*Kultur och information över gränserna*, SOU 1978:56) which the government largely followed in the later Government Bill "On Cultural Exchange Abroad" (*Om kulturytbytet med utlandet*, prop 1978/79:147), that in turn laid the foundations for the present organization of cultural internationalization and exchange. Also, three more Official Commissions of Inquiry Reports (SOU or *Statens Offentliga Utredningar* in Swedish) were made between 1988 and 1995 that, to a great extent elaborate on the issue of culture, international issues and diplomacy (SOU1988:9, SOU 1994:35, SOU 1995:84). The latest one comes from the 2003 Committee of Inquiry on International Cultural Activities (*Internationella kulturutredningen 2003*, from now on SOU 2003: 121). This is a rather comprehensive report where experts give their assessment on the situation of culture and international issues for Sweden, having as the main focal point of reference the cultural events and action taking place in the 1990s. Many relevant issues are discussed in the reports and some key concepts are specifically dealt with, so that

⁸⁷ In my research, I came across many government reports and institutional drafts on the issue of CD. However, I found very little evidence that any independent researcher or academic group actually took the topic as an object of inquiry.

organizations and individuals understand the government position more clearly. Following that report, a debate took place over the meanings and distinctions to be made between Cultural Diplomacy (*Kulturell diplomati*) and Public Diplomacy (*Offentlig diplomati*). That was a conceptual definition to sustain the government actions in the field. As a result, SOU 2003: 121 mentions

For many countries, culture is an important means both to create national identity and to develop a positive image abroad. In the latter, the terms “public diplomacy” and “cultural diplomacy” have become more and more important. *Public diplomacy characterises a country’s needs to turn directly to the citizens of another country, often with powerful measures, in order to achieve short-term goals. Cultural diplomacy is the part of diplomacy intended for the creation of long-term, sustainable relations with other countries through the means of culture. A mutual exchange and trust is built up for example through intercultural exchange programmes; education programmes and scholarships; visiting programs for foreign journalists, academics, politicians etc; artistic performances; international media coverage of cultural events; conferences, seminars, symposiums about international culture etc. and promotion of language and publications of different kinds. Ever since the 1950s the Swedish Institute (SI) has had a mission from SMFA to conduct an extensive part of cultural diplomacy (pp. 38-39, my italics).*

The members of SOU 2003: 121 demonstrate a very clear understanding of the distinctions made not only in the field of diplomacy, but also in the cultural sector. In my several interviews with Fredrik Wetterqvist, one of the SMFA members of the enquiry group, I got the impression that he was not only well versed, with several years of experience in the field, but also that he understood the ways to communicate these needs to the politicians, the academic world and the general public. As Wetterqvist once mentioned to me (interview 2), Cultural Diplomacy for Sweden, although being a novel field of specialization, is highly developed and conceptualized, particularly because some diplomats have been interested in the cultural field from their own backgrounds (he mentioned that there were many Swedish diplomats with professional training in areas such as arts, humanities or anthropology). Or else, as diplomats recognize sooner or later, the dividends returned to Sweden from cultural activities can be rather beneficial in their everyday practice abroad. Wetterqvist made it clear, nonetheless, that the SOU 2003: 121 report did not emerge without controversies or heated debates among the participants (interview 3). Accordingly, a couple of years after SOU 2003: 121 the Swedish government consolidated an official definition of Cultural Diplomacy in the following way:

Cultural diplomacy is that part of diplomacy that is intended for the creation of long-term, sustainable relations with other countries and with culture as a means. Cultural diplomacy often has a more relaxed character than public diplomacy and builds on mutual exchanges of views and trust-building measures, for example in the form of intercultural exchange programmes, theatre, dance, literature, film, art and music. Cultural diplomacy is given larger meaning in international relations since cultural exchange has proven to work well as a bridge-builder and door-opener between different ethnic and religious groups, between countries and regions (Regeringens skrivelse 2005/06: 188⁸⁸).

⁸⁸ This is a central document in my investigation since it represents the decisions made by the government. It appears to be the first official policy document made after the 2003 inquiry “*Internationella kulturutredningen*.” Based on the results of the inquiry and the comments made to it by all

On the other hand, Public Diplomacy (PD) was referred to in the document as the “*country’s communication with the general public in other nations with the purpose of creating understanding for their own nation’s way of thinking, ideals, institutions and culture as well as national goals and current politics.*” In this sense, Public Diplomacy “is primarily used to understand, inform, affect and build relations abroad in order to realise real political, cultural and economical goals.” As stated in chapter one, the Swedish government further mentions that at a time when democracy and mass communication are common currencies, “a country’s ability to achieve political goals, promote trade, attract investments, visitors and take part in the exchange of talent and creativity is to a large extent dependent on how the country is perceived abroad” (*Regeringens skrivelse 2005/06: 188, my italics*).

Notice the difference between the definitions presented in the Official Commission of Inquiry Report SOU 2003: 121, and the Government Statement to the Parliament RS 2005/06: 188, particularly between the ideas of cultural and public diplomacy (in italics). Swedish Cultural Diplomacy is organized under the values of Cosmopolitan Constructivism while Public Diplomacy finds itself in the domain of Soft Power. Can the two coexist in this fundamental divide? Let us take the public diplomacy first in relation to the concepts explored in the theoretical chapters.

When discussing Public Diplomacy in chapter one, I mentioned that there were two possible ways to approach it, Hammarskjöld’s view that relied on “the public” as the constituency from which diplomatic legitimacy is derived, and Ross’ view, that emphasized the “national interest” of the State as the real source of legitimacy. I defined these two approaches to Public Diplomacy as bottom-up and top-down respectively. The former is in line with a democratic tradition, the latter is more pragmatic and instrumental. Taking the representational view of Hanna F. Pitkin as studied in chapter two, the question to Public Diplomacy would be of *representing*. In *acting for*, the representative advances the interests of the represented in line with the principal’s interests and responsive to the principal’s wishes. If Public Diplomacy deals with the “public interest” seen as the good of the whole, then it follows that the acts of representatives must follow the opinions of citizens (bottom up approach), in order to disentangle, as Pitkin says, the “selfish wishes of parts of the nation” from the “the good of the whole” (1967: 170-171). In a democratic contemporary milieu, Public Diplomacy bottom up approach makes more sense. And this should certainly be the case for Sweden, one of the most respected democracies on earth. In practice, public diplomacy *à la Suède* also deals with the State conviction that principled arguments in the name of international justice and equality matter. And that the more this principle is internalized in other countries and, more importantly, in the public attitudes, the more this will in turn influence foreign policies and the international system. Thus, for example, Swedish diplomacy on the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) side is seen as the cultivation of public

institutions through the *referral for consideration* process, the government formed this document as a policy guideline. It was presented for approval by the *Riksdag* in the spring of 2006.

opinion in other countries by promoting and financing just ideals, the use of media reporting of foreign affairs, networking with peoples and groups, and channelling resources to the developing world in the strengthening of international development.⁸⁹

In sum, the Swedish government distinguishes Public Diplomacy from Cultural Diplomacy, just as many other diplomacies do, the former being the “political-instrumental” arm, and the latter the “friendly-culture-altruistic” one (cf. Aguilar 1996: 12-15). This seems to be the road SMFA decided on when making a division between the two. In any case, in the two cases I found that there are very strong components of reflexivism in the form of Cosmopolitan Constructivism, as was explained in the theoretical part of this study.

5.1.2. Instrumentality and Cultural Diplomacy Representations

The difference between the definition presented in the Official Commission of Inquiry Report SOU 2003: 121 and the final Government Statement to the Parliament RS 2005/06: 188 is minimal, but yet important to scrutinize. In the two cases, Cultural Diplomacy is defined as a long-term activity aimed at sustainable relations with other nations having culture as the vehicle for the actions. In other words, the concept of “instrumentality” in discourse, as presented in chapter one fits quite well the description given for the Cosmopolitan Constructivist template of Cultural Diplomacy. My main claim when discussing instrumentality was that “the instrumentality of discourse is the key aspect in understanding the way cultural diplomacy is constituted” (chapter one). If my theory is consistent and “instrumentality in discourse constructs the subject via regimes of truth and technical authority” (chapter one), then Swedish Cultural Diplomacy regime of truth means that “cultural exchange has proven to work well as a bridge-builder and door-opener between different ethnic and religious groups, between countries and regions” (RS 2005/06: 188). Moreover, technical authority would be the “mutual exchange of views and trust-building measures” having as a specific example the different forms of intercultural exchange programmes in the arts and humanities (RS 2005/06: 188). This is indeed, a Cosmopolitan Constructivist agenda.

Overall, it is possible to assume that Swedish Cultural Diplomacy proper follows the main values articulated in theory in chapter one: when talking about discursivity, “culture is the means”; in security “mutual exchange and trust building through intercultural exchange programmes”; the spatiality is clearly international and in some respects regional, the directionality of the Cultural Diplomacy is mutual and plural, and the funding is essentially public. As a result, I claim, the application of this Cultural Diplomacy template has given a noticeable success to Sweden abroad, improving the perception about its representation internationally. Table 5.1. summarizes these trends, including Nation Branding as a deviant case and Soft Power as a rarely used representational strategy.

⁸⁹ Traditionally, Sweden allocates close to 1% of GNP to international development programs, above the 0.7% suggested by UN. This brings good reportage and positive attitudes towards Sweden.

Table 5.1: Representations of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy

Discursive issues	<i>CC</i>	<i>NB</i>	<i>SP*</i>
<i>Instrumentality</i>	Culture	Marketing	N/A
<i>Security</i>	Exchange	Promotion	N/A
<i>Spatiality</i>	International	Global	N/A
<i>Directionality</i>	Mutual-plurality	One-way/two way	N/A
<i>Public/private</i>	Mainly public	Mainly private	N/A

*Soft Power definitions are embedded mostly in Swedish Public Diplomacy.

Nation Branding is included here since Swedish cultural diplomacy began a process to adapt this trend via the Swedish Institute (*Svenska Institutet*, SI) at the beginning of the millennium. This is a peculiar move that exemplifies the pressures exercised by non-state actors, particularly from the private sector, to not only act on behalf (AF) of Sweden, but also, to *stand for* (SF) in official Cultural Diplomacy. Thus, I leave any further comments on Nation Branding for a later detailed discussion on Cultural Representations.

5.1.3. Differences in the Cosmopolitan Constructivist Discourse

The government's main goals, guidelines and strategies (*Mål, riktlinjer och strategi*) for Sweden's international culture efforts were also set out (open for discussion) in SOU 2003:121, which asserts that the relevant goals are to be found not only in the cultural policy, but also in foreign affairs, *i.e.* through trade and aid and development policies. Seen as discourses, these goals reveal the values, intentions and goals of diplomatic social life, allowing me to weigh them against the practices, and other possible inconsistent discourses (such as NB). I want to stress that the core point advocated by the Committee in SOU 2003: 121 report is that *culture should be seen as a goal in itself (Kulturen som mål)*. In this sense, the cultural policy goal for international culture exchange is identified by the committee as being to "promote international culture exchange and meetings between cultures within the country" (SOU 2003:121, p. 37).

The Committee also suggested that the main guidelines in the planning and evaluation of international cultural activities should be established as follows (SOU 2003: 121, p. 41):

<p>The <i>promotion</i> of artistic and cultural quality products The Building of <i>long-term cultural contacts</i> abroad Promotion of <i>diversity and democracy</i> The <i>Promotion</i> of international culture policy <i>cooperation</i>.</p>

And the main strategy in order to achieve the goals and guidelines set for international cultural exchange should contain three elements (SOU 2003: 121, p. 42)

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ambition: <i>Sweden should be an active international actor</i> in the field of culture. 2. Culture promotion (<i>Kulturfrämjande</i>): <i>Active international culture efforts</i> should be made to support cultural life. An active and recurrent Swedish presence in important international arenas should be maintained. 3. Attention: An active coverage of the international development in the field of culture is important, among other things to evaluate the consequences for culture of international decisions taken in other policy fields (the EU for example). |
|--|

These ideas were translated in the RS 2005/06, Chapter 5, as the “Goals for the internationalisation of cultural life” (*Mål för kulturlivets internationalisering*). The Swedish government assessment was that “*International cultural activities shall be an integrated part of the national culture policy and an agent in the achievement of cultural policy goals*. The cultural policy goal to promote international cultural exchange and meetings between cultures in the country should be operationalised through specific sub-goals” (my italics). The Sub-goals were established as follows:

that high quality, artistic integrity, *sustainability and mutuality* is pursued irrespective of which political goals that motivates government efforts for cultural activities, that cultural life in *Sweden strengthens its position internationally* and that institutions and artists are demanded for professional *cooperation abroad*, that cultural life in Sweden is made more open to *influences and culture from other countries* and that internationalisation gains a large public, independent of place of residence, sex, social or ethnic background or eventual physical disabilities AND that the cultural dimension in Sweden’s contacts abroad is strengthened and that opportunities for *cooperation within the frame of culture- and foreign policy goals are better used*. (my italics)

All things considered, the discursive differences regarding international cultural life for Sweden between SOU 2003: 121 and RS 2005/06 are minor. As the texts in italics emphasize Sweden aims at strengthening its international cultural presence abroad through promotion, cooperation and exchange, by practising a policy of mutuality and sustainability with other countries and international organizations in accordance with its own cultural and foreign policies. Examples of Swedish cultural diplomacy practice have been consistent with these claims. For example, the importance given to work in international organisations, such as UNESCO or the EU and its culture commission, the cooperation programs with the Baltic and Nordic regions, etc. SMFA also mentions that culture now is an integrated part in Sweden’s policy for global development, and therefore that cultural exchange becomes a clear dimension in development cooperation (*cf.* SOU 2003: 121 chapter 5). So far, there is a line consistent with reflexive principles in discourse.

However, the ambition of “making culture a goal in itself” has a peculiarity which is important to discuss. In principle, “making culture a goal in itself” is part of a constructivist discourse, as seen in chapter one. The task is then to ascertain the specific designation of “what culture means” in the broad political context, its specific substance in relation to the other interests and discourses. After reading the different reports, I came to the conclusion that in Sweden’s construction of the cultural field, the government has adopted at least three different discourses about culture:

as a manifestation of social, spiritual and artistic life,
as a means to promote peace, democracy and fight against poverty, and
as a tool to make Sweden more attractive for business and exports.

The first discourse is truly “culture as a goal in itself,” and the second and third ones use culture as a tool for something else. In cultural representations, as explained in chapter two, the appropriation of culture via cultural diplomacy will

say that the first is a Cosmopolitan Constructivist discourse, the second is a blend of Soft Power and Cosmopolitan Constructivism and the third is Nation Branding. Let us illustrate the idea further. The RS 2005/06 report points out the increased relevance of culture in trade and industrial policies, which goes hand in hand with the augmented awareness that culture can contribute to more exports, tourism, employment etc. The conclusion in simple: cultural activities can assist in the creation of markets for Swedish products in general through a positive evaluation of Sweden. A clear contradiction with the seemingly constructivist definition comes when the report argues, accommodating a branding discourse, that “Culture is a self-evident part of the Swedish brand. Ingmar Bergman or Abba probably mean more for the image of Sweden than the efforts made by different official bodies to spread knowledge. It is natural and necessary to build on well known expressions of Swedish cultural life as a part of the general promotion of Sweden” (RS 2005/06: 188 p. 43). There was criticism from different cultural groups in Sweden as regards the definition of the cultural field. For example, critical comments were presented to SOU: 2003:121 for “lacking clearer goals” and focus for the cultural efforts, and “ignoring the receiver’s perspective in cultural exchanges” (*Konstnärliga och Litterära Yrkesutövares Samarbetsnämnd*, KLYS). The SI responded that they should indeed have elaborated a broader definition of culture (cf. RS 2005/06 C5, *Remissinstanserna*). It is obvious that there was a difficulty for the committee involved in the recommendations and the official conclusion as regards a substantive definition of culture, consistent with its established multilateral principles of foreign policy. As the Foreign Affairs Committee reported later (Utrikesutskottet, Betänkande 2005/06: KrU30) the definition of “culture” was troublesome and the committee have chosen to use SIDA’s definition of culture when discussing these matters.


5.2. Organizational Structure and the Cosmopolitan Constructivist Layout

Let us remember that Cosmopolitan Constructivism is a representation I elaborate to group together a number of policies and practices in the field of Cultural Diplomacy that emphasize culture, identities, multilateralism, international exchange and a preoccupation for other nations’ wellbeing. As I present it here, many aspects of the official Swedish Cultural Diplomacy pay attention to these ideas and practices. These ideas are embedded within most of the Swedish official actors *standing for* and *acting for* Cultural Diplomacy. But there are other actors representing Sweden abroad which have other identities and values, different from Cosmopolitan Constructivism. Let us take a look at the organizational structure of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy.

The backbone of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy must be seen through the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SMFA) and the Swedish Institute (SI). The former has three official actors “*standing* and *acting for*”: SIDA, NSU and the more than one hundred and five diplomatic missions abroad (embassies, consulates, delegations and representations in international organizations, including

UNESCO); the latter, SI, and the *Centre Culturel Suédois* along with other SI centers in places such as Istanbul, Rome or Athens, administered and financed by other domestic institutions, such as the Ministry of Education and Culture. However, in order to understand the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy success (and paradoxes), it is important to look at other Cultural Diplomacy actors *acting for* officially *ad hoc* or unofficially, such as the Swedish Royal Court (SRC), the Nobel Foundation (NF), world class universities, multi-national companies such as IKEA or Volvo and/or individual icons such as Ingmar Bergman, Olof Palme or Pippi Longstocking. Table 4.2. illustrates this idea.

Table 5.2. Agents of Swedish CD: Official and unofficial



Under legislation, the promotion of knowledge about Sweden abroad is mainly a responsibility of the SMFA and the SI. This is, in Pitkin's theory, both the authorization (legal mandate) and the accountability of the representations, mainly in the descriptive sense as *standing for*, defined as "someone who is to be held to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does" (167: 55).

The SMFA is the main neuralgic center for Swedish Cultural Diplomacy in the *standing for* sense. It holds a number of so called "Functional Departments" which carry out their specific activities in Stockholm in areas as diverse as

Global Security, Migration and Asylum Policy or International Trade Policy. The Department of Press, Information and Cultural Affairs (*Press, Informations och Kulturrenheten*, PIK) coordinates most efforts in the field of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy, being responsible for the coordination of information about Sweden abroad. The area of responsibility also includes services to Swedish and foreign media in connection with official visits and major international conferences (PIK in SMFA homepage, 12 Jan 2006). PIK further consists of four sections; the press service (*presstjänsten*), the information service (*informationstjänsten*), culture and promotion service (*kultur- och främjande tjänsten*) and the web service (*webbtjänsten*). The area of culture and promotion service (*Kultur- och främjande tjänsten* PIK-KULT) plans and coordinates the government financed information about Sweden, culture promotion/support and general promotion of Sweden abroad. It is responsible, for example, for Sweden's participation in world exhibitions. It has the office for the NSU and it is the key responsible authority for the SI (cf. SOU 203:121, *Utrikesdepartementet*). The specific area of culture (*Kulturrenheten*) was an addition made to the department's responsibilities in the beginning of the 1990s when coordination of different efforts to export Swedish cultural views was more evident and the responsibility of the SI was part of their mission.

From a reflexive representation perspective, the SMFA has a dependable record. Over the years, it has carefully developed sophisticated mechanisms of multilateral and bilateral diplomacies in the area of culture, either directly with specific countries (one-by-one) or in multilateral forums, at regional level or through international organizations. These mechanisms are fairly well interlocked with both, SI and SIDA as well (see for example SOU 2003:121 chapter. 6 *internationell samarbete*, and the government's follow-up response in *Regeringens Skrivelse 2005/06:188*). This is, in part, a tradition within the Swedish government (from at least the post-war years) where an active multilateral diplomacy has proven to be one of the cornerstones of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy.⁹⁰ For example, in coordination with the Ministry of Education, Sweden maintains strong ties with the United Nations Organization for Culture, Education and Science (UNESCO) through *Svenska Unescorådet* (The Swedish National Commission for UNESCO), the main driver of the famous 1998 Stockholm Conference "The power of Culture" also known as the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, perhaps the most relevant in its genre in that decade (see chapter six).

Another official actor, the SI, is a public agency functioning as one of the "muscular arms" of Swedish cultural diplomacy. SI's main goal is "the dissemination of knowledge abroad about Sweden and organizing exchanges with other countries in the spheres of culture, education, research and public life in general. In doing so, it seeks to promote Swedish interests and contribute to economic

⁹⁰ In the appropriation directions (*regleringsbrev*) for 2006 all state authorities within the area of culture have been given a new international goal: "A strong, developed and varied international exchange and cooperation shall be supported, among other things through development of an international perspective in the activities" (*Regeringens Skrivelse 2005/06:188*, p. 33).

growth.” The Government in consultation with the SMFA and other cultural organizations appoints a Director General, defines the operative instructions and the annual appropriations for the programs. However, once this is established the Director General approves the plan of activities and the yearly budget, placing specific emphasis on areas of interest for Sweden. Three relevant areas of operation within the SI are the *Department of Information about Sweden*, “responsible for publishing information materials about Sweden in foreign languages and for providing a special information service to target groups abroad, primarily to Swedish diplomatic missions” (SI official information www.si.se); the *Department of Culture and Society*, responsible “for presenting Sweden abroad in forms other than printed materials or web-based information. Presentations include exhibitions, seminars, film screenings and guest performances, etc., often in connection with broad-based promotional events spotlighting Sweden. Activities include both country programmes and thematic projects targeting several countries. The department also promotes the spread of Swedish literature by providing translation grants” (SI official information www.si.se); and the *Department of Education and Research* supports “cooperation and exchange programmes between Sweden and other countries in education and research, and also provides information about and helps present Swedish higher education abroad. In addition, it supports the provision of Swedish language tuition at some 200 universities around the world” (SI official information www.si.se). The production of printed and digital materials about Sweden is broad in themes, highly specialized and enjoys a wide distribution. The full catalogue of topics about Sweden is rather impressive.⁹¹ A special feature of the SI is the setting up of the Swedish Cultural Centre in Paris (*Centre Culturel Suédois*, CCS), which follows the tradition of other nations in the 20th century to set up cultural quarters from where to expand their cultural influence in other nations or regions. “The CCS regularly organises exhibitions of Swedish art, crafts, design, architecture and photography. It also stages concerts, film screenings, literary *soirées*, plays and children’s activities, and organises debates and seminars focusing on cultural and social issues” (SI official information www.si.se). As explained later, much of the SI’s work is accomplished in collaboration with Swedish embassies consulates, and representations around the world.⁹²

A particular way to shape cultural diplomacy “the Swedish way” is by using international development aid policies in relation with cultural programs. In this camp SIDA provides an additional “Cultural Diplomacy muscle” (which diversifies traditional SI efforts) to establish long-term commitment to development issues around the world, but particularly in marginalized countries and regions,

⁹¹ It is important to mention a few examples here: Study in Sweden Official Home Page www.studyinsweden.se, Sweden’s Image Bank home page, www.imagebank.sweden.se. The titles from Janikke Åhlund (2002) *New Cinema in Sweden*, Ingrid Elam’s (2002) *New Fiction in Sweden*, or Bodil Persson’s (2003) *Contemporary Dance in Sweden*, are just a few examples.

⁹² In a conversation with a high rank public official from the SI, s/he made it clear that there is in fact a clear demarcation in responsibilities when it comes to Swedish organizations abroad. S/he stated that “the only direct Swedish Institute’s organization abroad is the CCS.” The other organizations belong to the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture and the Foreign Affairs Department at different levels. However, they are treated as SI in this study for they appear as such in the official organizations.

which in return report rather constructive views of Sweden in other countries, predominantly in the developing world. This is a “double representation” in the sense of *standing and acting for*, as explained in chapter two. SIDA seems to be in the process of becoming the main financial actor in the development of a cultural development (and diplomacy) with other nations according to the *Regeringens skrivelse 2005/06: 188*

A new policy for culture and media is currently under development within SIDA. The new policy is aimed to have a clearer connection to SIDA’s general goals. Until the new policy is finalised the current guidelines for culture and media (from 2003) are: Cultural politics, [...] Freedom of speech and media [...] Information and debate within civil society [...] Education and creational activities [...] Institutional infrastructure for culture. [...] Cultural heritage, and Internationalisation (cf. *Regeringens skrivelse 2005/06: 188*)

meaning the creation of the possibilities for an internationalisation that takes the cultural uniqueness of each country into account and that works against the negative effects of globalisation. Although SIDA is conceptualized mainly as a form of Public Diplomacy, the SMFA has fully recognized that SIDA efforts account for a good percentage of their cultural diplomacy goals (“SIDA is the biggest single spender in the sphere of government sponsored cultural activities outside Sweden [... *accounting for almost...*] half of all expenditures in this area, SOU 2003: 121, 23).

The Swedish embassies, consulates, missions and representations abroad operate under the responsibility of the SMFA and its main foreign policy objectives. The more than one hundred diplomatic missions abroad stand and act for cultural activities in a number of ways. Also, the Ministry of Education, Research and Culture (*Utbildnings- och Kulturdepartementet*, MERC), and the National Council of Cultural Affairs (*Statens Kulturrådet*, from now on NCCA), are “responsible for the coordination of international issues in the cultural and media field, including EU coordination and Swedish Counsellors for Cultural Affairs stationed in other countries” (Government Offices in Sweden, “Ministry of Culture” in <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2065>). These “Counsellors,” function as cultural *attachés* with very specific functions related to culture and education, are appointed by the ministry in consultation with the SMFA and then sent to the embassies in Berlin, London, Moscow, Tokyo, Washington, Warsaw and Vilnius, with an additional special appointment in Brussels, with tasks related to the EU.⁹³ In addition to this task, MERC also supports and gives funds to the Swedish Institute, particularly to the houses in Athens and Rome. In a chapter on this very issue, the Swedish mandate says regarding *Culture and research institutions abroad (Kultur och forskningsinstitut I utlandet)* that “Sweden has eight culture and research institutions abroad; The *Centre Culturel Suédois* in Paris is a unit

⁹³ In the field of international education, the MERC states that “cooperation at EU level complements national policy by promoting cooperation and exchanges through different programmes. Cooperation has been intensified in recent years, largely due to the increasing awareness of the strategic importance of education for economic growth and competitiveness. Within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, EU Ministers for Education are pursuing a process to achieve a number of common goals for the European education system by 2010; improved quality and effectiveness, easier access for all and openness to the wider world” from MERC web page “EU Work” at <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2063/a/20862>

within the Swedish institute. The Swedish institute in Alexandria is under the ministry of foreign affairs. *Voksenåsen* in Oslo and *Hanaholmen* outside Helsinki and the Mediterranean research institutions in Rome, Athens and Istanbul are all under the ministry of education and culture. They have a common office in Stockholm. Villa San Michele in Capri is independent and without government support” *Regeringens Skrivelse* 2005/06:188, chpt 8).

In my interviews with a few Swedish cultural diplomats, I got the impression that they were aware of the main missions and targets of the general principles of Cultural Diplomacy established mainly through the SI, but they also had leeway to propose something different as they liked, based on the ambassador’s strategy. One rather influential official of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy said to me in an interview that “for the most part, the PIK has had thematic goals through the years, say design, literature or pop music. Then the office sends these priorities to the embassies and they are expected to follow the basic thematic line, but if an embassy wants to follow a different path, they need to explain the reasons why and if we do not agree, they still can do what they want, but perhaps they also have to raise their own funding for that too” (Interview 2).

Another important cultural mission for the embassies is to collect information on how Sweden and Swedish people are perceived abroad, and send back to the SMFA a report based on media outcomes, personal contacts and eventual surveys. Since the late sixties, the SMFA has maintained a systematic analysis of Sweden’s image abroad, but the relevance of the information was more present in the 1990s than ever (*infra*). In a global world when the internet, the cell-phones and the fax-machines were disrupting the traditional ways of sharing and exchanging information, diplomacies found a need to reformulate their cultural strategies as well, and Sweden was no exception.

One especial aspect of Swedish cultural diplomacy is the “official acting for in *ad hoc* basis,” carried out mainly by actors such as the Swedish Royal Court, Nobel Foundation, NCCA, the Swedish Film Institute, etc. In my theory, I argued in chapter two that Symbolic Representations have a role to play in diplomacy in the double function of the representing proper, but more important in this case, that of *symbolizing*, “in the sense of producing relations of significance beyond the immediate referent.” In this case, the actors mentioned above have a “coupled referent,” *i.e.* Nobel’s legacy, Swedish royalty or the Swedish movie industry but they go beyond, *symbolizing the entire nation abroad*. These Swedish *ad hoc* actors are not set up to stand for Cultural Diplomacy or Swedish representations abroad. They have specific missions which are *ad hoc* with their identities, but to some extent, they “officially” act for Swedish culture abroad. The most obvious example is, perhaps, the Nobel Foundation and their prestigious prizes in the sciences, literature and peace. As Tore Frängsmyr writes about the Nobel Prize,

the will [Alfred Nobel’s] excited attention around the world. It was not common to donate such large amounts of money to scientific and philanthropic causes. Many criticized the international nature of the prize and felt that they should have been reserved for Swedes. But this would not have suited a cosmopolitan like Alfred Nobel [...] In the years since the prizes have firmly established themselves as the world’s highest civic honours. The announcement of the prize winners is

awaited enthusiastically each autumn, while the ceremonies in Stockholm and Oslo on 10 December in the presence of royalty and international dignitaries have become events of great social prestige (Frängsmyr, 1996: 26).

It is true that the Nobel Prize institution has been questioned on various relevant grounds. Some argue that the Swedish monopoly in the construction of international scientific and artistic reputations is unacceptable. Others raise questions about the political and ideological influences behind the prizes, particularly in some sensitive social areas of knowledge, such as economics and literature, etc. The point is that the Nobel Foundation acts for Swedish intellectual tradition, constructing itself as an international actor representing *Swedishness* abroad.

Finally, there are a great number of agents that constantly perform unofficial representations of Sweden abroad, with no official standing. In my theory, they are representing Sweden abroad (AF) in their symbolizing the nation in their own cultural or commercial terms. Their impact can be equally or even more powerful in symbolic terms than the official representations. These unofficial representatives of Sweden can be Swedish Universities, museums and galleries, television companies, radio stations, the State Church, Swedish multinational companies such as IKEA, Volvo, Ericsson, Electrolux, Absolut, etc., individuals with strong reputations in certain fields such as Ingmar Bergman, Ingrid Bergman, Olof Palme, or purely fictional characters such as Pippi Longstocking, etc. In this, Sweden has a wide array of actors that many times often act in the name of Sweden in relative positive terms abroad.

5.2.1. From Symbolic to Postmodern Representations of Sweden

In chapter two I studied three different types of cultural representations, *i.e.* Reflective, Symbolic and Postmodern. In this part, I want to make use of the ideas of Symbolic Representations and the Postmodern Representations to illustrate some revealing angles of Swedish cultural diplomacy. These actions create, at times, organizational functions that overlap and conflict with one another when institutions compete to represent Sweden abroad. Let us briefly take the example of the Swedish image abroad.

Cultural Diplomacy does not directly deal with a nation's image abroad (traditionally, it is more a matter for PD). As expressed in chapter three, a country's image in diplomatic terms is the estimation of the views foreign countries and people hold of a given nation, in the form of images, representations, stereotypes of perceptions. The Swedish investigations during the 1990s concluded that "Apart from the international questions of dialogue, *culture is becoming more and more important in the creation of the image of Sweden abroad.* Here, a careful balance must be made between on the one hand, the state's interest in promoting special cultural expressions for chosen countries and regions and on the other hand the wishes and possibilities for the cultural life. The credibility and the purpose should not be able to be questioned, either by the own cultural life or by the receiver" (SOU 2003:121, p 39, my italics).



Illustration VII: FrontPage publication, *Sweden & Swedes*, 2003. Swedish Institute catalogue.

torial force that makes necessary the deterritorialization of identities, networking and e-economies.⁹⁴ Cultural life then also transcends the local, placing the identities in an idealized cosmos of symbols representing utopia as place-success. Illustration 5.1 from a catalogue produced for the Swedish Institute, for worldwide distribution, suggests this point. Branches of foliage and leaves form the background for the representation of *Sweden & Swedes* where the references to nature are obvious, but identifications with nation or local culture disappear. In my discussion in chapter two, I argued that National Identities show “the authenticity and uniqueness of each nation, by appealing to the essential links, symbols, traces or cultural codes in tandem with the community, the region and the histories where they originated and developed.” Many of the visual representations of Sweden in the catalogue (and other Swedish materials) seem to eschew the “national component” in the search for a more global, less local spirit. The decoupling of the symbolic national referent for something else, unrelated, point to the Postmodern Representations discussed in chapter two. These are not casual exceptions, out of context, but frequent occurrences in discourse. For instance, in one of my visits to a Swedish embassy abroad, I found it peculiar that a group of my colleagues and I

The report also points out the increased relevance of culture in trade and industrial policies, which go hand in hand with the augmented awareness that culture can contribute to more exports, tourism, employment etc. The conclusion is simple: cultural activities can assist to create markets for Swedish products in general through a positive valuation of Sweden. In this, the view of Sweden refers to different conceptualizations of globalization, such as the dissolution of frontiers, the evaporation of the in-out divide, and acceptance that the nation state and global structures represent a supraterritorial

⁹⁴ Here, Jens Bartelson has written an article (2000) that deals with three concepts of globalization, which is quite relevant to distinguish the perspectives. My ideas here come from his third conceptualization, “Globalization as Transcendence.”



were listening to an experienced ambassador talking about Swedish foreign policy and diplomacy, the roads to build peace, mediate and solve conflicts, while a small-scale model of a Swedish military aircraft (SAAB's *Gripen*) was sitting in the middle of the table. These discourses tend to be confusing in all instances, pointing to a fragmentary reality where discourses and representations do not hold and dispel their immediate meaning. Take for example illustration 5.2 where an inside page of the SI's catalogue *Sweden & Swedes* promotes three ontologies, war, peace and religion, as

part of the its social representation of Sweden. This is a confusing display of symbols where Swedish cultural representations are fragmented. In Cultural Diplomacy terms Postmodern representations mean two things, as explained in chapter three, a plurality of discourses and identities as actors capable of representing cultural values abroad and the acceptance that international relations is a fragmented camp integrated by conflicting interests and powers. If the role of official Swedish cultural diplomacy is to represent the public interest, then national identities must be represented in their sophistication and dignity, in line with a discourse that emphasizes international concern, cultural life, peace and development. It is important to mention that the SI has an impressive catalogue with many diverse and specialized articles and cultural reports that are not mentioned here as counter examples.

5.3. Swedish Cultural Diplomacy à la Nation-Branding

As explained so far, Swedish cultural diplomacy runs an advanced cosmopolitan constructivist agenda with excellent results. However, in recent years, Sweden began a process of looking into the possibilities of diversifying its approach to both Cultural and Public Diplomacy. In particular, business advocacy groups like Swedish Trade Council (*Sveriges exportråd*), Invest in Sweden Agency (ISA), *VisitSweden* (formerly the Swedish Travel & Tourism Council) and different Swedish chambers of commerce (*svenska handelskamrarna*) successfully explored the available options to link their interests with the public and cultural di-

plomacies of Sweden. This is nothing unusual these days, when the pragmatic merger of interests among politicians and business people reveals more cooperation and coincidence than differences. Take for example *VisitSweden* (the Swedish Tourism Council) formed in 1995: the “company” is owned (in equal shares) by the state and the Swedish tourism business with the tasks of *marketing Sweden as a tourist destination and thereby making sure that People both inside and outside Sweden are given attractive and rewarding experiences; that Companies and cooperation organisations in Sweden can increase company profits, and; that Sweden as a nation achieves increased revenues and thereby increased welfare (cf. Regeringens Skrivelse 2005/06:188, my italics).*

Not all is crystal clear, however. Let us not forget that the official government communication and mandate I referred above establishes a policy in cultural diplomacy and promotion/support of Sweden abroad (*kulturdiplomati och Sverige-främjande*) that has little consistency with the main principles expressed earlier at the beginning of this chapter. For example, if cultural diplomacy is about *the creation of long-term, sustainable relations with other countries and with culture as a means* (a constructivist view, I argue), then how can these principles be reconciled with the views held by Promotion of Sweden that *The promotion of Sweden, which includes trade- and investment promotion and profiling of Sweden [...and] A positive image of Sweden abroad increases the trust for the country as cooperation partner and contributes to increased growth and employment* (a Neoliberal view, I argue) (*Regeringens Skrivelse 2005/06:188, pp. 25-26*). I think there are two discursive principles behind this view which are very hard to reconcile in practice. As you may agree, Nation Branding does not help to make the transition easier.

Under this umbrella the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (*Nämnden för Sverige-främjande i Utlandet, NSU*) becomes a key mover in shaping the way we understand Swedish cultural diplomacy in discourse and of course the practices carried out. In principle, the council (NSU) “is a body for consultation and cooperation working with the profiling of Sweden. The NSU members are the Swedish Export Council (*Sveriges exportråd*), the Invest in Sweden Agency (ISA), the Swedish Institute (SI), the Swedish Travel and Tourism Council (*Sveriges rese och turistråd*) and the SMFA. NSU works from a common strategy for promotion and profiling of Sweden. The committee’s efforts shall give support to the individual activities of the NSU-organisations and encourage cooperation of promotional activities abroad” (*Regeringens Skrivelse 2005/06:188, page 13*). In my investigations, almost all cultural diplomats interviewed said they find it difficult to accommodate the principles of Swedish culture on its own merits with the more instrumental *Sverige-främjande* (promotion/support) approach, which sometimes contradicts the longer-term goal of international cultural exchange. Hans Lepp from the SI said he understood the dilemmas and he thought they had to do with global pressures on many different Swedish interests. However, he thought that culture must have a place on its own and offered a metaphor that associated Culture with the Swedish *Åkerö-Äpple* tree, which takes 40 years to grow to maturity but then in return produces crops of fruit for 400 years (interview 10).

It is clear that the alternatives for this nation-profiling may come in different presentations, and the Swedish official mandate offer general guidelines but no specific strategy. Therefore, more or less, “anything -within reason- goes” (interview 7). In recent years, the SMFA has developed a program parallel to the more structural and established ideas of cultural diplomacy, emphasizing a marketing dimension under the denomination of Nation Branding. This global trend calls for making national cultures an enterprise, a form of special “commodity,” and in our case, more directly, a nation-brand. The assumption is made that countries, cities or towns can be reduced and packaged to be part of market mechanisms, using methodologies and theories of design, marketing and social sciences (Russell and Abercrombie, 1991). The branding concept implies, in most cases, an assimilation and reduction of the vast complex political and cultural relations of a nation into a “global brand” metaphor. The idea is to resemble the way corporations present their interests and products to the potential shoppers in a sort of global market network where identities are built via images and stereotypes. National meaning and international presence is then manufactured via design and media, where a product is elaborated in the form of a “branded nation” (cf. Fairclough 1991). In this way, countries’ images abroad compete for a spot in an imaginary market of symbols where finances, politics and commerce are decided. The idea is then to ask countries to restrain their prestige and power and transform the whole nation’s influence in international relations into a sort of market commodity. Nicholas Ind, a leading expert on the field says that

a brand is something that is owned by buyers and other stakeholders. This is an idea that is sometimes difficult to grasp, but it indicates that the power in a relationship between an individual and an organization is not necessarily where we think it is. The argument is this: just as capital is a concept, so is a brand. Although a brand is related to a physical product or service it is itself immaterial. It is a transforming idea that converts the tangible into something of value (2004:3).

I claim that this discourse constitutes the cultural diplomacy of Sweden these days. However, the suggestion of this approach in Sweden can be found as early as 1992.⁹⁵

Initially, as the text suggests a brand is a representation of a form of commercial capital, which brings itself the subjective value to the product. But at the same time, the brand is sustained by the relations of power between the individual consumer and the stakeholders, which in a company may include shareholders, directors, management, suppliers, government and employees *i.e.* the organiza-

⁹⁵ Birgitta Wistrand wrote a report under the title “*Det behövs en offensiv sverigeförmedling för att skapa en positiv sverigebild*” or “There is a need of an offensive Information of Sweden in order to create a positive image of Sweden.” In the report, she was very critical of the previous efforts to make Sweden more visible and competitive abroad, and was worried that the European Community (this is 1992) would make it even harder for Sweden to find its own *brand* or *logo*... (Varumärke saknas—Lacking a brand). Her position must be seen under the ideological battles of the 1990s in Sweden: Birgitta Wistrand was an MP for the Moderate Party 1991-2002 (conservative ideology in politics and liberal in economics). At the time when this report was written she was a member of the Parliamentary Committee of Culture. Privately she has the title of CEO, which may explain the business-oriented approach in her report. As an MP she has also written a number of motions etc on cultural and foreign policy matters. The most relevant was written just a few months before this report (*Motion till riksdagen* 1991/92:U301 “Information om Sverige”) and is about the information and image of Sweden abroad. (Thanks to Stefan Lindqvist for giving me the extended context on this).

tion that offers the product. Put simply, the brand strategy is a form of commercial representation of the nation. Simon Anholt, executive director of the journal *Place Branding*, argues that the “Countries, cities and regions are brands because people perceive them as brands. Few of us have time to learn what most places are really like, so we navigate through the complexity of the modern world armed with a few simple clichés: Milan is about fashion, Switzerland is about precision and integrity, America about power and money, Japan about technology, Moscow about corruption” (Anholt, 2006). While this approach has an appeal and certainly many people would be prone to reason in this direction⁹⁶, from an international politics scholarly perspective, the branding idea applied to countries would have many inconsistencies as to be taken seriously. As Hellen Vaid recognizes “One of the hardest areas to apply design to has always been that of ‘branding’ countries for the tourist market. This is not only because it is an emotive, complex and often controversial exercise (one that could be accused of pandering to clichéd ideas of national identity), but also because so much information is ‘given’ and unshakable” (2003: 70). However, since a more systematic analysis of this approach would require further research, I will just present some evidence on the ways the SI and the SMFA have been trying out this approach in the recent past to dress up their Cultural Diplomacy and mention some of the key technical challenges along the way.

5.3.1. Sweden as a Nation-Brand

“And the winner is... Sweden.” This is the way the Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index report (2005, Q1) applauds Sweden in a recent study. The report analyzes eleven countries, namely UK, Germany, Italy, US, Japan, China, India, South Korea, Russia, Turkey and Sweden, under a methodology developed by the Anholt-GMI group. The core idea is to measure the “power and appeal of a nation’s brand image” and report back “how consumers around the world see the character and personality of the brand.” The report is mainly based on people’s perceptions of a country. The Swedish Institute home-page gives attention to this approach explains that “Branding is the way in which an organization communicates, separates and symbolizes itself *vis-à-vis* its own public. *National branding is the same but for a whole country*. More importantly, it means something more than image and perception; *Nation Branding can be defined as the way a country or a nation is perceived by the public*.” The conceptual definitions go on and the SI adds that

when we say we like vacations in France, German Cars or Italian opera, bring comments on Japanese ambitions’ levels, American straightforwardness, British politeness, avoid investing in Russia, or support Turkey’s entrance into EU or

⁹⁶ These ideas have been on the air for some time now. Jenkins (1991), Kotler (1984), Olins (1978) and more saliently Ohmae (1983) have argued in one way or another for the “image” and the symbolic sphere of business through identities from the eighties and onwards. Kenichi Ohmae (1990 & 1992) has gone as far as announcing and rallying for the end of the nation state all at once and the rising of the glorious era of globalization in the form of free markets. Nicholas Ind (1992) has also worked out the ideas of corporation and identity that seem the baseline for the nation-branding approach.

admire the cultural heritage of China or India, then we are reacting to branding in exactly the same way as when we are shopping for clothes or groceries. *But it has to do with much bigger brands than Nike and Nestlé.*

These are nation brands. “Nation Brand” is an important concept in today’s world. *Globalization means that countries compete with each other for attention, respect and trust from investors, tourists, consumers, donors, immigrants, media, and the governments of other nations.* A powerful and positive nation brand is therefore an important competitive advantage. Countries must understand that they are viewed by the public around the world, and know that their successes and failures, their assets and liabilities, their people and their products are reflected from their branding image (SE “Nation Branding,” www.si.se, accessed June 2006, my italics).

As should be obvious here for any reader of political science, these examples of the conceptualization of these branding ideas have many problems from the very beginning. Initially, the distinction between the State’s own identities and principles, as distinct from those of enterprises and business, cannot be simply confused or brushed away. However, Anholt and van Gelder insist on their agenda: “Unless national, regional and local governments in developing countries provide an environment conducive to entrepreneurial initiatives by people within public, private and non-governmental organizations, no amount of nation or commercial branding will change the lot of the population” (2005: 66). Each actor, business and state sector has a distinct area of operation and while cooperation is possible and desirable in many cases, it is also important to look into the public at large, the representation of their interests and the implications for that. A state cannot be equated with a company (however large!) since each has different objectives and values. The SI definition of globalization is extremely normative and adduces market principles only, while most of the experts in the field have recognized many other dimensions as well, such as the social, political and cultural, which, by the way, seem to be the view closest to the SI’s interests (*cf.* Appadurai 1999, Crane 1999, Canclini 1999, Harvey 2002, Scholte 2000, Stiglitz 2002). Another particular angle concerns the uncontrolled stereotyping of countries. This may be a difficult task to carry out without encroaching on somebody’s particular interests, especially in the complex multicultural societies we live in. And when it comes to nations, some responsibility must be exercised to avoid stereotyping people or countries in an official diplomatic context, since a nation can be accused of constructing negative symbols, stigmatization or spreading an “Orientalist effect” as explained in chapter three. This is indeed a slippery slope for people working in marketing and design as Vaid herself recognizes (2003: 70-71).

In any case, these ideas have been developed more consistently by the Anholt-GMI group whose task it is to make a quantitative index. At the moment, they propose measuring six areas (or variables) of national competence, namely, tourism, exports, governance, investment & immigration, culture & heritage, and people. Surveys are carried out throughout the world asking for specific perceptions about the countries’ specific variables. Then a hexagon is presented as an end result, showing how leaders and decision makers perceive of the nation. In

the initial report, Sweden scored the highest, the result being expressed in this way: “Top of our list came Sweden, with consistently high scores all around the hexagon. This country is almost universally admired, and its brand image boasts a rare combination of stable and responsible governance, honest and trustworthy people, successful cultural exports, a prime location for investment, and yet isn’t seen as boring or predictable, but young and dynamic.” The report concludes that “Few other countries manage to maintain such a healthy balance between basic reassurance and a touch of vibrancy, adventure and youthful spirit” (Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index report, 2005, Q1).

Yet, the following report from the company (2005, Q2) places Sweden in fifth place inside the index. The report made a one page summary of the results with an interpretation of why Sweden scores high as a brand and the reasons why it came lower in this second measurement (2005, Q2). However, the report expresses the opinion that “Whether first or fifth, Sweden is still punching substantially above its weight in world affairs [...]. The wealth of a country and its population size are important factors when considering the strength of a nation brand for several reasons. Larger countries engage in a higher volume of international trade and have more products on the global market, as well as more ambassadors. This offers them more opportunities to build a powerful and popular brand” (Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index report, 2005, Q2). The report also suggests that some Swedish people expressed surprise that “their country was perceived internationally as a kind of Utopia. They asked me how Sweden, a country rife with racial tension and welfare crises, where ministers are assassinated in broad daylight, could possibly be considered to have a good brand.” It is hard to address such line of thought but what the report expresses afterwards is remarkable: “I was tempted to ask them when they last compared their country to Rwanda, Serbia or Afghanistan, but I suppose that familiarity breeds contempt, and that one tends to be more conscious of the faults than the virtues of one’s own country. The Swedes, in any case, have always suffered from what I call Groucho Marx Syndrome (referring to that great man’s quip, “I’d never join a club that would have somebody like me for a member”)” (Anholt-GMI Nation Brands Index report, 2005, Q2).

The report suggests that there is an inertial effect in people’s minds about Sweden’s positive image that continues to score high in its favour. For many years Sweden has been seen as a good place to live with high standards of life. However, the report warns, “Problems in Sweden –even grave problems– appear to be interpreted as exceptions to the rule which states that Sweden is a safe and orderly society. However, this benign branding effect won’t last forever, and if bad news from Sweden starts to become a regular event, its brand will eventually spoil” (NBI 2005, Q2). Finally, this report makes a critical analysis of the results and points to the fact that “The only area where Sweden’s brand image lacks noticeable power is on the heritage side of culture –an issue which would certainly benefit from closer analysis” (NBI 2005, Q2).

In a final report from 2005, the same company gives Sweden seventh place in their ranking, to bring it back to fifth, when studying the “brand value” of the na-

tion, measured in American dollars (NBI 2005 Q4). In this report, Sweden's brand value is measured at \$398,000 million dollars, or 15% above its 2004 GDP. The report suggests that it is even possible to calculate the Brand value per capita for Sweden to the amount of \$44,309 US. The implication is that the capital value of Sweden's nation-brand is much higher than the economic worth of the country. The SI complements this idea in their web-page by saying that the Swedish Nation Brand can be seen in relation to the American Nation Brand (18,000 trillion US) or the Norwegian (276 Billion US), but "The value of the Swedish Nation Brand can also be compared to the most valuable commercial brands, *i.e.* Coca-Cola, Microsoft or IBM, which in another investigation made by *Newsweek & Interbrand* in 2005 showed had a value of 67.5 millions, 60 millions and 53.5 millions of dollars respectively" (SI, "*Sverige – ett av världens främsta varumärken*" at www.si.se, accessed on June 2006).

5.3.1.1. Discussion

A thorough and a careful assessment of the nation-branding approach will be of benefit for the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy overall discussion. What I have just done is to present a brief introduction and selection of official discourses from the SI about Sweden Nation Brand and also extracts from the NBI reports, the way they are brought into the public discussion. These results are only from 2004-2005, but the discourse and tendencies are very similar in 2006 and 2007. However, the tendency to look at prestige and power from this marketing perspective is clearly present within the Council for the Promotion of Sweden (NSU) from at least 1999. In a study commissioned by the NSU at that time, a company (The Angus Reid Group, 1999) carried out a global study measuring perceptions of a number of Swedish issues, including people, nature, tourism and business opportunities. Interest in this approach had been promoted by both the SMFA and the SI, particularly in recent years (cf. SI: 2005)

Some voices have criticized the branding approach for a number of reasons. The most prominent such critic is Ingrid Dahlberg, (2003 and 2004). Her main points refer to the inconsistencies of the SMFA new move towards excessive commercialization of Swedish culture, far beyond the common Swedish profile based on exchanges, cooperation and development aid plans. Her criticism hits at the use of public funding for the promotion of private interests (however helpful for the nation) and the commercialization of aspects of national culture and identity (aren't business groups supposed to have their own means to pay for the promotion they need?). She is also worried that the overlapping of organizational functions from the public institutions make goals take a way apart from the cultural missions themselves. She summarizes the problem very clearly:

There are extensive limitations in the way Swedish culture is represented abroad. Responsible authorities like *Svenska Institutet* (Swedish Institute) and *Statens kulturråd* (National Council of Cultural Affairs) are working poorly. Resigning members of the board have even proposed that the SI should be shut down since it has lost contact with cultural life. The ministry of culture put most efforts into national matters and the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication (*Näringsdepartementet*) into design. *The ministry of Foreign Affairs is culturally insecure*. Instead the aid organisation SIDA has developed as Sweden's largest international actor in culture (Dahlberg 2003).

In sum, the Nation Branding approach contradicts some of the principles on which Swedish Cultural Diplomacy rests. Sweden has clearly stated its efforts to seek cooperation, exchange, development and international understanding. The Nation Branding approach is a contradictory message from the Swedish diplomacy side. Or is it that they think they can have it all? Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism running at the same time? If the answer is that these are the global times, I respond that using a very restrictive and non-diplomatic formula may be a poor attempt to cope with globalization and to “place Sweden in the world cultural map.” To use the Nation Brand concepts to constitute Cultural Diplomacy is very restrictive, in my opinion. As Anholt and Du Gelder recognize in relation to the branding strategy “branding is something that people outside the profession don’t and won’t understand; the vocabulary is too inflammatory for the times we live in; the risks of being misunderstood (let alone making grave mistakes through applying the marketing model too narrowly) are too great” (2005: 67). If so, why bother with it? Why to use a strategy that is not “well-understood” beyond the field, and “too risky.” In any case, it is clear that Nation Branding is the last take on cultural diplomacy embraced by Sweden, and it is still a project under construction. It requires a more substantial discussion, particularly on the part of Swedish diplomats who in my opinion are failing to foresee the negative implications of Nation Branding for their professional activities. At its best, the promotion/support of Sweden abroad (*Sverigefrämjande*) and the strategy for Nation Branding can be seen as a metaphor for today’s politics in the world where commercial enterprises and public policies are artificially reconciled in a metaphysical form, in discourse or, more blatantly, in pure rhetoric and propaganda.

In the last resort, the decision a nation must make when confronted with how to represent its own culture abroad (in the form of identity, heritage or values) boils down to a simple representational question posed by Pitkin in chapter two: where is the public interest? If we define the public interest as the interest of business groups from which jobs, income and welfare derive, then we have a business agenda. If we define the public interest as the interest of bureaucrats from whom stability, moderation and reason derive, then we have a bureaucratic agenda. If we define the public interest as the interest of the citizens of a nation from whom legitimacy, authority and fairness derive, then we have a democratic agenda. Finally, if we define the public interest as the interest of the bureaucrats in encouraging businessmen to reconcile their differences in order to increase the prosperity of the people, either we are not trained in politics or we are a group of cynics.

5.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented different illustrations of some basic concepts discussed in chapters one, two and three, using the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy, as an expository case. The theoretical debate between Swedish public and cultural diplomacies showed that there is a divide and a connection between the two. A divide because Swedish Public Diplomacy is more inclined to use Soft Power

strategies as a baseline, while Swedish Cultural Diplomacy is informed mainly by Cosmopolitan Constructivist ideas. The link between the two is in their relative constitutive relation in their tasks of informing the rest of the world about Sweden. This is evident in the way the two activities are presented in discourse: for Sweden, Public diplomacy is a strategic political tool to address and influence the citizens of other nations about Sweden's interests, which has a short term perspective; cultural diplomacy uses culture as the main tool to address people, interest groups and nations, which has a long term perspective.

In this chapter I also discussed the different discursive strategies followed by the Swedish diplomatic apparatus, to appropriate the idea of culture. The discursivity of culture having "culture as the means," or the main instrument of Cultural Diplomacy, places Sweden along the lines of a Cosmopolitan Constructivist agenda. However, many competing actors interpret this idea in different ways according to their own interests, making it difficult to hold a coherent understanding of this core concept. For example, the Swedish Institute and other subsidiary organs shape their operational understanding of culture in ways that serve their interests or a peculiar contingency. Also, non-state actors, particularly related to the private sector put pressure to have their agendas being included in the discursive debates of Swedish culture abroad. All in all, the reflexive views influence what Swedish Cultural Diplomacy is: in security exchange and intercultural exchange programmes, in spatiality the perspective is international and to a less extent, also regional; the directionality is mutuality and plurality, and the funding is essentially public.

This chapter also paid attention to the representational concepts, *standing for* and *representing*, so as to shed light on how Swedish Cultural Diplomacy is performed. The main conclusion is that to understand its roles, one has to pay attention to different actors claiming their own place to represent Sweden abroad: the Nobel Foundation, Swedish companies, or fictional icon Pippi Longstocking, to mention a few. This was done by looking into Hanna F. Pitkin's ideas that helped me establish that the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy is operated in the two forms of *standing for* and *acting for* through the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Institute. The SMFA is composed of three official actors: SIDA, NSU and diplomatic missions abroad; the SI manages the *Centre Culturel Suédois* along with other SI centers in places around the world. This is not the end of the story, as my model showed. In order to make sense of the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy it is important to look at other actors acting for officially *ad hoc*, or unofficially, such as the Swedish Royal Court, Swedish universities, companies such as Electrolux or Ericsson and/or individual icons such as Ingrid Bergman, Olof Palme or Inga from Sweden.

Another aspect of Swedish Cultural Diplomacy shown in this chapter was the concept of Cultural Representation, particularly looking into the Postmodern Representations evident in some Swedish official cultural materials. As I discussed here, the official Swedish discourse of cultural diplomacy falls, on occasion, into a number of contradictions and fragmentations that make it difficult to get a grasp of the Swedish cultural goals and principles. I discussed how the na-

tional identity of Sweden can be dissolved in the global images or fragmentary discourses depicted in some of the official Swedish materials for foreign consumption. Also, some of the Postmodern Representations naturalize a conflicting referent of basic Swedish principles such as peace and development in a symbolic confrontation with signs of war, menace or material consumption.

Finally, as a special case-study, I also discussed the way Sweden is appropriating Nation Branding strategies as embedded in forms of cultural diplomacy. I presented the way Nation Branding describes itself and posed questions related to political science and the diplomatic roles, where representational questions in relation to the “public interest” were posed. My conclusion was that the way Swedish cultural diplomacy is using Nation Branding contradicts its Cosmopolitan Constructivist principles. It is true that Nation Branding accommodates the cultural discourses needed by companies, private interest groups, or the construction of a propagandistic image of Sweden abroad. But at the same time, these discourses and practices put an unnecessary stress to the more consistent reflexive practises that have shown excellent results.

In sum, Swedish cultural diplomacy in the late 1980s and early twenty-first century can be characterized as a programmatic, systemic and resourceful policy to cooperate, share and also project the cultural values of Sweden to other nations, which in turn convey a very positive view of the country to foreigners. The SMFA, the SI, SIDA and Swedish embassies and missions abroad are the main actors that define cultural diplomacy in Sweden. However, some lack consistency in discourses, and the apparent overlapping and redundancy of the Swedish Cultural Diplomacy organizational structure make it difficult to advance a more coherent agenda in a global world. In spite of their differences, inconsistencies and new approaches, Sweden’s cultural diplomacy is indeed a success story. As expressed in this chapter, the sources of this success are rooted in a Cosmopolitan Constructivist program which anchors Sweden as a moral actor in international affairs. Also, as we can deduce from the analysis in this chapter, the diplomatic discourses and institutional arrangements have positioned Sweden in a bright spot internationally.

Concluding Notes

6 .1. The Overall Question

In the course of the first three chapters I organized a body of theoretical knowledge that helped me to answer the most general question for this thesis: *How can representational theories construct an understanding of Cultural Diplomacy in the late 20th century and early years of the new millennium?* It is possible to argue that the thesis presents answers to this question in three different ways: ontological, political and identity-reflective.

The first one has been addressed when discussing the ontology of representations in chapter two, from where some epistemic aspects were also drawn. In short, representational theories can shed light onto the theoretical aspects of cultural diplomacy if they succeed in setting up the descriptive and formalistic views as socially constructed, beyond the individual-idealistic approaches. It is here that the work of Hanna F. Pitkin makes sense. If the ontology of representations is made clear as a social construction where two conditions are required, “authorization” and “accountability,” then we perceive representation as a formal contractual relationship that can justifiably be said to occur when both procedural conditions are met (Pitkin 1967: chapter 3). This makes cultural diplomacy an object of study that informs a relation between patron and agent, requiring the legitimacy of the formalistic view. In this, cultural diplomacy is both authorized to be represented by someone/something and at the same time responds to a constituency. There are two discussions in the thesis addressing this issue. In chapter one I discuss the discursivity of cultural diplomacy on its own formulations, looking at how it defines itself in five concepts (instrumentality, security, spatiality, directionality, and the public/private divide). In chapter two, I make a more extended analysis in order to locate cultural diplomacy in relation to Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. Finally, in chapters four and five I approach the very specific definitions put forward in the official cultural diplomacy definitions presented by the foreign ministries of Mexico and Sweden (SFA and SMFA). The conclusion is that theories of representation based on Pitkin’s analysis can effectively accommodate an analysis of cultural diplomacy.

For the second answer, I want to conclude considering the political specificity of the model. My theoretical work assumes that in order to make a case for a coherent cultural diplomacy, the underlying assumptions must be drawn from representational theories. Let us first consider that cultural diplomacy is not an isolated idea, but comes embedded with the principles of foreign policy of the nation. This means that all cultural diplomacy is actually motivated by a general

policy that permeates its contents. At this very moment, in practice, we are dealing with a political representation. Thus, if the action is political, it can be studied by the representational models I suggest here. This is not self-evident since prior to this recognition, the identities/alterities, motivations and objectives of the actors performing cultural representations are not explicit. This is the reason why I formulate a clear political distinction between Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism as representational models throughout the whole thesis.

Lastly, the overall general question has been answered from an identity perspective when I assume that representations can be framed as a “self-and-other” discussion, as argued in chapter three. For this, I contend that the model of endo- and alter-representations made it clear that cultural diplomacies also view nations and cultures in terms of themselves-and-others. At the center of this discussion, the idea of representations was salient and organized an understanding of how nations tend to represent themselves abroad. This was much more obvious in empirical terms when discussing the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden in chapters four and five. My selection of the cases Mexico Splendors of Thirty Centuries and Sweden’s Nation Branding exemplified how Mexico developed an exotic view of its own culture for external consumption and Sweden’s cultural identity is commodified as a brand in a market place.

In sum, the overall general question has been answered in constructivist terms by appealing to a political representational discussion mainly following Pitkin’s views and by seriously addressing identities and alterities as a form of representation.

6.2. Interrelated and Subsidiary Questions

In the introduction to this thesis I posed three interrelated and subsidiary questions that were helpful in discussion of, mainly, the theoretical chapters. The first was concerned with how cultural diplomacy can be understood and constructed by means of three representational models: Soft Power, Nation Branding and Cosmopolitan Constructivism. Throughout the thesis I have made sure to set up and develop these three distinct camps with their own discourse and objectives. The conclusion to be reached is that Cultural Diplomacy cannot be a transparent field of action but is modelled by any of these three templates. The empirical part also showed that Sweden and Mexico actually combined them according to the respective foreign policies and the political climate. For example, both nations can be characterized as using some form of Cosmopolitan Constructivism in their cultural diplomacy during the 1990s. However, Mexico also made use of Soft Power, particularly in some of its mega “road shows.” For Sweden, the first years of the new millennium were the time to test the limits of Nation Branding via the Swedish Institute.

Yet, the weakness of the model of three cultural diplomacy representations lies in its asymmetries which are not very clear in the way I organize them through-

out the thesis. Soft Power has been the most scholarly advanced theory, with many experiences from which to learn. Some recognized researchers have actually supported or favoured it in their analysis, and research money has been allocated in many universities or think tanks for actual development of the field in the coming years. It is, without a doubt, the most visible application for cultural diplomacy in the period studied here. Nation Branding is a weak complement to the previous theory; it has been poorly set up and is supported only by relatively unknown figures from the field of diplomacy, international relations or political science. Its empirical results are weak and difficult to take seriously. Enthusiasm for Nation Branding is not altogether lacking and there is also a willingness to find it a place inside the cultural diplomacy apparatuses, especially backed up by firms, industries and commercial groups. However, it appears to have a long way to go.

Finally, Cosmopolitan Constructivism is a challenger in a number of ways. First of all, it has not been set up as such before this thesis, lacking a recognizable ground in the field of Cultural Diplomacy. It is not that its main features did not previously exist, nor that cultural diplomacies around the world did not operate along its lines. Let us remember, the philosophical base of Cosmopolitan Constructivism rests on multilateral diplomacy, cosmopolitan theory and constructivist politics. However, these ideas were not altogether recognized as belonging to a specific representation that actually made a cultural diplomacy program. If anything, this is the main contribution of this thesis and there can be no assurance that it will actually succeed in years to come. At all events, this is the point of departure from where my peers should judge whether or not this concept deserves more attention, research and resources.

A second question had to do with establishing the relevance of the three cultural representations, *i.e.* Reflective, Symbolic and Post-modern, for the contemporary cultural diplomacies. Chapter two addresses this question in concrete terms and suggests two ways of looking at it: initially, the answer lies in how culture is defined and appropriated by the cultural diplomacy apparatus and secondly, that the act of representing culture can be performed in three different “styles.” The reflective corresponds with the mimetic. The symbolic, following Pitkin, has two functions, *to represent* in the sense of substituting for, and *symbolizing*, in the sense of producing relations of significance. The postmodern approach takes for granted that the world is a fragmented, socially constructed playground where power relations are exercised. These three representations have consequences for how cultures are represented abroad by diplomacies. For example, as I showed in chapter four, Mexico elected in its Soft Power strategy “to reflect” an official historical discourse of a past glorious indigenous world, where civilizations flourished and conflicts were non-existent. At the same time, Mexican cultural diplomacy decided to symbolize certain aspects of its cultural identity by showing an exotic alter-representation of artistic figures such as Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo. In the same vein, Sweden has sometimes used postmodern representations to project its own culture in its public official information abroad. The idea of having a highly modern and hyper-technified society, where environ-

mental issues play along with the consumer society, and the sale of military crafts, show fragmentation of discourses exemplifying this very strategy.

Finally, a third question is related to the idea of “how” identities/alterities are constructed, given the cultural diplomacy representations studied throughout this study. It took me a whole chapter to provide an answer to this question. Chapter three developed a rather complex view where the representations of identities and alterities are studied. In this chapter, I based a great proportion of my argumentation on the social constructivist theories erected by Alexander Wendt (1999). I took the liberty of re-interpreting his views for an analytical grid adapted to cultural diplomacy. However, I also acknowledge that there is a need for critical assessment of the theoretical foundations of the model. While I am arguing from a social constructivist position, much of the chapter is arranged in the form of separate blocks, where niches contain classifications of identities and alterities as if they did not interplay (*cf.* Neumann 1999).

In the case of the Endo-representations, for reasons related to the context of diplomacy and international relations, I have a bias towards collective representations. My investigations have concrete applications for National and Cultural Identities, but hardly for Psychological and Corporeal Identities. In the case of alter-representations, the dual alterities of ally-friend and enemy-competitor need more study.⁹⁷ In fact, researchers present divergent views on this matter in the field of IR. The reason I present for bringing them together is that in terms of cultural diplomacy, it is quite all right to have such distinctions. For example, an enemy in cultural terms means something completely different from its meaning in a military perspective (*cf.* Dower 1976). A “cultural enemy” is interpreted in this work as a nation whose values are incommensurable for another set of beliefs in a different context. In cultural terms, this does not imply extermination of the opponent, a declaration of war, or a total break up. To give a concrete example, modern republics find it disturbing, in cultural terms, to combine religions and politics in public life as other nations do. Consider the case of the American government, where public rituals of government imply using the bible and addressing prayers to God. Secular nations would be fiercely opposed to using religious rituals (or *vice versa*) but at the same time, this would not be a matter for a bilateral rupture. This kind of difference between nations is what I have in mind when speaking of a “cultural enemy” in Cultural Diplomacy terms. This is as far as the model can be stretched, and the reason why enemy and competitor can be accommodated together in my model. A competitor, in cultural terms, would be a nation whose values or beliefs challenge those of other nations. Take the case of language. For many years during the 19th and early 20th centuries, French was a dominant language worldwide. After the Second World War, English, Spanish and Russian “competed” against French to become a cultural preference among other nations. The end result in our days is that English has become the *lingua franca*, with Spanish and Mandarin Chinese as close rivals, for reasons distinct from the market logic.

⁹⁷ I am grateful to Emil Uddhammar and Mats Sjölin for pointing out the necessity of reviewing these concepts in more detail.

6.3. The Mexican and Swedish Expository Cases

It was not my aim to evaluate the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden in the period studied here. However, my investigations show that, in general, the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden were fairly successful in constructing their identities abroad during the 1990s. In the different aspects I illustrated I realized that confronted with the challenges posed by globalization, Swedish and Mexican cultural diplomacies managed to interpret and adapt their policies to meet their objectives. Nonetheless, their cultural diplomacies were constantly subordinated to the economic and political agendas of influential groups and actors pushing to steer the practice of cultural diplomacy for their own benefit. Private firms, local politicians and some artists or cultural companies managed to influence the diplomatic practices of official cultural diplomacy or otherwise became actors themselves. The regional component was relevant as well. The EU and the US exerted influence on what was, or was not, possible, along the lines of cultural diplomacy, with Sweden at greater liberty to operate and Mexico being more traditional and restricted in its options. It is possible to say, in general terms, that their cultural representations abroad are in good shape.

Nevertheless, a number of issues undermine the way in which foreign societies and interest groups view the Swedish and Mexican representations abroad, both officially and unofficially. The challenge for Mexico is to break with the static and stereotypical picture of itself, to create more dynamic and realistic representations that combine the traditional and modern symbolic necessities. Mexican diplomacy also needs to do its homework and to show greater interest than hitherto in exploiting the cultural information available. Sweden's challenge is to "become," to learn to trust its own cultural diplomatic apparatus and the non-official actors in order to produce a representation that emphasizes its powerful cultural diversity. In my view it is time to produce a Swedish style of approaching cultural issues abroad instead of merely trying out the most recent market trends in national image designs. The two countries mainly relied on traditional approaches, bilateral mechanisms, their own cultural expertise, and the traditional advantages of their own cultural heritages. I imagine that exploring the constructivist and post-modern representations of identities in Cosmopolitan Constructivist ways may be useful to these two nations in the years to come.

However, looking into the organizing principles of foreign policy of Sweden and Mexico, they have traditionally emphasized "multilateralism, neutrality and non-alignment" as organizing principles in the former and "self-determination, non-intervention and peaceful resolution of conflicts" in the latter. What can be said is that in neither case did the cultural diplomatic discourses run contrary to or contradict main foreign policy principles. In fact, one of the objectives in the two countries, which is the "representation" of the nation's interest and cultural life abroad, is carried out in one way or another through cultural diplomacy. Even so, there is no automatic representation of foreign policy principles in cultural diplomacy discourses. It is possible to argue that the basic principles can be inferred in the quest to represent diversity, respect for human rights and so forth.

My study shows that in the case of Mexico, there is a very strong cultural policy emphasis on using active words such as “protection,” “strengthening,” “access” and “promotion” when talking about cultural identities and goods. This corresponds with active words in the cultural diplomacy actions as explained in chapter one. However, the practices did not match the discourses. When it came to the provision of financial support to carry out actions, decisions were biased and selective. The best example is found in the mega-exhibitions: there is no discourse in the Mexican foreign policy, in cultural diplomacy or in cultural policy that explicitly asks for or gives substance to that type of practice. However, it happened to be one of the most visible and more expensive practices Mexico carried out in net terms.

The case of Sweden is very similar to the Mexican one in terms of the representations between cultural policy and diplomacy. The active words for cultural policy are “promotion,” “enabling,” “taking action,” “preservation” and “safeguarding.” These have very few nationalistic tones and have a very strong communitarian ground mixed with a defense of freedom of expression. The cultural diplomacy discourse is more transparent here, but is also rather discretionary and unstructured, since the different actors interpret these principles in their own interests. The best example of discretionary practice is the Swedish Institute’s Nation Branding. If regarded in relation to the goals of cultural policy and diplomacy (especially *the creation of long-term, sustainable relations with other countries and with culture as a mean*), there is very little connection since no discourse refers to the need to market Sweden as a “brand” *vis-à-vis* other nations. Here there is a conflict between a constructivist view and a neo-liberal perspective of diplomacy.

In sum, Swedish and Mexican cultural diplomacies functioned as expository examples to illustrate the theoretical strengths of the conceptual apparatus suggested earlier. In the two examples, I collected materials to make sense of their definitions of cultural diplomacy via representations, their diplomatic apparatus, their policies as well as their own practices. The two specific cases chosen to illustrate the political templates underlying concepts of representation were the idea of Soft Power in Mexico through the 1990-1992 international exhibition “Mexico Splendours of Thirty Centuries”; and the idea of Nation-Branding as established by the Swedish cultural diplomatic apparatus in the first years of the new millennium. A brief conclusion from the two cases shows that for Mexico, the use of cultural diplomacy *à la* Soft-Power has successfully fulfilled the economic expectations of political elites interested in concluding the NAFTA agreement, while in Sweden the use of Nation Branding has produced a business global dimension that achieves greater visibility for Sweden in certain entrepreneurial circles. However, it is necessary to study further to what extent the national cultural identities of the two nations have been objectified and estranged abroad by the use of such strategies, leaving very little room to produce understanding of their rich cultural diversities and histories. This study would also have benefited greatly from a careful analysis of the multilateral cosmopolitan constructivist agenda, used by both nations in their efforts to open up a cultural

dialogue among nations in their hosting of international conferences on culture (Mexico City 1982 and Stockholm 1998).

6.4. Cultural Diplomacy Lessons

If anything, my work shows the importance of the symbolic, identitary and cultural in the making of politics these days, and by extension, cultural diplomacy too. That is why I wanted to emphasize constructivism as a promising platform from where to discuss cultural diplomacy. In my investigations, I was highly surprised to see how far the liberal economic discourse permeates politics in general and cultural diplomacy in particular. Today's ruling discourses emphasize the rights of individuals to "choose freely" any aspect of their lives, *e.g.* jobs, education, place of residence, governments, etc. Their preferences are taken into consideration by market mechanisms (in government or firms' environments) and these outcomes can represent their own identifications. This is, in my view, a regression in political thought and action. Chapter one explored the ways in which cultural diplomacy is set up in discourse. From the five concepts studied in the discursive definitions of cultural diplomacy presented, instrumentality and the public/private divide showed very clearly the subordination of political thinking to economic rationale, especially evident in the Nation Branding strategies. This is consistent with results in recent documents or studies that assess the current state of the discipline, such as "Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy" (Feigenbaum 2001), "The Cultural Diplomacy of Other Nations" (Arts & Minds Seminar 2003), "Cultural Diplomacy" (Bound, K *et. al.* 2007) or "Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey" (Cummings 2003). Most of the results I have seen show that "There is a common understanding that cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, is in the enlightened self-interest of our country" (Arts & Minds Seminar 2003: 36).

As I stated in chapter one, the traditional exchange-promotion and advertisement triad of cultural diplomacy offered an apparently unproblematic field where countries simply exchanged and promoted themselves abroad. As I have shown, this was hardly ever the case. Cultural diplomacy practices were conceptualized following certain political argumentations, mainly cooperation and Soft Power. However, practices of domination are not explicit and tend to be disguised in discourses of freedom. In all instances, my work showed that for cultural diplomacy, identities are presented as being trouble-free. They are taken as given and assumed to be constant. The conclusion to which I came in this thesis is that, on the contrary, this is a highly problematic assumption.

A brief conclusion from my empirical research is that Sweden and Mexico depend upon interactions with countries to shape what they can be and signify in the global arena. Their identities were, in many instances, manufactured abroad, however hard they work on their own constructions of identities, by official means. The two countries recognize, for example, the hegemonic power of the United States in shaping their identities abroad. The Swedish Institute brochure

Sweden and the Swedes says explicitly “Especially in American propaganda, Sweden in the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s was often portrayed as a half-communist nation [*crypto-communist*] where the freedom of the citizenry was tightly restricted” (2003: 15). Agustín Gutiérrez Canet, a Mexican diplomat, expresses his view that “The first stereotype of Mexico in the world was projected by foreigners and not by us [*Mexicans*]. It was Hollywood and not the Mexican cinema the first to represent the sleeping Mexican sitting with legs bent under a big sombrero next to the shadow of a saguaro. This is the image that continues to be, like it or not, a symbol for which we are recognized abroad. However, stereotypes are changing according to the times and perceptions adjust accordingly.” Similarly, Miriam Molina, an expert in cultural diplomacy, said in an interview in Mexico City (interview 20) that in order to exert a positive influence on the commercial or foreign policy of the United States during the 1990s, Mexico needed to exploit preconceived cultural ideas and stereotypes among decision makers, since there was very little time to make new ones or reformulate them. This is, in my view, a good example of the potential suppression of identities and alterities, especially in the cultural sphere, where symbols become cages of meaning that are very difficult to escape. In other words, the endo-alter representational strategy can concentrate on the symbolic part of the dominations via the cultural dimensions imposed on identities and alterities via discourse.

In the thesis I presented authors discussing diplomatic affairs in more contemporary contexts, addressing practices of symbols, representations and emancipation. They all proved a great aid to reconsideration of the challenges for diplomatic apparatuses. If diplomacy has any value in contemporary times, it must engage in these questions and become self-reflexive. In my research, I suggested that the bottom-line assumption is that the world is constantly changing. I also presuppose the transformation of reality with both its materiality and *constructedness*, assuming that most concepts are themselves unstable and indeterminate, prone to re-shaping and re-signification. I advocate the constant “opening” of concepts and practices in diplomacy and opposition to “incontestable” cages of meaning that seem to permeate the field in the first place. However, as I also showed in this work, new cultural diplomacy actors are emerging and their interests in representing culture abroad also differ from a strict public interest agenda. Governments and foreign policies have a difficult time reconciling all of these legitimate interests. This is, indeed, Cultural Diplomacy at a crossroads.

My personal normative view is that in a contemporary cultural diplomacy, governments should “celebrate cultural difference” and collaborate in the intersubjective construction of their identities (intercultural dialogue) to ensure the quality and equality of their cultural exchanges, by giving individual citizens and civil society responsibility to set up their own “representational networks,” to facilitate direct exchange of values, ideas and people for common understanding. Cultural diplomacy is then a cosmopolitan, foreign policy arrangement conducive to the construction of a democratic representation of the national identity

abroad via the plurality of discourses, with the coordination of the official institutions to ensure equity and equality.

In representational terms, Cultural Diplomacy can be as a compromise between the two fundamental distinctions of the term in Pitkin’s own differentiation: *standing for* and *acting for*. In figure 6.1 I establish a division in interests between Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Relations as explained in chapter one (Cultural Diplomacy = government interests and Cultural Relations = private and non-government interests) and the appropriation of the symbolic discourse in representational terms, either in the form of elite or public approaches.

Figure 6.1. Cultural/Public Diplomacy and Cultural Relations

<i>ACTING FOR</i>	Public Approach	Individuals & NGOs
Cultural & Public Diplomacies (Government)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cosmopolitan Constructivism (Civil society) • Soft Power (National Interest) • Nation Branding (Business) 	Cultural Relations: (Artists, creative industries, museums, firms, etc.)
<i>STANDING FOR</i>	Elite Approach	Companies & <i>ad-hoc</i> groups

Cultural Diplomacy also authorizes diplomatic players and is legally accountable for its own actions. “Cultural Relations” are “unofficial” representations based on private or non-governmental interests. From an elite approach, the symbolic world is fixed and static, and discourses emphasize difference and distinction (e.g. “Mexico is corruption” Sweden is “blonde-sex craze,” etc.) This is why cultural diplomacy representations in the form of Soft Power and Nation Branding seem rather uninterested in addressing the symbolic world seriously. Soft Power and Nation Branding, for example take the stereotypes at face value, produce them or reproduce them at their own interest, reshuffling *clichés* into the system of meaning via international media, thus organizing a representation that builds the reputation of nations and their peoples. As I further discuss in chapter five, Nation Branding strategies allow for a contest of stereotypical labels where nations can be called to be “dirty,” “vibrant” or “lacking integrity,” at the will of the image makers.

6.5. Further Research: Parallel Theoretical Arguments

Since my study concentrates on the cultural diplomacies of Mexico and Sweden in the 1990s, it is important to outline in brief four popular global theoretical debates which took place during the 1990s as regards international relations and culture. Since I do not elaborate on them in the course of this thesis, they are traces to develop further research in the area of cultural diplomacy. It is possible, for example, to explore to what extent any recent foreign policy of a given nation reflects the influence of these mainstream ideas in their cultural diplomacies.

In the first place, Francis Fukuyama's claim that the end of the Cold War singled out "liberalism" as the unchallenged universal project for human kind (1989 and 1992). Liberalism, in his view, was understood as the triumph of liberal democracy and market capitalism. In cultural diplomacy terms, the concept of culture requires a process whereby the symbolic world constructed in collective terms (as representations) is now shaped in terms of choices and preferences. In this, cultural diplomacy would be a preferred choice for a nation, viewed in terms of aggregated utility constricting diplomatic preferences. If cultural diplomacy, seen as a liberal strategy offering competing cultural products in a market of international symbols, is a preferred outcome for a nation, then its existence is justified by the results. In general, this is a position that falls under the umbrella of the Rational-instrumental representational strategies as described in the introduction, rather close to the Nation Branding representation.

In a second discussion, Samuel Huntington's early 1990s prognosis was that the fundamental source of conflict and divisions among human kind would be cultural in nature – and not primarily ideological or economic, as was then thought (1992 & 1996). Huntington's theories still regard the nation-state as the most powerful actor in world affairs; however, the principal conflicts of global politics would occur between groups and their beliefs in different civilizations. The "cultural" clash of civilizations that dominates global politics, according to Huntington, is unavoidable and located in the irreconcilable ontologies of the West versus the East. Cultural conflict is the contemporary state of world affairs, bordering on Alexander Wendt's Hobbesian culture (1999: 259). In this, the prospects of a cultural diplomacy of any kind come closer to the idea of Soft Power. In other words, if the assumption is made by a foreign ministry that the world resembles Huntington's view, a common response would be to play a cultural diplomacy *à la* Soft Power.

A third possibility of looking at a theoretical cultural argument during the 1990s, is to direct attention to Benjamin Barber's criticism of the new hegemony of both Western capitalism via transnational corporations and its fierce opponent, tribal religious fundamentalism (1996). The former is represented as the *McWorld* metaphor, or the predominance of monoculture; and latter as the *Jihad* metaphor, standing for cultural fragmentation. In Barber's eyes, these two forces shape the dynamics of the world's ideologies and fracture the future of multicultural societies and civic citizenship. In this thesis, there was no room to study the representation of homogenization and fragmentation as results of the global forces. The only reference I made came as a clarification of the term "globalization" in Jens Bartelson's discussion (2000). Barber's discussion can be productive in its analysis of the sources of conflict for cultures around the world. The first one is clearly a criticism of commercial consumerism and the destructive effects of transnational companies in local places, where the pervasive effects of global capitalism leave cultures no choice but to "adapt or die" (see also Cowen 2002). The second one is inspired by the fact that some cultures are incapable of adapting to global forces, becoming incompatible and parochial, producing a violent reaction in the form of fundamentalism. In cultural diplomacy terms, Barber's position would account for the inability of cultures to communicate and resolve

their shared conflicts, given their incommensurable differences in a global world. Similar to Huntington’s view, Barber’s position would lead us into a rather pragmatic Soft Power representation. It could also be argued that Barber’s harsh views are actually a “last call” for a sort of a Cosmopolitan Constructivist position as the ultimate solution to reach a peaceful common world.

Finally, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s report for the UN (1997) stresses the importance of material development for societies but also the cultural alternatives to reach a satisfying, comprehensive and inclusive quality of life. The book gathered a panel of specialist under Pérez de Cuéllar’s leadership (former United Nations Secretary-General) who promoted a less confrontational view of global cultural encounters, and triggered an imaginative exploration of the possibilities of cooperation and cultural understanding among societies, based on the principles of respect, diversity and multiculturalism. Let us explore some of these ideas and their consequences.

It is possible to argue that the book recovers the diplomatic tradition I support throughout the book: multilateralism, the cultivation of peace and open dialogues with societies. A very good example of this is the Cosmopolitan Constructivist programme present in the diplomatic agendas of both Sweden and Mexico, evident in the setting up of international conferences in Mexico City 1982 (Mondiacult) and Stockholm 1998 (The Power of Culture). The former was known as the World Conference on Cultural Policies, held in Mexico City between 26 of July and August 6 1982; and the latter as Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development, held in Stockholm, Sweden, between the 30 March and the 2nd of April in 1998. Having the historical perspective “The Mexican Declaration,” the preamble to MONDIACULT, contains a visionary cosmopolitan agenda in spite it was promulgated during the Cold War. It truly aspires to reconcile culture with cooperation and understanding of others. For example, the idea of recognizing the cultural heritage of nations, developing artistic exchange programs or leaving room to think about democracy, are all aspects of bringing societies in, as main cultural actors of diplomacy (see chart below).

Chart 6.1. Main Topics of Discussion in Two International Conferences of Cultural Policy in Mexico and Sweden

MONDIACULT, MEXICO 1982	STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN 1998
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural identity • Cultural dimension of development • Culture and democracy • Cultural heritage • Artistic and intellectual creation and art education • Relationship of culture with education, science and communication • Planning, administration and financing of cultural activities • International cultural cooperation • UNESCO, the institution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A commitment to pluralism (multiculturalism, gender, etc.) • Cultural rights • Cultural heritage and cultural creativity • Creativity and cultural industries • Culture, Children and Young People • Improving research and international co-operation for cultural policy • Improving research and international co-operation for cultural policy • Mobilising resources for cultural activities • The role of the media in cultural policies • Culture and the new media technologies

In Stockholm 1998, many of these ideas had been part of the diplomatic international jargon, and they needed to be substantiated with documents and participation of society to really become standard norms. In Stockholm, the idea of creativity, cultural rights, the cultural industries and the role of media, for example, became aspects that consolidated the already functional discourses of development, cooperation and peace. Chart 6.1 taken from a discussion on the merits of the two conferences, shows the similarities of values that Mexico and Sweden supported in the setting up of an international cultural agenda (Villanueva 2003). Pérez de Cuéllar's efforts to guide and propel these norms among the member states, their diplomats and the societies is something that needs to be reconsidered and evaluated. It is possible to argue, for example, that the efforts of the two conferences (supported by their countries) and Pérez de Cuéllar's ambition, triggered the diplomatic channels for the promulgation of UNESCO's *Universal Declaration On Cultural Diversity* adopted by the 31st Session of the General Conference of UNESCO Paris, 2 November 2001: a fully cosmopolitan declaration. Further research can also connect these diplomatic norms with the continuation of *The Universal Forum of Cultures* in Barcelona 2004, and this year (2007) in Monterrey, Mexico. Common ideas in the two forums have to do with topics such as ethics in the cultural sector, the setting up of a cultural *ombudsman*, the accessibility to the information highways, multiculturalism as a public policy, etc. These all contain a societal, cosmopolitan agenda that is being discussed in diplomatic settings in many parts of the world. And Mexico and Sweden have had a strong presence from the very beginning.

All in all, as a criticism, it could be argued that most of the goals, principles and central argumentations set up in Pérez de Cuéllar's book are normative, having very little pragmatic advice on how to accomplish such goals. The exploration of the mechanisms of global power is hidden and the book then transforms itself into a rhetorical examination of future cultural scenarios. However, my understanding of Pérez de Cuéllar's report is that his ambition is more a change of consciousness, creating an awareness that brings about global consensus among decision makers, thus making it possible to establish a dialogue among civilizations against the confrontational views presented by Huntington and Barber. This is clearly a reference to Alexander Wendt's "Kantian Culture" as presented in his book (1999: 297) but more specifically, a source for the kind of Cosmopolitan Constructivism I have been advocating throughout this book.

How did these ideas internalized in the diplomatic practice and discourse of Sweden and Mexico? The official documents studied in this thesis (of the foreign cultural policies of Mexico and Sweden) showed that, with the exception of Pérez de Cuéllar's views, their cultural diplomacies did not refer to any of the discourses considered in this part (Fukuyama's, Barber's nor Huntington's). This comes as no surprise: *Our Creative Diversity* is a report that establishes an agenda akin to the interests of peripheral nations, appealing for the governments and institutions because it is in many ways uncompromising.

Sweden (seen in this study -culturally speaking- as a semi-peripheral nation), benefited from the book and its ideas: it organized *UNESCO's World Conference on Cultural Policies for Development* in Stockholm "The Power of Culture" (March/April 1998), where the Perez de Cuéllar report was discussed, along with the European Commission's *In From The Margins*. The conference became a marker in current debates. For example, the definition of culture as "the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group.... not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs,"⁹⁸ which is a comprehensive view, nowadays informs many of the official documents (and diplomacies) of many countries, including Sweden and Mexico. Ideas such as "globalization of culture," "sustainable development," the promotion of "cultural diversity" and especially the idea of an "intercultural dialogue" were a response to the fatalistic views of Huntington and Barber.

On the other hand, Sweden and Mexico do not show any direct preoccupation with concepts such as the "Clash of Civilizations" the "Commodification of Cultures" or the "Tribalism and Religious Fundamentalism" in their public cultural diplomacies. Neither did I find any direct significant reference to the ideas expressed by Francis Fukuyama about the triumph of market capitalism and democratic liberalism. Even though Mexico and Sweden have clearly used cultural/public diplomatic representations that contradict the cosmopolitan official discourse (by engaging in soft power and nation branding practices), it seems to me that it was only Perez de Cuéllar's conclusions that had an effect on their conscious discourses about others. This is why I claim that in their institutional plans and programs, Sweden and Mexico reflected a cultural diplomacy coming from the semi-periphery, and not installed in a/the hegemonic core (such as UK, France or US). My point is that the cultural diplomatic performance (programs, plans, budget, activities, etc.) was more pragmatic and prepared for the construction of a plan that would conceptually accommodate their cultural diplomacies for global times. Three questions remain:

- 1) How to account for the "representations of cultures" in the everyday decision-making of cultural diplomacy?
- 2) How to evaluate the impact of cosmopolitan cultural diplomatic actions in the short run so that policies can be shown to work?
- 3) How to develop the field of Cosmopolitan Constructivism further, making it a viable framework to deal with cultural diplomatic issues?

In any case, further research can be fruitfully channelled into discussing these discourses of global culture and their possibilities for reformulating a conception of cultural diplomacy based in these precepts in the coming years.

⁹⁸ This definition does not depart from the one offered by sociologist Raymond Williams (1994) who claims that the definition of culture has three general categories: the 'ideal,' the 'documentary,' and the 'social.' Respectively, Williams' categories include values pertaining to some 'timeless order,' "the artifacts" of intellectual and imaginative work in which human thought and experience are variously recorded'. Finally, he advises that culture 'is a description of a particular way of life which finds expression in institutions and ordinary behavior.'

REFERENCES

Books, Journal Articles and Occasional Papers

- Aguilar, M. (1996) *Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: German-American Relations, 1955-1968*, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.
- Alexander, S. ed. (2006) *The Americanization of Europe: culture, diplomacy, and anti-Americanization after 1945*, NY: Berghahn Books.
- Althusser, L. (1987 [1969]) "La Ideología y los Aparatos Ideológicos de Estado, notas para una investigación" en *Lenin y ka Filosofía: Otros Ensayos*, México: El Caballito.
- Anderson, B. (1991 [1965]) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso Books.
- Anholt, S. (2002) "Nation Branding: A continuing theme" in *Journal of Brand Management* Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Pages: 59-61.
- Anholt, S. (2006) "What is Nation Branding", May 03, 2006, PBS program at http://www.nationbrandindex.com/docs/PBS_5306.pdf
- Anholt, S. and van Gelder S. (2005) "Branding for Good?" in Ind, N. ed. *Beyond Branding: How the New values of Transparency and Integrity are Changing the World of Brands*, London: Kogan Page Limited.
- Anholt-GMI (2006) *Nation Brands Index report: Special Report: Denmark's International Image*, Q1, www.nationbrandindex.com.
- Appadurai, A. (1999) *Globalization*, US: University of Minnesota Press.
- Arizpe, L. (1999) "Culture and Globalization" in *UNDP Working Papers of the Human Development Report*, NY: UN.
- Arndt, R.T. (2005) *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, US: Potomac Books.
- Arnold, Matthew (1971 [1869]) *Culture and Anarchy*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Astíe-Burgos, W. (2003) "Diplomacia y Cultura" in Sosa, E. ed. (2003) *La Cultura en un Mundo Global: Una Perspectiva desde México*, México: IMRED-SRE.
- Autores Varios (1990) *México: Esplendores de Treinta Siglos*, Los Ángeles/Nueva Cork: The Metropolitan Museum of Art / Amigos de las Artes de México.
- Axelrod, R. and Keohane, R. (1993) "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Baldwin, D. ed. NY: Columbia UP.
- Bartelson, J. (1995) *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Bartelson, J. (2000) "Three Concepts of Globalization" in *International Sociology*, June 2000, vol. 15 (2) 180-196.
- Barthes, R. (1972 [1957]) *Mythologies*, London: Paladin.
- Baylis, J. and Smith, S. (2001) *The Globalization of World Politics: and introduction to International Relations*, England: Oxford UP.
- Bauman, Z. (2002) *La Globalización*, México: Planeta.
- Bauman, Z. (1999) *Liquid Modernity*, UK: Polity Press.
- Bauman, Z. (1995) *Life in Fragments*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Beck, U. (2002) "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology and the Second Age of Modernity" in Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. (2002) *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford UP.

- Bélanger, L. (1999) "Redefining Cultural Diplomacy: Cultural Security and Foreign Policy in Canada", *Political Psychology*, vol. 20, no 4, 677-699.
- Benítez, F. (1964) "El mago Gironella que transforma a las reinas en perros y percheros" in Eder, R. (1981) *Gironella*, México: Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, UNAM.
- Berridge, G.R. and James, A. (2003) *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Berridge, G.R., Keens-Soper, M., and Otte, T.G. (2001) *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, NY: Palgrave.
- Boréus, K. (1997) "The shift to the right: Neo-Liberalism in argumentation and language in the Swedish public debate since 1969", in *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 31, pp. 257-286.
- Boulding, K. (1959) "National Images and International Systems", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3: pp. 120-31.
- Bound, K. Briggs, R. Holden, J. and Jones, S. (2007) *Cultural Diplomacy*, UK: Demos – North East England Cultural Observatory. Paper: <http://www.neeco.org.uk/>
- Brown, R. H. (1995) *Postmodern Representations: Truth, Power and Mimesis in the Human Sciences and Public Culture*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Bryder, T. (2005) "European Political Identity. An attempt at Conceptual Clarification" in *Psicología Política*, No. 31, 2005: 37-50.
- Bryder, T. (2004) *Essays on the Policy Sciences and the Psychology of Politics and Propaganda*, Växjö: Växjö UP.
- Bryder, T. (1998) *Human Nature in Politics: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Political Behaviour*, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press.
- Bryder, T. (1990) *Machiavelli and Modern Political Analysis*, Copenhagen: Forlaget Politiske Studier.
- Bull, H. (1995) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, NY: Columbia UP.
- Buzan, B. (1991) *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Wheatshaf: Hemel Hempstead.
- Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. eds. (2003) *Regions and Powers-The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Bynander, F. (2003) *The Rise and Fall of the Submarine Threat: Threat Politics and Submarine Intrusions in Sweden. 1980–2002*, Sweden: Uppsala UP.
- Calhoun, C. (2002) "The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism" in Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. eds. *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Campbell, D. (1998) *Writing Security - United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, UK: Manchester UP.
- Carlsnaes, W. (1981) "Can Perceptions be Ideological?", *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 183-188.
- Carlsnaes, W. (1987) *Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization*, Oxford/NY: Blackwell.
- Carlsnaes, W. (2002) 'Foreign Policy', in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., and Simmons B.A. eds. *Handbook of International Relations*, pp. 331–349. London: Sage Publications.
- Cassirer, E. (1987 [1944]) *Ensayo del Hombre: Una Introducción a la Filosofía de la Cultura Humana*, México: FCE.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (1998) *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, Washington, DC: CSIS.
- Chaney, D (1995) *The Cultural Turn*, London: Routledge.
- Childs, M. (1984) *Sweden: the Middle Way*, New Haven: Yale UP.
- Chilton, P. (2004) *Analysing Political Discourse*, London: Routledge.
- Cohen, R. (1987) *Theatre of Power: The Art of Diplomatic Signaling*, London: Longman.

- Cohen, R. (1991) *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Cohen, R. (1997) *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, US: United States Institute for Peace Press.
- Cohen, R. (2004) "The Uses and Abuses of Culture" in Knudsen, O. *Cultural Barriers, Cultural Bridges: Experience and Evidence from Diplomacy and Politics*, Conference papers 34, Sweden: Utrikespolitiska Institutet.
- Cohen, Y. (1986) *Media Diplomacy: Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age*, US: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Constantinou, C. (1996) *On the Way to Diplomacy*, Minneapolis: Minnesota UP.
- Constantinou, C. (2004) *States of Political Discourse: Words, Regimes, Seditions*, London: Routledge.
- Constantinou, C. (2006) "Human Diplomacy and Spirituality", *Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, No. 103, April 2006, pp. 20.
- Cottingham, J. Stoothoff, R. Murdoch, D. and Kenny, A. (1991) *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, 3 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Cowen, T. (2002) *Creative Destruction: How Globalization is Changing the World's Cultures*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
- Crane, D., Kawasaki, K. and Kawashima, N. (2002) *Global Culture: Media, Arts, Policy and Globalization*, London: Routledge.
- Cummings, M.C. Jr. (2003) *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, Washington, D.C: Center for Arts and Culture.
- Dahlén, T. (1997) *Among the Interculturalists*, Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology.
- De Diego, E. (2003) "Representing Representation: Reading *Las Meninas* Again" in Stratton-Pruitt, S. ed. *Velázquez' Las Meninas*, UK: Cambridge UP.
- Denzin, N. (1997) *Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 21st Century*, US: Sage.
- Denzin, N. (1995) "The Post-structural Crisis in the Social Science: Learning from James Joyce" in Brown, R. H. ed. (1995) *Postmodern Representations: Truth, Power and Mimesis in the Human Sciences and Public Culture*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Denzin, N. (1989) *Interpretive Interactionism*, US: Sage.
- Der Derian, J. (2005) "Imaging Terror: Logos, Pathos, and Ethos" *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1: 5-22.
- Der Derian, J. (2003) "Cyber-Deterrence", in *Dialogues*, webpage at the Watson Institution: US. <http://www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/vy2k/deterrence.cfm> Originally published in *Wired*, September 1994. "Wired visits the digital battlefield of Desert Hammer VI to see whether the US Army can win the next war without firing another shot."
- Der Derian, J. (1996) "Headley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture" pp. 84-100 in Rick F. and Larkings J. eds. *The International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered*, McMillan: Houndsmills.
- Der Derian, J. (1993) "The CIA, Hollywood, and Sovereign Conspiracies" *Queen's Quarterly*, V100, N2 Summer.
- Der Derian, J. (1992) *Anti-diplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*, Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Der Derian, J. (1987) *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Der Derian, J. ed. (1995) *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, UK: Macmillan.

- Der Derian, J. and Shapiro, M.J. eds. (1989) *International/Intertextual Relations*, Toronto: Lexington Books.
- Derrida, J. (2001) *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, UK: Routledge.
- Derrida, J. (1983) *Dissemination*, US: University Of Chicago Press.
- Derrida, J. (1982) "Sending: On Representation" in *Social Research* 49, no.2 summer, pp. 296-326.
- Dizard, W. (2001) *Digital Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy in the Information Age*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
- Douglas, M. (1970) *Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology*, London: Routledge.
- Douglas, M. (1987) *How Institutions Think*, London: Routledge.
- Douglas, M. ed. (1976) *Implicit Meanings*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Dower, J.W. (1976) *War Without Mercy*, Boston: Faber and Faber.
- Du Gay, P. (1996) "Organizing identity: Entrepreneurial governance and public management" in Hall, S. and du Gay, P. eds. *Questions of Cultural Identity*, UK: Sage.
- Du Gay, P., Hall, S., Janes, L., Mackay H., and Negus, K. (1997) *Doing Cultural Studies: The Story of the Sony Walkman*, London: Sage Publications.
- Durkheim, E. (1996 [1915]) *Las Formas Elementales de la Vida Religiosa*, México: Océano.
- Eban, A. (1998) *Diplomacy for the Next Century*, New Haven and London: Yale UP.
- Eckstein, H. (1975) "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Greenstein, F. and Polsby, N. eds. (1975) *Handbook of Political Science*, US: Addison-Wesley.
- Edelman, M. (1985 [1967]) *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, Chicago: University of Illinois press.
- Eder, R. (1981) *Gironella*, Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, México: UNAM.
- Elias, N. (1982) *The Civilizing Process*, NY: Pantheon.
- Elizondo, S. (1967) "El sueño de Felipe IV o los pudrideros ópticos" in Eder, R. (1981) *Gironella*, Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas, UNAM: México.
- Eulau, H. and Karps, P. (1978) "The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness" in Heinz, E. et al. (1978) *The Politics of Representation*, US: Sage.
- Evans, J. and Boswell, D. eds. (1999) *Representing the Nation: A Reader: Histories, Heritages and Museums*, London: The Open University/Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2003) *Analysing Discourse*, London: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (1995) *Critical Discourse Analysis: the critical study of language*, London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge, Polity.
- Fairclough, N. (1991) "What might we mean by 'Enterprise Discourse'" in Russell, K. and Abercrombie, N. eds. (1991) *Enterprise Culture*, UK: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (1989) *Language and Power*, London, Longman.
- Fan, Y. (2005) "Branding the Nation: What is Being Branded?" in *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, vol. 12, no. 1.
- Fearon, J. D. (1998) "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation" in *International Organization* 52 (2): 269-305.
- Fatherstone, M. (1994) *Undoing Culture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity*, London: Sage.
- Fine, R and Cohen, R. (2002) "Four Cosmopolitan Moments" in Vertovec, S. et al. eds. (2002) *Conceiving cosmopolitanism: theory, context and practice*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Finn, H.K. (2003-a) "Cultural Diplomacy and US Security" in *Arts and Minds Seminar: A Conference on Cultural Diplomacy amid Global Tensions*, US: Council on Foreign Relations, April 14, 2003.
- Finn, H.K. (2003-b) "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences" in *Foreign Affairs*, Nov-Dec 2003.

- Foister, S., Roy, A., Wyld, M. (1998) *Holbein's Ambassadors: Making and Meaning*, London: National Gallery.
- Foucault, M. (1973) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, NY: Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (1994 [1970]) *Los Motivos y las Cosas*, México: Alianza Editorial.
- Foucault, M. (1991) "Politics and the Study of Discourse" in Burchell, G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. eds. *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: Chicago UP.
- Foucault, M. (1980) *Power/Knowledge*, NY: Pantheon.
- Foyle, D.C. (1999) *Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy*, NY: Livrenoir.
- Fromm, E. (1964) "Our Way of Life Makes Us Miserable" in: *The Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, Vol. 237 (No. 8, 25. 7. 1964).
- Fry, G. and O'Hagan, J. (2000) *Contending Images of World Politics*, McMillan Press: UK.
- Fuentes, C. (1992) *The Buried Mirror: Reflections on Spain and the New World*, US: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Gallagher, C. (1984) "The politics of culture and Debate over Representation", in *Representations*, No. 5 (winter 1984) pp. 115-147.
- García-Canclini, N. (1999) *Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and Multicultural Conflicts*, US: Paidós.
- García-Canclini, N. (1992) *La Educación y la cultura ante el Tratado de Libre Comercio*, México: Nueva Imagen.
- García-Ponce, J. (1964) "El escándalo, la necesidad de ofender a la sociedad que se cree depositaria de la herencia cultural", in Eder, R. (1981) *Gironella*, México: UNAM.
- Geertz, C. (1982) *The Interpretation of Cultures* NY: Basic Books.
- Geertz, C. (1972) "Deep play: notes on the Balinese cockfight" *Daedalus*, 101:1-37.
- Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell, NY: Cornell UP.
- Giddens, A. (1999) "Globalization: An Irresistible Force" in *Daily Yomiuri*, June 7, 1999.
- Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gilboa, E. (2004) "Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects" in Jönsson, Ch. and Langhorne, R. eds. (2004) *Diplomacy*, London: Sage Publications (vol. III).
- Gombrich, E.H. (1978) *Symbolic Images: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance*, London: Phaidon.
- Gombrich, E.H. (1977) *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, London: Phaidon.
- Grace, S. (1996) *Picasso's Variations of the Masters*, NY: Harry E. Abrahams Inc.
- Gramsci, A. (1997 [1917]) *Cuadernos de la Prisión*, México: El Caballito.
- Grotius, H. (1987 [1625]) *Del Derecho de presa; Del derecho de Guerra y de la Paz: textos de las obras de "De lure Praedae" y "De lure Belli ac Pacis,"* Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales.
- Guevara, G. and García, N. eds. (1992) *La educación y la Cultura ante el Tratado de Libre Comercio*, México: Nueva Imagen/Nexos. 49-72.
- Guzzini, S. (2000) "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations" in *European Journal of International Relations*, Volume: 6 Issue: 2 Pages: 147-183.
- Guzzini, S. and A. Leander eds. (2006) *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics*, US: Taylor and Francis Ltd.
- Götz, N (2003) "The People's Home as a Symbol of Order in the Swedish Welfare State" in Rothholz, W. ed. (2003) *Political Culture in the Baltic Sea Region and in Eastern Europe*, Berlin: Aland.

- Hacking, I. (2002) *Historical Ontology*, Boston: Harvard UP.
- Hadenius, S. (1997) *Swedish Politics during the 20th Century*, Sweden: Svenska Institutet.
- Hall, E.T. (1990) *Understanding Cultural Differences, Germans, French and Americans*, Yarmouth: Intercultural Press
- Hall, E.T. (1985) *Hidden Differences: Studies in International Communication*, Hamburg: Grunder and Jahr.
- Hall, E. T. (1981) *Beyond Culture*, Garden City, NY: Anchor P.
- Hall, E.T. (1966) *The Hidden Dimension*, NY: Doubleday.
- Hall, E. T. (1959) *The Silent Language*, NY: Doubleday/Anchor press.
- Hall, M. (2004) "Has There Always Been a Democratic Culture?" in Knudsen, O. *Cultural Barriers, Cultural Bridges: Experience and Evidence from Diplomacy and Politics*, Conference papers 34, Sweden: Utrikespolitiska Institutet.
- Hall, S. (2002) "Political Belonging in a World of Political Identities" in Vertovec, S. et al. (2002) *Conceiving cosmopolitanism: theory, context and practice*, UK: Oxford UP.
- Hall, S. (1997) "Cultural Revolutions" in *New Statesman*, 12/05/97, Vol. 126 Issue 4363, p. 24.
- Hall, S. (1996) "Introduction: who needs identity?" in Hall, S. and du Gay, P. (1996) eds. *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London: Sage.
- Hall, S. (1993) "Cultural identity in question", in Hall, S., Held, D., and McGrew, T. eds. (1993) *Modernity and its Futures*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Hall, S. (1990) "Cultural studies and the crisis of the Humanities" in *October* vol. 53: 11-90.
- Hall, S. (1990) "Cultural identity and Diaspora", in Rutherford, J. ed. *Identity*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Hall, S. ed. (1997) *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, London: The Open University/Sage.
- Hall, S. ed. (1993) "Culture, Community and Nation" in *Cultural Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3 pp. 349-363.
- Hall, S. and du Gay, P. eds. (1996) *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London: Sage.
- Hamilton K. and Langhorne R. (1995) *The Practice of Diplomacy*, London and NY: Routledge.
- Hammar skjöld, D. (1979) "New diplomatic techniques in a new world" in Plischke, E. ed., *Modern Diplomacy: the Art and the Artisans*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Studies in Foreign Policy.
- Hand, S. ed. (1989) *The Levinas Reader*, Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (2002a) *Spaces of Hope*, US: California UP.
- Harvey, D. (2002b) *The New Imperialism*, UK: Oxford UP.
- Harvey, D. (1990) *The Condition of Postmodernity*, US: Blackwell.
- Hastings, A. (1997) *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Held, D. (2002) "Culture and Political Community: National, Global and Cosmopolitan" in Vertovec, S. et al. eds. (2002) *Conceiving cosmopolitanism: theory, context and practice*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Held, D. (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, London: Open University.
- Herder, J.G. et al. (1992) *Johann Gottfried Herder: Selected Early Works, 1764-1767: Addresses, Essays, and Drafts; Fragments on Recent German Literature*, US: Pennsylvania State UP.
- Hill, Ch. (2003) *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hill, R. (1997) *We Europeans*, Belgium: Europublic.

- Hobbes, T. (1980 [1651]) *Leviatán, o la Materia, Forma y Poder de Una República Eclesiástica y Civil*, México: FCE.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1994) *The Age of Extremes. A History of the World, 1914-1991*, NY: Vintage Books.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1990) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, UK: Cambridge UP.
- Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. eds. (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*, London: Cambridge UP.
- Holt, D. (2004) *How Brands Became Icons*, Boston: Harvard UP.
- Hopf, T. (2002) *Social Construction of International Politics. Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999*, US: Cornell UP.
- Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T.W. (1998 [1954]) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, NY: Continuum.
- Hugoson, R. (2000) *Vad Är Kulturpolitik: En Fråga om Retorik*, Umeå: Department of Political Science.
- Huntington, S. (1999) "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 1999.
- Huntington, S. (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, NY: Touchstone.
- Husserl E. (1973) *Cartesian Meditations*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Hutchby, I. and Woofit, R. (1998) *Conversation Analysis: Principles, Practices and Applications*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Ind, N. (2003) *Beyond Branding: How the New values of Transparency and Integrity are Changing the World of Brands*, London: Kogan Page Limited.
- Inglehart, R. (2003) *Human values and Social Change: findings from the values surveys*, Leiden: Brill.
- Iriye, A. (2002) *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, California: University of California Press.
- Iriye, A. (1997) *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, NY: John Hopkins UP.
- James, A. (2004 [1980]) "Diplomacy and International Society" in Jönsson, Ch. and Langhorne, R. (2004) *Diplomacy*, London: Sage Publications (vol. I).
- Jameson, F. (1993) "On Cultural Studies", *Social Text*, no. 34: 17-52.
- Jenkins, N. (1991) *The Business of Image: Visualizing the Corporate Message*, London: Kogan Page Limited.
- Jensen, L. and Miller, L.H. (1997) *Global challenge: change and continuity in world politics*, Harcourt Brace: NY.
- Jervis, R. (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Jones, Ch. P. (1999) *Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World*, Cambridge: Harvard UP.
- Jones, J. (2003) "Las Meninas, Diego Velázquez (1656-7)" in *The Guardian*, UK, Saturday August 23, 2003.
- Jönsson, Ch. (2004) "Diplomatic Signaling in Television Age" in Jönsson, Ch. and Langhorne, R. eds. (2004) *Diplomacy*, London: Sage Publications (vol. III).
- Jönsson Ch. and Hall, M. (2002) "Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy" in *International Studies Association*, 4, 195-210.
- Jönsson, Ch. and Hall, M. (2005) *Essence of Diplomacy*, UK: Palgrave-Mc Millan.
- Jönsson, Ch. and Langhorne, R. (2004) *Diplomacy*, London: Sage Publications (three vols.).
- Katz, S. (2001) "Re-thinking the Humanities Endowment" in *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 5 January 2001, pp. B7-10.
- Katz, S. (1996) "The Future of Educational Exchange in North America: A View from the United States," in Blumenthal, P., Goodwin C., Smith, A. and Teichler, U. eds. *Aca-*

- demio Mobility in A Changing World*, London and Bristol, Pennsylvania: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Katz, S. (1985) "History, Cultural Policy and International Exchange in the Performing Arts" in *Performing Arts Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2/3, 10th Anniversary Issue: The American Theatre Condition, pp. 76-88.
- Katzenstein, P. (2002) "Open Regionalism: Cultural Diplomacy and Popular Culture in Europe and Asia" paper presented at the *Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Boston MA, Marriot.
- Katzenstein, P. (1996) *Cultural Norms and National Security*, Cornell UP: Ithaca.
- Katzenstein, P. ed. (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, NY: Columbia UP.
- Katzenstein, P., Wendt, A., and Jepperson, R. (1996) "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security" in Katzenstein, P. ed. (1996) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, NY: Columbia UP.
- Kegley, Ch. (1995) "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An Introduction" in Kegley, Ch. ed. (1995) *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, NY: St. Martin Press.
- Keillor B.D. and Hult G.T.M. (1999) "A five-country study of national identity Implications for international marketing research and practice" in *International Marketing Review*, Volume 16, Number 1.
- Kennan, G. (1986) "Diplomacy in the Modern World" in Vazquez, J. (1999) *Classics of International Relations*, London: Prentice-Hall.
- Keohane, R. (1989) *International Institutions and State Power*, Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Keohane, R. (1988) "International Institutions: Two Approaches" in Der Derian, J. ed. (1995) *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, UK: Mc Millan.
- Keohane, R. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP.
- Keohane, R. and Nye, J. S. (1998) "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age" in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1998.
- Kissinger, H. (2001) *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Kissinger, H. (1994) *La Diplomacia*, México: FCE.
- Knudsen, O. ed. (2004) *Cultural Barriers, Cultural Bridges: Experience & Evidence from Diplomacy and Politics*, Conference papers 34, Sweden: Utrikespolitiska Institutet.
- Kockelmans, J. (1967) *Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and its interpretation*, NY: Doubleday.
- Kosslyn, S. M. (1994) *Image and Brain*, US: MIT Press.
- Kotler, P. (1984) *Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning and Control*, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Krasner, S.D. (1982) "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables" in *International Organization*, 36 (2): 185-205.
- Krasner, S. D. (1985) *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, US: St. Martin Press.
- Krauze, E. (1985) *Caudillos Culturales de la Revolución Mexicana*, Mexico: SEP-Cultura.
- Kristeva, J. (1982) *Powers of horror: an essay on abjection*, NY: Columbia UP.
- Kuper, A. (2001) *Cultura: La Versión de los Antropólogos*, Barcelona: Paidós.
- Lapid, Y. (1989) "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era", *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, pp. 235-54.
- Lash, S and Urry, J. (1994) *Economies of Sign and Space*, London: Sage.
- Latour, B. (2002) *War of the Worlds: What about Peace?*, Chicago: Chicago UP.

- Lennon, A.T.J. ed. (2003) *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*, US: A Washington Quarterly Reader, MIT UP.
- León Portilla, M. (1992) "Encuentro de Dos Mundos", *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, n. 34, p. 9-20, Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México.
- León-Portilla, M. (1976 [1959]) *Visión de los Vencidos: Relaciones Indígenas de la Conquista*, México: UNAM.
- Levinas, E. (1969) *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP.
- Levi-Strauss, C. (1964) *The Raw and The Cooked*, NY: Harper and Row.
- Lewin, L. (1988) *Ideology and Strategy: a Century of Swedish Politics*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Lindroth, S. (1982) *A history of Uppsala University 1477-1977* Sweden: Uppsala UP.
- Lippmann, W. (2003 e-version [1922]) *Public Opinion*, Virginia: Free Press. <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper/Lippman/header.html>
- Little, R. (2000) "The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations" in *European Journal of International Relations*, Sep 01, 6: 395-422.
- Lloyd P. G. (2003) *Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Locke, J. (1993 [1690]) *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Vol.1 and 2, NY: Dover Books.
- Lundberg, L.O. (2005) *Bilder av Sverige i Utlandet: – En Studie om Förändringar, Nuläge och Mätmetoder*, Sweden: Utrikesdepartementet, Press, informations- och kulturenheten/Fritzes.
- Magnusson, L. (2000) *Economic History of Sweden*, UK: Routledge.
- Marion, F.V. (1996) "Representation Represented: Foucault, Velazquez, Descartes" in *Journal of Postmodern Culture* vol: 7 issue: 1, US: The Johns Hopkins UP.
- Marks, S. (1976) *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918-1933*, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Marx, K. (1859) *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*.
- Mathijs, E. and Mosselmans, B. (2000) "Mimesis and the representation of Reality: A Historical World View" in *Foundations of Science* no. 5, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Mattingly, G. (1988 [1955]) *Renaissance Diplomacy*, NY: Dover Publications.
- Maturana, H. (1970) *Biology of Cognition* (Report 9.0) US: Biological Computer Lab.
- Melissen, J. (2005) *The New Public Diplomacy, Soft Power in International Relations*, UK: Palgrave.
- Mercer, J. (1995) "Anarchy and Identity" in *International Organization*, 49, 229-252.
- Meyer, L. (1998) "La construcción histórica de la soberanía y del nacionalismo mexicanos", in Bizberg, I. comp. (1998) *México ante el fin de la Guerra Fría*, México, COLMEX.
- Meyer, L. (1990) *Mexico Frente a los E.U.*, Mexico: COLMEX-F.C.E.
- Miller, D. (2000) *Citizenship and National Identity*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Miller, T. and Yúdice, G. (2002) *Cultural Policy*, London: Sage.
- Mitchell, J.M. (1986) *International Cultural Relations*, London: Allen and Unwin.
- Moreno-Pino, I. (1996) *La Diplomacia. Aspectos teóricos y prácticos de su ejercicio profesional*, SRE: México.
- Morgenthau, H. (1993 [1966]) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Moscovici, S. (2000) *Social Representations*, UK: Polity.
- Moss, J. (1998) *The Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy*, UK: Sage Publications
- Mowat, R.B. (1982 [1929]) *Historia de la Diplomacia Europea*, México: Paidós.
- Mowat, R.B. (1967 [1935]) *Diplomacy and Peace*, US: Williams and Norgate.

- Murray, E. (1985 [1967]) *The Symbolic Uses of Power*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Nadel, S.F. (1957) *A Theory of Social Structure*, NY: Cohen and West.
- National Council for Cultural Affairs (1994) *Handbook of Cultural Affairs in Sweden*, Gothenburg.
- Navon, E. (2001) "The 'third debate' revisited" in *Review of International Studies*, 27, 611-625 Copyright, British International Studies Association.
- Neumann, I. and Nexon, D. eds. (2006) *Harry Potter and International Relations*, UK: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Neumann, I. (2004-a) "To Be a Diplomat" in Knudsen, O., *Cultural Barriers, Cultural Bridges: Experience and Evidence from Diplomacy and Politics*, Conference papers 34, Sweden: Utrikespolitiska Institutet.
- Neumann, I. (2004-b) "The English School on Diplomacy" in Jönsson, Ch. And Langhorne, R. eds. *Diplomacy*, Vol. I, London: Sage.
- Neumann, I. (1999) *The Uses of the Other*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Nicholson, H. (1988 [1939]) *Diplomacy*, Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.
- Niebuhr, R. (1960 [1932]) *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, NY: Scribner's Sons.
- Niebuhr, R. (1959) *The Structure of Nations and Societies*, NY: Scribner's Sons.
- Nivón, E. (2002) "Cultura e integración económica. México a siete años del Tratado de Libre Comercio", in *Pensar Iberoamérica*, Número 2 - Octubre 2002 - Enero 2003 Organization of Ibero-American States, at <http://www.oei.es/pensariberoamerica/ric02a02.htm>
- Nixon, S. (2003) *Advertising Culture: Gender, Commerce, Creativity*, London: Sage.
- Nola, R. ed. (1998) *Foucault* UK: Frank Cass and Co.
- North, D. (2002) *The Ambassadors' Secret: Holbein and the World of the Renaissance*, NY: Hambledon.
- Nye, J.S. Jr. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs.
- Nye, J.S. Jr. (2002) *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, NY: Public Affairs.
- Nye, J.S., Jr. (2001) *The Paradox of American Power*, US: Oxford UP.
- Nye, J.S., Jr. (1990) "Soft power" *Foreign Policy*, 80, Fall 1990: 153-171.
- Ogunnaiké, L. (2004) "Sweeten the Image: Hold the Bling-Bling" in *New York Times*, January 12.
- O'Hagan, J. (2000) "A Clash of Civilizations?" in Fry, G. and O'Hagan, J. (2000) *Contending Images of World Politics*, UK: McMillan Press.
- Ohmae, K. (1993) "The Rise of the Region State" in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring, 78-87.
- Ohmae, K. (1990) *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, US: Harper Business.
- Olins, W. (1978) *The Corporate Personality: An inquiry into the Nature of Corporate Identity*, London: The Design Council.
- Olson, G. (2004) "How Swede it is" in *The Vancouver Courier*, Oct 19, 2004. <http://vancourier.com/issues04/103104/news/103104nn1.html>
- Onuf, N. (1989) *World of Our Making*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Özkirimli, U. (2005) *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: a Critical Engagement*, US: Macmillan/Palgrave.
- Özkirimli, U. (2000) *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Palmer, G. and Morgan, T. C. (2006) *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Paz, O. (1992 [1959]) *El Laberinto de la Soledad*, México: FCE.
- Paz, O. (1990) "Introducción y Presentación" in *México: Esplendores de Treinta Siglos*, Los Ángeles/NY: The Metropolitan Museum of Art/Amigos de las Artes de México.
- Peirce, Ch. (1958) *Collected Papers*, Cambridge: Harvard UP.
- Pendergast, Ch. (2000) *The Triangle of Representation*, NY: Columbia UP.
- Pereira, B.F. and Malgahaes, J. C. (1988) *The Pure Concept of Diplomacy*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Pérez De Cuéllar, J. (1997) *Our Creative Diversity: The World Commission on Culture and Development*, France: UNESCO.
- Petersson, B. (2001) *National Self-images and Regional Identities in Russia*, UK: Ashgate.
- Petersson, O. et al. (1999) *Democracy the Swedish Way*, Sweden: SNS-Förlag.
- Phillips-Martinsson, J. (1992) *Swedes As Others See Them*, Sweden: Studentlitteratur.
- Pickering, W.S.F. ed. (2000) *Durkheim and Representations*, NY: Taylor and Francis.
- Pinker, S. (1997) *How the Mind Works*, UK: Penguin.
- Pinker, S. (1994) *The Language Instinct*, NY: Harper Collins.
- Pitkin, H.F. (1967) *The Concept of Representation*, US: Berkeley UP.
- Plato (1993) *Republic*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Plischke, E. (1979) *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute.
- Potter, J. (1997) "Discourse analysis as a way of analyzing naturally occurring talk", in Silverman, D. ed. *Qualitative Research*, London: Sage.
- Potter, J. (1996) "Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: theoretical background" in Richardson, J. ed. *A Handbook of Qualitative Methods for Social Psychologists and other Social Scientists*, Leicester: British Psychological Society.
- Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1994) "Analyzing discourse" in Bryman, A. and Burgess, R. G. eds. *Analyzing Qualitative Data*, London: Routledge.
- Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1987) *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour*, London: Sage.
- Prevost, N. (1998) *Dance for Export: Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War*, Connecticut: Wesleyan UP.
- Price, R. and Reus-Smit, Ch. (1998) "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism" in *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, 259–94.
- Putnam, H. (1988) *Representation and Reality (Representation and Mind)* US: MIT UP.
- Rabinow, P. (1991) *The Foucault Reader*, US: Penguin.
- Radu, R. F. (1963) "Stratford Canning, Palmerston, and the Wallachian Revolution of 1848" in *The Journal of Modern History*, pp. 229-244.
- Redner, H. (1994) *A New Science of Representation: Towards and Integrated Theory of Representation in Science, Politics and Art*, Boulder: Westview.
- Reus-Smit, Ch. (1999) *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Ricoeur, P. (1971) "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" in *Social Research*, vol. 38, No. 3, 1971.
- Riding, A. (1989) *Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans*, NY: Vintage books.
- Riegler, A., Peschl, M. F. and Von Stein, A. eds. (1999) *Does Representation Need Reality?*, NY/Dordrecht: Kluwer-Plenum Publishers.
- Riordan, S. (2003) *The New Diplomacy*, UK: Polity Press.
- Rosecrance, R. (1998) "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", (Book Review) in *American Political Science Review*, Vol.92, No.4, December 1998.

- Rosenau, J.N. (1980) *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, London: Frances Pinter.
- Ross, Ch. (2003) "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age" in Lennon, A.T.J. (2003) *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*, US: A Washington Quarterly Reader, MIT UP.
- Rousseau, J.J. (1992) *El Contrato Social*, Madrid: Altaya.
- Ruggie, J. (1998) *Constructing the World Polity*, London: Routledge.
- Ruggie, J. (1993) *Multilateralism Matters*, NY: Columbia UP.
- Rumelili, B. (2004) "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation" in *Review of International Studies*, 30, 27–47 British International Studies Association.
- Russell, K. and Abercrombie, N. eds. (1991) *Enterprise Culture*, UK: Routledge
- Russell, W. (2001) "Russian-Estonian Diplomacy and the English School" paper presented at the *4th Pan-European Conference*, Canterbury, 8-10 September 2001.
- Sablosky, J.A. (1999) "What Others Do and Why: The Cases of Germany and The United Kingdom" *Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society*, Spring 99, vol. 29, Issue 1.
- Said, E. (2001) "The Clash of Ignorance" in *International Conference on the Dialogue of Civilizations*, 31 July to 3 August 2001, Tokyo and Kyoto, <http://www.unu.edu/dialogue/conf-report.pdf>
- Said, E. (1995 [1978]) *Orientalism – Western Conceptions of the Orient*, London: Penguin.
- Said, E. (1993) *Culture and Imperialism*, US: Vintage Books.
- Salinas de Gortari, C. (2002) *México, Un paso difícil a la modernidad*, México: PyJ.
- Sarvary K. (2001) "Devaluing Diplomacy: A Critique of Alexander Wendt's Conception of Progress and Politics" in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 4:4 December 2001.
- Satow, E. and Bland, N. eds. (1979 [1932]) *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, London: Longman.
- Saussure, F. de (1993 [1915]) *Course in general Linguistics*, NY: Bayley and Sechehaley.
- Schiffrin, D. (1994) *Approaches to Discourse*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- Schmitt, C. (1976 [1932]) *The Concept of the Political*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP.
- Scholte, J.A. (2000) *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, UK: Palgrave.
- Schopenhauer, A. (2003 [1818]) *El Mundo Como Voluntad y Representación*, Spain: Trotta.
- Schopenhauer, A. (1974 [1851]) *Essays and Aphorisms*, US: Penguin.
- Schulzinger, R.D. (1975) *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers 1908-1931*, US: Wesleyan UP.
- Schulzinger, R.D. (1984) *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, NY: Oxford.
- Schutte, T. F. (1969) "The Semantics of Branding" in *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 1969) pp. 5-11.
- Searle, J. (1995) *The Construction of Social Reality*, NY: Free Press.
- Serra, L. (1967) "Gironella a la hora en punto" in Eder, R. (1981) *Gironella*, México: UNAM.
- Shafer, P. (1979) *Canada's International Cultural Relations*, Canada: Department of External Affairs.
- Shankman, P. (1984) "The Thick and the Thin: On the Interpretative Theoretical Program of Clifford Geertz", in *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 261-279.
- Shapiro, M.J. (1988) *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography and Policy Analysis*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Sharp, P. (2005) "Revolutionary States, Outlaw Regimes and the Technique of Public Diplomacy", in Melissen, J. ed.(2005) *The New Public Diplomacy, Soft Power in International Relations*, UK: Palgrave.

- Sharp, P. (2002) "The English School, Herbert Butterfield and Diplomacy" in *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy Series*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' [No 83 November 2002].
- Sharp, P. (2001) "Making sense of Citizen Diplomats: The People of Deluth, Minnesota, as International Actors", *International Studies Perspectives*, 2:2, pp. 131-150.
- Sharp, P. (1999) "For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations", *International Studies Review*, 1: 51.
- Sharp, P. (1996) "Representation in a Nationalist Era" in *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy Series*, Holland: Netherlands Institute of IR 'Clingendael' [No. 15].
- Smart, B. (1998) *Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments*, UK: Routledge.
- Smith, A. D. (2001) *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, UK: Polity Press.
- Smith, A. D. (2000) *The Nation in History*, US: Brandeis UP.
- Smith, A. D. (1998) *Nationalism and Modernism*, UK: Routledge.
- Smith, A. D. (1993) *National Identity*, US: University of Nevada Press.
- Smith, A. D. and Hutchinson, J. eds. (1995) *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Smith, G.S. (2000) "Reinventing Diplomacy: A Virtual Necessity" in *Virtual Diplomacy*, Series no. 6, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2000.
- Smith, S. (2004) "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, p. 499 – Sept. 2004.
- Smith, S. (1995) "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory" in Booth, K. and Smith, S. eds. (1995) *International Relations Theory Today*, UK: Polity.
- Smith, S. (1988) "Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 345-348.
- Smith, S. (1986) "Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 13-29.
- Smith, S. and Little R. eds. (1988) *Belief Systems and International Relations*, NY: Blackwell.
- Söderberg, M. and G. Vahlquist et al. (1999) *Sweden: Cultural Policy*, Sweden: Council of Europe, ERICarts.
- Stedman-Jones, S. (2000) "Representation in Durkheim masters: Kant and Renuvier" in Pickering, W.S. ed. (2000) *Durkheim and Representations*, NY: Taylor and Francis.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) *Globalization and Its Discontents*, US: Norton and Company.
- Stratton-Prouitt, S. (2003) *Velázquez's Las Meninas*, UK: Cambridge UP.
- Stubbs, M. (1983) *Discourse Analysis: Natural Language*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sylvan, D. A. and Voss, J. F. eds. (1998) *Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- 't Hart, P., Stern, E. and Sundelius, B. eds. (1997) *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Talbot, S. (2004) "Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective" in Jönsson, Ch. and Langhorne, R. eds. (2004) *Diplomacy*, London: Sage Publications (vol. III).
- Taylor, Ch. (1995) *Philosophical Arguments*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP.
- Taylor, Ch. (1989) *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Tenorio, M (1998) *Artilugio de la nación moderna. México en las exposiciones universales, 1880-1930*, México: FCE.
- Tomlinson, J. (1999-a) *Globalization and Culture*, UK: Polity.
- Tomlinson, J. (1999-b) "Interests and Identities in Cosmopolitan Politics" in, Vertovec, S. et al. (2002) *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, UK: Oxford UP.

- Tonkiss, F. (1998) "Analysing discourse", in Seale, C. ed. (2004) *Researching Society and Culture*, London: Sage.
- Tovar y de Teresa, R. (1993) *Modernización y política cultural: Una visión de la modernización de México*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Tylor, E.B. (1976 [1871]) *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Custom*, London: Gordon Press.
- United Nations (2005) "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)" in *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, p. 95.1961. Done at Vienna on 18 April 1961. Entered into force on 24 April 1964.
- Vaid, H. (2003) *Branding*, NY: Watson-Guptill.
- Van Dijk, T.A. ed. (1997) *Discourse Analysis as Social Interaction*, London: Sage.
- Van Dijk, T.A. ed. (1985) *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, London: Academic Press.
- Van Dinh, T. (1987) *Communication and Diplomacy in a Changing World*, NJ: Ablex.
- Van Oort, R. (2003) "Cognitive science and the problem of representation" in *Poetics Today*, 24:2.
- Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. (2002) *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Villanueva, C. (2005-a) "Cultural Representation and Diplomacy: The cases of Sweden and Mexico in the Nineties" in Wallin, Ch. and Silander D. eds. (2005) *Culture and Democracy in a Transatlantic Perspective*, Sweden: Växjö UP.
- Villanueva, C. (2005-b) "UNESCO en sus Sesenta Años", in Rosas C. (2005) *El Sistema de Naciones Unidas en su Sesenta Aniversario*, México: Siglo XXI.
- Villanueva, C. (2003) "Los desafíos de la cultura en la organización internacional. Una visión desde México hacia el siglo XXI" in Sosa, E. ed. *La Cultura en un Mundo Global: Una Perspectiva desde Mexico*, Mexico: IMRED-SRE.
- Villanueva, C. (1997) *The Cultural Policy of Mexico in Global Times*, Seattle: University of Washington. Master's degree thesis.
- Villanueva, C. (1992) *Análisis de la Declaración de Principios para la Cooperación Cultural Internacional, de la U.N.E.S.C.O. 1966*, México: UNAM. Bachelor's degree thesis.
- Von Glasersfeld, E. (2001) "The Radical Constructivist view of Science" in *Foundations of Science*, special issue on "The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science", edited by Riegler, A. 2001, vol. 6, no. 1-3: 31-43.
- Von Glasersfeld, E. (1999) "Piaget's Legacy: Cognition as Adaptive Activity" in Riegler, L. et al. eds. (1999) *Does Representation Need Reality?* NY: Kluwer-Plenum.
- Wæver, O. (1990) "The Language of Foreign Policy", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 335-343.
- Wagner, R. (1975) *The Invention of Culture*, Chicago UP: Chicago.
- Walker, R.B.J. (1992) *Inside/Outside*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Walker, R.B.J. (1990) The Concept of Culture in the Theory of IR; in Chay, J. ed. *Culture and International Relations*; Praeger Publishers: NY.
- Walker, R.B.J. ed. (1984) *Culture, Ideology and World Order*, Boulder: Westview.
- Waltz, K. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, Boston: Addison-Wesley.
- Watson, A. (1982) *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*, London: Methuen.
- Weber, M. (1984[1920]) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, US: Roxbury Publishing Co.
- Wellman, D.J. (2004) *Sustainable Diplomacy: Ecology, Religion and Ethics in Muslim-Christian Relations*, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Wendt, A. (2006) "Social Theory as a Cartesian Science: An Auto-critique from a Quantum Perspective" in Guzzini, S. and Leander, A. eds. (2006) *Constructivism and International Relations*, US: Routledge.

- Wendt, A. (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, UK: Cambridge UP.
- Wendt, A. (1994) 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review* 88(2) pp. 384-396.
- Wendt, A. (1992) "'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics'", *International Organization*, 46(Spring) pp. 391-425.
- Wetherell, M., and Taylor, S. eds. (2001-a) *Discourse Theory as Practice*, London: Sage.
- Wetherell, M., Taylor, S., and Yates, S. eds. (2001-b) *Discourse as Data*, London: Sage.
- White, B. (2001) "Diplomacy" in Baylis, J. and Smith, S. eds. (2000) *The Globalization of World Politics: and introduction to International Relations*, England: Oxford UP.
- Wicquefort, A. (1681) *L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions*, La Haye: Jean and Daniel Steucker.
- Williams, M.C. (2007) *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*, NY: Routledge.
- Williams, R. (1988 [1976]) *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, London: Fontana.
- Williams, R. (1983 [1976]) *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, London: Fontana.
- Williams, R. (1979) *Politics and Letters*, London: Fontana.
- Williams, R. (1958) *Culture and Society 1789-1950*, US: Doubleday.
- Wise, M.Z. ed. (2003) *Arts and Minds: Cultural Diplomacy Amid Global Tensions*, US: Center for Arts and Culture.
- Wise, M. (2002) "Showing the Flag of Culture (Or Not)" in *The NY Times*, April 14, 2002.
- Woodward, K.M. ed. (2000) *Questioning Identity: Gender, Class, Nation* NY: Routledge.
- Wright, J. (2006) *The Ambassadors*, UK: Harper Press.
- Wyszomirski, M. et al. (2003) *International Cultural Relations: A Multi-Country Comparison, US: Arts Policy and Administration Program*, US: Ohio State UP.
- Yan, J. (2003) "Branding and the international community" in *Journal of Brand Management*, Volume: 10, Issue: 6 Pages: 447-457.
- Ying, F. (2006) "Branding the Nation: What is Being Branded?" in *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, Vol.: 12 Issue: 1 Pages: 5-14.
- Young, I. (2000) *Inclusive Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Zedillo, E. (1995) *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000*, México: Asamblea de Representantes del Distrito Federal.
- Zehfuss, M. (2006) "Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison" in Guzzini, S. and A. Leander eds. (2006) *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics*, UK: Routledge.
- Žižek, S. (1990) "Beyond Discourse Analysis" in Laclau, E. ed. (1990) *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London: Verso.
- Zoraida, J. and Meyer, L. (1985) *The United States and Mexico*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Swedish Sources, Reports and Materials

- Anholt-GMI (2005) *Nation Brands Index report*, Q1, Q2, Q3 & Q4 (references to Sweden) available at <http://www.nationbrandindex.com/>.
- Anholt-GMI (2006) *Nation Brands Index report*, Q2, & Q4, (references to Sweden) available at <http://www.nationbrandindex.com/>.
- Bergman L. (2007) *Varumärket Sverige - ett av Världens Ledande*, 2007 Q1 SI webpage at http://www.si.se/templates/CommonPage____1738.aspx

- Britton, C. and Swedish Institute (2002) *Sweden and the Swedes*, Sweden: SI. Editions 2002-2004 and electronic version.
- Dahlberg, I. (2003) "Sveriges svar på kulturlivets internationalisering" from *Pressmeddelande från Kulturdepartementet*, 2003-12-16.
- Dahlberg, I. (2004) "Svensk kultur säljs dåligt i utlandet" in *Dagens Nyheter* 16 december 2004.
- Elam, I. (2002) *New Fiction in Sweden*, Sweden: SI.
- Global Status Report on Alcohol
2004 http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_status_report_2004_overview.pdf
- Internationella kulturutredningen 2003*, (SOU 2003:121)
- Jansson, H. (2003) "Utomlands är svensk kultur blond och blåögd" in *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 augusti 2003.
- Jarehov, M. and Stenfelt, C (1997) *Sverigeinformation i Framtiden – en bit på väg, För NSU*, Sverige: mars 1997.
- Kultur och information över gränserna* (SOU1978:56)
- Kulturpolitik* (prop. 1996/97:3, bet. 1996/97: KrU1, rskr. 1996/97:129).
- Kulturpolitikens inriktning* (SOU 1995:84)
- Kulturrådet (2002) *Kulturens Pengar 2002*, Sweden: Kulturrådet.
- Lundmark, Å. (2002) *The Swedish Institute*, Sweden: Falköping.
- Nordic Alcohol Studies (1994) *Nordic Alcohol 1994*, 11, 80-82, English Supplement.
- Persson, B. (2003) *Contemporary Dance in Sweden*, Sweden: SI.
- Press-, informations- och kulturenheten (PIK) in UD, homepage:
www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2868/a/16257;jsessionid=amG4a8zFJWL8, 12, Jan 2006
- Regeringens skrivelse 2005/06:188*
- SI (2005) *Sverige i Världen: Public Diplomacy, Nation Branding och Sverige bilden*, Svenska Institutets Jubileumskonferens den 8 Juni 2005.
- SI, (2005) "Mission Statement", Feb 13,
http://www.si.se/templates/CommonPage_471.aspx
- Statistiska Centralbyrån (2000), *Sweden in Figures*, Sweden: pocket book.
- Study in Sweden*, Official Home Page: www.studyinsweden.se
- Svenska bilder – översyn av Sverigeinformation* (DS 1993:72)
- Sverigeinformation och kultursamarbete* (SOU 1988:9)
- Sweden's Image Bank*; home page: www.imagebank.sweden.se
- Sweden's Official Home page* www.sweden.se
- Swedish Institute*, official Home Page: www.si.se
- Swedish Institute, *Suecia Byline*, Text: Lars Forsberg, 2001.
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) *official Home Page* www.sida.se
- The Angus Reid Group (1999) "The Sweden Image Project –Opinion Leader's Views-" a presentation to the Council for the Promotion of Sweden, July 8th and 9th, 1999.
- UD (1979) *Sverige i Utländska Medier 1978*, Stockholm, UD Press- och Informationsenheten.
- UD (1989) *Sverige i Utländska Medier 1988*, Stockholm, UD pressbyrå.
- UD (1996) *Sverige i Utländska Medier 1995*, Stockholm, UD pressbyrå.
- UD (1998) *Sverige i Utländska Medier 1997*, Stockholm, UD PIK.
- UD (1999) *Sverige i Utländska Medier 1998*, Stockholm, UD Artikelnummer UD: 99.064.
- UD (2001) *Sverige i Utländska Medier 2000*, Stockholm, UD PIK.
- UD (2005) *Images of Sweden Abroad: A study of Changes, the Present Situation and Assessment Methods* (summarized version) Sweden: Alfa Print AB.

- Utrikesdepartementet, Reports "Sverige i utländsk press/utländska medier" years 1968-1975, 1977-1984, 1986-1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005.
- Utrikesutskottet, Betänkande 2005/06: KrU30
Vår andes stämna – och andras (SOU 1994:35).
- Wästberg, O. (2007) "Allt färre i omvärlden känner till Sverige" *Dagens Nyheter*, 13 Jan 2007.
- Wästberg, O. (2006) "Borat och bilden av Sverige" in *Sundsvalls Tidning, Västerbottens-Kuriren* m.fl. December 2006.
- Wästberg, O. (2004) "Månadens stockholmare i mars" in *Stockholms Stads* webpage at <http://www.stockholm.se/Extern/Templates/PageWide.aspx?id=34277>
- Wästberg, O. (2003) "New Ways of Representing Sweden" in *The Stockholm Bulletin*, Aug.
- Wästberg, O. and Wästberg I.C. (2003) *Sverige i New York*, Sweden: Wahlström & Widstrand.
- Weibull, J., (1993) *Swedish History in Outline*, Sweden: SI.
- Wistrand B. (1991) Motion till riksdagen 1991/92:U301 "Information om Sverige"
- Åhlund, J. (2002) *New Cinema in Sweden*, Sweden: SI.

Mexican Sources, Reports and Materials

- Alvarez Acosta, M. (1971) *Las Distancias Limítrofes*, Mexico: AP Artes y Ciencias.
- Amador Tello, J. (2004) "Fracaso del TLC en Cultura: Entrevista con Andrés Ordóñez" in *Proceso*, sección Cultural, 23 Mayo 2004.
- Anonimo (2003) "SRE: cultura y mercado, con un "vínculo indisoluble" in *El Independiente*, 12 March 003.
- Dirección General de Asuntos Culturales (DAC), "Promoción Cultural de México en el Mundo desde la S.R.E." DAC-SRE *Informe 2004*, formato electrónico en versión *Power Point*.
- Domínguez, Ch. (2003) "Diplomacia y Tradición Literaria en México" in Sosa, E. ed. *La Cultura en un Mundo Global:: Una Perspectiva desde México*, México: IMRED-SRE.
- Dora, L.H. (2002) "Evalúa SRE labor de agregados culturales" in *Reforma*, 11 nov 2002.
- Ehrenberg, F. (2002) "Agregado Cultural" No.66, junio 2002 *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, México: SRE.
- Figueroa Fischer, B. (1999) "Imagen de México en la prensa francesa, 1994-1998" No. 58, octubre 1999 *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, México: SRE.
- Fuentes, C. (1994) *The Buried Mirror Series*, 6 videocassettes on Mexican culture based on the book by the author, 412 mins. total. CONACULTA: Mexico.
- García, A. and Abelleira, A. (2002) "Polemizan en Nueva Cork en Torno a *Mexico: Esplendor de 30 Siglos*" in *La Jornada*, Oct 2, 1990.
- Haw, D.L. (2002) "Limita labor diplomática presupuesto" in *Reforma* 11 nov 2002.
- Hughes, R. (1990) "Onward from Olmec" at *Time*, 10/15/90, vol. 136 Issue 16.
- Instituto Mexicano de Cooperación Internacional (2000) *Glosa del Informe final*. Documento Interno (archivo digital).
- Infante, G. (2001) *Arte Mexicano: Del México Antiguo a Diego Rivera*, DVD 72 mins.
- López, M.L. (2003) "Agregados culturales, futuro en estudio" in *Milenio* 14 Febrero 2003.
- Lozoya, J.A.. (1999) "La Nueva Política Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional y su Entorno Mundial" in Lozoya J.A. et al. ed. (1999) *La Nueva Política Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional*, Mexico: SRE-PNUD-IMEXCI-Porrúa.

- Nualart, J. (1999) "La Cooperación Educativa y Cultural" in Lozoya, J.A. et al. ed. (1999) *La Nueva Política Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional*, Mexico: SRE-PNUD-IMEXCI-Porrúa.
- Nualart, J. (2000) "La promoción cultural de México como instrumento de la política exterior" No.61, octubre 2000 *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, México: SRE.
- Ochoa, G. (2002) "Difusión de la cultura de México en la República Checa" No.66, junio 2002 *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, México: SRE.
- Olivares-Jara, K. (2005) *La Diplomacia Cultural de Mexico en el sexenio de Carlos Salinas de Gortari*, UNAM: Bachelor's thesis.
- Orestes, H. (2002) "Cómo ser agregado cultural en la otra Europa (y no morir en el intento)" No.66, junio 2002 *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior*, México: SRE.
- Paz, O. (1989) *Mexico En la Obra de Octavio Paz*, Video III, Section Second, Modern Mexican Art, Mexico, 56 min.
- PND (*Plan Nacional de Desarrollo*) 1989-1994, 1995-2000 and 2001-2006. Mexico.
- Quirarte, X. (2003) "Conocimiento, mercado y política" in *Milenio*, México, Dec 2 2003.
- Riding, A. (1989), *Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans*, NY: Vintage books.
- SAIPG 2004, (stands for "Solicitud de acceso a la información pública gubernamental) registrada con el número de folio 00005000011304", requested on March 11 and 19 and April 1, 2004 via IFAI, www.ifai.gob.mx.
- Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (2002) *Ley del Servicio Exterior Mexicano*, published in the DOF January 4, 1994. Latest corrections made on February 25, 2002.
- Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (2000) *Glosa VI informe 2000 Final*, 2000. E-file.
- Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, *Reglamento Interior de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*, (1998) then published in the Federation's Official Diary (DOF) August 10, 2001, then reformed and published in the DOF October 11, 2001, July 31, 2002, on November 01, 2002 and August 26, 2004.
- Silva Herzog-Márquez, J. (2003) "De inocencias" en *Milenio Diario*, México 12/29/2003.
- Soler, J. (2005) "Siete días en casa de Oscar Wilde" in *Día Siete*, México Agosto 2005.
- Solis J. (2003) "Ratifican a agregados" in *El Universal*, México 25 de julio de 2003.
- Solis, J. (2003) "Ratifican a agregados" in *El Universal*, 25 de julio de 2003.
- Sosa, E. (1998-2001) "Las Relaciones Internacionales de México" programa radiofonico de la *Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores*, donde el autor entrevistó a distinguidas personalidades de la cultura y la diplomacia. <http://www.sre.gob.mx/imr/>
- Tenorio, M. (1998) *Artulugio de la nación moderna. México en las Exposiciones Universales. 1880-1930*, México: F.C.E.
- Time Editorial, (1990) "Mexico: Celebrating Thirty Centuries of Culture" in *Time Magazine*, US, October 15, 1990.
- Vargas Llosa, M. (1992) "La Dictadura Perfecta" in *El País*, Spain 01-06-1992
- Villanueva, C. (2003) "Los desafíos de la cultura en la organización internacional. Una visión desde México hacia el siglo XXI" in Sosa, E. ed. *La Cultura en un Mundo Global: Una Perspectiva desde Mexico*, Mexico: IMRED-SRE.
- Volpi, J. (2004) "Política cultural: Diplomacia sin *Intelightsia*. Tragicomedia en tres actos", in *Letras Libres*, México February 2004 issue.
- Yáñez, A. ed. (1987 [1939]) *Cronicas de la Conquista*, México: UNAM.
- Zea, L. (2003) "Mi Experiencia en la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores" in *Cuadernos Americanos*, núm. 97, at <http://www.ensayistas.org/filosofos/mexico/zea/milenio/1-4.htm>

Interviews

SWEDEN

Number	Name	Institution	Date	Method
Interview 1	Ann-Louise Schallin	Swedish Institute	May 29, 2006	Direct Interview
Interview 2	Fredrik Wetterqvist	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Apr 19, 2006	Direct Interview, e-mail
Interview 3	Fredrik Wetterqvist	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	May 9, 2006	Direct Interview, e-mail
Interview 4	Gudrun Vahlquist	Council of Culture	July 2004	E-mail
Interview 5	Hans Lepp	Swedish Institute	Sep 22, 2006	Direct Interview
Interview 6	Maja Bentzer	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Jul 12, 2006	Direct Interview
Interview 7	Patrik Svensson	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	May 31, 2006	Direct Interview
Interview 8	Per Svensson	Council of Culture	May 9, 2006	Direct Interview
Interview 9	Åsa Lundmark	Swedish Institute	May 18, 2006	Direct Interview

MEXICO

Number	Name	Institution	Date	Method
Interview 10	Agustín Gutierrez-Canet	Secretary of Foreign Relations	Sep 2006	E-mail exchange
Interview 11	Daniel Leyva	National Institute of Fine Arts	Ago 18, 2005	Direct Interview
Interview 12	Ernesto Sosa	Secretary of Foreign Relations	Jun 19, 2003	Direct Interview
Interview 13	Ernesto Sosa	Secretary of Foreign Relations	Jul 2, 2004	Direct Interview
Interview 14	Gerardo Estrada	Culture Department, UNAM	Jul 11, 2005	Direct Interview
Interview 15	Jaime Nualart	National Council of Culture and Arts	Ago 25, 2005	Direct Interview
Interview 16	Jessica Cascante	Secretary of Foreign Relations	Ago 10, 2004	Direct Interview and e-mail
Interview 17	Jorge A. Lozoya	Universidad de las Americas, Puebla	Jan 12, 2006	Direct Interview
Interview 18	Martha Bárcenas	Secretary of Foreign Relations	Ago 29, 2005	Direct Interview
Interview 19	Porfirio T. Muñoz Ledo	Secretary of Foreign Relations	Ago 11, 2004	Direct Interview
Interview 20	Silvia Molina	National Institute of Fine Arts	Ago 14, 2004	Direct Interview

Mexican Diplomatic Dossiers

Research was carried out at *Archivo Genaro Estrada* from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SRE) between January and December 2004. Particularly, attention was paid to the sections: “Image of Mexico Abroad” and “The Cultural Activities of Mexico Abroad”. The period studied was from January 1989 until December 2000. Since the doctoral thesis de-emphasized the need for the study of the diplomatic dossiers, the results await publication somewhere else. A summary of the collected material:

COUNTRY	DOSSIERS COLLECTED
ARGENTINA	17
BELGIUM	12
BRASIL	24
CANADA	18
CHILE	27
CHINA	18
CUBA	32
EGYPT	7
ENGLAND	39
FRANCE	42
GERMANY	27
GREECE	16
GUATEMALA	18
THE NETHERLANDS	14
INDIA	21
ISRAEL	17
ITALY	29
JAPAN	11
RUSSIA	25
SAUDI ARABIA	31
SPAIN	45
SWEDEN	16
TURKEY	11
US	47